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Abstract

Why does the strength of local courts vary in new democracies? Highlighting empirical
and theoretical puzzles generated by the state-level variation in court strength within
Latin America’s two largest democracies, Brazil and Mexico, this study offers a historical
institutional explanation of judicial change. Notably, in contrast to much “new
institutionalist” work – which examines the effects of formal instititutional arrangements
– judicial institutions here are the dependent variable. The theoretical framework builds
on existing explanations regarding the effects of electoral competition and ideology,
specifying underlying causal logics and mechanisms. The framework also highlights the
role of actors internal to institutions (judges), and the importance of social movement
theory for understanding interactions between ideological judges and sympathetic actors
outside the institution, leading to judicial mobilization or behavior “beyond the bench.”
The empirical analysis draws on the analytic leverage of a subnational level of analysis
and integrates quantitative and qualitative methods, yielding conclusions that would be
impossible using either method in isolation. First, time-series cross-section analyses of
judicial spending (as a proxy for court strength) examine broad relationships across
Brazil’s 26 states from 1985 to 2006 and Mexico’s 31 states from 1993-2007.
Quantitative tools for case selection identify “nested”, model-testing cases, around which
I build small-N research designs consisting of three states in each country. The in-depth,
qualitative analysis draws on 115 personal, semi-structured interviews with judges and
other legal elites, archival evidence, and direct observation to trace the process of judicial
change. Overall, electoral competition operates as a pre-condition for reform, but its
effect is indeterminate once a minimum threshold of competition is crossed. Ideology has
the most consistent and meaningful effect on reform. Actors and their intentions matter.
However, the expression of these intentions is contingent upon the nature of opportunity
structures, including mobilization strategies and alliances, as well as overlapping
historical processes. In short, I find that strong reforms are most likely where progressive
judges coincide with sympathetic, left-of-center politicians. The results emphasize the
role of ideas and the conditional expression of these ideas, that is, the contingency of
intentionality.
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1. Crafting Courts in New Democracies
1.1. Two Puzzles of Judicial Reform
Over the last three decades, the twin processes of democratization and economic
liberalization raised the profile of courts in Latin America. Judicial strength and the rule
of law are increasingly understood as vital to political and economic development.
Regarding political development, strong legal institutions enhance the ability of
individuals to vindicate rights and liberties, promoting a broader and deeper form of
democratic citizenship, and improve mechanisms of accountability, maintaining checks
and balances and guarding against arbitrariness and corruption. Calling attention to this
democratizing role of judicial institutions, O’Donnell (1993) and the UNDP (2004)
highlight the inadequacy of minimalist definitions of democracy that are associated with
merely procedural participation, which is usually reduced to voting. Echoing Marshall’s
(1965) trichotomy of rights, the UNDP identifies political, social, and civil dimensions of
democratic citizenship. Courts and other components of the “legal complex” (Halliday et
al. 2007), when working well, enhance the civil dimension of democratic citizenship –
that valence of citizenship based on the day-to-day effectiveness of a bundle of legal
rights and liberties that constitute real agency in modern democracies – especially for
low-income groups that lack other means by which to defend themselves. For economic
development, strong legal institutions provide transparency and predictability, stabilizing
contracts and property rights and facilitating commercial transactions. These benefits of
strong courts translate into economic efficiency and investment gains, promoting growth
and promising prosperity (Kaufman et al. 1999; Hirschl 2004, 46, 47). The sound
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development of both democracy and markets, therefore, hinges in part on the strength of
courts.1
Despite the compelling normative argument for building strong courts, descriptive
accounts teach us that there is wide variation in court strength, not only cross-nationally
but also across regions within countries. Given cultural and institutional pressures for
policy convergence and harmonization, variation within single countries is perhaps most
intriguing from empirical and theoretical perspectives. For instance, judicial spending
varies dramatically across states within Mexico and Brazil. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 help
visualize this intra-national variation in court strength. These figures map judicial
spending data – court budgets – across the Mexican and Brazilian states, respectively.
Figure 1.1 shows the average amount of judicial spending per capita in Mexico in
constant, 2000 pesos, from 1993 to 2007. Figure 1.2 shows the average amount of
judicial spending per capita in Brazil in constant, 2000 reais, from 1985 to 2006. In both
figures, light shading indicates low court budgets and dark shading indicates high court
budgets.2

1

Like “political economy”, the constitutive relationship between legal institutions, politics, and economics
generates the terms that define the field and work within it, e.g., “public law”, “political jurisprudence”,
“judicial politics”, or “constitutional political economy”. We might even speak of “judicial economy” or
“judicial political economy”.
2
Both maps generated with ArcGIS 9.3, using spending data from large-N analyses in Chapters 4 and 5.
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Figure 1.1. Average judicial spending per capita in Mexican states, 1993-2007
(constant 2000 pesos).
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Figure 1.2. Average judicial spending per capita in Brazilian states, 1985-2006
(constant 2000 reais).
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The financial strength of courts varies substantially across territorial units within
both Mexico and Brazil, granting vastly different financial resources to local judiciaries
within these single countries. As one Brazilian judge noted, echoing repeated comments
from judges in both countries, “the budget is the lifeblood of the judiciary” (Interview
136). Without resources, no reform or improvements can be made, including staffing,
materials, and physical investments.3 Thus, the variation in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 signals

3

In Chapters 4 and 5, I conduct econometric analyses of judicial spending across all states in each country
to identify the determinants of this variation.
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vastly different institutional capacities for the judiciary across territorial units within each
country.
Variation in the strength of state courts extends beyond the size of judicial
budgets. The following vignettes outline the general contours of institutional changes in
Mexico and Brazil, along with some of the central political dynamics associated with
these reforms.
On May 23, 2006, a constitutional reform in the Mexican state of Michoacán
altered the financial autonomy, institutional design, and the career structure of judges in
the local judiciary, yielding one of the strongest administrative designs across the 32
Mexican states. The reform process was highly contested, capping more than three years
of local political struggles in which left-of-center politicians belonging to the Party of the
Democratic Revolution (PRD) promoted the reform initiative and ideologically
sympathetic, progressive judges were its chief architects. The reform project was opposed
by politicians and judges affiliated with the previously hegemonic Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI). In the central state of Aguascalientes more than a decade
earlier, in 1994, a neoliberal4 PRI governor, closer ideologically to the right-wing
National Action Party (PAN), also pursued a judicial reform. Though this earlier reform
was milder than the one in Michoacán, it nonetheless encountered strong opposition,
especially from local judicial elites, some of whom resigned rather than submit to the
institutional alterations. Once the neoliberal, PRI governor left office, the gains from his

4

I use “neoliberal” to refer to a set of policies oriented towards free markets, or “liberalizing” the economy.
Although the term is itself contested, it nonetheless is useful shorthand in Latin America (and beyond) to
identify a bundle of policies that, since the 1970s, has emphasized, among other issues, fiscal discipline,
deregulation, and privatization, and has generally been supported by the political right and opposed by the
political left. Alternate terms include “neoclassical” economics, “structural adjustment”, or “market
reforms” (see, e.g., Williamson 2000; Naím 2000; Weyland 2004; Roberts 2008).
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project were reversed by the combination of conservative, traditional judges and a more
traditional, clientelist PAN administration. And in the state of Hidalgo, which contines to
be a bastion of the once-dominant PRI, reform arrived late in 2006 and in weak,
superficial form, essentially leaving existing political and judicial elites undisturbed.
In Brazil, in the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul, a center-left governor
belonging to the Democratic Labor Party (PDT) was the first to delegate financial and
administrative autonomy to the local judiciary in 1991-1992. In doing so, the governor
was limiting his own power, effectively constraining himself. Crucially, he was
responding to reformist initiatives from the judicial leadership and to the recent pressure
of striking judges. A close friendship between the governor and the president of the state
court facilitated communication about reform. Several years later, in 1999-2000, a leftist
governor belonging to the Workers Party (PT) sought to reduce the court’s budget,
generating constitutional litigation in which the judiciary sued the governor. Meanwhile,
in the state of Acre, a governor from the same leftist party (PT) combined with
progressive, ideologically sympathetic judicial leaders to strengthen the financial
resources and staffing of the court. In contrast, in the northern state of Maranhão, where
traditional, conservative elites sympathetic to the military dictatorship of 1964-1985 still
dominate local politics, courts are by all accounts extremely weak institutions, financially
and administratively. The judiciary remains a source of patronage for local elites, and
there is increasing tension between progressive, reformist lower-level judges and
conservative, anti-reform judicial elders.
Overall, court strength varies substantially over time and across space within both
Mexico and Brazil. Judicial budgets vary widely. Further, institutional design and career
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structure in Mexico vary from state to state. In some of the strongest cases of reform, the
selection of judges follows a fairly transparent civil service process, and selection to the
state’s highest court is no longer dominated by the executive branch, having been
delegated to administrative organs that are often composed of judges, legislators, and
other politicians. The administrative organs generate a list of candidates, which is then
turned to the legislature for a vote. Indeed, these administrative organs – judicial councils
– can offer meaningful benefits depending on their structure, composition, and powers.
Michoacán offers a strong council on all three counts, and is an example of positive court
strengthening in Mexico. Conversely, in other states the judiciary remains fairly
impoverished and council reforms are superficial, perpetuating institutional weaknesses.
Selections to the state’s supreme court are still dominated by the governor, raising
questions about independence, competence, and corruption. Hidalgo is an example if this
kind of state.5
In Brazil, institutional designs and career structure are fairly centralized
nationally, yielding minimal variation along these two dimensions compared with
Mexico. Variation in Brazil emerges in terms of administrative capacity – adequate
staffing, materials, and physical infrastructure. Indeed, variation in these areas led one
prominent observer of Brazilian courts to comment that the administrative unevenness
across Brazil’s state courts yields “multiple judiciaries” (Falcão 2006). In some states,
courts are well-staffed and equipped, and therefore function reasonably well. This is the
case in Rio Grande do Sul. It is also increasingly the case in Acre, where judges who
complained of once having to cover two or three different geographic jurisdictions for
lack of judges, or bring their own paper on which to write decisions, are now relatively
5

Both Michoacán and Hidalgo, along with Aguascalientes, are examined in Chapter 6.
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satisfied with staffing levels and working conditions. Other states offer striking examples
of poor staffing and infrastructure, and misuse or abuse of materials, resources, and
power. Maranhão is an example of this kind of state, where judges on the state supreme
court have historically appropriated most of the institution’s resources for themselves,
paying little attention to first-instance courts or the daily operation and administration of
justice. 6
In both Mexico and Brazil, the uneven strength of local courts highlights
substantive and theoretical concerns in the study of democracy and its public institutions.
These empirical and theoretical puzzles motivate this dissertation.
1.1.1. An Empirical Puzzle
First, the unevenness of democracy identifies a substantive problem with the
quality of democracy in both countries, namely, that there are better institutions in some
territorial units than in others. This unevenness demands an explanation because of the
multiple ways irregular state strength or differential institutional capacity affects the
everyday lives of ordinary citizens and the interactions between branches of government.
That is, the variation in court strength across the Mexican and Brazilian states is part of a
broader problem, namely, the irregular, unbalanced, or uneven character of democracy
and democratization within single countries (O’Donnell 1993; Cornelius 1999; Snyder
2001a; 2001b; Gibson 2005), highlighting issues of both democratic citizenship (UNDP
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In Maranhão, for example, first-instance judges have had to invest their own money to pay for plumbing
and basic building maintenance (AMMA Noticias 2008d), or courthouse evidence rooms have been
burglarized for lack of security (AMMA Noticias 2008a; 2008b; 2008c). Meanwhile, state supreme court
judges (desembargadores) have historically hired hundreds of discretionary employees; hired “ghost
employees” (servidores fantasma – individuals who receive a paycheck but do not actually work at the
court); frequently violated nepotism norms and laws; arbitrarily increased their own salaries and benefits;
and, despite the concerns just mentioned regarding the security of courthouses, used more than 100 officers
of the military police to guard their own private homes. Chapter 7 examines judicial change in the three
Brazilian states mentioned here.
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2004) and accountability (Gloppen et al. 2004; Schedler et al. 1999). Regional
institutional weakness within individual countries resonates with O’Donnell’s criticism of
the coexistence of regions with strong public instiutions alongside “brown areas” in new
democracies – territorial spaces where functional public institutions fail to develop. These
institutional lacunae undermine the ability of citizens to seek redress and vindicate
individual rights and liberties in these regions, thereby eroding the real effectiveness of
these rights and liberties. Under these conditions, the core of the legal or “civil”
dimension of citizenship is diminished, truncating democratic citizenship (Marshall 1965;
UNDP 2004). Further, weak judiciaries translate into poor restraints on other branches of
government, increasing the risk of arbitrary, abusive, or unchecked power. Put simply,
variation in court strength within a single country is itself a meaningful empirical
problem, posing the kind “big, substantive question” or “real-world puzzle” that Pierson
and Skocpol (2002, 695-696) emphasize as being “inherently of interest to broad publics
as well as to fellow scholars”, and therefore at least as important for political research as
theoretical puzzles (see also Bates el al. 1998; Thelen 1999). That is, political research
should be relevant to and engaged with public concerns. Understanding the nature and
sources of the “patchwork” character of the state (Snyder 2001b) – the “crazy quilt” or
“highly variegated mosaic” of democracy and democratization (Cornelius 1999, 4, 12) –
is a crucial challenge for students of democracy, and a central concern of this dissertation.
1.1.2. A Theoretical Puzzle
Beyond this empirical puzzle, patterns of judicial reform in the Mexican and
Brazilian states pose a second, theoretical puzzle for students of judicial change and
institutional development more broadly. The empirical puzzle above underscores the
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need to understand the origins of strong institutions, which leads directly into theoretical
debates about what we already know about institutional development and whether this
existing knowledge is sufficiently complete. With regards to judicial reform at the local
level in Brazil and Mexico, existing explanations fail to provide reasonably satisfying
accounts of the reform processes outlined above. Specifically, rational-strategic and
cultural-ideational explanations fail to provide convincing accounts of patterns of reform,
primarily because of a lack of attention to issues of timing, sequencing, contingency, and
context, including meaningful patterns of change occurring at different levels of
government, the lasting legacies of authoritarian conditions, and the intersection and
interaction of these patterns with local processes of reform.
Prominent rational-strategic accounts draw on rational incentives derived from
electoral competition to explain why politicians strengthen courts. However, multiple
causal logics underpin this expectation, generating a problem of behavioral equivalence,
equifinality, or causal complexity. That is, disparate and perhaps competing or
complementary causal pathways can generate the same institutional outcome. For
instance, politicians can improve institutions in order to be remain or advance in office
(“re-election logic”; Beer 2003; 2006), to signal credible commitments to political
minorities (“signaling logic”; Elster 2000; Ginsburg 2003, 28), or as politicial insurance
(“insurance logic”; Ginsburg 2003; Finkel 2005; 2008). Further, even the insurance logic
is composed of at least three sub-logics, identifying legislative protagonists engaged in
“profit-maximization” (Landes and Posner 1975), or political majorities engaged in either
“self-protection” (Ginsburg; Finkel) or “policy preservation” (Hirschl 2004).
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Beyond the problem of behavioral equivalence, the local processes of reform do
not conform with these prominent logics and there are strong theoretical reasons to
expect the applicability of these logics is conditioned by the identity of relevant actors
(i.e., preferences or ideology), as well as contingent on secondary or other historical
processes. For instance, many reform projects begin after electoral victories by ascendant
parties that formed part of the opposition during the authoritarian regime. This timing,
i.e., the sequence of elections and reform, cuts against the re-election logic, as well as all
of the insurance arguments. Regarding the insurance sub-logics, this sequence of events
is especially problematic for the “self-protection” argument because the incentive for
political insurance is strongest for outgoing, authoritarian elites, not newly empowered,
ascendant parties (see Hilbink, forthcoming 2009). Further, Hirschl’s “policy
preservation” thesis is explicitly an argument about political insurance, but unlike other
insurance arguments also hinges upon the ideological identity of dominant elites.
Specifically, Hirschl’s elites are “secular, neoliberal” elites who strengthen courts in
order to insulate their policies from the “vagaries of democratic politics” (214). In
Mexico and Brazil, authoritarian elites were not ideological in this way. Rather, dominant
elites were sustained by networks of patronage, corporatism, and clientelism, so it would
be more likely that – when threatened by electoral competition or anticipating an
electoral threat – they would protect the traditional source of their power. That is, where
authoritarian elites are still dominant, non-ideological “patronage preservation” is
perhaps more likely than Hirschl’s ideological “policy preservation”.
Further, with the exception of the proposed “patronage preservation logic”, the
above explanations share an optimism regarding elections in that they uniformly expect

11

elections to have a positive effect on courts. Put simply, competition is always expected
to improve institutions. This expectation is overly mechanical, however, and is at odds
with evidence regarding the failure to reform in some states despite the onset of
competition and party turnover. For instance, reforms in Rio Grande do Sul and Acre
failed to occur early on despite initial increases in competition and alternation in power.
More importantly, the optimism of electoral accounts fails to explain negative counterreforms like the one in Aguascalientes.
In contrast to the optimism of these election-based accounts, veto player theory
(Tsebelis 2002) complicates matters by suggesting just the opposite – that competition
has negative consequences. That is, competition increases the number of relevant
political actors or “veto points”, and this increase makes policy change harder, not easier.
In short, competition should make judicial reform more difficult.
Up to this point, election-based expectations are plagued simultaneously by
behavioral equivalence and indeterminacy. Rising electoral competition can have either
positive or negative effects, perhaps even both, and multiple causal logics can overlap in
independent, complementary, or competing ways. Election-based accounts of reform are
ill-equipped to handle these elements of contingency and complexity.
Moreover, these explanations – both optimistic and pessimistic – emphasize
actors external to target institutions, i.e., exogenous actors – namely, politicians –
neglecting the role of endogenous actors – judges and other legal elites. Yet judges play
prominent roles “beyond the bench” in shaping reform. For example, judges in both the
Mexican and Brazilian states engage in lobbying and litigation, and judges in Brazil
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frequently engage in labor actions. Overlooking this kind of “extrajudicial” activism by
judges fails to account for central agents of reform observed in Brazil and Mexico.
The pattern of reform in Aguascalientes illustrates many of the ways in which
reform does not comport with existing accounts, highlighting temporal dynamics, the
complexity and contingency of electoral dynamics, the need to integrate both politicians
and judges, as well as cultural-ideational features of reform. As outlined earlier,
Aguascalientes experienced an early reform (1994-1995) and a subsequent counterreform (1999-2001). The reform is inconsistent with insurance arguments due to its early
timing and the fact that the PRI did not expect to lose local office in 1994. On the other
hand, the reform is consistent with veto player theory in that it occurred under a unified,
PRI-aligned administration, that is, a single-veto-player environment. Similarly, counterreform was easy because it also occurred in a single-veto-player environment. However,
the character of the electoral landscape does not explain the policy reversal since both
reform and counter-reform occurred in single-veto-player contexts. Rather, the identity of
relevant actors is important. Specifically, a PRI-aligned admininistration facilitated
reform and a later PAN-aligned administration facilitated the counter-reform. However,
conservative judicial leaders also motivated this reversal, so the identity of both political
and institutional actors is meaningful, as well as the nature of alliances between them.
Finally, the roles of the PRI and PAN in the reform process confound existing accounts
of reform based on ideology in that the PRI is generally considered non-ideological or
centrist and would therefore not be expected to promote reform, while the PAN’s rightwing social and economic agendas should lead it to promote reform. Thus, while
electoral competition and ideology are useful analytic categories, their effect is
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interactive and complex, especially as we consider the unevenness of ideological
orientation within a single party across states.
Summarizing, prominent realist-strategic and cultural-ideational explanations of
institutional change do not account for the patterns of reform in the Mexican and
Brazilian states. Elections matter, but multiple, inconsistent, and even contradictory
causal logics undergird the relationship between electoral competition and judicial
change, and institutional actors (judges) appear to matter as much as politicians. Ideology
also matters, but preferences and intentions do not map cleanly onto party identification,
and actors may or may not be able to express these preferences. Rather, preferences are
also conditioned by the strategic terrain, at least part of which is defined by electoral
competition. In short, the effects of both elections and ideology are complex, conditional,
and contingent. Central concerns with improving our understanding of judicial change,
therefore, hinge on issues of the identity of actors and their preferences or intentions, the
unevenness of these preferences among apparently similar actors (e.g., ideological
variation within same party across states), the nature of alliances, as well as timing,
contingency, and context. In short, local reforms in Brazil and Mexico do not conform to
prominent expectations regarding the sources of institutional change, generating a
theoretical puzzle alongside the empirical puzzle outlined above. The discussion above
highlights the causal complexity of reform processes, but also emphasizes issues of
timing, sequence, contingency, and overlapping historical processes. These features of
subnational reform in Mexico and Brazil suggest a historical institutional approach to
understanding reform.
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1.2. A Historical Institutional Solution
This dissertation offers a historical-institutional solution to these puzzles of
judicial change across the Mexican and Brazilian states, contributing new evidence and
insights regarding the character and sources of the territorial unevenness of democracy
within individual countries. The strength of historical institutionalism is precisely its
ability to address issues of timing and temporal order (sequencing), contingency and
conditionality, and to contextualize causal processes amidst other ongoing and
intersecting processes and the legacies of prior events and patterns. Thus, the approach
presented here draws on these characteristic features of historical institutional (HI)
accounts to help resolve the empirical and theoretical puzzles outlined above (Thelen
1999; Pierson and Skocpol 2002; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003a; Smith 2008).7
Importantly, the contextualism, contingency, and conditionality of HI accounts do
not mean that theoretical generalizations are impossible or unlikely. Rather, theoretical
accounts must be (i) attentive to the timing and sequence of key events, i.e., temporal
onset, order, and duration matter, and causal processes often unfold over long periods of
time or are conditioned by events that took place in the past; (ii) explanations cannot be
de-contextualized; and (iii) institutional development can be uneven over time, i.e.,
institutional change can be progressive (e.g., positive reforms) or regressive (e.g.,
negative counter-reforms), so expectations regarding outcomes should be neither

7

Pierson and Skocpol (695-696) identify three defining features of historical institutionalism: (i) big,
substantive questions, (ii) “taking time seriously”, and (iii) analyzing “macro contexts” and the “combined
effects of institutions and processes”. Mahoney and Rueschemeyers, however, in restricting their discussion
to “comparative historical analysis” – what they describe as a subset of historical institutionalism – replace
“big questions” with “causal analysis”. Thelen implicitly acknowledges all of the above as important, and
also emphasizes the importance of multiple intersecting and interacting processes over time and the need to
identify underlying mechanisms.

15

automatic nor overly optimistic. This approach seeks causal regularities, but the ontology
of HI also acknowledges the complexity of causal relationships (Hall 2003).
It should also be emphasized that a historical institutional approach does not
necessarily exclude existing theories or suggest a particular method of anlaysis. Rather,
taking time and historical processes seriously (Pierson 2004; Thelen 1999) can be
reconciled with theoretical and methodological diversity. Thus, the theoretical framework
developed in Chapter 2 builds on the rational-strategic and cultural-ideational approaches
already mentioned. Furthermore, the theoretical framework also draws on social
movement theory (McCadam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996) and closely-related theories of
legal and judicial mobilization (McCann 1994; Epp 1998; Hilbink 2007b) to understand
the “complex strategic interaction” (Sikkink 2005) of judge-led reform efforts, i.e.,
judicial behavior beyond the bench.

1.3. Conceptual Clarification: Court Strength in Mexican and Brazilian States
Within the literature on judicial politics and public law, and the rapidly expanding
literature in comparative judicial politics, “court strength” can mean at least three
different things. In roughly chronological order from the perspective of the sequence of
court activities, research addresses (i) institution-building, (ii) decision-making within
these institutions, and (iii) the societal impact of judicial decisions. As with many
categories in the social sciences, these three categories overlap and there is feedback
between and among them. For instance, a weak institution may not have the jurisdictional
power, resources, or administrative capacity necessary to either decide a case or shape
good decisions on a consistent basis. Alternatively, a poor decision may weaken the
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institution from which it emanates. Nonetheless, the three categories are analytically
distinct and are useful for situating the current study and for clarifying the concept of
judicial strength that will later be operationalized as a dependent variable.
First, institution-building refers to the process of creating a functional judiciary.
The current study fits squarely this area. In asking whether a court is strong, scholars seek
to understand instances of crafting and constructing democratic institutions, specifically
the origins or genesis of positive institutional change. Who promotes stronger
institutions? Why do they work toward this end? How does institutional growth and
expansion happen? This area of research can also explore the persistence or stability of
weak or strong institutions, as well as the decay or deterioration of institutions, fitting
broadly into a category of institutional “development” rather than institutional “choice”
or “selection” (Pierson 2000). Second, perhaps the largest set of scholars, and this is
certainly true of judicial politics in the U.S., examine judicial decision-making. Whether
called “executive-judicial relations” (Helmke 2005) or “constitutional interpretation”
(Whittington 1999; 2007), this set of scholarship focuses on the behavior of judges on the
bench. The phenomena under examination are instances of court rulings. Why did the
judge or judges decide in favor of the executive branch? Why did they decide not to hear
a case? How did a judge go about making her decision? Third, judicial impact refers to
the aftermath of a decision. Once a judicial body made a decision, what were the societal
consequences? Why was the order carried out? Why was a judgment not enforced? More
broadly, how was society changed?8 As noted above, this study is concerned with the first
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Rosenberg’s (2008[1991]) analysis of the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court is a now classic study in this
area.
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set of phenomena – institution building or development. Why build courts? Why and how
are strong democratic institutions crafted?
Clarifying further, “crafting courts” here refers specifically to building functional
judicial institutions at the subnational level in Latin America’s two largest democracies.
In this regard, it is important to note that the baseline condition in both of these countries
is one of weak, dependent, and impoverished courts. Thus, a primary emphasis is on the
origins of positive institutional reform. However, it is also possible that once institutions
begin to change in a positive direction, opposing actors may promote negative, corrosive
counter-reforms. Throughout this study, judicial change and judicial reform are used
interchangeably, though change can also refer to negative, counter-reform. In this regard,
the current study resonates with broader studies of the genesis of institutions, as well as
with research on institutional change and continuity in comparative politics (Mahoney
and Rueschemeyer 2003b; Pierson 2004; Thelen 2004). Importantly, in contrast to much
“new institutionalist” work – which examines the effects of formal instititutional
arrangements – judicial institutions here are the dependent variable.

1.4. Subnational Analysis: Substantive, Methodological, and Theoretical Gains
In Latin America, where a full sixty per cent of the population and seventy-five
per cent of economic production is generated by the federal systems of Argentina, Brazil,
and Mexico (ECLAC 2004), subnational research is critical. State courts in these federal
systems are the source of the majority of litigation. In Brazil and Mexico, for example,
state courts are the first point of contact between citizens and the justice system, and
more than 80 per cent of all litigation originates in state courts (Ministerio da Justiça
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2004; INEGI 2000; 2005). In short, state courts are “the foundation of justice” in large,
federal countries (Fix-Fierro 2004, 287).9 State courts host the vast majority of litigation
activity, so ignoring them is problematic for our understanding of courts in
democracies.10 Stated otherwise, given the link between the effectiveness of courts and
the consolidation of democracy and markets, understanding the sources of this state-level
variation is of critical importance for both political and economic development.
Beyond its substantive importance, subnational research offers methodological
advantages over cross-national studies of policy change. Substantial variation in judicial
strength exists across states within individual countries like Brazil and Mexico. This
within-country variation enhances the leverage of statistical analyses. Additionally,
Snyder (2001b) echoes Lijphart’s (1971, 689) advice on the strengths of “intranational”
research designs, reminding us that subnational research provides greater analytic
leverage, controlling for country-level factors while also drawing on the greater unit
homogeneity of states vis-à-vis whole countries.
Furthermore, subnational analysis – particularly subnational analysis of legal
institutions – is a promising area for the development of democratic theory. As discussed
above, one of problems with democracy that motivates this research is the uneven
coverage of the state in new democracies. O’Donnell’s (1993), Cornelius et al. (1999),
Snyder (2001a; 2001b), and Gibson (2005) remind us of the importance of subnational
research for understanding “spatially uneven” processes and phenomena, and of the
theory-building value of understanding how policy change is shaped by different levels

9

Author’s own translation from Spanish. Original quote: “Los sistemas judiciales de las entidades
federativas constituyen ... la base de la justicia en el país” (Fix-Fierro, 286-87).
10
Chavez (2004) and Beer (2006) offer notable contributions for understanding judicial change at the
subnational level.
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or territorial units of a regime, i.e., how policy moves from states to the federal center or
vice-versa, or how policy moves laterally across territorial units within a single country.
Institutional change in the judicial sector is especially suited to this kind of research,
given that state courts are closer to ordinary citizens than lofty high courts, weak judicial
institutions create particularly severe “brown areas”, and policy change in the judicial
sector is susceptible to influences from different levels of a regime. Moreover, given the
geographic reach of local courts – i.e., unlike executives or legislatures, courts are
dispersed throughout cities and judicial districts in every state – state judiciaries may be
uniquely situated among the three branches of government to transform state-society
relations and exert a local democratizing effect.

1.5. Overview of the Argument
The central argument is that electoral competition and ideology shape court
strength in the Mexican and Brazilian states, though in ways and for reasons that do not
necessarily align with conventional understandings. That is, electoral competition and
ideology influence “how” and “why” courts become stronger, but conventional
understandings of judicial reform are not always helpful. In brief, a minimum amount of
electoral competition is a necessary pre-condition for reform, but once this minimum
threshold is crossed, the effect of competition is highly contingent on (a) the identity of
relevant political and institutional actors, and (b) the alliances between and among these
actors. Actors and their intentions matter, but these actors succeed to varying degrees
depending on their ability to create and leverage alliances to overcome obstacles and
constraints. Specifically, I find that strong reforms are most likely where progressive
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judges coincide with sympathetic politicians. That is, where left-of-center preferences
from within the judiciary intersect with left-of-center preferences outside the judiciary.
These alliances are frequently both ideological and affective, in the sense that close
friendships and loyalties between judicial leaders and governors were a crucial factor in
three of four instances of successful reforms in both Mexico and Brazil. The findings
highlight the role of ideas in the reform process, putting ideational dynamics – ideology,
friendship, and loyalty – at the center of judicial change.
Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework, elaborating on some of the
theoretical issues introduced in this opening chapter. Electoral competition is generally
expected to exert a positive pressure on institutional change and performance, but the
precise causal logic behind this expectation is not always clear. Chapter 2 identifies four
distinct causal logics – re-election, signaling, insurance, and opportunity – in addition to
three sub-logics that implicitly motivate the “insurance” logic above. Moreover, veto
player theory complicates expectations in that an increased number of veto points should
make policy change harder, not easier. This chapter also proposes a “patronage
preservation logic” that helps us understand the persistence of dysfunctional judicial
institutions in new democracies. Beyond electoral competition, this chapter also outlines
expectations regarding ideology in Mexico and Brazil, and concludes by discussing ways
in which elections and ideology can interact, and the way the effects of this interaction
can be shaped by temporal dynamics. For instance, ideology may have a positive effect
in a newly competitive electoral setting, but may have a different or even negative effect
with the same amount of competition if that competition has lasted for several electoral
cycles. That is, the duration of electoral dynamics can influence the effect of ideology.
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Drawing on this specification of causal logics, I find support only for the veto
player, opportunity, and patronage preservation logics. That is, competition generates
obstacles to reform by increasing the number of veto points, but in post-authoritarian
settings this increase in veto points also creates political “openings” or “opportunities”
for the mobilization of reform initiatives, resonating with social movement theory.
However, where dominant elites depend on patronage and clientelist networks for their
power, signs of electoral competition can trigger “patronage preservation”, i.e., the
entrenchment of elites that, unlike other electoral logics, has a distinct motivation and
does not result in the strengthening of courts. Indeed, this dynamic is found in both
Hidalgo and Maranhão. The fact these two states are from different countries and come
from different styles of authoritarianism suggests the patronage preservation logic may
be generalizable to other new democracies in Latin America and beyond.
Notably, ideas and ideological commitments are still able to gain traction without
political openings, and these ideas and commitments can also overcome the obstacles of
veto players. Indeed, across both Mexico and Brazil, the evidence suggests that
normative, cultural, or ideational commitments are consistent forces behind judicial
change, while the electoral incentives associated with competition are not. Stated simply,
competition is not a necessary condition for reform, but ideology may be a sufficient
one.
In sum, conventional rational and strategic incentives generated by electoral
competition do not provide an adequate explanation of judicial change in the empirical
analysis, but ideas and ideological commitments do. The findings suggest an important
role for cultural-ideational factors and, closely related, political agency, in the study of
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judicial change and state-building. What I find is that institutional strength is an
intentional outcome, not a mere byproduct of democratization, and that institutional
change is largely endogenous (i.e., judge-led) rather than a response to exogenous
influences or incentives.11 These findings improve our understanding of the origins of
strong institutions in new democracies, offering methodological, empirical, and
theoretical contributions that complement existing comparative scholarship on judicial
politics and institutional change.
1.5.1. Methodological Contributions
Methodologically, the research design leverages a subnational level of analysis,
explicitly integrates the quantitative and qualitative phases of analysis by “nesting” a
well-predicted case within the quantitative analysis in each country, and then selects two
additional states in each country for controlled comparison. This combination of methods
draws on the strengths of (i) subnational analysis, (ii) large-N, quantitative methods, (iii)
nested designs, (iv) small-N, controlled comparisons, and (v) within-case, theory-guided
process tracing (Hall 2003; Falleti 2006).
While none of these methods are novel individually, and multi-method research
has been gaining traction and popularity since at least the 1990s,12 the present study
offers two methodological contributions. First, time-series cross-section datasets offer
new opportunities for nested analysis, facilitating the identification of statistically typical
(well-predicted) and atypical (poorly-predicted) observations within a single “panel” or
“case”, which then allows for a finer identification of “model-testing” or “modelbuilding” observations (Lieberman 2005) within these cases based on variation on key
11

Thanks to Ken Roberts for suggesting this phrasing.
Gerring and Seawright (2007) and Fearon and Laitin (2008) offer more extended discussions of multimethod research and techniques for integrating quantitative and qualitative research.
12
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independent variables or the dependent variable. In the large-N phase of analysis
presented here, for instance, a single case (state) generates multiple observations (“stateyears”), and each state-year may be statistically typical or atypical in post-estimation
diagnostics. Thus, while conventional approaches to nesting cases emphasize the
identification of cross-case typicality, the methods section here (Chapter 3) suggests
ways in which nested cases can emphasize both cross-case and within-case variation in
typicality, leading to different quantitative strategies for selecting cases (see Lieberman
2005; Gerring and Seawright 2007).
Second, the multi-method approach employed here specifically seeks to
neutralize one of the weaknesses of subnational research – the interdependence of
observations (Snyder 2001a; see Chapter 3). Snyder notes that the greater unit
homogeneity of subnational cases can be a methodological strength, but can also be a
weakness in that there is an increased risk of policy diffusion. Snyder understands policy
diffusion, or interdependence more generally, as violating a methodological assumption
of the independence of observations. This interdependence could be understood as
compounding methodological problems associated with case-based research, i.e.,
“omitted variable bias”, “too many variables, too few cases”, or “degrees of freedom”
problems.
Drawing on recent work in qualitative research, specifically process tracing and
process-based inferential reasoning, I argue that the weakness identified above is
primarily a weakness in large-N, statistical analysis, but is misapplied in qualitative
research that employs process tracing (Falleti 2006; Hall 2003). Indeed, just as Bennett
(2008, 711) notes that the “degrees of freedom” critique of case-study methods is
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“woefully misguided” because of the unspoken assumption of a frequentist logic of
inference, I argue that a process-based logic of inference neutralizes the interdependence
critique. Specifically, process-based inferences are different from correlation-based
inferences, and the approach here draws on the distinction between “causal process
observations” and “data set observations” (Brady and Collier 2004) to argue that
interdependence or policy diffusion are not special weaknesses of small-N research at the
subnational level. By judging observed causal processes against expected, theory-derived
causal patterns (Hall 2003), and weighing the probative value of different types of
evidence along a causal chain (Van Evera 1997), process-based inferences are quite
different from correlation-based inferences, approaching a “folk-Bayesian” logic of
inference, i.e., weighing prior beliefs against different types of new data (McKeown
2004, 158; see also Bennett 2008; Goldstone 2003, 44-45). Indeed, small-N, processbased research is especially suited for assessing and evaluating the causal importance of
policy diffusion and, if this kind of interdependence is happening, for identifying the
mechanisms that make the movement of policy across levels or units of a regime
possible.
1.5.2. Empirical Contributions
Empirically, the study offers the first time-series cross-section analysis of state
courts in Latin America’s two largest federal systems and democracies – Mexico and
Brazil. 13 Moreover, the analysis draws on two methods – large-N, statistical techniques
and small-N, controlled comparisons – as well as multiple streams of evidence. The
large-N analysis examines judicial spending – as a proxy for court strength – across the

13

Beer (2006) offers an econometric analysis of Mexican state courts, but her analysis is limited to a single
year, 2003 (N=31). I am aware of no quantitative analyses of state courts in Brazil of any kind.
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26 Brazilian states from 1985 to 2006, and the 31 Mexican states from 1993 to 2007,
excluding the federal districts in both countries. The spending data in Brazil was in large
part already organized by the Treasury Department (Ministério da Fazenda), but
systematic spending data in Mexico was unavailable from government sources and had to
be collected personally from state reporters in the Legislative Archive at the Institute for
Legal Research at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (Instituto de
Investigaciones Jurídicas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, or UNAM-IIJ),
and supplemented by visits to the legislative and judicial archives in individual states.
The small-N analysis draws on 115 personal, semi-structured interviews with judges,
lawyers, legislators and other legal elites, archival evidence, and direct observation
during 22 months of fieldwork between 2006 and 2008. Thus, the data and evidence
presented here – spending data, interview data, archival data, and direct observations –
contribute new evidence to the study of institutions and judicial politics.
1.5.3. Theoretical Contributions
In terms of theoretical contributions, the study offers a historical institutional
account of the ways in which electoral competition and ideology shape judicial change.
The theoretical foundations are not novel, but the analysis contributes a finer
understanding of preferences – highlighting the role of ideas (see Smith 2008) – and of
mechanisms of institutional change (see Thelen 1999). Further, the analysis contributes a
better understanding of the conditioning effect of long-term legacies of authoritarianism
on ideology, and the conditioning effect of baseline institutional strength on ideology.
Finally, the analysis also contributes a better understanding of policy movement across
different levels of a regime, across territorial units within a single country, and of the way

26

simulatenous and ongoing policy processes – local, national, and international – can
shape and condition each other. These contributions emphasize the importance of
historical institutional accounts in comparative politics, but also contribute to the
development of historical institutional approaches to institutional change and to our
substantive understanding of the unevenness of democracy within individual countries.
A principal feature of Chapter 2 is a detailed specification of causal logics
underpinning electoral competition. Indeed, this specification of causal logics is a
meaningful contribution on its own, as it can provide a better understanding of
theoretically-anticipated causal patterns than can be judged against observed causal
processes. However, the analysis also seeks to adjudicate among these disparate and rival
causal logics. In doing so, the analysis contributes to identifying micro-foundations of
behavior and mechanisms of institutional change. This component of the research
resonates with Thelen’s (1999) review of false distinctions between rational-choice
institutionalism and historical institutionalism, showing how detailed specifications of
causal logics and micro-foundations complement the broader historical instiutitonal
approach. Further, the emphasis on causal logics also answers her call for greater
attention to causal mechanisms, especially relating to institutional change.14 Causation
need not be directly observable (George and Bennett 2005, 218; Falleti 2006, 10) – and it
may be that it is never directly observable (Collier, Seawright, and Munck 2004, 42), so
finer and more clearly specified causal arguments and propositions help us test these
14

Thelen the lack of attention to mechanisms of institutional reproduction in some historical institutional
literature, e.g., critical juncture or path-dependence accounts, but that “feedback processes” help fil this
theoretical gap (e.g., Pierson 2000; 2004). That is, we know more about mechanisms of institutional
continuity than institutional change, though both should be examined together as insights regarding the
sources of institutional stability can reveal how these institutions might break down or transform over time
(Thelen 1999, 392-400). Thelen’s own work (2004) provides insights into mechanisms of institutional
“layering” or “conversion” (see also, Orren and Skowronek 1994), but in general, mechanisms of change
are undertheorized.

27

propositions more rigorously and identify underlying mechanisms. The theoretical
chapter (Chapter 2) aims for just these kinds of finer theoretical specifications of causal
logics – including motivations, mechanisms, and causal order – to improve statements of
observable, empirical implications and test these implications against observed processes
of reform.
As stated in the summary of the argument, the empirical analysis does not support
many of the conventional causal logics underpinning electoral competition. Perhaps most
notably, the evidence suggests that one of the logics – Hirschl’s (2004) “policy
preservation” variant of the insurance logic, operates differently in new, postauthoritarian democracies than in more advanced polities. In the standard formulation,
Hirschl anticipates that neoliberal elites preserve their economic policies within
ideologically friendly judiciaries. Gillman’s (2002; 2006; 2008) argument is logically
similar, anticipating that current elites seek to preserve their policies within friendly
courts. However, in new democracies, current hegemonic elites are likely not liberal
democrats, much less neoliberal, as in Hirschl’s account (e.g., “near ideal” case of Israel).
Elites in new and transitioning democracies are also likely not elites of different
ideological stripes, as in Gillman’s post-Reconstruction Republicans (2002) or post-Great
Society Democrats (2006). Rather, elites in new democracies, especially in Latin
America and other parts of the developing world, are more likely to be traditional, landed
or propertied elites. I argue that these elites do not strengthen courts in order to entrench
ideologies in any policy-preserving sense. Instead, these elites often strengthen courts in
superficial ways, with continuity masquerading as reform, as in the Mexican state of
Hidalgo (see Chapter 6). Unfortunately, “reform” in these instances is only “democratic

28

windowdressing” or an institutional variant of a “rule of law show” (Hilbink 2007a).
Thus, I suggest a different version of the entrenchment logic in new democracies – a
patronage-preserving logic. This logic is evident in Hidalgo, but it is most striking in the
Brazilian equivalent of Hidalgo – Maranhão (see Chapters 6 and 7).
Moreover, the theoretical framework draws on multiple strands of theory from the
study of institutional development and change, including rational-strategic, culturalideational, and social movement accounts. Importantly, rational-strategic approaches
stress the way external forces such as elections shape institutions. Social movement
theory stresses opportunity structures, which are also exogenous forces. However, by
suggesting ways in which judges or other institutional actors might organize and
mobilize, and their attention to mobilizing techniques and framing, social movement
theories stress the important role of ideas and alliances with sympathetic actors that can
amplify the movement’s ideas. These features of reflect a more endogenous account of
institutional change. In contrast to the rationalist emphasis of rational-choice and strategic
accounts, this is a more cultural-ideational approach. This study highlights the role of
judges “off the bench” or “beyond the bench,” joining other studies that emphasize the
role of actors internal to institutions, and the role of ideational dynamics and how judges
can shape preferences of external actors, altering the constraints of a strategic terrain
(Staton 2006; 2007; forthcoming 2010; Hilbink 2007a; 2007b).
Finally, the focus on causal logics and the emphasis on “mobilizing structures” in
social movement theory lead to the identification of ways in which policies regarding the
judiciary move across levels of a regime (Snyder 2001b), i.e., from the local to the
national, or vice-versa. For instance, the local process of judicial change in Brazil was
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shaped in meaningful ways by policy debates and institutional changes at the national
level. In some cases, this influence was negative, as in the case of the second judges’
strike in the state of Acre in 2003, when what was clearly rational locally did not take
place because of the involvement of key judicial leaders in a separate national debate (see
Chapter 7). In other cases, the influence is positive, as in the instances in which local,
progressive judges in Maranhão have used the national judicial council to draw attention
to problems in the state’s administration of justice. In this regard, the national council
acts as a “federal foothold” for local actors, who are able to effect local change by
leveraging the power of a national institution. These patterns of state-center-state or
local-national-local policy movement also resonate as domestic versions of policy
“boomerangs” (Keck and Sikkink 1998).
In addition to illuminating the movements of policies across levels of a regime,
the relationship between the leftist PT and the judiciary also raises the issues of (a) the
conditional effect of ideology depending on the baseline strength of target institutions,
and (b) the uneven movement of policy across territorial units within a single country.
This is also the case with regard to the slow, uneven appearance of judicial councils
across the Mexican states, despite the fact the federal council was created in 1994 and
began operating in 1995. Finally, the key role of Spanish-trained judges in the Mexican
state of Michoacán, the role of neoliberal policies in Aguascalientes, and the movement
and role of progressive judicial attitudes across states within Brazil identify ways in
which ideas travel subnationally and internationally. These phenomena again highlight
the role of ideas (Smith 2008), but also highlight the movements of ideas. In short, the
current study helps us understand how policies regarding the judiciary move across
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different levels of a regime, across different territorial units within a single country, and
across national boundaries.

1.6. Plan of the Dissertation
The dissertation is organized as follows. In Part I, Chapter 2 outlines the
theoretical framework, taking special care to identify the causal logics underpinning
electoral competition and ideology, and highlighting the roles of actors external and
internal to judicial institutions, i.e., politicians and judges. Chapter 3 presents the
methods employed in the empirical analysis, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of
quantitative and qualitative techniques, and the particular strengths of integrating both at
the subnational level in more than one country. Part II offers the empirical core of the
dissertation. After a brief introduction regarding judicial spending, Chapters 4 and 5
present the quantitative analysis in Mexico and Brazil, respectively. Mexico is analyzed
first because the results are clear and straightforward, assisting with the interpretation of
the more complex landscape of parties and competition in Brazil. Chapters 6 and 7 turn to
the qualitative analysis in three Mexican states and three Brazilian states, respectively.
Chapter 8 in Part III concludes, summarizing the overall findings and integrating the
quantitative and qualitative findings, as well as offering comparative reflections and
indications for future research.
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Part I. Theory and Methods

2. Theory
Electoral Competition, Ideology, and Court Strength:
A Causal Logics Approach
2.1. Introduction: Why Build Strong Courts?
This chapter turns to the theoretical approach used to answer the empirical and
theoretical puzzles introduced in Chapter 1. Overall, the approach is historical
institutional, emphasizing temporal processes, context and contingency, and the
intersection of different historical processes. Within the broad contours of this approach,
two main strands of theory inform the analysis. The first focuses on the consequences of
increasing electoral competition, highlighting the rational incentives, strategic
constraints, and political openings faced by relevant actors in the context of competitive
or non-competitive elections. In this regard, this first strand could be considered a brand
of rationalism. The second emphasizes the role of ideas, stressing the extent to which –
despite external constraints, electoral or otherwise – ideology and other culturalideational influences shape behavior. In this regard, this second strand could be
considered a brand of culturalism. Electoral competition and ideology, however, do not
exert their influences in isolation. Rather, their effect is interactive, and the effect of
ideology is conditioned by at least three other overlapping processes: (i) the ideological
location of the authoritarian regime, thus shaping the character of both traditional elites
and opposition; (ii) the baseline condition of judicial institutions when ideological actors
seek reform; and (iii) the nature of alliances for reform, both locally and at other levels of
the regime. Moreover, while the most relevant actors can sometimes be politicians, key
actors are also often internal to institutions, e.g., judges. Thus, the theoretical framework
is attentive to interactions between competition and ideology, to the intersection of
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electoral and ideological factors with other historical processes, and to both external
(politician-led) and internal (judge-led) explanations, i.e., exogenous versus endogenous
explanations of judicial change. Briefly stated, the approach emphasizes the contingency
of intentionality, that is, the conditional expression of ideological preferences,
highlighting the preferences of judges.
A central goal of the theoretical discussion in this chapter is the specification of
rival causal logics underpinning theories of the effects of electoral competition and
ideology on court strength. Generating these logics accomplishes two things: (i) it
emphasizes causal mechanisms and the microfoundations of behavior (the identification
of causal mechanisms contributes to an undertheorized area of institutional change and a
discussion of microfoundations blurs one of the conventional divisions between rationalchoice institutionalism and historical institutionalism (Thelen 1999)); and (ii) it specifies
expected causal patterns against which observed causal processes can later be tested.
Regarding the latter point, this chapter generates a wide variety of alternative causal
logics for judicial reform. While some of these can be tested in the large-N analyses in
Chapters 4 and 5, generating these rival logics is especially beneficial for the processtracing method employed in the small-N analysis in Chapters 6 and 7, where the ability to
test a wide variety of theory-derived logics against observed causal patterns enhances the
method’s analytic strength.
The interplay between the two broad theoretical currents noted above –
rationalism and culturalism – might be summarized as strategic interaction marked
simply by goals and constraints, i.e., preferences and situations (Epstein and Knight
1998; Katznelson and Weingast 2005). For instance, viewed from the perspective of
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politicians (e.g., a Congress-centered approach; see Cameron 2005), the dynamics of
electoral competition both drive rational incentives or interests and define constraints,
and ideology might reduce to sincere, programmatic preferences adapted to strategic
preferences by the constraints imposed by the electoral landscape. That is, constrained
preferences have a different effect than unconstrained preferences.
In addition to politicians, however, the theoretical framework seeks to include
actors internal to judicial institutions and consider the manner in which judges and other
“legal elites” shape institutional change or continuity. In this regard, a compelling
theoretical framework should anticipate when we might expect judges to organize,
express reform preferences, and successfully influence reform outcomes – what other
scholars have referred to as “extrajudicial” conduct or activity (Whittington 1995;
Dubeck 2007). That is, what explains the behavior of judges “beyond the bench”?
Further, how does this off-bench behavior – lobbying, litigation, labor actions, public
speaking, or teaching – shape the preferences of other actors, and perhaps even alter
existing constraints?
Social movement theory lends itself to this goal. Specifically, the three analytic
pillars of social movement theory – (i) opportunity structures, (ii) mobilizing structures,
and (iii) framing (McCadam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; McCadam, Tarrow, and Tilly
2001) – can help explain judicial mobilization. Indeed, many compelling accounts of
legal mobilization build implicitly or explicitly on these pillars of social movement
theory (e.g., McCann 1994; Epp 1998; Hilbink 2007b).
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To a certain extent, social movement theory and strategic accounts coincide.15
That is, rationalist incentives of strategic situations or constraints map onto “opportunity
structures” and “mobilizing structures”, and ideological preferences and “framing” share
similar cultural-ideational qualities. Thus, some analysts might collapse the two and
suggest adopting one or the other, or perhaps even integrating the two in a single
framework. Others might simplify further and argue that “framing” is simply another
kind of constraint, and that actors or certain rhetorical devices can influence an ideational
setting to either decrease or increase the chances of success. For instance, Hilbink
(2007b) argues that progressive currents within the Spanish church starting in the 1950s
generated an ideological context that made later arguments about democratization more
palatable in the 1970s, and facilitated the mobilization of politically liberal, reformist
judges. That is, ideological changes in a legal culture reduced the constraints for the
subsequent mobilization of pro-reform judges. However, while acknowledging that an
ideological context can change to facilitate reform, Hilbink’s account asks us to consider
how the process of framing can be quite different from strategic constraints. That is, how
exactly was the ideological context changed in the first place? In short, how and why did
preferences change? The issue of preference formation and change highlights the role of
ideas in the active, dynamic sense of “framing”, a role that is often neglected in
rationalist or even strategic accounts, which often take preferences as given,
understanding a passive, static form of framing, i.e., an existing cultural “frame”.
In a similar vein, “mobilizing structures” can act as more than strategic
constraints, identifying mechanisms by which ideas diffuse, gain or lose currency or

15

Andreas Schedler raised this issue at a seminar on “Latin American Judicial Politics” at CIDE, Mexico
City, March 5-7, 2009, organized by Gretchen Helmke and Julio Ríos-Figueroa.
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traction, and perhaps even effect ideational or preference change themselves. That is, the
role of ideas might be conditioned by the particular mobilizing structures or
“technologies”16 on which they travel. Returning to Hilbink’s example of judicial
mobilization in Spain, the key factor she identifies in the success of the pro-reform
message is the fact that the movement’s ideas were amplified by two such mobilizing
technologies: (i) a progressive wing within the Catholic clergy, and (ii) leftist parties. The
attention to specifying causal mechanisms that inheres in the conceptualization of
mobilizing technologies is absent from conventional strategic accounts. Thus, social
movement theory captures the interactive dynamic between relevant actors, goals, and
constraints (see Epstein and Knight 1998), while also adding greater attention to
rhetorical devices and the role of ideas, as well as causal mechanisms that transport these
ideas. Ultimately, the emphasis on both ideas and causal mechanisms can shed light on
preference change, which is a critical but understudied and undertheorized area in
comparative politics and public law/judicial politics.17
To summarize, drawing on rationalist, strategic, and social movement accounts, I
highlight the role of ideology and electoral constraints, and contextualize these two
factors in the legacies of authoritarianism, the baseline condition of the judiciary, and the
nature of alliances for reform. External actors (politicians) and internal actors (judges) are
both relevant for the reform process. Both types of actors respond to their ideological

16

I use the phrases “mobilizing structures” and “mobilizing technologies” interchangeably. However,
where possible, I give preference to “technologies” in order to avoid confusion with “opportunity
structures” and with broader structural argument, i.e., theoretical propositions in which macro-economic or
macro-social factors are key explanatory variables.
17
A better understanding of preference formation and preference change can also suggest lessons for
understanding cultural change, a difficult topic in the social sciences and the Achilles heel of explanatory
arguments in the political culture tradition, which tend to inspire the question, “if ‘bad culture’ is the source
of a problem, how do we change to ‘good culture’?” Cultural change, in turn, suggests theoretical links to
other sub-fields of political science, including constructivist approaches in international relations.
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preferences and to incentives from the electoral landscape. Finally, the approach expects
that the two types of actors interact in ways that can change each other’s preferences, and
the the effect of ideology is further conditioned by three other overlapping processes.
Aside from drawing on the complementary strengths of different theoretical
approaches, the framework presented here highlights underlying causal logics associated
with electoral competition that can be tested in the empirical analysis. Much of the
literature on electoral competition anticipates competition to have positive consequences,
but I identify four separate causal logics underpinning this expectation, plus distinct sublogics in the case of one of these logics. Notably, the causal logics can be
complementary, inconsistent, or even contradictory. Moreover, in post-authoritarian
regimes, competition causes the the political landscape to transition from being largely
dominated by a single actor to multi-party competition. In this context, veto-player theory
anticipates that competition increases the number of relevant actors (veto points), thus
generating conditions for less policy change, not more. That is, competition could have a
negative effect on judicial change. Thus, a central aim of the empirical analysis is to
identify when causal logics are complementary and, if inconsistent or contradictory,
adjudicate among competing logics. The small-N, process-based analysis is especially
suited to this task (Hall 2003). Finally, each causal logic raises issues that make it either
more or less relevant in newer and poorer democracies.
In sum, the theoretical framework builds on a mix of rationalist, strategic, and
social movement accounts to anticipate exogenous, endogenous, and hybrid explanations
of institutional change. Following Hall (2003) and Falleti (2006), one of the principal
goals of the theoretical framework presented here is to use theory to derive explicit,
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finely stated causal patterns. These patterns serve to establish key actors and events,
mechanisms and motivations, as well as causal sequences and timing. Notably, the
theoretical framework generates both general and specific testable propositions (see Van
Evera, 36). The large-N analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 is limited to testing broad, average
effects of electoral competition and the ideology of politicians. In contrast, the small-N
analysis in Chapters 6 and 7 develops a much finer analysis of the interaction between the
electoral landscape, politicians, and judges. In this latter analysis, the process-based
approach evaluates the observed causal processes against the expected causal patterns.

2.2. Electoral Competition and Court Strength
Existing research generally anticipates electoral competition has positive effects.
This is especially the case in post-authoritarian settings, where research indicates
increasing electoral competition and pluralism yield positive, liberalizing policy change.
However, multiple and potentially competing causal logics underpin this general
expectation, including logics that focus alternately on actors external to institutions (e.g.,
politicians) and actors internal to institutions (e.g., judges). Moreover, these findings on
the positive effects of competition overlook veto-player theory, which yields
contradictory expectations. That is, electoral competition increases the number of veto
points, inhibiting the possibility of new, reformist policies. Thus, rival and even
contradictory causal logics lie behind theoretical expectations related to electoral
competition. The following sections identify these causal logics in order to make them
more explicit, generating finer specifications of causation and more precise empirical
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implications, thereby facilitating tests of the theories in the empirical analysis (Hall
2003).
2.2.1 Positive Consequences of Electoral Competition
Existing political-institutional research shows electoral competition exerts upward
pressures on the performance of public institutions. Studies in Latin America find
competition improves legislative performance and institutionalization (Beer 2003; Solt
2004), fiscal policy and performance (Boyce 2005; Flamand 2006), and educational
spending (Hecock 2006). Competition also translates into more protections for human
rights (Beer and Mitchell 2004).18
Scholars of judicial politics find a similarly positive relationship between electoral
competition and court strength. For instance, the anticipation of party turnover generates
incentives for judicial independence in the form of “strategic defection” at the end of
outgoing administrations (Helmke 2002; 2005). The expectation of electoral defeat also
generates incentives for current majorities to strengthen the judiciary as a prophylactic
measure, or “insurance policy”, for themselves as future minorities, a result found in
Asian countries (Ginsburg 2003) and Latin America (Finkel 2005; 2008). Moreover,
divided government – an alternative measure of competitiveness – enhances judicial
independence in Argentina and Mexico (Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tommasi 2002; Chavez
2004; Ríos-Figueroa 2006), and, in another example from Mexico, generates incentives
for judges to promote case results strategically to expand court influence (Staton 2006).
Finally, smaller margins of victory translate into stronger judicial budgets in the Mexican
18

Cleary (2007) finds no relationship between electoral competition and the responsiveness of municipal
governments in Mexico, measured as the provision of public utilities (potable water and sewerage) and the
generation of local revenue. However, Cleary also includes a long bibliography of findings regarding the
positive effects of electoral competition, including Coppedge (1993), Rodriguez (1998), Mizrahi (1999),
Aziz Nassif (2000), and Langston (2003).
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states (Beer 2006). Thus, existing research anticipates that competition has positive
effects on court strength.
However, disparate causal logics undergird this expectation. Four main causal
logics underpin the electoral explanations of institutional and judicial change cited above:
(1) re-election, (2) signaling, (3) insurance, and (4) opportunity. Each logic is detailed
below, identifying sub-logics within each where necessary in order to gain analytic
precision.
2.2.1.1. Re-election Logic
First, the “re-election logic” anticipates that inter-party competition generates
incentives to be more responsive to the electorate’s demands for functioning institutions,
better performance, and smoother delivery of public goods, including accessible,
efficient, and independent courts. In short, electoral competitiveness has a “lasting effect
by forcing all parties in government to perform better if they aspire to win the next
election” (Rodriguez 1998, 164; see also Cleary 2007, 284).
As noted by Cleary (2007), the re-election logic requires clarification in Mexico,
which I also extend to Brazil. In Mexico, there is a long-standing prohibition against reelection. This prohibition also existed in Brazil until a 1997 reform that permitted two
consecutive terms and additional, non-consecutive terms. However, re-election is not the
only reason incumbents at the level of governor seek successful policies. Candidates also
do so to build good reputations as politicians because they want to run for higher office.
Furthermore, parties place a premium on successful policies in order to stay in power,
and unsuccessful politicians are unlikely to be rewarded with future party candidacies and
support. These incentives are reflected in the political cliques or “camarillas” in Mexico
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(Ai Camp 2002; 2007, 122-123; Mizrahi 2003, 16), which find their equivalent in the
political “grupos” of Brazil.
In Brazil, a significant debate divides scholarship on the importance of political
parties. One strand of scholarship highlights low party identification and discipline
(Lamounier and Meneguello 1986; Lima Jr. 1993; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Ames
2001), so some analysts might argue that the party reputation argument is weaker in
Brazil. However, much of the evidence for this strand of party research comes from the
1980s and early 1990s – the first years of the new experience with democracy. More
recent research, which includes both Brazilian scholars and Brazilianists abroad that were
previously critical of the apparently weak, fragmented, or “non-ideological” nature of the
party system in Brazil, now finds strong party identification (Kinzo 1993; Limongi and
Figuereido 1995; Meneguello 1998; Figueiredo and Limongi 1999; Mainwaring,
Meneguello, and Power 2000). In Mexico, individual career ambitions are tied closely to
one’s political party, party identification is strong, and party rhetoric often infuses
discussions of policy authorship and development, particularly since the controversial
1988 election that forged the PRD (see Hecock 2006; Cleary 2007), and since the PAN
began winning municipal and state elections in 1989. Thus, I anticipate incumbents in
both Brazil and Mexico to respond to electoral incentives for positive policy performance
in much the same way the U.S. literature expects incumbents to respond to these
incentives. We should observe “best policies” towards the judiciary as part of strategies
geared towards electoral success. In terms of sequence and timing, we should observe the
development of these policies, especially in public statements, prior to elections.19

19

The extent to which the electorate cares about the administration of justice should condition the real
effect of the re-election logic. Many campaign speeches regarding the justice system in Latin America
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2.2.1.2. Signaling Logic
Second, following studies of “credible commitments” (e.g., Elster 2000),
Ginsburg (2003) alerts us to the possibility of a “signaling logic.” Many constitutional
changes require a legislative supermajority. Where electoral configurations are shifting,
actors belonging to a slight political majority may need the support of the minority, or at
least a portion of the minority, in order to reach this supermajority (usually two-thirds of
the legislative votes). Political majorities may favor constitutional changes that
strengthen courts in order to provide the opposition with a “credible commitment”
(Ginsburg, 28) that the majority will, after the constitutional transition, respect the
minority. Even in ordinary legislative changes of a non-constitutional nature, simple
majorities are still required. Dominant groups that represent a plurality of legislative
votes may need the support of a minority, or at least one minority block, to support their
policies. This is a distinct causal mechanism underpinning the positive relationship
between electoral competitiveness and institutional change. We should observe majorities
who expect to stay in power using reform efforts as strategies to gain the support or
confidence of political minorities.
2.2.1.3. Insurance Logic
Third, the “insurance logic” also motivates theoretical expectations. This logic
anticipates that competitive elections create political uncertainty, and that this uncertainty
generates incentives for insurance. Stated otherwise, “[a]s democratization increases
electoral uncertainty, demand for insurance rises” (Ginsburg 2003, 33). However, at least

highlight the need to fight crime and improve public safety. However, the opacity and unresponsiveness of
the judiciary are also frequent themes. Thus, I expect that the electorate does indeed care about the
administration of justice, and that, if the re-election logic is relevant to judicial reform, we should observe
politicians highlight reform initiatives as described above.
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three different types of causal accounts either explicitly use the label “insurance” or can
easily be associated with this label, so this logic needs to be unpacked into three separate
sub-logics. Each of the sub-logics conceptualizes a distinct response to uncertainty.
Moreover, all three different accounts are prominent in studies of judicial politics and
public law, though rarely explicitly acknowledged as different logics, which adds to the
risk of theoretical confusion.20 Thus, as argued below, clarity requires that this logic be
itself divided into three distinct sub-logics. The three logics are arranged chronologically,
roughly in order of appearance in the literature.
The first insurance sub-logic builds on theoretical insights from Landes and
Posner (1975). In their seminal piece, the authors argued that strong, independent courts
enhance the lifespan of legislation. That is, legislation created in the present will likely
last longer if protected by an autonomous judiciary than if left unprotected, either because
of an institutionally weak or politically vulnerable judiciary. As the longevity of
legislation increases, the political prestige and importance of the legislature also increases
– since this is the institution where lasting law will be made – raising the demand for
legislation and drawing the attention of interest groups, lobbyists, and other politicians.
Thus, in this economic formulation, positive judicial reforms indirectly raise the value of
the legislative process. Plainly stated, strong courts raise the price at which legislators can
sell the lawmaking process. It is in the legislature’s own interest to build the judiciary in
order to enhance its own institutional value by creating demand for durable legislation. In
short, legislators strengthen courts to profit indirectly from insuring their own laws,
which are made in the present, against being changed easily in the future.

20

See, e.g., Landes and Posner (1975), Ginsburg (2003), Hirschl (2004), Finkel (2005; 2008), Shambayati
(2008), and Serigil (2009).
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In terms of a theory-guided causal pattern, legislators are the key actors in this
sub-logic. Thus, we should observer legislators as the initiators or activators of reform,
and the timing of reform efforts should begin early in legislative terms so that legislators
can receive the full benefit of “selling” their legislation. The application of this logic to
new democracies, however, is in doubt, considering that it requires, at a minimum, a
functioning, competent, and relevant legislature, as well as a high level of coordination
and strategic sophistication among legislators. Further, the logic assumes the institutional
strengthening of the legislature relative to the executive (governor). It is unclear that
these conditions could readily be met in many local legislatures in either Mexico or
Brazil, or that governors would easily tolerate the rise of legislative power at the expense
of their own power.
A second insurance sub-logic follows Ginsburg (2003) and Finkel (2005; 2008).21
In autocratic or single-party dominant environments that are transitioning to greater
electoral competition, strengthening the judiciary operates as a kind of safeguard –
current majorities accept the short-term costs of strengthening the judicial branch in
order to gain the long-term benefit of judicial protection as future minorities (Finkel
2005).22 For instance, Ginsburg argues that, in Korea’s transition from authoritarianism in
1987, the combination of (i) new, direct elections for president and (ii) three parties of
roughly equal strength led each party to expect a one-in-three chance of winning the
21

Whittington’s (2007) “oppositional leader”, who strengthens court in self-protective way, might also be
characterized as following this sub-logic, since the court-strengthening is carried out for self-protective
reasons.
22
In this regard, this sub-logic parallels the underlying logic of “veil rules” in the process of writing new
constitutions. Drawing on John Rawls’s theory of justice and his central concept of a “veil of ignorance,
veil rules require introducing some degree of uncertainty about the exact configuration of future power and
interests, i.e., at the time the constitution takes effect, in order to maximize the writers’ present
attentiveness to a broader range of interests (Widner 2007, 1517; Vermeule 2001). For instance, elections
may be postponed until after the constitution writing process, or a constitution may not be scheduled to take
effect until after a certain period has elapsed, during which elections will take place (Widner, 1518).
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election. Stated in the opposite, each party believed there was a real possibility they
would not win, generating incentives to create a constitutional court that could protect
them from the ultimate victor (Ginsburg, 215-216). Similarly, Finkel argues that the
erosion of the PRI’s decades-long rule in Mexico caused the party to be insecure
regarding its electoral future, creating the rational incentives to strengthen the judiciary as
a way of protecting itself from current opposition parties that might govern in the future
(Finkel 2008, 102-105).23
In short, current elites – particularly long-standing, authoritarian elites –
strengthen courts to protect themselves from hostile policies, persecution, or even
retribution once they are no longer in power. Regardless of the character of current
majorities, the logic suggests a scenario in which the majorities sincerely believe they
will likely lose power and so they make a meaningful effort to strengthen courts. Thus,
we should observe (i) sincere private beliefs that power will likely be transferred, (ii)
serious reform efforts, (iii) the temporal proximity of these reform efforts to the perceived
point at which power would be transferred, (iv) a real increase in the strength of courts,
and (v) this increase should occur prior to the transfer of power.
A third insurance sub-logic follows Gillman (1993; 2002; 2008) and Hirschl
(2004). Gillman chronicles the entrenchment of U.S. political elites within the nonmajoritarian judiciary when electoral outcomes are uncertain in order to protect the
policies of these elites. Similarly, Hirschl argues that the global phenomenon of
23

Notably, Finkel herself notes that the PRI in 1995 no longer controlled a supermajority of votes in the
lower chamber of congress. Thus, it needed the help of the PAN in order to change the constitution. The
PAN, however, wanted a stronger reform, so the PRI was forced into approving a stronger positive change.
In short, ideology also played a significant role, i.e., “The combination of an insecure ruling party seeking
insurance and an opposition party pushing for greater judicial empowerment determined the final judicial
reform package” (Finkel 2008, 102). Also, it is important that the PRI turned to the PAN for help, not the
PRD, with which it had much tenser and hostile relations following the 1988 elections and the renewal of
“dirty wars” in many states where the FDN/PRD was strong, e.g., Michoacán (Interview 38; 76).
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“juristocracy” – constitutional revolutions that enhance the powers of the judiciary,
tending towards judicial supremacy – has been crucially shaped by elites seeking to
insulate their policies against rising opposition. Critically, it only makes sense to seek this
kind of policy insulation if the judiciary itself is ideologically sympathetic. This
sympathy may exist ex ante if the current majority and the courts share the same
ideology, e.g., if traditional elites dominate both the political branches and the judiciary,
or it may be created by the current majority by placing its own members within the ranks
of the judiciary. Classic examples of the entrenchment of political projects in the
judiciary draw from the early and more recent history of the U.S. Upon losing the
election to Jefferson, rather than strengthen the courts in order to “sell” legislation at a
higher or price or protect their own rights and liberties, the Federalists “retired into the
judiciary,” seeking to preserve their policies from the vagaries of majoritarian politics
from the vantage of these non-majoritarian trenches (see, e.g., Whittington 2007, 94-95).
More recently, the Republican project of placing conservatives in the federal judiciary,
beginning with the Reagan administration, can be seen through the lens of this kind of
policy preservation.
Regarding the ideological character of key actors, Gillman’s elites are “partisan
coalitions” of different stripes – late 19th century Republicans (2002) and late 20th century
Democrats (2006) – who strengthen the judiciary when it is friendly, sympathetic or
affiliated in order to insulate policies from change.24 Hirschl’s elites are secular and
24

The role of ideological affinity in this sub-logic resonates with Whittington’s (2007) “affiliated leaders”
and “affiliated courts”, though his affiliations refer not simply to ideology but to a broader set of policies
and interests (what he calls “regime”). His “oppositional leader” also resonates in part with the electoral
uncertainty of the insurance logics, though only the “pre-emptive” variant of oppositional leaders. As noted
by Whittington, oppositional leaders – those opposed to the status quo or existing regime – might arrive in
office with a strong mandate. In such a case, oppositional leaders might be transformative, or
“reconstructive”. Conversely, if they arrive with weak supports or a weak mandate, they would be the pre-
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neoliberal political, economic, and judicial elites, leading to characterizations of some
constitutional revolutions as “neoliberal revolutions”. Indeed, Hirschl’s “near-ideal” case
is Israel, where he argues the Basic Laws of 1992 that strengthened the judiciary were the
consequence of a dominant, European (Ashkenazi), secular, neoliberal alliance that was
threatened by changing electoral configurations, i.e., facing a potential electoral defeat,
and sought to protect or entrench its policies within a non-majoritarian institution – the
judiciary. For these reasons, Hirschl labels his thesis “hegemonic preservation”.25
Regardless of the ideological character of dominant elites, both Gillman and Hirschl
anticipate that, when threatened electorally, elites that are presently dominant will burrow
or entrench within the judiciary, strengthening the institution in the process, in order to
preserve their policies from alteration by the majoritarian, political branches.
Turning to the expected causal pattern of this third sub-logic, we should observe
growing electoral competition accompanied by efforts to strengthen courts. The
strengthening of courts should occur prior to but in close proximity to the perceived
transfer of power. However, unlike the “profit-maximizing” insurance sub-logic,
additional politicians – not just legislators – should face pro-reform incentives, as long as
they belong to current majorities or governing coalitions. Also, unlike the first two sub-

emptive kind of oppositional leader. In either case, Whittington’s typology reflects the interaction between
electoral constraints and ideology identified in Gillman and Hirschl. This interaction is closest to the
general insurance thesis in the “pre-emptive” oppositional leader. Notably, the “reconstructive leader” is
not responding to insurance incentives, but to exactly the opposite – the incentives for bold or
transformative action that political capital or a solid victory can provide. Over time, we might expect to see
this kind of dynamic in new democracies, i.e., situations where former ideological minorities win a
resounding victory and carry that mandate into a reconstructive administration. However, this is unlikely in
nascent democracies, especially following pacted transitions.
25
Shambayati (2008) and Serigil (2009) offer similar accounts of hegemonic preservation in action in
Turkey, though I expect Shambayati would likely object to characterizing his account in this way since the
military is not explicitly ideological. Nonetheless, the military does have policy preferences and
empowered the judiciary in an effort to preserve these policies against the opposition of majoritarian
institutions. Indeed, I would argue the open and public nature of Turkey’s “divided sovereignty”
(Shambayati, 287-289) is a striking example of hegemonic preservation.
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logics, the motive should be to prevent policy change for the sake of maintaining the
policy itself, rather than for the sake of generating demand for legislation or providing
self-protection in the future. In this regard, the ideological content of policies and the
ideological preferences of key actors matters more than in either of the other two sublogics. Indeed, with regard to the first, profit-seeking logic, Landes and Posner assume
the ideological neutrality of courts.26 In contrast to the second, self-protective sub-logic,
where current majorities are willing to accept the short-term costs of strengthening the
judiciary in order to gain the long-term benefits of judicial protection, this third, policypreserving sub-logic anticipates that current majorities are unwilling to accept the shortterm costs of strengthening an ideologically unaffiliated or unsympathetic judiciary.
Stated otherwise, current majorities are unwilling to accept any short-term costs at all that
are associated with policy change. That is the point of entrenching the policies. However,
the corollary of refusing short-term costs is the prospect of having to accept the long-term
costs of policy reversal in perhaps a much harsher form, once new majorities confront the
efforts to hide policies from majoritarian processes. In this regard, this sub-logic is shortsighted, privileging shorter time horizons over longer ones, and risking potentially high
long-term costs. Hirschl (74) acknowledges this risk, noting that “short-term political
relief [may lead] to a gradual politicization of the law, thus unintentionally planting the
seeds for a long-term erosion of both the judiciary’s legitimacy and the ruling elite’s
future institutional maneuvering room.”
A crucial question related to this policy preservation sub-logic is whether any
strengthening or empowerment of courts is actually taking place. In each case of
26

Landes and Posner (894-895) explicitly state that they assume judges and courts to be ideologically
neutral (“…the judicial attitude implied by our analysis is one of indifference to the ethical content of the
legislative or constitutional provision that the court is being asked to enforce”) (emphasis added).
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“preservation-insurance”, from Hirschl’s Canada or Israel to Shambayati’s Turkey,
scholars describe an ideological elite essentially capturing the adjudicatory institutions in
order to perpetuate the elites’ preferred policies. Reasonable concerns might be raised
whether these kinds of courts are “strong” in any real sense that is consistent with
normative democratic practice, or whether they are simply (and highly) politicized.27 The
basic point, however, is that courts – as instiutions – become more powerful; they enjoy
greater resources, jurisdiction, and influence. From a normative perspective, they may not
necessarily be more liberal, democratic, or even fair, although this can happen. But in a
descriptive and very real sense, courts do become more powerful.
As outlined above, the insurance perspective generally anticipates that electoral
competition creates uncertainty, but the central actors and the underlying motives for
strengthening courts are different across three distinct sub-logics. In Landes and Posner,
legislators are the protagonists and the central plot of their account is economic in nature:
lawmakers strengthen courts in order to generate demand for legislation and raise the
price of making law, which indirectly strengthens the legislators’ position by allowing
them to sell laws at a higher profit – political attention, relevance, and prestige. In
Ginsburg and Finkel, the protagonists are politicians (executives or legislators) in the
current majority, and the central plot is that these elites strengthen courts in order to
protect their own individual rights and liberties once they become political minorities.
Notably, the elites in both Ginsburg and Finkel’s specific accounts are long-standing,
authoritarian elites facing not only the transfer of power but also the transition to
27

Indeed, Shambayati’s description of the repression and persecution carried out by the judiciary in both
Turkey and Iran (296-298, 301-302) emphasizes the extent to which courts that preserve hegemonies (a la
Hirschl) may be the very definition of a “weak judiciary”. Granted, these countries are what Shambayati
calls “semi-democracies”, but the logic of the argument, and the notion of “court strength” or “judicial
power”, does not depend on regime type.
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democracy. In contrast to both of these accounts, Gillman’s and Hirschl’s protagonists
are a wide array of political, economic, and judicial elites – Gillman’s partisan coalitions
and Hirschl’s neoliberal alliances – that strengthen courts neither to enhance their own
institutional profit or prestige nor to protect themselves from future majorities, but rather
to shield, insulate, prolong, preserve, or perpetuate their policies. Importantly, Hirschl’s
elites strengthen courts only because the judiciary is ideologically sympathetic to these
policies, and his elites, in contrast to Gillman, are also long-standing, dominant elites,
though not necessarily authoritarian elites facing democratization.
The insurance logic in general requires clarification at the subnational level. Each
of the sub-logics assumes that the court in question has the capacity to protect legislation
from change, protect future minorities from abuse, or preserve policies in general from
change. This assumption is strongest when the court of reference is a national supreme
court or other high court relying on the formal constitutional constraints these courts can
impose on policymaking in order to explain, in the three different forms articulated by the
sub-logics, why politicians build strong courts as insurance. At first glance, this
assumption may seem weaker at the subnational level. For instance, in Finkel’s work on
Mexico, the 1994 federal reform that enhanced methods for challenging the
constitutionality of state action in Mexico can be interpreted as generating the kind of
safeguards anticipated by the insurance logic (Finkel 2005). However, jurisdiction over
these mechanisms is purely federal. Thus, some observers may doubt whether state courts
have similar constraining power, and therefore question whether we should expect to see

51

the insurance logic at the local level.28
The potential criticism, therefore, is one of jurisdiction; do state courts have the
same kind of jurisdiction that would enable them to protect legislation, minorities, and
policies? This question echoes Snyder’s cautionary note (2001b) about moving
theoretically from one level of a regime to another. Specifically, “when making crosslevel inferences, the researcher must be careful to choose lower-level units that are
appropriate for replicating the hypothesis under consideration. That is, the lower-level
units should be ones in which ‘the process entailed by the hypothesis can take place’”
(Snyder 2001b, 95; citing King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 221). Plainly stated, should
the insurance logic(s) operate at the state level in Mexico and Brazil?
The short answer is “yes”. First, taking the question on its own terms, the
criticism is about jurisdictional authority in one area of the law – constitutional law. That
is, do state courts have the formal legal power to hear the kinds of cases that would
constrain the political branches? In Mexico, the primary mechanism of judicial review or
constitutional control is the writ of amparo, though the 1994 reform generated additional
mechanisms (see Finkel 2005; 2008; Ríos-Figueroa 2007; Magaloni 2008). Federal
courts have jurisdiction over amparo litigation, so it would appear that Mexican state
courts do not have the jurisdictional power or authority raised by the criticism. Brazilian
courts do have this jurisdiciton, primarily in the form of direct actions of
unconstitutionality (ação direta de inconstitucionalidade, or ADI). Indeed, the analysis in
Brazil in Chapter 7 draws in part from several of these cases litigated at the state level.
Thus, on formal jurisdictional grounds, the insurance logic appears to operate in the
28

Thanks to Jeff Staton for helping me think about how the conceptualization of court strength links to
existing theoretical models. For their insights on this issue, I am also grateful to Alejandra Ríos-Cázares,
Julio Ríos-Figueroa, and Andreas Schedler.
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Brazilian states but appears not to operate in the Mexican states. However, this formal
jurisdictional objection to applying the insurance logic subnationally oversimplifies the
constraints on state action generated by strong courts. Interview evidence notes
administrative courts in the Mexican states perform a judicial review function that is
conceptually indistinct from constitutional actions at the federal level. Indeed,
administrative law may well be a far more meaningful arena of constraining activities
given that this is the area of the law where most executive agency actions are challenged.
The executive branch is not challenged directly, i.e., the litigation does not necessarily
name the governor, but the litigation challenges executive policies in actions via
administrative agencies. Further, state supreme courts also have criminal and civil
jurisdiction over local officials, including the governor, and local courts also have
jurisdiction over most criminal, civil, and commercial litigation. For instance, complaints
against public officials generated by local fiscal auditing agencies (Entidad de
Fiscalización Superior) are adjudicated by local courts (Ríos-Cázares and Cejudo 2009).
Effective courts also limit the corruption and violence that often accompany
transitions from single-party regimes, problems that we expect to see in traditional, PRIdominated states. It should be noted that the baseline condition in the Mexican states is
PRI hegemony. In this context, most public institutions are dysfunctional, allowing the
local administration to govern unchecked in a highly corporatist and clientelist fashion,
and managing the judiciary as a source of patronage. While there is increasing variation
among local PRI administrations, any movement away from PRI hegemony and towards
a more plural, functional institutional life constrains local executives. Thus, a strong local
judiciary can provide checks in formal administrative, civil, or criminal settings outlined
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above, but a strong local judiciary can also constrain the executive via informal channels,
including public statements and media attention that shape public opinion. The
“extrajudicial” activity mentioned in Chapter 1 as activities “beyond the bench” –
lobbying, litigation, labor actions, public speaking, and teaching – are examples of this.
These formal and informal constraints generate the same kind of insurance incentives
locally that purist, jurisdiction-based formulations of the insurance logic should expect
federally. Indeed, I would argue that the additional mechanics of constraint outlined in
this paragraph – including administrative, criminal, and civil litigation, as well as
informal roles the judiciary can play, especially as a participant in public debates and the
media (e.g., Staton 2006; forthcoming 2010) – should be considered in other studies
employing the insurance approach.
2.2.1.4. Opportunity Logic
Quite apart from the politician-centered logics identified above, electoral
competition can also create political openings for other actors to assert themselves. The
“opportunity logic” captures this causal dynamic. Social movement theory anticipates
that three factors enhance the capacity for effective mobilization: (i) opportunity
structures, (ii) mobilizing structures, and (iii) framing (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald
1996; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). The first of these factors – opportunity
structures – refers to macro-level changes in the economic, social, or political landscape
at the domestic or international level that generate openings for mobilization. For
instance, the gradual opening of the military regime in Brazil is often cited as a reason for
the increasing success of social movements (Keck 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998).
Following social movement theory, electoral competition can alter existing
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“opportunity structures”, generating the political space that enhances the possibility of
reformist initiatives by other actors. That is, electoral competition may be shaping the
incentives of politician-led reform (i.e., incumbents, as noted by the previous logics), but
it may also be shaping the incentives for other actors (i.e., opposition) to organize and
mobilize reformist agendas. Specifically, judges and other actors internal to the judiciary
may see in a competitive electoral context a political opening in which to assert their own
reformist agenda. In this regard, the “opportunity logic” derived from social movement
theory seeks to explain institutional reform in a manner similar to the way spatial theories
seek to explain the behavioral independence of judges in adjudicatory settings (e.g.,
Epstein and Knight 1998). Thus, this logic offers an explanation of judicial behavior “off
the bench” that complements existing theories of decision-making “on the bench”. For
example, where a broad policy space generated by electoral competition or divided
government might encourage judicial independence on the bench, the same competition
or divided government might encourage reform-oriented judicial lobbying off the bench.
This framework sees judges not at apolitical, but as political actors vital to the process of
institutional continuity or change.
Hilbink’s explanations of judicial conservatism in Chile (2007a) and the
contrasting judicial progressivism in Spain (2007b) are emblematic of this approach. Her
account of the progressive judges’ movement in Spain in the 1970s is an example of
precisely this kind of phenomenon. In that case, several structural changes – Franco’s
alliance with Catholic rather than openly autocratic segments beginning in the 1950s,
ideological shifts associated with progressive and technocratic wings of Catholicism,
pressures to integrate with the European Economic Community, and the decrease in
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repressive tactics – “softened” the Franco regime, allowing reformist judges greater
opportunities for movement and expression (Hilbink 2007b, 418, 426). Electoral
competition, especially in early post-authoritarian phases, can provide similar openings,
yielding broader political spaces in which groups can mobilize.
As stated above, social movement theory is not just about opportunity structures –
it is also about “[re]framing” issues and mobilizing “technologies.” Scholars of the legal
complex refer to the latter as “structural supports” for mobilization, i.e., existing
organizations that can help articulate social movements and therefore enhance the
capacity for mobilization (McCann 1994; Epp 1998; Halliday et al. 2007). For instance,
Epp’s (1998) explanation of “rights revolutions” in four countries hinges on the presence
and strength of “support structures for legal mobilization” (emphasis added). Indeed,
Hilbink’s work on Spanish judges emphasizes that the structural changes outlined in the
previous paragraph – the softening of the Franco regime – were not sufficient
explanations of the success of reformist judges. Rather, two other factors were also
critical. First, the framing of legality in terms of fundamental principles versus positive
law – rights versus law, or derecho versus ley – was critical, questioning the legitimacy
proferred laws, and this was mostly a progressive intellectual current that increasingly
gained traction in Spain from the 1950s forward (Hilbink 2007b, 419-422).29 Second, and
more importantly, the ability of reformist judges to articulate their efforts through two
existing organizations – (1) leftist political parties and (2) the progressive wing of the
clergy – was vital to the judges’ success (423-426). In fact, Hilbink highlights these last
two technologies – leftist parties and a progressive clergy – as the most important in the

29

See Engelmann (2004; 2007) for discussion of similar movement in southern Brazil during 1980s, called
“direito alternativo”.
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successful mobilization of Spanish judges.
In terms of causal patterns, Hilbink highlights three factors that might be
important to look for in the qualitative analysis – political openings, ideological
(re)framing, and mobilizing technologies. Specifically, where nascent reform movements
are present, openings generated by electoral competition should trigger broader
mobilization, cultural-ideational forces can create a context that is politically friendly to
these movements, and existing networks or organizations can facilitate mobilization by
operating as the technological transports for the movement’s ideas.
2.2.2 Negative Consequences of Electoral Competition
In contrast to the positive effects of electoral competition anticipated by the causal
logics identified above, veto player theory predicts that competition hinders policy
change by increasing the number of veto players, thereby inhibiting reform (Tsebelis
2002). Stated otherwise, electoral competition should produce less policy change, not
more. Reform should be easiest in single-veto-player environments, and more difficult in
multi-veto-player contexts, as would occur in competitive environments characterized by
narrow legislative majorities – falling short of the simple majorities required for normal
legislation or supermajorities required for constitutional changes – or divided government
with executive and legislative powers in the hands of competing parties.
The extent to which veto points condition the success of policy change suggests a
way in which veto player theory provides analytic leverage for evaluating the explanatory
role of ideology. Ideology is discussed in greater detail below, but with regard to veto
players, the expression of an ideological commitment should be easier in single-vetoplayer environment if the dominant veto player holds said commitments. For instance, if
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a governor is committed to a particular policy, and the governor also controls a
supermajority of the legislature, then the probability of that policy’s success is high.
Conversely, if a policy is not successful in such a single-veto-player environment, we can
reasonably infer that the dominant actor was not committed to the policy in question. I
return to a fuller discussion of ideology and the interaction with electoral competition
later.
Table 2.1 summarizes the theory-derived, causal logics underlying the anticipated
positive and negative effects of competition. The first column lists each logic or sub-logic
individually, followed, from left to right, by the logic’s expected causal pattern, key
actors, and their principal motive.
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Table 2.1. Causal Logics Underpinning Electoral Competition.
Logic
Re-election

Key Actors
Politicians

Motive
Political office

Signaling

Politicians

Governability

Insurance 1

Legislators

Profit
maximization

Insurance 2

Politicians

Self-protection

Insurance 3

Politicians
and
sympathetic
economic
and judicial
elites*
Judges and
other legal
elites

Policy
preservation

Opportunity

Veto Player

Politicians

Patronage
Preservation

Politicians
and allied
elites

depends on
ideology or
interests of
mobilization
Credit for
policy success,
or own policy
or interests, i.e.,
re-election logic
or ideology
Maintain
sources of
power
(patronage and
clientelism)

Expected Causal Pattern
Competition causes all parties to
strengthen courts in order to remain
in office or advance in their careers
Competition causes parties that
expect to win or stay in power to
strengthen courts in order to gain
support of current minorities
Legislators strengthen courts in
order to protect their policies from
arbitrary reversal in the future,
thereby increasing the price of
current policy formation (e.g.,
present legislative acts)
Current majorities that expect to
lose an upcoming election to
strengthen courts in order to provide
future protection for themselves
from abuses of current minorities
who will be the future majorities
Politicians strengthen courts as a
means of preserving, perpetuating,
or entrenching their preferred
policies

Electoral competition generates an
“opening” of political regimes that
facilitates legal or judicial
mobilization.
Competition increases the number
of veto players, inhibiting reform

Electoral competition, or signs of
future competition, causes
traditional elites to tighten control
of institutions; real change is weak
or superficial

* Gillman (2002; 2008) calls these “partisan coalitions”, though Hirschl (2004, 50) suggests politicians are
“most active”.
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The empirical analysis in Chapters 4-7 seeks to examine each of these causal
forces underlying electoral competition. The large-N analysis is able to test the broad
association between electoral competition and judicial strength, but its ability to discern
between the causal logics identified here is reduced. The large-N analysis is also
hampered in its ability to discern to what extent electoral competition activated actors
other than politicians in the manner anticipated by social movement theory. However, the
qualitative, small-N analysis is well-suited for this task. Thus, a principal goal of the
small-N studies is to adjudicate among rival or contradictory logics, or assess to what
extent more than one logic may be operating at the same time. Beyond this adjudicatory
role, however, the small-N analysis also highlights the role of judges and other legal
elites, and can also assess to what extent other causal factors, namely opportunity
structures, framing, and mobilizing structures, are also exerting a meaningful effect in
causing judges to act on reformist impulses. For instance, in Brazil, reframing has a clear
analog in the “alternative law” movement (direito alternativo) that had its epicenter in
Rio Grande do Sul and crested in the late 1980s and early 1990s, emphasizing natural law
and human dignity over legal formalism and the more positivistic law of the dictatorship
(Engelmann 2004). The small-N analysis can consider factors like this and assess the
extent to which they shaped the reform process. In sum, focusing only on electoral
competition – a factor external to the judiciary – yields rival hypotheses and inconclusive
or contradictory predictions. While these four logics explain why electoral competition
shapes courts, they might provide competing or complementary causal accounts. That is,
we do not always know which causal logic is operating in any given sequence of electoral
competition followed by reform, or whether more than one logic is operating at any given
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time.
2.3. Ideology and Court Strength
In order to generate reliable predictions of judicial reform, we need to know more
than just the conditions of electoral competition external to the judiciary. In addition to
electoral competition, programmatic-ideological orientation influences judicial strength.
Therefore, we need to know the preferences of actors within the judiciary (judges), and
we need to know the preferences of politicians. These preferences are conceptualized
here (and later operationalized) as ideology. Notably, explanations centering on ideology
have a different analytic emphasis than those centering on electoral competition. Where
election-based explanations highlight the rational, cost-benefit incentives faced by
relevant actors as well as strategic considerations, ideology-based explanations highlight
cultural-ideational factors – non-material considerations in a decision that generally have
some moral or ethical character. In this regard, ideology-based accounts emphasize the
role of ideas and culture. In short, ideas matter.30
Some scholars anticipate that the judiciary cannot reform unless there is a strong
commitment for reform by judges in top positions of the judiciary (Nagle 2000). Others
have argued that it takes a strong commitment, impetus, or “will” from the state - in the
executive, legislative, or judicial branches - to implement reform (Hammergren 1993;
2002). Tsebelis (2002) uses the term “government commitment” to signal the role of
ideological intentions or policy preferences in his discussion of veto players and policy
choices. Thus, political will can be though of as an identification between actors and the
goals of reform despite the presence of obstacles and constraints. In the Latin American
context, Nagle argues that judges - spoiled by corruption and other rents collected due to
30

Thanks to Lisa Hilbink for helping me think about the role of ideas.
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their privileged positions – can often become obstacles to reform because it is not in their
interest to alter the status quo. That is, judges develop interests of their own –
institutional, career, or perhaps pecuniary – that do not necessarily coincide with the
public interest (Staton 2007). The commitment to change the status quo, therefore, must
come from a deep identification with the goals of reform. It is reasonable to expect that
this commitment would come from new political actors or political actors that are
ideologically driven, or from judges or other institutional actors that are driven by ideas
rather than interests. In short, new and ideological actors serve as political or institutional
entrepreneurs, and these entrepreneurs seek to implement policies that reflect their
ideological commitments.
Comparative studies of reform teach us that both left- and right-leaning actors
favor judicial reform, but for different reasons. On the left, programmatic actors seek to
enhance the real effect of individual rights and liberties, contributing to the quality of
democratic citizenship. On the right, actors tend to emphasize the security and
predictability of commercial transactions, as well as public safety. That is, leftist parties
favor democracy promotion, while parties on the right favor market promotion. Morton
and Knopf’s (2000) work on the Liberal Party in Canada supports this expectation. Epp’s
(1998) comparative research on “support structures for legal mobilization” also suggests
parties with strong links to activist networks will exert greater pressure for judicial
change. Gilman (2002; 2006) also finds that “partisan coalitions” of different ideological
alignments shape the judiciary in different ways, and Hirschl’s (2004) study of
constitutionalism and “juristocracy” in four countries found these changes were
motivated by neoliberalism.
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Focusing on the Iberian Peninsula and Latin America, existing research suggests a
similar link between programmatic party commitments and policy change in the legal and
judicial arenas. Hilbink’s (2007a) study of the stagnating effect of a conservative
“institutional ideology” on the Chilean judiciary highlights the role of ideas, and her
(2007b) analysis of the key roles of (a) leftist parties and (b) a progressive clergy in
“politicizing the law in order to liberalize politics” shows how the currency of ideas
shaped both the cultural “frame” and organizational technologies of judicial mobilization
in Spain’s transition to democracy. In Brazil, the leftist PT initiated the early effort in
1992 to bring about a national judicial reform (Sadek 1998). In Mexico, Mizrahi (1999)
finds that crime control increased with the presence of the rightist National Action Party
(PAN) in power in Mexico.Thus, leftist and rightist parties are expected to foment
judicial reform more than their centrist counterparts. Populist, clientelist, and other
parties not easily classified along a left-right spectrum are expected to signal support for
democracy-oriented policies to maintain a populist appearance. However, these gestures
will lack programmatic commitments necessary for adequate funding or long-term
support, and thus are expected to have little effect.
Identifying ideological orientation across the two countries poses different
challenges. In Mexico, this coding is relatively simple in a party system that is dominated
by three main parties. Political parties evolved out of a dominant-party system under the
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) that ruled national politics until 2000. Due to its
patrimonial and corporatist structure, as well as its hegemonic and authoritarian tradition,
the PRI is not expected to be one of the ideological actors driving positive changes in
judicial performance. Rather, the PRI is a non-ideological, populist party (Coppedge
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1997, 6; Hecock 2006) that has depended historically on broad latitude for patronage,
corporatism, corruption, and vote-buying. The PRI is therefore expected to have a
negative relationship with institutional change and judicial spending at the state level. It
would not be in the interest of the PRI to promote institutional performance – including
judicial performance – that increases the checks and balances on its style of governing.
Additionally, in spite of promoting a prominent judicial reform at the federal level in
1994, the PRI’s motivations for that reform remain unclear. While some observers
suggest the 1994 reform shows the PRI is in favor of strong courts, the evidence is at best
inconclusive and at worst indicates far more paroquial interests within the PRI. Although
the reform changed the composition of the national supreme court (SCJN) and created a
new mechanism for judicial review, the reform also allowed the PRI to control the
selection of the 11 new justices on the SCJN, and placed substantial limitations on the
effectiveness of constitutional review, limiting standing, statutes of limitations, and the
effect of decisions (Ríos-Figueroa 2007; Ríos-Figueroa and Taylor 2006). Moreover, the
behavior of the Mexican Supreme Court between 1995 and 2005, both in the “strategic
dismissal” of cases and in actual decisions, highlights the PRI-protective aspects of the
reform (Magaloni and Sanchez 2006; Magaloni 2008).31
Conversely, the center-left Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and the
rightist PAN (Coppedge 1997; Bruhn 1999; Mizrahi 2003; Shirk 2005) are both
ideological parties that have strong commitments towards judicial reform. The PAN is a
31

It is worth noting that in separate interviews during field research, two former PRI politicians suggested
that the main motivation of the national reform was to control the composition of the supreme court
(Interviews 13; 47). A third interview noted the same, qualifying that the main thrust of the reform was to
align the judiciary with economic priorities, primarly international trade and investment (including the
North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA), and that removing (all but one of) the existing
justices was perhaps the only way to break up the old order that hindered progress towards these priorities
(Interview 53).
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conservative party of the right, with strong business ties, a free market ideology, and a
vocal stance on increasing public safety. It is reasonable to expect the PAN to pressure
for reform in the area of commercial and business law, and to pressure for greater
efficiency in commercial transactions. Business interests also favor public order and
security for their investments, so the PAN is expected to exert a positive influence on
judicial strength, both for its own business base and as an indicator of a secure
environment for investment and other commercial activity. The PRD is a progressive
party of the left, with strong ties to social movements and activist networks. The PRD is
therefore expected to pressure for reform in the area of public justice and criminal
procedures, highlighting issues of human and civil rights. In sum, judicial strengthening
is expected where either the PAN or PRD are dominant, but no significant improvement
is expected where the PRI is dominant.
In Brazil and Mexico, conservative parties of the right, with strong business ties
and a free market ideology, are expected to pressure for reform in the area of commercial
and business law, and to pressure for faster and smoother commercial transactions.
Business interests also favor public order and security for their investments, so the
rightist parties are expected to exert a positive influence on judicial spending. In contrast,
progressive parties on the left, with strong ties to social movements and activist networks,
are expected to pressure for reform in the area of public justice and criminal procedures.
That is, both rightist and leftist parties are expected to pressure for stronger judiciaries,
though for ideologically different reasons. Thus, increased judicial strength is expected
where either right or left parties are dominant, but no significant improvement is expected
where centrist, populist, or clientelist parties are dominant.
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In Brazil, all states emerged from a de facto two-party system in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. Prior to 1979, the military regime restricted partisan organization to two
parties – (1) ARENA, which represented the sectors supportive of the regime and had
roots in the conservative parties of pre-1964 Brazil, and (2) MDB, or Movimento
Democrático Brasileiro, which represented the opposition. Since then, Brazil’s party
system has undergone substantial transformations. First, it appeared that the party system
was expanding and fragmenting beyond control, and that ideological commitments were
weak or nonexistent. Both of these patterns turned out to be short-lived, due perhaps
more to a temporary adjustment to electoral freedoms than to an essential lack of stability
of ideological orientations in Brazil. Importantly, the 1988 Constitution describes
political parties as “national” in character, and a growing number of scholars identify the
systematic nature of ideological identification in the Brazilian electorate and the
programmatic-ideological nature of Brazilian parties (Meneguello 1998; Mainwaring,
Meneguello, and Power 2000; Singer 2000; Martins Rodrigues 2002, 33-39, 48). Despite
some regional variations in party system institutionalization and the degree of oligarquic
control of the state apparatus (Meneguello 1998; de Paula 2005), the national party
system has stabilized and seems to have become more institutionalized (Meneguello
1998; Martin Rodrigues 2002). The extent to which this institutionalization is reproduced
in the provincial party systems is in part the subject of this study.
Parties in the Brazilian states are classified along a left-right ideological spectrum
relying on Coppedge (1997), de Lima Jr. (1997), Meneguello (1998), Mainwaring,
Meneguello and Power (2000), Martins Rodrigues (2002), and Power and Zucco
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(2009).32 The seven most important parties in the time frame analyzed are, from left to
right, PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores), PDT (Partido Democrático Trabalhista), PSDB
(Partido da Social Democracía Brasileira), PMDB (Partido do Movimento Democrático
Brasileiro), PTB (Partido Trabalhisto Brasileiro), DEM (Democratas, formerly Partido
da Frente Liberal, or PFL), and PP (Partido Progressista, formerly Partido Progressista
Brasileiro, or PPB). PT is on the left end of the political spectrum and, along with the
Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), is widely regarded as the only unquestionably
ideological party formed on a foundation of social movements or forces (Giusti Tavares
1997, 177; Meneguello, 30; Schmitt 2000, 49). PDT is center-left, founded by Leonel
Brizola in 1980 after returning from exile, and building on the tradition of the center-left,
pre-1964 PTB founded by Getulio Vargas (Schmitt, 26-27).33 The PMDB is centrist,
though it drifted towards the center-right after 2001 (Power and Zucco 2009). The PSDB
changed its ideological character in the period analyzed. From its leftward breakaway
from the PMDB in 1988 until 1992, the party was center-left. However, between 1993
and 1996 it drifted rightward, and from 1997 onward, Power and Zucco coded it as
center-right, to the right of the PMDB. The PTB is center-right, and the PFL/DEM and
PP are on the right. Other minor parties that won governorships from 1982 forward were
the PSB (left), PCB/PPS (left), PSL (center-right), PL (right), PRN (right), and PTR
32

The discussion in Martins Rodrigues includes comments on work by Kinzo (1993), Figueiredo e Limongi
(1994; 1999), Limongi and Figueiredo (1998), Mainwaring and Scully (1994; 1995), and Novaes (1994),
among others.
33

In 1979, Brizola originally intended to revive the PTB after the military’s political reforms that allowed
more than the two oficial parties (EC . However, a conservative group – led by a distant niece of Vargas,
Yvette Vargas – challenged Brizola for the right to use the initials, and the TSE decided in favor of the
conservative group, leading Brizola to form the center-left PDT, which was truer to the policy
commitments of the original PTB. Evidence of the conservative nature of the post-1979 PTB includes the
fact that three of the four federal deputies that formed the new PTB originated from ARENA, making the
composition of the PTB remarkably similar to that of the PDS (more than 80% of PDS deputies and
senators came from ARENA). Conversely, the PDT had 10 deputies in the lower chamber of Congress, and
not one of them came from ARENA (Kinzo 1988, 209; Schmitt 2000, 50-51).
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(right).
It should be noted that this study does not argue that the ideological behavior of
parties is uniform across all 26 states. It is not. Rather, the argument regarding the
programmatic effect of Brazilian parties emphasizes that, while there are differences in
the ideological position of parties across the states, the parties maintain a similar position
relative to other parties within individual states. For example, the PT in Rio Grande do
Sul is different from the PT in Pará, but in both places they occupy a position to the left
of other parties in the states. Similarly, the DEM may be clientelist or neoliberal across
different parts of the country, but in all states it anchors the right end of the political
spectrum. Thus, the ideological continuum may be wider or narrower in different states,
but in all states the PT anchors the left and the DEM and PP anchor the right, with the
other parties falling in between in a left-to-right spectrum.

2.4. Integrating Competition, Ideology, and Causal Logics
Following the arguments above, reform in the Mexican and Brazilian states can
occur under many conditions, but we expect it to be strongest where electoral competition
breaks up traditional patronage structures – associated historically with the PRI in
Mexico and with ARENA/PDS-based parties in Brazil – and where new, ideologically
motivated politicians (e.g., PAN or PRD in Mexico, or PT in Brazil) coincide with
ideologically sympathetic judges. Reform is not expected where traditional, authoritarian
elites remain dominant, e.g., single-veto player environments consisting of authoritarian
elites. In these conditions, the veto player logic can be qualified as an “antagonistic” veto
player logic. Conversely, especially strong instances of reform are expected where
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opposition parties become locally dominant, e.g., single-veto-player environments where
former opposition parties gain control of both branches of government. These are the
optimum conditions for positive judicial change. Given the positive effect of this kind of
single-veto-player environment, the veto player logic can be qualified in these cases as an
“agonistic” veto player logic. For instance, in Mexico, we should not observe reform in
noncompetitive (single-veto-player) PRI environments; this is a political environment
that is antagonistic to reform. However, we should observe reform in (1) noncompetitive
(single-veto-player) PAN environments, (2) noncompetitive (single-veto-player) PRD
environments, and in (3) competitive (multi-veto-player) environments where judges are
either PAN- or PRD-sympathetic and lead reform initiatives. Both (1) and (2) are
instances of the agonistic veto-player logic, and (3) offers an example of the opportunity
logic. If reform does not occur where parties dominate the executive and legislative
branches, a reasonable inference is that the party is not ideologically committed to
reform. In all cases above, competition and ideology interact to shape judicial outcomes.
Table 2.2 summarizes these theoretical expectations, identifying relevant causal logics
where appropriate.
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Table 2.2. Implied Casal Logic of Reform Using an Integrated Framework.

Reform Preferences
(External and Internal)
Political majority (non-ideological)
anti-reform
Judges anti-reform

Political majority anti-reform
Judges pro-reform

Political majority pro-reform
Judges anti-reform

Political majority pro-reform
Judges pro-reform

Electoral Competition
(External)
Low
High

No

Low

Veto player logic
(antagonistic)
Patronage preservation

Politician led
Re-election,
Insurance, and
Veto player logics
Patronagepreservation

Low

Low

Judge-led
Mobilizing techniques?
Framing?

Opportunity logic
Veto player logic
(antagonistic)

1
3

2

4

Low

High

Veto player logic
(antagonistic)
Ideology?
“reconstructive”
mandate?

All logics

High

High

Veto-player logic
(agonistic)
(politician-led
and judge-led)

All logics
Including agonistic
& antagonistic VP
logics; outcome
depends on strength
of coalition
(politician-led
and judge-led)

5
7

6

8

Along the left side, Table 2.2 lists four possible preference configurations among
politicians and judges. The top row lists two main competition settings – low (e.g.,
single-veto-player) and high (e.g., multi-veto-player). Boxes 1-8 note the likelihood of
reform (No/Low/Med/High), whether politicians or judges lead reform efforts, and what
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causal logics or mechanisms should be relevant. The space is empty where reform is not
expected (box 1). It should be noted that this alternative framework refocuses our
attention on ideology and the role of ideas. Electoral competition is not conceptualized as
a necessary condition for reform, while ideology can be a sufficient one. Specifically,
reform is hypothesized as possible, even probable, in three low-competition settings.
Moreover, ideologically-motivated judges can lobby to persuade politicians to alter their
preferences, as in boxes 4 and 8. Judges can target the political majority in the former,
and the political minority in the latter.

2.5. Conclusion
The theoretical framework highlights the influence of electoral competition and
ideology, drawing on rational-choice, strategic, and social movement accounts of
institutional change, and highlighting where the different theoretical accounts coincide
with each other and what specific causal logics they yield. The causal logics generate
specific expectations regarding both the average relationship we should observe in the
large-N analysis and the precise causal patterns – including key actors, events,
mechanisms and motivations, as well as sequence and timing – that we should observe in
the small-N, process-based analysis. The following chapter turns to these different
methods, discussing the special strengths of subnational and multi-method research. The
next chapter also explains how the large-N and small-N methods are integrated in the
current study, and the strengths of the small-N, process-based analysis in adjudicating
among the distinct causal logics discussed above.
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3. Methods
Scaled-Down, Cross-Border Nesting:
Subnational Nested Analysis in Two Different Countries
3.1. Introduction
The empirical analysis sequences large-N and small-N methods, explicitly
integrating the case studies from the small-N analysis within the sample analyzed
econometrically. First, using court budgets as a proxy for judicial strength as the
dependent variable, time-series cross-section analyses in each country show the
significant relationship that both electoral competition and ideology have with court
strength. Post-estimation diagnostics identify well-predicted (low-residual) and poorlypredicted (high residual) observations or “state-years”, leading to the identification of
generally well-predicted and poorly-predicted cases or states. Based on these diagnostics
and variation on key independent variables or the dependent variable, I identify
promising candidates for “model-testing” case studies (Lieberman 2005), and build
small-N research designs around these cases. In this regard, the large-N analysis serves to
both test some of the causal arguments in Chapter 2 and structure a more purposeful
selection of cases for in-depth analysis. The small-N research design in each country is
composed of three states, and each trio consists of a model-testing case and two
additional states that, together with the first, represent the full variation along key
independent variables of competition and ideology. That is, each set of cases reflects the
“trilogy” of political variation in provincial party systems in each country. Having
selected the cases for qualitative analysis, I employ theory-guided process tracing (Hall
2003; Falleti 2006) to further test the causal relationships anticipated in Chapter 2. The
process tracing relies on 115 personal, semi-structured interviews with judges and other
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legal elites, document analysis, and direct observation carried out during 22 months of
fieldwork.
The empirical analysis draws on the methodological strengths of a subnational
level of analysis, the selection of data and cases from two different countries, the
combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, and the combination of “nested” and
“structured” logics of case selection to bolster causal inferences. Indeed, the combination
of these four research design elements provides analytic gains in terms of measurement
(i.e., construct) and internal validity, enhancing the validity of conclusions.
The following sections discuss each of these four components of the research
design in greater detail. Reprising Snyder (2001b), Section 3.2 highlights the strengths
and weaknesses of subnational research, noting how the current research design draws on
the strengths while seeking to overcome the two weaknesses identified by Snyder.
Specifically, Snyder notes strengths regarding the increased number of observations and
the enhanced ability to make controlled comparisons, along with measurement and
theory-building gains. However, he also highlights two potential weaknesses of
subnational analysis – (i) reduced generalizability and (ii) threats to inference due to the
interdependence of observations. I follow Snyder’s suggestions for overcoming the first
weakness, but I add my own observations about overcoming the second. Regarding the
latter, Snyder warns that the lack of independence of observations undermines the
validity of inferences, but I argue this is mainly a concern in the quantitative, statistical,
correlation-based research tradition. Following Hall (2003) and Brady and Collier (2004),
process-based inferences are different from correlation-based inferences. Thus,
observational independence is less of a threat to inferential validity in qualitative research
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that draws on “causal process observations” and a different, process-based logic of
inquiry. Section 3.3 highlights the strengths of multi-method research in general, and
subsequently details the particular approach to integrating quantitative and qualitative
methods employed here. This section is therefore divided into three subsections that
discuss each the following: (a) the quantitative methods employed in the large-N,
econometric phase of analysis, specifically, time-series cross-section (TSCS) methods;
(b) the process of case selection, which explicitly links the quantitative and qualitative
phases of analysis by “nesting” case studies within the same samples analyzed
econometrically (Coppedge 2005; Lieberman 2005) and then builds a structured,
controlled, small-N qualitative research design (Collier 1993; Snyder 2001a) around the
nested cases; and (c) the theory-guided, process-based qualitative methods (Hall 2003;
Falleti 2006) employed in the small-N phase of analysis in a total of six states (three in
Brazil and three in Mexico) over the course of 22 months of fieldwork. The chapter
concludes by highlighting the strengths of the particular combination of methodological
choices in the current research design.
Aside from clarifying the methods of the current project, this chapter addresses
four methodological concerns for future comparative research: (i) the ways in which
process-based, qualitative analysis at the subnational level can neutralize Snyder’s
(2001b, 103-104) methodological concerns regarding policy diffusion and the
interdependence of observations; (ii) particularly promising aspects of research designs
that pair intra-national and inter-national cases in regions like Latin America; (iii)
understudied opportunities for case selection provided by nesting case studies within
time-series cross-section datasets, especially at the subnational level; and (iv) the
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advantage of combining different strategies for case selection, namely, “nested” analysis
with small-N, controlled comparisons, potentially including most-similar systems (MSS)
or most-different systems (MDS) designs.

3.2. Subnational Research: Leveraging Strengths, Overcoming Weaknesses
Echoing Lijphart’s (1971, 689) advice on the strengths of “intra-national”
research designs (“the advantage of intra-unit comparison is that inter-unit differences
can be held constant”), Snyder (2001b) issued a clarion call for cross-territorial analysis
within single countries.34 Snyder reminded comparativists that subnational research
provides three distinct methodological advantages: (1) greater unit homogeneity vis-à-vis
whole countries, controlling for country-level factors and decreasing the number of
plausible alternative explanations, therefore providing greater analytic leverage and more
controlled comparisons; (2) increased measurement validity, or construct validity; and (3)
improved understanding of the uneven process of policy change across political units
within a single country, strengthening theory-building exercises.
In the study of state courts in Brazil and Mexico, Snyder’s first point means that it
makes more sense analytically to compare the judiciaries of two states within a single
country, e.g., Hidalgo and Michoacán in Mexico, or Acre and Maranhão in Brazil, than to
compare the national supreme courts of Brazil and Mexico, or the national courts of any

34

Notably, subnational research had begun well before Snyder’s call. Snyder cites several early examples,
including Lipset (1966) and Linz and de Miguel (1966), but more recent work begun in the 1990s includes
Beer (2001; 2003) and Snyder’s own research in Mexico (1999a; 1999b; 2001a). Additional examples of
this kind of research design, testaments to the influence of Snyder’s article, include Hecock (2006; 2007),
Jepsen (2006), Cleary (2007), Giraudy (2009), Armesto (forthcoming 2009), and Micozzi (forthcoming
2009).
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two countries, for that matter.35 In the subnational design, we can control for structural
and historical similarities, including macroeconomic context, the timing and nature of
transitions to democracy, social and cultural patterns, as well as legal culture and the
timing and content of national judicial reform efforts.36 That is, there is less random
heterogeneity in a sample of subnational units within a single country than in a sample of
national units in cross-country research. Following Sartori’s admonishment that “to
compare is to control”, and thus that we should enhance the extent to which our research
subjects are “comparable” (1970, 1035),37 Snyder’s emphasis on subnational designs
makes methodological sense.38
Snyder’s second point is that the subnational level of analysis is advantageous
because of the closer correspondence between concepts and variables. That is, we should
be able to more accurately measure concepts like “judicial power”, “judicial strength”, or
“rule of law” at the subnational level than at the national level, strengthening
measurement or construct validity.39 These measurement gains overcome what Rokkan

35

Paralleling Snyder’s analysis of one sector of the economy – the coffee sector – this study analyzes one
institutional sector of the state – the judicial sector.
36
As noted by Eulau (1966, 397-398), using his own work on the State Legislative Research Project
(SLRP) as a central point of departure, “[r]esearch in [U.S.] state politics seemed to be a particularly
opportune way of advancing comparative analysis because the number of uncontrolled variables would be
substantially reduced: a considerable degree of institutional similarity and behavioral uniformity could be
assumed to exist from state to state.”
37
The issue is “comparability” (Eulau, 398). Smelser (1967, 114-115) also notes that "intra-unit
comparisons may prove more fruitful than inter-unit comparison” because less heterogeneity inheres in the
former. See also, Lijphart (1971, 689), stating “comparability can also be enhanced by focusing on
intranation instead of internation comparisons.”
38
“[I]f ‘control’ is the sine qua non of all scientific procedure, it would certainly seem easier to obtain in a
single culture, even one as heterogeneous as that of the United States, than across cultures” (Eulau 1966,
397).
39
Some observers may note that judicial budgets, which are examined in Chapters 4 and 5, are not the best
measures of judicial strength. Still, they are better measures of judicial strength throughout Mexico than a
single measure of judicial spending at the national level for federal courts or, as is more often the case, the
high court. Additionally, the qualitative analysis expands the range of outcomes examined to measures of
administrative capacity and a much more textured discussion of court strength as it relates to the daily lives
of ordinary citizens in different contexts than would be possible at the national level.
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(1970) called the “whole nation bias” of cross-national research. 40 Where cross-national
research relies on national averages or means to operationalize a concept, or infers
national values from “best known cases”, e.g., drawing conclusions about the whole of
Brazil from well-known states like São Paulo or Rio de Janeiro, subnational research also
overcomes “mean-spirited analysis” (emphasis added) and “misuse of the best known
case” (Snyder, 99, also calling the latter “invalid part-to-whole mapping”). As one
Brazilian judge noted, “you cannot see Brazil through [the state of] Rio Grande do Sul,
[and] you cannot see Brazil through [the state of] Maranhão; states within the same
country are completely different realities” (Interview 160).41 Thus, measurement and
coding gains from intra-national analysis of cross-territorial variation within a single
country yield coding gains for subnational units that enhance our ability to make accurate
causal inferences.42 Further, when the time comes for inter-national comparisons, these
measurement and codings gains would allow a better basis for comparison since each
nation is better characterized.43
The third point Snyder makes has received growing attention in the last two
decades in studies of democracy, democratization, and democratic governance. That is,
large-scale processes like political or economic development occur in territorially uneven
patterns within large countries. O’Donnell (1993) makes this point about state-building,
noting that the state can have a very strong presence in some areas, usually metropolitan
centers, but that in other “brown areas”, usually rural peripheries, the state is almost
40

Also cited in Lijphart (1975, 167). See also, Snyder’s discussion of Hagopian (1996) (Snyder 2001b,
106-107, fn. 30).
41
Author’s own translation; original Portuguese: “você não pode ver o Brasil pelo Rio Grande do Sul; não
pode ver o Brasil pelo Maranhão…estados no mesmo pais são realidades totalmente distintas.”
42
Abstractions from variable to concept make more sense intra-nationally, i.e., concepts travel better within
single countries than across countries, reducing the risks of conceptual “stretching” (Eulau, 401; citing
Sartori).
43
Thanks to Bill Stanley for suggesting this phrasing.
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completely absent or irrelevant to local affairs. Stated otherwise, there is no public
presence in some parts of large countries, leading to patterns of privatization – of
resources, decision-making, and even forceful coercion and violence (e.g., militias,
private security groups, or vigilanteism) – that are antithetical to democratic practice and
citizenship. Indeed, one of the greatest challenges for students of new democracies is to
provide better explanations for how to de-privatize what should be public functions, i.e.,
how to institutionalize public functions, or how to make institutions less territorially
uneven. This unevenness is what Snyder labels the “patchwork pattern” of the state,
democracy, development, or any other major political phenomena, and he sees
subnational research as offering several valuable corrections for theory building
regarding the “dynamic interconnection between levels and regions” of a regime (Snyder
2001b, 100). Resonating with Snyder’s second point about measurement validity, failure
to capture and understand this unevenness across territorial units or regime levels can
lead to misleading inferences and “skew” theory building (Snyder 2001b, 94).
A central part of the argument presented in the current project is that the strength
(and strengthening) of state courts in Brazil and Mexico exhibits this unevenness.
Following Linz and de Miguel’s (1966) work on subnational variation across Spain’s
eight territorial divisions, or the “eight Spains,” and noting that Brazil and Mexico have
27 and 32 states, respectively (including their federal districts), the current project could
be retitled court strength in the “27 Brazils” and “32 Mexicos.” A better understanding of
how policies regarding the judiciary change in the 27 Brazils or 32 Mexicos, and of how
policy change at the local level interacts with policy change at the national or
supranational levels, meets the theory-building dimension of Snyder’s appeal for
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subnational research.
However, Snyder also notes two weaknesses of subnational designs. First, the
design reduces our ability to generalize to other countries or other levels of analysis.
Second, the very strength of unit homogeneity generates threats to our ability to draw
inferences due to the interdependence of units, i.e., the lack of independence among
observations, because of policy diffusion, borrowing, or migration (Snyder, 103-104).
Lieberman (2005) expresses a similar concern in noting that we should avoid picking
cases that are close to each other because of the risk of hitting a “political neighborhood”.
Both of these vulnerabilities can be overcome. I follow Snyder’s suggestions for
overcoming the first. Drawing on recent developments in qualitative methodology, I offer
my own suggestions for how small-N, process-based research overcomes the second.
The first weakness – that findings are less generalizable – asks us to consider the
following questions. Beginning with the examples from Brazil and Mexico, why should
the lessons we draw from Mexican states be true for Brazilian states, or vice-versa? Why
should a study of Argentine provinces tell us anything useful about Canadian provinces,
U.S. states, German lander, Russian republics, or cantons in China?44 Pressing further
still, why should a study of subnational units teach us anything meaningful about national
units, even small national units like Ecuador or El Salvador? Following Lijphart’s (1971;
1975) and Snyder’s (2001b) own advice to combine “intra-national” and “inter-national”
data, as well as Snyder’s additional suggestion to select non-contiguous states within
44

The examples of Russian republics and Chinese cantons might raise the added concerns that China is
autocratic and Russia is not “as democratic” as the other countries mentioned, and therefore that lessons
learned from democratic contexts, e.g., Argentine provinces, might not travel as well to non-democratic
contexts. These concerns simply restate the importance of comparability, i.e., that the concepts and process
of political change in democracies and autocracies are not comparable. However, a colleague (Kim Nolan)
and I have often marveled about striking similarities between Mexican and Russian politics, prompting us
to rethink a comparability question, “how Mexican is Moscow?” Perhaps Mexican states can, after all,
teach us meaningful lessons about Russian republics.
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each country (Snyder 2001b, 97, 104), this project overcomes the first concern by
selecting data and cases from non-adjoining states in two different countries. Notably, the
trade off is that states can be from very disparate regions, thereby reducing the
comparability of cases. However, all empirical analysis rests on trade-offs (see Gerring
2001) and “fine judgments” (Hall 2003, 392), and the trade-off here errs in favor of
generalizability, mindful that the qualitative analysis should be attentive to the influence
of regional disparities among the cases. In short, if we can draw the same or similar
conclusions from non-neighboring states within each country, as well as across both
Brazil and Mexico, we can be more confident in their validity.
This discussion of generalizability raises an additional question regarding case
selection, namely, why Brazil and Mexico? Why not other countries? Section 3.3 below
addresses why I selected certain states within Brazil and Mexico for the in-depth case
studies, but why did I pick Brazil and Mexico in the first place?45 The answer to this
question is in part practical and personal, and in part methodological. First, in order to
examine subnational court systems – state courts – there are only a limited number of
federal systems from which to choose, and my family background in Mexico disposed me
to favor that country, or at least to remain within the Latin American region. Once within
Latin America, the choice of federal systems is effectively restricted to Argentina, Brazil,
and Mexico. Among these three cases, it would have been easier to select Argentina and
Mexico, since Brazil required me to learn Portuguese (I already spoke Spanish). It might
have been easier – and cheaper – to pick Argentina and Brazil, since travel between them
would be shorter. However, Mexico and Brazil offered the most variation across two

45

I ask this question self-consciously and somewhat contemptuously, fully aware that Americanists are
rarely, if ever, asked to justify their country selection.
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background conditions: (1) style of authoritarianism (Argentina and Brazil both endured
military regimes, where Mexico’s had a dominant-party regime); and (2) temporal span
of authoritarianism (Argentina and Brazil both had uneven patterns of autocracy and
democracy throughout much of the 20th century, but had recently lived through similar
phases of autocracy, 1966-1973 and 1976-1983 in Argentina and 1964-1985 in Brazil,
whereas Mexico was emerging from seven decades of authoritarian rule). Moreover,
Brazil and Mexico have different party systems and styles of judicial federalism. Brazil’s
party system consists of multiple parties, with 14 different parties winning governor races
in the post-authoritarian period, whereas Mexico’s is essentially a three-party system
dominated by the PRI, PAN, and PRD. Counterintuively, Brazil’s judiciary is highly
centralized in terms of institutional structure and design, while Mexico’s judiciary is
highly decentralized. As a result, there is greater system-level variation across Mexico
and Brazil than across either Mexico and Argentina or Argentina and Brazil. Returning to
the discussion of generalizability, if the analysis across Mexico and Brazil reaches the
same conclusions regarding causal pathways despite these differences, then our
confidence in these conclusions will be stronger. Thus, the selection of these two
countries draws on the advantages mentioned above of combining intra-national and
inter-national research designs, i.e., of conducting subnational research in more than one
country and maximizing the variation in relevant variables across the two countries in
order to enhance the validity of conclusions.
With regards to the second weakness of subnational designs identified by Snyder
– the interdependence of observations – Snyder does not offer any suggestions for how to
overcome or neutralize this obstacle. I argue that the concern regarding the independence
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of observations is, in part, misplaced. Such a concern is appropriate in quantitative,
frequentist settings, but is less of a threat to inferential validity in qualitative, processbased analysis, where the logic of inquiry is different. Specifically, small-N, qualitative
research that employs process-based analysis of the kind used here (see Section 3.3.3
below for fuller discussion of process tracing) draws on an inferential logic that is not
hampered by the interdependence of observations. More cautiously, it might be the case
that the processes experienced in the examined states are unrepresentative of states
generally. That is, a causal process detected in one state might be either idiosyncratic or
the result of some undetected causal dependence that affects other states. With regard to
the former, the selection of more than one case for the small-N research design reduces
the risk of generalizing from idiosyncracies. 46 With regard to the latter, considering that
“causal analysis is inherently sequence analysis” (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens
1992, 4; cited in Thelen 1999, 390), process-based inferences enjoy an analytic advantage
over correlation-based inferences in being able to detect this causal dependence. That is
not to say that process tracing or historical analysis is a panacea, but that the method does
provide leverage for at least reducing or minimizing risks derived from causal
interdependence, leverage that frequentist assumptions overlook.
This point deserves further emphasis. Recent developments in qualitative
methodology assert a fundamental difference in the inferential logic of large-N, statistical
analyses and small-N, process-based analyses. The conventional view of case studies and
small-N research is that this approach is a weak version of statistical analysis. Within this

46

Thanks to Bill Stanley for helping me think about this, as well as the broader issue of trade-offs inherent
in choosing among different research strategies.
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frequentist view, case studies are fraught with problems of selection bias47 and
indeterminate results associated with “omitted variables”, “too many variables, too few
cases”, or interdependence. Thus, the pervasive prescription is simply to increase the
number of cases (Lijphart 1971; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). That is, to build a
dataset for quantitative, statistical analysis.
Qualitative methodologists respond differently. First, scholars have sought to
clarify the distinction between different types of observations, or between “case” and
“observation”, noting that a single case can yield multiple observations, or that a single
observation (albeit, in context) can have a high degree of probative value. Thus,
criticisms regarding overdetermination or indeterminacy associated with the “too many
variables” concern are largely misplaced, even if we think of policy diffusion or
interdependence as adding an additional variable to the examination of a single case.
More importantly, the nature of an observation can be different if one is highlighting a
process or mechanism than if one is simply measuring a variable and looking for
statistical correlations with other variables. In the language of Rethinking Social Inquiry,
statistical inference based on average effects across a large numbers of “dataset
observations” (or “DSOs”) in a rectangular dataset is not the same as the logic of
inference based on examining “causal process observations” (or “CPOs”) in qualitative
research (Brady and Collier 2004).48 DSOs are pieces of data that are quantified, placed
in a rectangular dataset, and then analyzed for average effects or correlations in the
47

Case selection is addressed fully in section 4.3. However, selection bias in qualitative research largely
reduces to a problem of selecting cases on the dependent variable when the range of that variable is
truncated, i.e., when only high (or low) values of that variable are analyzed (Collier and Mahoney 1996;
Collier, Mahoney, and Seawright 2004). This is not the case here, where the values on all measures of
judicial strength vary across the three cases in each country.
48
In an essay on causal mechanisms that resonates with the discussion here, Hedström (2008, 320) notes
that “statistical inference” and “causal inference” are “different kinds of activities”,
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conventional frequentist mold. If the strength of these correlations crosses a certain
threshold of probability, the analyst can conventionally make an argument regarding
causation. The analysis of CPOs, however, is different. Rectangular datasets, average
effects, and correlations are immaterial. Rather, the analyst judges observed causal
processes or “chains” – including key events or markers, as well as the timing or
sequence of these events – against anticipated causal patterns derived from theory. In this
regard, a single case can yield several observations along a causal chain, or even several
different causal chains. Moreover, a single causal chain can be used to test theory, or a
single observation along this chain can have great causal value, and the extent to which
the theory is confirmed or disconfirmed helps to refine or build new theories, though
problems of generalization may persist. An observed causal process – consisting of
multiple CPOs – may match the anticipated causal patterns, or it may reveal new
antecedent, intervening, or conditioning factors (Hall 2003). Further, multiple
observations from within a single case offer different kinds of evidence – some strong
and some weak – that must be evaluated for their probative value, and a single, strong
observation can offer evidence that confirms or falsifies a theory (Van Evera 1997;
Bennett 2008). Ultimatley, a single observation can have high probative value and
inferential weight depending on the kind of evidence it is. In Van Evera’s terms, “hoop”
tests and “smoking gun” tests can offer decisive negative and positive evidence,
respectively – ruling causal factors in or out – and some observations are “doubly
decisive” in that they can offer both kinds of evidence. 49
Recalling Snyder’s concern regarding the interdependence of observations, the
frequentist, correlation-based logic of inquiry of quantitative analysis assumes
49

As Van Evera notes, most evidence is of a fourth, less conclusive type, that is, “straw in the wind”.
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observations are identical and independent (identically and independently distributed, or
“i.i.d.”), and the concern is that subnational case studies, in addition to violating the other
assumptions of statistical research, violate the independence assumption, as well.
However, following these recent corrections in qualitative methodology, the language,
terms, and assumptions of statistical inference are misapplied if used to describe the
standards of inferential reasoning in process tracing. Small-N, process-based analysis,
rather than being a “distinctly fragile” version of statistical analysis, 50 is a distinctly
stronger method for the task of examining whether interdependence shapes outcomes of
interest. That is, the risk of contamination across interdependent observations is strong in
purely quantitative research, but this risk is in large part neutralized in qualitative
research that employs process tracing. In the current project, the phenomenon of policy
diffusion or borrowing is something to look for in the case studies, but its presence or
absence does not in and of itself make inferences drawn from these case studies less
valid. Indeed, not only can process-based case studies overcome the methodological
concerns associated with correlation-based analyses, but they also align more closely
with the new ontologies of comparative politics that understand causation in relation to
context, complexity, and conditionality (Hall 2003).51 Indeed, as suggested by Pierson
and Skocpol (2002, 711), a historical institutional approach employing process tracing
may be best suited for addressing causal complexity given that this approach assumes
50

The phrase is from Hall (2003, 381). Notably, Hall is criticizing this derogatory view of case-based
research.
51
Hall identifies the old ontology as that which “saw the political world as a sphere governed by immutable
causal regularities based on a few forceful causal variables” (387). Within such an ontology, it is
understandable that explanation would seen as “a matter of attaching weights to a small set of causal
variables”, that correlation-based regression analysis would be the privileged modus operandi, and that
parsimony would be valued over complexity (386-387). Notably, Hall does not discredit statistical analysis
and indeed states there is a methodological space for it. However, his draws on the advances in strategic
interaction, primarily noncompetitive game theory, as well as path dependence, to assert that context,
causal complexity and conditionality are centerpieces of the new ontology (384-387)
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“operative variables may not be independent of each other at all”, and understands that
“causally important variables are often bundled together in the real world”. Mahoney and
Rueschemeyer complement, arguing that historical analysis can help determine whether
cases and observations are independent of each other (2003b, 13), that is, whether
processes within subnational units are independent of processes occurring nationally or
across a large set of states.52
Brady (2008) notes that an examination of causation seeks to understand why and
how an empirical regularity occurs. This perspective emphasizes the identification of
causal processes, mechanisms, and motivations in order to be able to describe how and
why an empirical regularity occurs, paying special attention to the temporal nature of
causation – how causal processes activate and unfold over time (McKeown 2004, 150151; see Brady 2008; DeFelice 1986). This study seeks to do just that, identifying the
critical role of both politicians and judges in the process of judicial changes, and
emphasizing how judicial lobbying, labor actions, and litigation may shape the process of
change. For instance, judges lobby for material considerations, but they also lobby for
ideational change and new policy ideas. The movement of these ideas can often be traced
nationally, subnationally, and even internationally. In one example from Mexico, a local
judge who played a critical role in designing and implementing judicial councils at the
local level had studied the Spanish judicial council while a law student in Spain, had been
profoundly influenced by leading progressive judges in Spain, and had clerked for a
federal judge and at the federal judicial council in Mexico City. Thus, a policy idea
gained currency and viability through international and national influences, materializing
52

“[T]he question of whether and to what extent different cases are independent of each other can be
subjected ot nuanced examination through the intensive study of cases” (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer
2003b, 13)
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several years later at the local level. In short, the evidence may show that centrifugal
policy diffusion from the national center to the subnational margins occurs, or the
evidence may show diffusion does not occur. If diffusion does occur, it may take
unexpected forms, such as the international flow of ideas described in the example above,
rather than in the purely domestic, centrifugal, center-to-margin pattern from the national
capital to the provinces. In either case, by focusing on the causal process of change and
fleshing out mechanisms and motivations, the logic of inquiry is much less vulnerable to
violating the assumption of observational independence in quantitative analysis. In short,
concern about this assumption is misplaced in process-based, qualitative case studies at a
subnational level of analysis, thereby strengthening Snyder’s general argument regarding
the analytic value of subnational designs.
Moreover, where Snyder (2001b) warns against lapsing into false security of
comparability with subnational units, highlighting that there may be other confounding
factors, such as policy diffusion due to the interdependence of units, I warn that this is
also the risk with attempting to control for the similarity of non-political factors. In short,
careful case selection can enhance comparability, but never fully neutralizes alternative
explanations. Rather, just as with policy diffusion, careful and self-conscious within-case
analysis must be alert to alternative explanations – cultural, historical, ecological,
socioeconomic, or other – and leverage the evidence available to rule for or against these
explanations. In fact, if quantitative analysis assumes observations are identical and
independent, as is the case with standard OLS regressions, careful qualitative analysis is
always aware that observations are rarely (if ever) identical or independent, and therefore
examines dissimilarity or interdependence when found. Again, this is not a “degrees of
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freedom” problem. That hurdle of statistical inference is not a similar obstacle in processbased inferences. Thus, the process tracing employed in the small-N analysis is also wellsuited for examining behavioral equivalence and causal complexity, alternately
understood as equifinality or multi-causality. Thus, the combination of both quantitative
and qualitative methods ameliorates this concern in the present research. It is to this
integration of multiple methods that I now turn.

3.3. Multi-Method Research: Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Methods
This research sequences quantitative and qualitative methods to yield conclusions
that would not be possible using either method in isolation. First, I conducted time-series
cross-section analyses with court budgets as a proxy for judicial strength as a dependent
variable. Subsequently, quantitative tools for case selection identified statistically typical,
well-predicted observations (“state-years”) in each sample, nesting two “model-testing”
cases (Lieberman 2005) in each country – Acre in Brazil and Aguascalientes in Mexico. I
then built a small-N research design of structured, controlled comparisons in each
country around these two cases, resulting in a qualitative analysis of three states in each
country. Thus, each small-N design is anchored by the nested, model-testing case in each
country. The in-depth case studies draw on qualitative research tools, including 115
personal, semi-structured interviews, archival evidence, and direct observation.
Recalling Brady and Collier (2004), this mixed-methods approach combines
“data-set observations” (DSOs) and “causal-process observations” (CPOs). While the
differences between types of observations were relevant for the discussion of
interdependence in subnational research, these differences are also relevant for multi-
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method research. Each approach has is its strengths and weaknesses. Large-N statistical
analyses allow the examination of variation and co-variation among independent and
dependent variables across a large number of cases, emphasizing the average effects
among these variables. However, these analyses often miss important details, or questions
remain about quality of measurement, timing, sequence (causal order), complexity, or
heterogeneity (Lieberman 2005, 442; Pierson 2000). Conversely, small-N analyses or
single case studies may not be representative, and qualitative examinations of these cases
may lead to overgeneralization from case-specific or idiosyncratic causal processes
(Munck 2004). Both approaches are imperfect, but their combination – a “diversity of
imperfection” – allows us to draw on the strengths of one approach to “compensate for
[the] particular faults and imperfections” of the other approach (Brewer and Hunter 1989,
16-17). In drawing on this diversity of imperfections, the analysis avoids the pitfalls
associated with “mono-method” or mono-data approaches, relying on the strengths of
each tradition to offset the weaknesses of the other (Jick 1979; Tashakkori and Teddlie
1998, 40-42). These different “streams of evidence” (Beer 2003, 8) join in a process of
triangulation across data (data triangulation) and across methods (methods triangulation)
in order to enhance the validity of conclusions (Denzin 1978; Tarrow 1995). Moreover,
the explicit nesting of the case studies within the sample analyzed econometrically also
strengthens causal inferences.
3.3.1 Large-N Method: Time-Series Cross-Section (TSCS) Analysis
In the large-N phase of research, the unit of analysis is the “state-year”. The panel
datasets have 502 observations from Brazil and 259 observations from Mexico (NBRA =
502 and NMEX = 259). These observations come from all 26 Brazilian states and all 31
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Mexican states, excluding the federal district in both countries. The time span ranges
from 1985 to 2006 in Brazil and from 1993 to 2007 in Mexico. Thus, the time periods
cover some portion of the authoritarian period, the transition, and a post-authoritarian
period in each country. 53 However, data are available for varying numbers of years in
each state and in each country, making the panels unbalanced. In Brazil, a minimum of
14 time points and a maximum of 22 time points are available. In Mexico, the minimum
is five and the maximum is 14. There were some missing data in Mexico due to
incomplete reports from individual states, but this small number of gaps (five) occurred
in single time points within longer series of data, so the gaps were filled with interpolated
values. Thus, there are no remaining gaps in the dataset. Data from each country are
analyzed separately, not pooled.
This unbalanced panel structure of the data generates several methodological
challenges. Standard OLS regression models assume the independence of individual
observations, an assumption that is violated both temporally and spatially with the “stateyears” analyzed here. State-years are correlated over time within each panel (state) and
across space within each time point (year).
Several statistical techniques attempt to correct for problems associated with these
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This assertion is clearest in Mexico, where the national PRI-to-PAN transition occurred in 2000. Some
observers may object to the assertion as applied to Brazil in that governor election were held for the first
time in 1982, and there was a presidential election in 1985. Spending data were not available systematically
prior to 1985. Nonetheless, I follow other scholars in expressing skepticism that Brazil’s transition to
democracy can be unequivocally marked in 1985, much less 1982. The military regime began its opening,
or abertura, in the 1970s under General Geisel, and parties were allowed to re-organize in 1979. The
competitive gubernatorial elections in 1982 were a positive sign, but the military still held the reins of
power, and refused to allow popular presidential elections in 1985 despite the powerful movement for
direct election, diretas já. Thus, the presidential election in 1985 was moderated by the electoral college,
endorsing the alliance between conservatives and centrists in the form of José Sarney and Tancredo Neves,
respectively. The continuity of conservative forces is highlighted by Sarney’s rise to the presidency after
Neves’s sudden death, marking in many ways a PDS presidency (Mainwaring, Meneguello, and Power
2000). A more reasonable transition point seems to be 1989, after the new constitution came into effect in
1988 and direct elections for the presidency were allowed in 1989.
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challenges, including fixed-effects models (FEM), autoregressive models (AR), randomeffects models (REM), panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs), lagged dependent
variables (LDVs), population-averaged, generalized-estimating equations (GEE), and the
use of dummies for both time points and spatial units. 54 Considering these
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FEMs are inappropriate where key explanatory variables are time invariant or have “level effects” since
the FEM will obscure the significance of these variables (Plümper et al. 2005). In both Brazil and Mexico,
the theoretical model anticipates electoral competition and programmatic-ideological orientation to have a
meaningful impact on judicial spending, and both of these variables are relatively time invariant and also
generate level effects. For instance, measures of legislative ideology change at most every three years
within units. Also, a shift in the mean-left-right-position from −0.40 to −0.20 is not the same as the shift
from 0.20 to 0.40. That is, both shifts involve an equal change of 0.20 points on Coppedge’s ideology scale,
but theory anticipates that remaining on the left (negative) side of the scale will have a qualitatively
different effect than remaining on the right side of the scale.
Similarly, a LDV model is not the best solution because it will absorb the significance of other
explanatory variables (Achen 2000). As noted by both Plümper et al. and Achen, LDVs are atheoretical
corrections that, while improving the formal statistical fit of a model, do not generate any theoretical
insights. They may also incorrectly specify the temporal correlation, i.e., assuming an AR(1) disturbance
rather than AR(2) or AR(3). Moreover, in short time series like those analyzed here, LDVs threaten to
produce other statistical irregularities and obliterate the significance of theoretically-derived variables. The
short time series of no more than 22 years in either country also mean time dummies are not justified.
Moreover, there are no clear temporal moments, stages, or “eras” within these short time series that clearly
motivate the inclusion of time dummies.
Following Huber et al. (2006), AR models are also inappropriate with unbalanced panel data
because AR models require the same number of time points (t) across all units. That is, AR models require
balanced panels. Moreover, AR models require the number of spatial units (n) to be smaller than the
number of time points, i.e., n < t (Huber, 956). Since the number of states in Brazil and Mexico (26 and 31,
respectively) exceeds the maximum number of years in each country (22 and 14, respectively), AR models
cannot be used.
Similar problems arise with PCSEs. Beck and Katz (1995) recommend using ordinary least
squares (OLS) modified to calculate PCSEs for TSCS data. As is the case with AR models, however, these
methods work best when t > n. In such circumstances, PCSEs are indeed the “gold standard” in the
discipline, as Greg Wawro noted at a panel on time-series analysis at the 2005 annual meeting of the
American Political Science Association. However, because this study analyzes judicial spending in 26
states over 22 years (Brazil) and 31 states over 14 years (Mexico), it is always the case that the number of
time points is lower than the number of panels, i.e., t < n, and the number of time points (22 and 14,
respectively) is low in both countries. Therefore, PCSEs are not statistically appropriate.
Beck and Katz (1995a) show that the GLS method for dealing with TSCS data generates lower
standard errors and inflated t-statistics when there are fewer time points than panels (644-45), thus
generating biased coefficients (they say that GLS is “unusable” even when the number of time points is
close to the number of panels, and that it is only good to use GLS if the number of time points is
“substantially” greater than the number of panels). Thus, if there are fewer time points (t) than panels (n),
or t < n, Beck and Katz suggest the use of OLS with PCSEs (xtpcse with data set for time series (tsset) in
Stata). However, Liang and Zeger (1986), suggest GEE, not OLS with PCSEs, is appropriate where there
are “few observation times”, i.e., where t is low. Indeed, Liang and Zeger highlight that GEE is only
appropriate under such circumstances. “Few” is unclear, but their own example No. 5 works on t being less
than or equal to 10. In the analysis presented here, t = 22 in Brazil and t = 14 in Mexico, so GEE is
employed. Hecock (2006) applies a similar model in the analysis of educational spending in the Mexican
states from 1998-2003. Given Liang and Zeger’s apparent caution against using GEE where t > 10, some
analysts might argue that OLS with PCSEs should be used here, where t = 22 in Brazil and t =14 in
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methodological hurdles, and following Zorn (2001) and Liang and Zeger (1986), the
large-N analysis applies a population-averaged panel-data model, or generalized
estimating equation (GEE), with a forward-lagged dependent variable to capture temporal
dynamics.
GEE models are appropriate here for both statistical and substantive reasons.
First, GEE models address the statistical difficulties presented by the TSCS data without
generating any of the concerns identified above. Second, the substantive interest here is
to identify the average effect of the explanatory variables across the entire sample in each
country, rather than the section-specific (unit- or panel-specific) relationship between
explanatory and dependent variables. In other words, the goal here is to identify the
average effect of competitiveness and commitments on spending across all Brazilian
states and all Mexican states, not to identify the character of this relationship in just one
or two states in each country. Following Zorn (2001), marginal or population-averaged
models like GEE are more suited for this substantive interest than conditional, clustered,
or panel-specific models. 55 Zorn also advises that this substantive interest is more
important than the statistical concern, and should drive model selection (Zorn, 475), a
concern echoed by Plümper et al. (2005) in their emphasis on the “theory-nexus” of
method selection. In sum, statistical and substantive concerns support the use of GEE.
Nonetheless, checks for robustness included OLS with PCSEs, PCSEs with a panelspecific AR1 correlation, and a fixed effects model. The results are substantially similar
in each of these models. Indeed, most of the additional models showed stronger effects of
Mexico. However, these are maximum time points per panel. There are other panels with as few as five (5)
time points in Mexico and 11 time points in Brazil.
55

All models estimated with Stata v9.0 using xtgee. Data and do-file available from the author.
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competition and ideology on judicial spending, suggesting the GEE results reported here
are among the most conservative.
3.3.2. Case Selection:
Anchoring Small-N Research Designs with Nested, Model-Testing Cases
Case selection requires consideration of both methodological and nonmethodological issues. Feasibility is one of the principal non-methodological
considerations (Gerring and Seawright 2006, 2).56 In turn, methodological considerations
in case selection can be approached with qualitative or quantitative tools. Conventional
qualitative approaches to case selection offer several options. The logic of crucial cases
(e.g., least likely or most likely cases), and typical or deviant cases (“typical” or
“deviant” in the general sense of appearing to conform or not conform to theoretical
expectations, which is different from the statistical “typicality” of cases as discussed
below) is prominent in the case study literature. Paired cases might also follow Mill’s
method of agreement or method of difference as articulated in the logics of “most
similar” or “most different” systems designs (Przeworski and Teune 1970; Mill 1838).
Finally, a case selection rationale that is particularly applicable to the study of judicial
performance in Mexico is that of selection on the dependent variable. Although
conventional social science methods tend to disfavor selection on the dependent variable,
the quality of within-case analysis ultimately matters more (Gerring and Seawright 2006).
Moreover, Collier and Mahoney (1996) and Collier, Mahoney, and Seawright (2004)
argue that selection bias may not be as significant an issue in case studies.57 Of particular
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See Appendix E for a more extended discussion of non-methodological considerations in case selection,
as well as other aspects of conducting fieldwork in Brazil and Mexico.
57
The logic of my argument regarding the ability of qualitative research to overcome the non-independence
of observations in subnational research is similar to Collier and Mahoney’s argument regarding the ability
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relevance to judicial performance, especially state-level judicial performance, is their
argument that selection on the dependent variable is a negligible concern when little is
known about the dependent variable or research topic. Arguably, this is the case with the
problem of explaining judicial change, especially at the subnational level. Thus, we could
select a state that has achieved high levels of judicial performance or is widely
recognized for its unusual accomplishments in this area, and within-case analysis in such
a state would likely yield useful lessons regarding the source of judicial change.
An example of the conventional kind of case selection would be the selection of a
“typical” state for this time period (typical in a non-statistical sense, i.e., having nothing
to do with the typicality of the relationship between independent and dependent variable
and the size of the residuals). For instance, in Mexico during this time frame, a “typical”
case would be a PRI-dominated state with low or no political competitiveness. These
states are Coahuila, Durango, Hidalgo, Oaxaca, Puebla, Quintana Roo, Tamaulipas, and
Veracruz. An example of selection on dependent variable would be a state that has
achieved high levels of judicial performance or is widely recognized for its rare and
understudied accomplishments in this area. These states might include Aguascalientes,
Baja California, Colima, México, Nuevo León, or Querétaro, all of which received the
highest ranking (1, on a scale of 1-5) in commercial court performance for 2003 in the
report by the Consejo Coordinador Financiero (2004).
Without disregarding these more conventional, qualitative options for case
selection, the current study relies on recent literature on “nested analysis” (Coppedge
2005; Lieberman 2005) and quantitative tools for case selection (Gerring and Seawright

of qualitative research to overcome weaknesses conventionally associated with selecting cases on the
dependent variable.
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2007) to integrate the quantitative and qualitative analyses. Although many scholars have
integrated quantitative and qualitative methods in an informal way (Martin 1992; Swank
2002; Beer 2003; Jepsen 2006; Hecock 2006), the more recent scholarship offers
guidance on how to conduct this integration in a more explicit and systematic fashion.
First, diagnostics of the results of the large-N analyses identify one state in each country
that generates well-predicted or “typical” observations (“state-years”), and that maintains
this typicality despite variation in key explanatory variables (Lieberman 2005).
Subsequently, I select two additional states to complement the first, generating a set of
three states in each country, for a total of six state-level case studies across the two
countries. This last step of building a small-N research design around the nested, modeltesting cases focuses on selecting states that exhibit variation on the key explanatory
variables – electoral competition and ideology. That is, following the logic of
“structured” or “controlled” comparisons (Collier 1993; Snyder 2001a), the small-N
research designs construct trilogies of cases in each country that are representative of the
main electoral and ideological dimensions of provincial party systems.58
In Mexico, this trilogy seeks to capture (i) levels of electoral competition, and (ii)
ideological change or continuity with respect to the authoritarian regime (non-ideological
or centrist PRI hegemony). In practice, this amounts to selecting three states that identify
three main categories of Mexican states: (1) non-competitive PRI continuity, (2)
competitive, rightward, PRI-to-PAN transitions, and (3) competitive, leftward, PRI-toPRD transitions. In Brazil, the trilogy also seeks to capture (i) levels of electoral
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This logic of case selection closely approximates a “most similar systems” (MSS) research design, but
the primary emphasis is on matching cases according to variation on the key explanatory variables, not on
other similarities structural characteristics. The underlying assumption is that by being states within the
same country, the cases are comparable in many ways though perhaps not “most similar” in a strict sense.
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competition, and (ii) ideological change or continuity with respect to the authoritarian
regime. However, unlike Mexico’s non-ideological authoritarianism, Brazil’s
authoritarian regime was a military government on the political right, with two officially
sanctioned parties for most of that regime, and a post-transition ideological landscape that
is not the relatively simple, centralized, tri-partite landscape that we see in Mexico.
Rather, the Brazilian party system is much more decentralized, with multiple ideological
positions and lower levels of institutionalization in many provincial party systems,
evoking much more traditional, regional, personalist, and/or clientelist interests and
practices. Thus, the cases in Brazil seek to capture variation in electoral competitiveness,
ideological orientation, as well as variation in the institutionalization of local party
systems. In practice, this amounts to selecting cases from three categories of states: (1)
non-competitive, oligarchic states with traditional, conservative elites frequently linked
ideologically to the military regime and territorially to the north or northeast of Brazil;59
(2) competitive, leftward transitions to the PT (or a PT-based coalition), of which there
are relatively few strong examples; and (3) competitive elections in more institutionalized
settings, with power alternating among ideologically different parties, a phenomenon
likely found in the south or southeast. The two steps of case selection – (i) nesting cases
and (ii) building a small-N research design around the nested cases – are addressed in
greater detail below.
Following Lieberman (2005), nested analysis involves sequencing quantitative
and qualitative analyses so that the case studies are selected from the sample in the
59

Notably, the left, including the PT, has recently fared well in the northern and northeastern regions of
Brazil. The PT won gubernatorial elections in 2002 in Piauí and in 2006 in Bahia, Paiuí, and Pará and
Sergipe. The PDT dethroned traditional alliances from the governor’s office for the first time in 2006 in
Maranhão (though the TSE removed the PDT governor and restored the Sarney dynasty on April 17, 2009;
see Chapter 7), and won the governor’s race in 2002 and 2006 in Amapá (Nicolau/TSE Dataset).
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quantitative analysis. Lieberman’s suggested sequence of nested analysis is the
following: (1) preliminary quantitative large-N analysis (LNA); (2) robustness-check of
LNA; (3) case selection for small-N analysis (SNA); (4) qualitative SNA in the cases
selected in step (3); and (5) repeat the steps in an iterative process, if necessary.
Once the LNA is complete and we are fairly confident in its results (steps 1 and 2
above), Lieberman suggests two types of SNA – model-testing SNA (Mt-SNA) and
model-building SNA (Mb-SNA). In each type of qualitative analysis, he emphasizes the
need to give special attention to two types of rival explanations. In the first strategy (MtSNA), Lieberman suggests identifying cases that are well-predicted by the statistical
model. Well-predicted, low-residual, or statistically “typical” cases offer opportunities for
within-case analysis that “provide support for, or clarification of, an existing causal
hypothesis” (Gerring and Seawright 2006, 11).
If we were to plot actual values against predicted values, with a 45-degree line
designating the perfect fit, these cases would be on or close to this line (see Figure 3.1,
adapted from Lieberman, 445). In Figure 3.1, the typical cases would be cases A, B, and
C.
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Figure 3.1. Potential typical and atypical cases (adapted from Lieberman 2005).
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After identifying which cases are well-predicted, we select from among this group
cases that vary on the value of the principal independent variable(s) of interest. For
example, if cases A, B, and C in Figure 1 are the most well-predicted cases, we would
select the two that display the most variation on the key independent variable(s). As
stated above, the statistical model is explaining these cases well and the goal is to identify
the causal process in order to clarify or confirm hypotheses, so selecting on different
values of the independent variable allows us to perform confirmatory case studies
regarding the causal relationship between the IV and the DV, tracing the relationship
from X to Y. In these cases, Lieberman also advises we should pay close attention to two
rival explanations: (1) plausible alternative hypotheses that did not lend themselves easily
to measurement across a large number of cases, so they could not be included in the
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LNA; and (2) the causal sequence of events to ensure that there is temporal precedence
between our independent variables and the dependent variable (Lieberman, 443-444).
The second strategy (Mb-SNA) selects poorly-predicted cases, i.e., cases that are
off the 45-degree line (e.g., cases E and F in Figure 3.1). In contrast to Mt-SNA, after
identifying this group of poorly-predicted cases, we select from among this group cases
that vary on the value of the dependent variable, approximating Mill’s method of
difference. The model does not explain these observations well, suggesting a
specification problem with the model. Selecting on a key IV would not be particularly
informative since the analysis already told us these observations are not explained well
by this variable. Conversely, selection on the DV maximizes the opportunity to identify
alternative causal pathways and explanations. That is, aside from the variables specified
in our model, what else explains the variation between cases E and F in Figure 3.1? In
this strategy, closer attention is paid to improving measurements of important concepts,
and to identifying concepts or explanations that were omitted from the original model but
might play a significant role. Thus the name, “model-building” SNA. 60
Complementing Lieberman’s work, Gerring and Seawright (2007) provide
quantitative tools that make Lieberman’s argument more explicit. Specifically, Gerring
and Seawright specify diagnostics that can be performed on the quantitative model. These
diagnostic tests are well-known in statistics, but they have only rarely been applied to the
60

Three important features of nested case selection are worth emphasizing: (1) the process is not either-or,
i.e., there are no clear, “black or white” distinctions; rather, as with other aspects of research design,
choices, judgments, and tradeoffs inhere in the process; (2) statistical typicality is not a dichotomous
concept or measure – it is a matter of degree; also, variation on key IVs or on the DV is a matter of degree;
again, judgment and tradeoffs are central to the process; and (3) judgment is involved in deciding to what
extent a case belongs in the Mt-SNA or Mb-SNA category. Stated otherwise, there is a little bit of art in the
science of case selection, especially in noting where a case can be leveraged for its typicality and where it
can be leveraged it for its deviance or atypicality, alternately focusing on tracing forward from variation in
the IV or backward from variation in the DV. Ultimately, the goal is a more systematic selection of cases
that are either confirmatory or exploratory.
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task of case selection and for the purpose of nested inference, integrating quantitative and
qualitative methods. In short, Gerring and Seawright provide guidance on how to employ
mathematical tools to identify well-predicted (low residual) and poorly-predicted (high
residual) cases, cases that can then be examined for variation on the dependent variable
or key independent variables, leading us closer to what Lieberman called Mt-SNA and
Mb-SNA. By calculating “typicality” scores, i.e., the absolute value of residuals,
therefore, we can begin to identify model-testing and model-building cases.
TSCS data offers a rich environment for the application of these quantitative tools
for case selection. Lieberman, along with Gerring and Seawright, discuss the application
of their methods to conventional regression analyses, where each observation
corresponds to a case. Stated in the inverse, each case has a unique observation in the
dataset. Therefore, each typical (on-the-line) or atypical (off-the-line) observation
corresponds to one and only one case. In contrast, each case in TSCS data contributes
more than one observation. In the Mexican and Brazilian data analyzed here, a Mexican
state might contribute as many as 14 observations and a Brazilian state as many as 22.
Consequently, diagnostics of TSCS data raise the possibility of identifying multiple
typical and atypical observations from the same case. Where there is variation in the
typicality of observations over time within a single case, this case may be a particularly
promising candidate for SNA. In combination with extreme values and influence
statistics (Gerring and Seawright 2007), typicality can be a powerful tool for case
selection in TSCS data, offering opportunities for case selection that are not present in
non-TSCS data. The following sections illustrate this process of integrating LNA, SNA,
and TSCS data with actual data from the analysis of judicial spending in the Mexican and
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Brazilian states. It should be noted that early in the research process, preliminary models
in each country identified well-predicted, model-testing cases as Aguascalientes in
Mexico and Acre in Brazil. The figures and discussion below report the latest data, using
the models and specification reported in the empirical analysis in Chapters 4-7.
Aguascalientes remains a good model-testing case in Mexico. However, Rio Grande do
Sul, rather than Acre, emerged in the latest models as the best model-testing case in
Brazil. 61
Table 3.1 reports the 30 most typical or well-predicted observations in Mexico,
and Table 3.2 reports the 30 most typical or well-predicted observations in Brazil, using
Model 9 from Chapter 4 for Mexico and Model 16 from Chapter 5 for Brazil (the 30 most
atypical, worst-predicted observations, are listed for each country in tables in the
Appendix C). Observations are listed vertically in order of typicality, with the most
typical or well-predicted first. Following Lieberman, key independent variables –
competition and ideology – are listed alongside typicality scores. From left to right, the
columns identify the observation rank in terms of typicality, state-year, typicality score,
margin of victory, effective number of parties (ENC), and two measures of ideology: (i)
ordinal (-1 to 1, where -1 = left and 1 = right), and (ii) interval, based on Alcántara (2008)
in Mexico and Power and Zucco (2009) in Brazil (1 to 10, where 1 = left and 10 = right).
In this table, we can see how each state generates more than one observation.
Hidalgo and Aguascalientes stand out because of their repeat appearances, listed six and
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Fortunately, Rio Grande do Sul was also one of the selected cases, given that the case selection rational
(see section 3.3.3) sought to identify three states that varied on key political variables. This good fortune
aside, the disclosure of the case selection rationale, and the changing location of some cases with respect to
their typicality in the econometric models, is intended to show the iterative process and associated risks of
conducting this kind of research. Further, reporting the current typicality of the six cases makes the
research design more transparent and explicit.
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five times, respectively. This repeat generation of typical observations by these two states
indicates the states are “typical cases”, and therefore good candidates for in-depth
analysis. However, Lieberman requires us to go one step further, identifying observations
that also vary on the value of key independent variables. In this regard, Aguascalientes
varies on measures of both competition and ideology whereas Hidalgo varies in terms of
competition but shows little or no variation in terms of ideology. Thus, Aguascalientes
emerges as the better candidate for Mt-SNA; it is both statistically typical and exhibits
variation on key independent variables. Following the same logic in Brazil, Rio Grande
do Sul (listed as “RG do Sul”) contributes three of the most typical observations,
suggesting the state is a typical case. Further, these typical observations also evince
variation on key independent variables. Thus, Rio Grande do Sul emerges as a good case
for Mt-SNA in Brazil.
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Table 3.1. 30 most typical observations in Mexico.
no.

state-year

typicality
score

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Michoacán-2006
Baja California-2001
Aguascalientes-1997
Hidalgo-2006
Hidalgo-1995
Chihuahua-1999
Hidalgo-2000
Tlaxcala-1999
Quintana Roo-1998
Sinaloa-2001
Baja California-2000
Sonora-2002
Hidalgo-2002
Queretaro-1999
Colima-1997
Hidalgo-1996
Aguascalientes-2001
Hidalgo-1997
Sonora-2001
Sinaloa-2002
Aguascalientes-1998
Aguascalientes-1995
Quintana Roo-2003
Veracruz-2001
Morelos-1998
Queretaro-1997
Veracruz-2000
Hidalgo-1998
Baja California Sur-2004
Aguascalientes-2004

0.04
0.18
0.20
0.26
0.35
0.36
0.54
0.55
0.61
0.62
0.65
0.77
0.82
0.97
1.22
1.33
1.52
1.72
1.82
1.89
1.92
1.95
2.05
2.23
2.43
2.56
2.57
2.71
2.73
2.74
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margin
of
victory
0.04
0.09
0.55
0.21
0.73
0.08
0.21
0.02
0.93
0.15
0.09
0.09
0.21
0.05
0.55
0.73
0.15
0.73
0.09
0.15
0.55
0.55
0.08
0.22
0.41
0.55
0.22
0.73
0.18
0.15

ENC

ideology
ordinal

ideology
interval

2.82
2.27
1.69
2.65
1.52
2.30
2.44
2.38
1.10
2.73
2.27
3.03
2.44
2.65
1.99
1.52
2.31
1.52
3.03
2.73
1.69
1.69
2.79
2.86
2.22
1.71
2.86
1.52
2.19
2.31

-1
1
0
0
0
0
0
-1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-1
1

2.78
9.27
6.94
6.31
6.82
6.94
6.09
2.68
6.94
6.09
9.27
6.09
6.09
8.94
6.94
6.82
9.27
6.94
6.09
6.09
6.94
6.82
6.31
6.09
6.94
6.94
6.09
6.94
2.78
9.17

Table 3.2. 30 most typical observations in Brazil.
no.

state-year

typicality
score

margin
of
victory

ENC

ideology
ordinal

ideology
interval

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Espirito Santo-1999
Pará-1997
Santa Catarina-1995
Goiás-1993
Goiás-1989
Paraíba-2002
Paraíba-2001
Paraná-1995
Tocantins-2004
RG do Sul-1993
Alagoas-1996
Minas Gerais-1997
RG do Sul-1991
Tocantins-2000
Pará-1990
Tocantins-2003
RG do Norte-1997
Paraná-1998
Minas Gerais-2000
Paraná-1994
Amazonas-1997
Piauí-2003
RG do Sul-1989
Rio de Janeiro-2000
Piauí-1988
Paraíba-1997
São Paulo-2003
Espirito Santo-2000
Pará-1992
Santa Catarina-1986

0.0012
0.0014
0.0026
0.0030
0.0049
0.0064
0.0078
0.0081
0.0118
0.0123
0.0124
0.0134
0.0188
0.0188
0.0210
0.0212
0.0249
0.0252
0.0256
0.0321
0.0324
0.0334
0.0341
0.0364
0.0399
0.0408
0.0427
0.0431
0.0435
0.0452

0.48
0.01
0.12
0.22
0.23
0.65
0.65
0.16
0.27
0.03
0.69
0.21
0.03
0.28
0.48
0.27
0.14
0.16
0.06
0.02
0.32
0.07
0.21
0.13
0.02
0.03
0.06
0.48
0.05
0.01

2.37
3.12
2.89
2.28
2.20
1.48
1.48
2.22
2.07
3.41
1.54
3.04
3.41
2.03
2.13
2.07
2.32
2.22
2.71
3.36
2.07
2.20
3.05
2.77
2.10
2.44
3.34
2.37
2.72
2.03

0.5
0.5
0
0
0
0.5
0.5
-0.5
1
-0.5
0
0.5
-0.5
1
0
1
0
-0.5
0
0
1
-0.5
0
-0.5
0
0
0.5
0.5
0
1

6.22
6.22
5.17
5.17
5.10
6.19
6.19
3.51
8.59
3.51
5.17
6.22
3.15
8.48
5.10
8.59
5.76
3.24
5.76
5.17
8.38
2.27
5.10
3.24
5.10
5.76
6.30
6.22
5.10
8.51
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Figure 3.2. Average typicality scores in Mexico (overall mean = 15.51).
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Figure 3.3. Average typicality scores in Brazil (overall mean = 0.51).

Brazil
RG do Sul
Paraná
Amazonas
Rio de Janeiro
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Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 graph average typicality scores for all Mexican states
and Brazilian states, respectively. These graphs help to locate each state in terms of its
overall statistical typicality (Appendix D includes maps of Mexico and Brazil depicting
these typicality scores). As stated above, Aguascalientes emerged as a model-testing case
in early, preliminary analyses that guided case selection, and remains one in current
models reported here in Chapter 4. In Brazil, Acre emerged initially as a model-testing
case, but is an atypical, high-residual case in the current models in Chapter 5 (see Figure
3.2 and listing of atypical observations in Appendix D). However, Rio Grande do Sul was
and remains a good model-testing case (Figure 3.2 shows it having the lowest, i.e.,
“best”, average typicality score in the Brazilian analysis). Fortunately, Rio Grande do Sul
was selected early on because of the variation it offered on key variables that contrasted
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with Acre, so both states remain in the analysis. Acre now offers model-building insights.
Having selected a model-testing case in each country – Aguascalientes in Mexico
and initially Acre (and now Rio Grande do Sul) in Brazil – I proceeded to build a small-N
research design in each country around these cases. Following Lijphart (1971; 1975),
Collier (1993), and Snyder (2001a; 2001b), as well as recent examples in Mexico (Snyder
2001a; Beer 2003; Hecock 2006; 2007), the selection of cases adheres to a logic of
structured, controlled comparisons.62 The three states analyzed in each country express
similar structural conditions but vary on key explanatory variables, constituting
comparable systems, or small-N controlled comparisons.
With regard to the judicial sector, the three states in each country share critical
factors relevant to the study of the judiciary, including a common legal tradition (civil
law) and a shared legal culture. Most importantly, in terms of controlling for a common
rival explanation of judicial change, all three states are subject to the same federal
patterns of centrifugal, center-to-margin policy diffusion regarding court resources,
institutional choice, and the judicial career. In this regard, the critical event in Mexico is

62

This kind of design is close to a most-similar-systems design (MSSD) (Smith 1876; Przeworski and
Teune 1970; Gerring and Seawright 2008), but as Meckstroth (1975) points out, MSSD requires
dichotomous values on the matching and non-matching variables. This is not the case here, though
Meckstroth’s standard may be “too exacting” in the same way as Mill and Durkheim’s objections to the use
of the method of agreement or the method of difference in the social sciences (Hall 2003, 380; citing
Lijphart 1971, 688, and Smelser 1976, 62, 141). Notably, even Snyder (2001a), in what is the most
prominent recent study of this “structured”, “focused”, or “controlled” comparison, does not have perfectly
comparable cases. His cases are four states in southern Mexico, selected for similarity across
socioeconomic features: Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Puebla. Puebla and Oaxaca are more alike in
terms of income per capita, as are Chiapas and Guerrero, but Puebla is much more industrialized than the
other three. Cornelius (1999, 14) distinguishes Puebla as more “modern”, and labels the others as more
“politically primitive”. Moreover, indigenous populations vary across the four states. Ultimately, these
imperfections are not fatal. The main idea is that to “compare is to control” (Lijphart 1971; see Collier 1993
for additional comments on small-N designs), and that researchers should simply attempt to increase the
degree of control and be explicit in how this is being accomplished. The selection of cases at the subnational level exerts a substantial degree of control that is absent in cross-national studies, and the selection
here seeks the widest variation in electoral competition and ideology, seeking three cases that best represent
the variety of provincial party systems.
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President Zedillo’s federal reform of December 1994. Although this reform was
conducted quickly in the first month of President Ernesto Zedillo’s administration, the
initial reform and subsequent reforms in 1996, as well as the accompanying debate over
these reforms, alerted subnational judiciaries to the priority of policy change in the
judicial sector. Similarly, the crucial event in Brazil is the national judicial reform
process that began in 1992. Although the reform was not completed and implemented
until 2004, the debate maintained a high national profile in academic and policy circles
for 12 years until a reform was finally approved in 2004 (Sadek 1998; EC 45/2004).63 In
each country, all states were exposed equally to the timing and content of the national
reforms and accompanying debate, but these reforms and debates filtered differently
through very disparate local political conditions. The selection of cases, therefore,
focuses on states representing the main kind of variation on these local electoralideological conditions associated with provincial party systems.
In Mexico, as stated earlier, the crucial political factor is change or continuity
with respect to the former single-party regime of the PRI. In Brazil, the authoritarian
regime was not in the mold of Mexico’s single, dominant party, or PRI hegemony,
characterized by its corporatist and clientelist structures, and a largely non-ideological or
centrist program. Rather, Brazil’s brand of authoritarianism was a military regime with a
conservative ideology. In Brazil, therefore, we are looking for changes in electoral
competition, but the continuity of non-competitive systems is more often tied to the
political right rather than the center, and competitive settings are more often linked to the
emergence of the left, centrist parties, or at least party alternation. In short, the case

63

While the reform languished for most of those years, the impetus for reform reached a crescendo after the
first PT government entered office in January of 2003 (see Chapter 7).
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selection depends on identifying the authoritarian baseline condition in each country –
associated with the PRI in Mexico and with the pro-military ARENA in Brazil – and
identifying the most meaningful type of movement away from these authoritarian
baselines.
In Brazil, the central political phenomenon of the last three decades was the
gradual opening of the military regime beginning in the late 1970s and the slow transition
to democracy. The exact date of Brazil’s transition is unclear given the slow pace of this
opening and the continuity of conservative elements in the political branches, but most
observers agree that 1989 is the more analytically conservative date, given that the new
constitution was not drafted and approved until 1988 and the first direct elections for
president were not held until 1989. In Mexico, the transition is clearer. After 71 years of
single-dominant-party rule under the PRI, the right-of-center PAN won the presidency in
2000. Despite the fact opposition parties had been winning municipal and state elections
before this year, there is broad consensus that 2000 marked the end of an authoritarian era
in Mexico. Thus, in both countries, there was an authoritarian baseline condition, and the
last three decades have witnessed movement away from that baseline.
Importantly, both Brazil and Mexico shared non-competitiveness as part of their
authoritarian baselines. That is, the PRI was hegemonic at the national level and only lost
its first governorship in 1989. Even after 1989, PRI margins of victory were high and the
PRI continued to dominate the legislatures in many states. In Brazil, the military regime
officialized a two-party system – with the pro-military ARENA on one side and a statesanctioned opposition party, MDB, on the other. Despite the existence of an opposition
party, ARENA dominated most governorships and state legislatures through the 1970s.
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Even where MDB candidates were successful, the de facto power of the military was
never far out of sight, so competition was in a sense artificial. Thus, both authoritarian
baselines shared the feature of low electoral competition. However, the ideological
location of this baseline was different in each country. In Mexico, the authoritarian
regime was located in the center of a left-right ideological spectrum. In Brazil, the
authoritarian regime was located on the right. Thus, both electoral competition and
ideology inform which three states best represent the variety of types of subnational
electoral contexts in each country.
In Mexico, Aguascalientes represents an instance of the competitive rise of the
PAN, and therefore a rightward PRI-to-PAN transition. Following PAN victories in the
state capital and legislature in 1995, and then in the 1998 and 2004 governor’s races,
Aguascalientes is a PAN success story.64 In contrast, Michoacán offers an example of the
rise of the PRD, and therefore a leftward PRI-to-PRD transition. Michoacán has a solid
history of progressive, mass-based politics, principally in agrarian reform, dating back to
the post-revolution governorship of Lázaro Cárdenas (1928-1932), who later became
president. Indeed, the “allegedly socialist” character of the Cárdenas presidency is cited
as one of the triggers for the formation of the rightist PAN (Mizrahi 2003, 17; see also,
Shirk 2005, 55-56). Lázaro Cárdenas’s son, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, governed the state
from 1980 to 1986. The younger Cárdenas pushed for greater democratization of the PRI
and helped found the PRD in 1989 after a failed run at the presidency. Cuauhtémoc
Cardenas’s son, Lázaro Cárdenas Batel, governed the state from 2002-2008, and Leonel
Godoy Rangel, Secretary of State for both Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Lázaro Cárdenas
Batel, succeeded Cárdenas Batel in 2008, giving the PRD two consecutive
64

The PRI regained the state capital in 2007 and a narrow majority in the legislature in 2008.
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administrations despite the fact they had never won the local executive prior to 2002.
Thus, Michoacán is a PRD success story.
Contrasting with both Aguascalientes and Michoacán, Hidalgo is an instance of
continuing PRI dominance. As of 2009, the PRI had not lost the governorship in nearly
80 years. Moreover, through 1996, the PRI held at least 70% of the seats in the state
legislature. From 1996 to 2005, the PRI commanded between 62 and 72 per cent of
legislative seats. As of May 2008, the PRI’s majority for the 2008-2011 legislature stood
at 63% (73% if electoral allies from Nueva Alianza are considered).65 Thus, Hidalgo is
one of the most politically traditional states in Mexico. In this sense, Hidalgo is a
“typical” case historically in Mexico, representative of the broader population of states
with single-party dominance so characteristic of the PRI’s national trajectory until 2000.
The selection of three Brazilian states for in-depth qualitative analysis follows a
similar sequence. Having selected Acre as a statistically “typical”, model-testing case, the
next step was to diagnose the nature of electoral competition and ideological orientation
in Acre. In this regard, Acre is a state that exhibits rising electoral competition since the
mid-1990s, and it is also a state in which the leftist PT has emerged as a dominant
political force. Thus, Acre has recently become a PT stronghold, and therefore an
example of the competitive rise of the left. Following several conservative
administrations with traditional political elites sympathetic to the military regime, the PT
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In the local elections of February 17, 2008, the PRI candidates won every single one of the 18 plurality
district. The PRI gained one additional seat in the proportional representation calculations. In 12 of the 18
majority districts, the PRI had formed a coalition with Nueva Alianza, a new party formed in 2005, and
there were three additional Nueva Alianza seats from the PR calculations. Assuming that Nueva Alianza
votes with the PRI in the Hidalgo legislature, the PRI-Nueva Alianza majority consists of 22 of 30
legislators (IEE-Hidalgo 2008; El Universal 2008a; 2008b). At the federal level, Nueval Alianza is a small
party with only nine representatives in the Chamber of Deputies (lower house). For comparison, the PAN
has 206 deputies, the PRD has 126, and the PRI has 106 in the 500-member body (Cámara de Diputados
2009).
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won the governor’s office in the 1998 elections and has not lost since. Indeed, after
winning the mayor’s office in the state capital (Rio Branco) in 1992, the PT won the
governor’s office in 1998, 2002, and 2006, generating the only case of PT continuity in
the Brazilian states between 1998 and 2010. Jorge Viana, the PT mayor of Rio Branco
from 1993-1996, became the first PT governor in the state (1999-2002), and then
repeated as governor from 2003-2006. Since then, Binho Marques showed the PT can
win with a different candidate, demonstrating that the party’s strength in the state was not
encumbered by personalist ties to Viana. 66 Thus, Acre represents the competitive rise of
the left in Brazil’s post-authoritarian period.
Rio Grande do Sul, in contrast, has a longer history of left-right competition. Rio
Grande do Sul has witnessed a perfect alternation in the governor’s office since 1982,
with no single party dominating the others, giving the state an aura of competitive
centrism. Indeed, of the four parties that competed in the first open gubernatorial
elections allowed by the military in 1982 (PT, PDT, PMDB, and PDS), all four have been
elected to govern the state for at least one four-year administration: PDS (1983-1986),
PMDB (1987-1990), PDT (1991-1994), PMDB (1995-1998), PT (1999-2002), and
PMDB (2003-2006). The PMDB has held the governor’s office three times, but none of
these administrations have been consecutive. Most recently, the 2006 election was very
closely fought; the PT and PMDB were locked in competition and it looked like the
PMDB might repeat an administration for the first time or the PT might return for its
second administration. However, largely due to the split between the PT and PMDB, the
PSDB was able to gain power (becoming the fifth party to reach the governor’s office
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Marques was Viana’s secretary of education during the municipal administration of Rio Branco (19931996), and was later Viana’s deputy in the state administration.
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since 1982) (Interview 110). Thus, for more than a quarter century – the entire postauthoritarian period – Rio Grande do Sul, despite an initial phase of ARENA continuity
under the guise of the PDS, has seen two to three parties competing effectively at any
given time. Additionally, parties and the party system are more modern and
institutionalized in Rio Grande do Sul. It is worth emphasizing that, according to Aaron
Schneider, the alternation seen in Rio Grande do Sul is “not an indication of poor
institutionalization either of parties or of succession more generally, in terms of a
political elite capable of transferring power. Rather, the state is marked quite clearly by
center-left and center-right groupings, and politics essentially reduces down to a stable
two-way fight between blocks on the left and on the right,” generating the competitive
centrism that I referred to earlier.67
Finally, Maranhão represents the continuity of traditional politics and the
dominance of parties sympathetic to the authoritarian regime. State politics have been
controlled for 40 years by the family of José Sarney, who was president of the promilitary PDS until only nine months before becoming the first democratic president of
the country in 20 years, and a crucial piece of the conservative control over the transition
to democracy in the 1980s (Mainwaring, Meneguello, and Power 2000a; 2000b, 177;
Meneguello 1998).68 Sarney, therefore, fit into the mold of traditional Brazilian
strongmen or “colonels” (coroneis), anchoring Maranhão’s politics just as other powerful
local elites anchored and perpetuated coronelismo in other parts of Brazil, especially the
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Personal communication between Ben Goldfrank and Aaron Schneider. Thanks to both for their help in
thinking about Brazilian politics, especially in Rio Grande do Sul.
68
Sarney’s political roots prior to 1964 were in the right-wing UDN, which went on to support the coup
and military regime (Schmitt, 26-27, 35). Two prominent Latin Americanists refer to Sarney as a “pillar of
the military regime” (Skidmore and Smith 2005, 176).
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North and Northeast.69 Traditional politics, however, dominated Maranhão well before
Sarney, under Victorino Freire. In a twist of historical irony, in the elections of 1965 (one
year after the military coup, often termed a “revolution” by conservatives), Sarney
presented himself as the liberator of Maranhão, freeing the state from the grip of
vitorinismo. This irony is not lost on many local observers, who see Sarney’s local reign
since the 1960s as a continuation of Freire’s stranglehold on power; that is, vitorinismo
lives on in sarneísmo in an example of the continuity of authoritarianism clothed as the
arrival of liberation – of traditional, family-based politics repackaging itself (Cabral de
Costa 2006a; 2006b).70 Gastal Grill (2007, 20-22) notes that the majority of political
elites in Maranhão come from traditional, landed families that were established prior to
the 1930s, suggesting the despite some recent shifts in electoral configurations, local
politics reflect the “wardrobe changes” described by Cabral de Costa, where a deep
continuity lurks behinds apparent and superficial ruptures.71 The possibility of changing
this arrangement appeared to arrive in 2006 with the victory of the PDT in the governor’s
office. The extent to which this turnover marks meaningful change is questionable given
that the new PDT governor, Jackson Lago, is, in the eyes of many local observers, a
member of insular local elites and a former member of Sarney-based coalitions
(Interview 152). In any case, on April 17, 2009, Lago was removed from office by the
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Antônio Carlos Magalhães (ACM) did in Bahia, Fernando Collor de Melo did in Alagoas, and Ciro
Gomes did in Ceará (see Cabral de Costa 2006a; 2006b; Villaça and Cavalcanti 2006).
70
In late 2007, the main avenue that circle the center of the capital of São Luis was named Victorino Freire
in one segment, then became José Sarney, and circled back to become Victorino Freire, offering a concrete
reminder of the continuity between the two. The metaphor of authoritarianism “reclothing” itself as
democracy is not my own. See Costa Silva: “Desde o início da saga dos homens sobre a Terra, para fingir
que se foram da cena, o domínio exclusivo e a arbitrariedade na política, a exploração econômica, a
intolerância intelectual e o autoritarismo familiar têm se vestido e ataviado com novas roupas. Mas a
tesoura que as corta e a agulha que as cose parecem ou são as mesmas” (Cabral de Costa 2006b, 11).
71
In the original Portuguese, political patterns reflect “continuidades em processos ou momentos que
aparentam rupturas” (Gastal Grill, 3).
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TSE. In a second yet telling irony of Maranhão’s politics, Roseana Sarney – now under
the partisan umbrella of the PMDB –replaced Lago in the governor’s office since she was
runner-up in the 2006 elections. Thus, the Sarney dynasty remains in place in Maranhão.
In this regard, the persistence of traditional, oligarchic politics reminiscent of the
authoritarian era makes Maranhão the Brazilian equivalent of Hidalgo in Mexico.
It is worth noting that the provincial PMDB is effectively a conservative party of
the right-wing, conservative elites alongside the PDS and PFL/DEM. José Sarney turned
from the PDS to the PMDB in 1985 out of political convenience because in order to be
the vice-presidential candidate on the same ticket with Tancredo Neves Sarney had to
belong to the same party as Neves. Sarney continues under the PMDB, as a federal
senator for the state of Amapá. Roseana Sarney, meanwhile, operated under the rightist
PFL throughout her political career – during two terms as governor of Maranhão (19951998 and 1999-2002) and as a federal senator for the state. However, after being forced
out of the PFL for supporting Lula’s PT-based, national coalition, she converted to her
father’s PMDB during her term as Senator, mirroring her father’s political migration out
of political necessity in 1985. Despite the fact ARENA, PDS, and PFL/DEM, along with
the state’s provincial brand of the PMDB, could be located on the right of the political
spectrum, Maranhão’s politics are more accurately described as controlled by traditional
local elites (see Hagopian 1996) rather than programmatically right-wing in a
consistently ideological sense. That is, Maranhão’s party system is less modernized and
institutionalized, and politics are marked by an oligarchic brand of clientelism and
opportunism.
To summarize the rationale for case selection, Figure 3.4 below offers a 2x3 table
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that locates the three states in each country in relation to the two key political dimensions
– electoral competition and ideology. Ideology appears along the top, distinguishing
between left, center, and right, and electoral competition appears along the left side,
identifying low and high levels of competition. In Brazil, the authoritarian baseline was
in box 6, marked by low electoral competition and right-wing sympathies. Movement
away from this baseline leads us to boxes 1 and 2, where there are gains in competition
and also movement leftward along the ideology axis. Working backwards and starting
with the model-testing case of Acre, in box 1, I then filled in box 2 with Rio Grande do
Sul and box 6 with Maranhão. In Mexico, the authoritarian baseline was in box 5.
Movement away from this baseline leads us to boxes 1 and 3, where there are gains in
competition and also movement away from the ideological center. Working backwards
again and beginning with the model-testing case of Aguascalientes, which fills box 3, I
then filled box 1 with Michoacán and box 5 with Hidalgo.
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Figure 3.4. 2 X 3 table showing case selection.

Ideology
Left
High

Michoacán
Acre

Center
Rio Grande do Sul

Competition

1

2
Hidalgo

4
Low

5

authoritarian
baseline in Mexico

Right
Aguascalientes

3
Maranhão

6

authoritarian
baseline in Brazil

In sum, a nested, model-testing case anchors a small-N, structured and controlled
research design in both Brazil and Mexico. For any given year, no case is a perfect,
statistical fit in each country, but each case differs around key variables. The trilogy of
selected cases in each country best represents the variety of provincial party systems in
both the Brazilian and Mexican states. In Brazil, Maranhão represents the noncompetitive continuity of traditional, conservative, and elite-dominated politics; Acre
represents a right-to-left trajectory; and Rio Grande do Sul represents competitive, leftright alternation. In Mexico, Hidalgo represents PRI continuity; Aguascalientes
represents a rightward PRI-to-PAN transition; and Michoacán represents a leftward PRIto-PRD transition. Collectively, each set of three states increases the analytic purchase
regarding the influence of electoral competition and programmatic-ideological
commitments on judicial change, both longitudinally within these three states, and
spatially across the three states. This analytic leverage promises to maximize the validity
and generalizability of conclusions for other states within each country, but the
combination of small-N research designs in two different countries also enhances the
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validity and generalizability of conclusions for states in still other countries.
3.3.3. Small-N Methods: Process Tracing
Having completed the econometric analysis and case selection, the qualitative
portion of the analysis asks, how and why have these different electoral and ideological
conditions shaped local courts? In contrast to the cross-state analysis and the testing of
hypotheses using statistical techniques, the emphasis here is on the tracing of causal
processes, focusing on mechanisms, motivations, timing, sequencing, and complex or
heterogeneous causal relationships (Pierson 2000; 2004; Ragin 2000; Hall 2003; Brady
and Collier 2004; Bennett and George 2005).
In terms of dependent variables, the qualitative phase of analysis examines
judicial spending but also extends to additional dimensions of court strength, highlighting
the administrative capacity of local courts. The closer examination of judicial spending
creates a bridge with the quantitative analysis, which analyzed the same variable.
However, in both Mexico and Brazil, the qualitative analysis unpacks spending to an
additional degree by looking at aspects of budgetary autonomy and accountability.
Beyond judicial spending, the qualitative analysis shifts to focus on administrative
capacity. Due to the different constitutional arrangements and styles of judicial
federalism in Brazil and Mexico, however, the additional dependent variables under the
rubric of “administrative capacity” are different in each country. In Mexico, institutional
design is highly decentralized, and the primary advance in many states is the formation of
judicial councils beginning as early as 1988, before the federal judicial council was
formed in 1994. Notably, it is not just the formation of the council that matters. Rather,
the analysis highlights three dimensions of judicial councils: (i) power or authority, (ii)
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composition, and (iii) physical structure. The analysis in Mexico also examines career
structure. In Brazil, institutional design and the judicial career are highly centralized,
especially since the 1988 constitution and the state constitutions that were reformed in
1989 to match the federal charter. The degree of centralization increased in 2004 with the
creation of a single, national judicial council that is in charge of overseeing the
administration of the entire judicial apparatus – constitutional courts, federal courts, and
state courts. Despite this growing institutional uniformity, there remains wide variation in
administrative capacity. Indeed, one prominent observer of Brazilian courts notes that
administratively, state courts are highly divergent, constituting a “multiform judiciary”
(Falcão 2006; “o multiplo judiciário”). The main variation in administrative capacity
involves budgetary matters, staffing decisions, and physical and personnel resources. The
budgetary issues are already described above, but the qualitative analysis examines
outcomes in staffing (measured as judges per capita) and the physical resources of the
courts (measures as physical infrastructure).
While the differences between Brazil and Mexico might lead one to conclude that
subnational phenomena or simply not comparable across the two countries, I suggest just
the opposite. If the analysis finds similar causal pathways across the two countries –
despite differences in party systems, styles of authoritarianisms, timing and styles of
transitions to democracy, and styles of judicial federalism – then the inter-national
differences greatly strengthen the conclusions.
The qualitative, process tracing approach in each state, what Hall (2003) calls
“systematic process analysis”, draws on three streams of evidence: (i) interviews, (ii)
archival evidence, and (iii) direct observation. First, I conducted 115 personal, semi-
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structured interviews with judges and other authorities on law and courts, distributed in
the six state case studies as follows: Acre (14), Maranhão (18), and Rio Grande do Sul
(23) in Brazil; Aguascalientes (23), Hidalgo (20), and Michoacán (17) in Mexico.
Interview participants consisted of first- and second-instance judges, lawyers, members
of judicial councils (these could be judges or politicians, or other authorities selected for
their judicial expertise), court staff, as well as politicians (governors and legislators,
especially legislators on key committees affecting the judiciary), law professors, and
other local experts. Notably, these interviews included eight current or former state courts
presidents, as well as two current or former governors. These participants could be
classified as legal “specialists”, “experts”, or “elites”. In order to safeguard anonymity, a
random number between 1 and 200 was generated and assigned to each interview. All
interviews are referenced only by that number. Several participants gave multiple
interviews over the course of time in the field, as well as continued contact via electronic
mail. Thus, while the total number of participants is 115, the number of separate
interviews conducted was greater (see Appendix E for more information regarding
fieldwork, including interviews and participant selection).
Archival, textual, or documentary evidence covered legislative and judicial
documents, including state constitutions, administrative regulations (leyes orgánicas in
Mexico), legislative bills (iniciativas), finalized laws, voting records, annual reports,
budgetary statements, litigation records, and journalist accounts. Direct observations
included multiple visits to courthouses, including first-instance courts (fórum or juizado
in Brazil, and juzgado in Mexico), state supreme courts (Tribunal de Justiça in Brazil,
and Tribunal Superior or Supremo Tribunal de Justicia in Mexico), as well as other local
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courts (small claims, fiscal courts, and labor courts), federal courts, and legislative and
executive offices. Additionally, I interacted multiple times with judges and other
interview participants in multiple formal and informal settings, including dinners, official
events (swearing-in ceremonies, “state-of-the-state” and “state-of-the-courts” addresses),
and associational meetings.
Relying on these sources, I construct an analytic narrative that traces the process
of judicial change in each state (Bennett and George 2005; Gerring 2007). Following
Collier, Brady and Seawright (2004) and Gerring (2007, 29-33), each case study is
therefore composed not of a single observation, but rather of a series of observations or
evidentiary markers along a longitudinal causal process, drawing not on the correlationbased inferential logic of “data set observations” (DSOs), but rather on the process-based
inferential logic of “causal process observations” (CPOs) (Brady and Collier 2004).
These “causal chains” are judged against the “causal patterns” (Hall 2003) specified from
theoretical expectations. Specific attention focuses on the mechanisms and motivations
activating or initiating a causal process, and the sequence of actions or events within that
causal process, comparing expected causal patterns with the observed process. This
process tracing identifies key moments, actors, and strategies, clarifying both
mechanisms and motivations that explain significant changes over time and help
adjudicate among complementary, competing, or inconsistent causal logics. In this
regard, the approach employed here closely approximates what Falleti (2006) calls
“theory-guided process tracing” (TGPT). Falleti joins Hall (2003) and others (Bennett
and George 2005; Bennett 2008) who highlight the theory-building value of this kind of
approach and of its strengths in small-N research.
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3.4. Conclusion: Present Strengths and Future Promise of Research Design
The research design adopts a subnational level of analysis, extends nested analysis
to time-series cross-section (TSCS) data, demonstrating the additional opportunities for
case selection offered by this kind of data structure, and integrates large-N analyses of
this data with small-N, controlled comparisons in two countries. Summarizing, the
research design might be described as multi-method, subnational nested and most similar’
analysis in multiple countries. This rather awkward phrase captures the advantages of (i)
a subnational level of analysis; (ii) mixed methods research; (iii) nested case selection
combined with controlled comparisons; and (iv) subnational research across two different
countries. The chapter title reframes this as scaled-down, cross-border nesting.
Aside from discussing the methods employed in the current research, however,
this chapter also highlights concerns in current methodological debates regarding both
subnational and qualitatitve research: (1) beyond combining intra- and inter-national
research, i.e., subnational data from non-adjoining states in different countries, this
research design notes how qualitative, process-based analysis can be leveraged to
overcome the costs associated with the interdependence of subnational observations; (2)
the research design also identifies understudied opportunities for case selection offered
by TSCS datasets, drawing on within-case variation in typicality over time, i.e., typical
and atypical “state-years” from within the same state; and (3) the design notes the
advantage of combining different strategies of case selection, namely, identifying
promising nested cases and then building structured qualitative research designs around
these cases.
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Beyond contributing to these methodological debates, the research design also
suggests fruitful methodological avenues for future research. Commenting on Linz and de
Miguel’s (1966) study of backward regions in Spain and Italy, Lijphart (1971, 689)
emphasizes “a particularly promising approach may be the combination of intranation
and internation comparison”. Offering several specific examples of the strengths of this
combination, Snyder (2001, 96-97) recalls Lipset’s (1950) work on southern Canadian
provinces and North Dakota in order to understand the origins of agrarian socialism, Linz
and de Miguel’s study mentioned by Lijphart, O’Donnell’s (1973, 21) use of a “crossmodern” approach, comparing developed regions of Argentina and Brazil, and Linz’s
(1986) study of Basque regions in northeastern Spain and southwestern France in order to
understand variation in ethnic identification. Combining intra-national and inter-national
data and cases can be a fruitful path for understanding other major phenomena, including
the persistence in new democracies of subnational enclaves of authoritarianism,
environmental degradation, public health policies (including HIV/AIDS and nutrition),
education reform, and a variety of topics in administrative and institutional reform and
performance, including judicial politics.
Extensions of the current study might pursue regional comparisons across Mexico
and Brazil. Small-N, controlled comparisons across southern Mexico and northern or
northeastern Brazil are especially promising due to greater similarities in levels of
development across these two regions in different countries than among these regions and
other regions within the same country. For instance, the Oaxaca in southern Mexico is a
poor state with a large indigenous population and communal practices that are distinct
from many other states. Depending on the question being asked, it might make more
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analytical sense to compare this state with one of the poorer states in the Brazilian
Amazon or northeastern region than to compare Oaxaca with a more developed state in
Mexico that does not have a strong indigenous presence. Similarly, it might make more
sense to compare states in Brazil’s industrial south or southeast with states in Mexico’s
industrial center or north. Pushing these examples further, it might make more sense to
compare the resilient and traditional brand of politics in Hidalgo or Oaxaca with the
resiliently traditional brand of politics in the states of Alagoas or Maranhão in northern
Brazil. In addition to the current study, other research that combines intranational and
international comparisons include Jepsen (2006), Armesto (forthcoming 2009), and
Giraudy (2009). By drawing data and cases from two different countries to generate
causal inferences, these inferences are more likely to teach us something interesting about
subnational units in still other countries, and possibly teach us lessons about whole
nations. That is, the lessons generated at one level of analysis (subnational) are more
likely to apply at a higher level of analysis (national) (Snyder 2001b, 103).
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Part II. Empirical Analysis
Poder que não tem recursos orçamentários para sua manutenção, crescimento, e
remuneração digna dos braços trabalhadores que o sustentam, não é independente.
Judge Adair Longuini, Acre72
O orçamento é a vida do judiciário.
Judge Laudivon Nogueira, Acre73

Introduction
Part II constitutes the core empirical analysis of the dissertation. Chapters 4 and 5
offer time-series, cross-section examinations of judicial strength – with judicial spending
per capita as the dependent variable – in Mexico and Brazil, respectively. Mexico is
analyzed first because the results are clear and straightforward, facilitating the
interpretation of results in Brazil (see Chapter 3 for discussion of statistical methods).
Chapters 6 and 7 build on the quantitative analysis by offering small-N studies of court
strength. Chapter 6 examines the process of judicial change in three Mexican states:
Aguascalientes, Michoacán, and Hidalgo. Chapter 7 examines the same process in three
Brazilian states: Acre, Rio Grande do Sul, and Maranhão (see Chapter 3 for case
selection rationale). First, the section below introduces judicial spending as a proxy for
court strength.

Judicial Spending and Court Strength
While judicial spending is an imperfect measure for court performance, the U.S.
and comparative literature on judicial politics recognizes court budgets as a critical
72

Quote from Longuini (2003, 12). Translation: “A branch of government that does not have the budgetary
resources for its own maintenance, growth, and dignified remuneration of the employees that sustain it, is
not independent.” As of December 2007, Longuini was promoted to desembargador and joined the TJ in
Acre.
73
Author interview. Translation: “The budget is the life of the judiciary.”
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component of judicial strength and independence. Systematic studies in Latin America,
either quantitative or qualitative, of the effect of spending on different components of
performance (e.g. access, efficiency, and independence) are lacking. However, the
logical relationship between financial resources and institutional performance allows us
to deduce that court budgets determine the proper functioning of the judicial branch. In
addition to this deductive argument for the importance of judicial spending, the evidence
from studies in the U.S. supports the expectation that weak court budgets undermine
judicial performance. In short, if studies in the U.S. show that judicial spending is
important for the performance of the courts, then the autonomy and performance of
courts in newer and poorer democracies is in greater jeopardy due to the heightened
political vulnerability of court budgets in these countries. Finally, existing research in
both Brazil and Mexico identifies judicial spending as a critical determinant of judicial
performance, particularly with regards to independence.
In the U.S. literature, Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist No. 79 notes that “[n]ext
to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of judges than
a fixed provision for their support.”74 More than two hundred years after Hamilton’s
words, judicial budgets in the U.S. are generally secure at the federal level, but as of
2003 only one state (West Virginia) had laws to protect the judicial budget from
reductions by the legislature (Douglas and Hartley 2003, 453 n.2). It should be noted,
74

The importance of court budgets is also contemplated in Art. III, sec. 1 of the U.S. Constitution, which
establishes that judges shall “receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished”.
Sufficient budgetary resources provide judges with secure salaries, thereby avoiding a very concrete form
of judicial dependence. Funding also allows the judiciary to fill vacancies, purchase equipment, implement
programs and reforms, and generally provide a better administration of justice. In short, adequate budgets
allow the judiciary to perform effectively as the third branch of government. Thus, Jackson (1999) lists
adequate resources as one of six conditions for judicial independence, the American Bar Association (ABA
1997, ii-iii) lists “[an] adequate appropriation from congress” as a condition for judicial independence, and
the American Judicature Society (AJS 2005) adds that “adequate funding is critical to preserving an
independent judiciary”.
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however, that even stable judicial budgets – neither growing nor shrinking – do not
account for the corrosive effect of inflation, which reduces the real value of similar
allocations over time (Domingo 2000, 715). Moreover, recent state-level scholarship in
the U.S. demonstrates that “assaults on judicial independence” include “punitive cuts” in
judicial budgets (Douglas and Hartley, 441; Kaufman 1999; Bermant and Wheeler
1995). Douglas and Hartley’s 2003 study of court administrators and both executive and
legislative budget officers found that both governors and state legislatures leverage
budgetary decisions against the judiciary in order to influence the courts (448-50).
Similarly, a position paper by the Conference of State Court Administrators (COSCA
2003, 8) identifies the sometimes punitive function of the power of the purse. Thus, court
budgets appear to be relatively secure at the federal level in the U.S., but are still
politicized and vulnerable in the states. Moreover, policymakers recognize this
vulnerability and target court budgets as a way of constraining the courts.
Judicial budgets are even more vulnerable and of greater importance to court
strength in newer and poorer democracies. In Latin America, where transitions to
democracy took place in the last 20-30 years, judicial spending is highly politicized. A
United Nations report on democracy in the region notes the allocation of financial
resources to courts as one of the “outstanding issues” in the administration of justice
(UNDP 2004, 104). Similarly, Pásara (2004, 18) identifies sufficient financial resources
as one of the five principal themes of judicial reform in the region. Additionally, a 2005
report by the U.S. National Center for State Courts, which analyzed state courts abroad
and sponsored an initial study of state courts in Mexico (Caballero Juarez and Concha
Cantú 2001), identifies adequate judicial budgets as “essential to ensuring judicial
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independence” (Gramckow 2005). Finally, in a region beset by inflation rates higher than
the U.S., Domingo (2000, 715) notes that these historically higher inflation rates further
erode the real value of judicial budgets and corresponding salaries that are technically
protected from reduction.
In Brazil, court budgets have been relatively healthy in comparison to Mexico.
Indeed, the Ministry of Justice’s Diagnóstico do Poder Judiciário (2004, 72-75)
emphasizes the high level of judicial spending in Brazil, measured as a percentage of the
total public sector budget, relative to other countries. Using country-level data from the
World Bank (2000), the Diagnóstico’s comparison focuses only on the federal judiciary,
and additional reports from the World Bank (2004, 8-15) note that federal judicial
budgets are historically higher in Brazil than in other countries in the region, including
Mexico. However, state budgets are generally overlooked in these comparisons.75
Despite these historically larger federal budgets in Brazil, there is still wide
variation in judicial spending at the state level. Twenty per cent of the dataset presented
here is composed of states with judicial budgets that constituted less than one per cent
(1%) of state GDP. Although these figures are not directly comparable with the World
Bank data that compares court budgets to public sector budgets (systematic data over
time on total public sector budgets at the state level is unavailable), these numbers reveal
substantial variation in state-level spending. This variation is striking considering the
often repeated “national character” of the Brazilian judiciary. 76 Most importantly, the
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In this context, it is not surprising that judicial spending was not part of the 2004 reform package in
Brazil, and, unlike Mexico, spending was rarely highlighted in the reform debates over the preceding 12
years.
76
This phrase was most recently expressed in a judgment of the Brazilian supreme court (Supremo
Tribunal Federal, or STF) in which the court ruled that different salary “ceilings” for state and federal
judges are unconstitutional due to the principles of “isonomy” and “symmetry”, and the “national and
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fact that spending is identified as perhaps a met goal at the federal level in Brazil
highlights the significance of any variation found at the subnational level. That is, if
analysts applaud the “reasonable to generous” federal court budgets in Brazil (World
Bank 2004, 8), then there should be cause for concern regarding large subnational
variation, especially regarding the states at the low end of that variation. It is this
variation that this research seeks to explain.
Turning to Mexico, Domingo’s (2000) analysis of the Mexican Supreme Court
emphasizes the importance of court budgets. In general, “financial autonomy and decent
salaries” reduce judicial dependence on the political branches. More specifically,
Domingo finds that judicial spending enhances the prestige of the judicial career
(Domingo, 715). Whereas historically a position on the court was not a worthwhile
career aspiration, higher salaries and greater resources with which to operate draw more
competent individuals to the career. Additionally, secure salaries serve to insulate judges
from bribery and corruption. Perhaps more importantly in the Mexican context, healthy
salaries also insulate judges from the temptations of future political aspirations in which
they might receive higher salaries. Historically, Mexican judges treated the judicial
career as a stepping stone to more lucrative positions in the political branches, so
political loyalties were often more important than judicial standards, and career mobility
served as a kind of euphemism for the instability of judicial positions. With higher
budgets, and correspondingly higher salaries (salaries make up more than 80% of
budgets across both Brazilian and Mexican states), career incentives shift away from
political loyalty and towards institutional professionalism (Domingo, 723-25). Judges

unitary character of the judiciary” (ADI 3.854-1, Feb. 28, 2007, Rel. Min. Cesar Peluzo, paras. 9,10)
(emphasis added).
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become more concerned with developing their professional reputation and remain in
their positions on the bench for longer periods of time. As an added benefit of career
stability, the reservoir of experience and expertise of the judiciary also grows. In short,
higher budgets enhance the ethics, stability, and competence of the judicial career.
The financial reality of judicial institutions at the subnational level in Mexico,
however, is bleak. As in the U.S., federal court budgets are increasingly secure and
federal judges are very well compensated, earning in 2006 between $100,000 and
$160,000 in U.S. dollars per year in base salary, which does not include year-end
bonuses or other benefits (El Universal 2007). Despite growing budgets at the federal
level, however, state budgets remain weak, vulnerable, and volatile.77
Responding to this resource vulnerability, a recent two-year study commissioned
by the Mexican Supreme Court listed the security of judicial budgets as one of its top
priorities for reform (Caballero Juárez 2005; Caballero Juárez, López Ayllón, Oñate
Laborde 2006). Emphasizing this point, another 2006 report by the Supreme Court
(SCJN 2006) identified court budgets as the “Achilles heel” of judicial independence.
Given the importance of judicial spending, it is not surprising that existing
research also relies on judicial spending as a proxy for, or a component of, judicial
performance, especially independence (e.g., Beer 2006; Ríos-Figueroa 2006).
77

In the Mexican states, the financially strapped judicial branch is what one lawyer referred to as
“Cinderella”, the poor relative of the other branches of government (Arroyo Moreno 2007, 17). Until very
recently, state judicial positions were subject to the approval of the governor, so judicial terms overlapped
with the six-year term of the state executive, leading to what some scholars have labeled the “sexenio
judicial” (Caballero Juarez 2005, 87). This openly dependent relationship between the executive and the
judiciary lead to a subservient judiciary that, among other things, did not challenge the budget assigned to it
by the governor. Even if the legislature noticed a weak budget, party discipline, loyalty, and hierarchy
within the dominant PRI prevented any changes to the budget. Additionally, where the judiciary has dared
to make such challenges, state executives have historically reduced budgets and starved the judicial branch
in order to maintain its subservience and dependence. In a recent and extreme example of budgetary
conflict, the judiciary of the State of Jalisco sued the other state branches of government in 2001 over the
size of the judicial budget (Caballero Juárez, 89).
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Furthermore, my own interviews in Brazil and Mexico reveal that judges consider the
budget an important annual responsibility, determining the planning, prestige, and
performance of the courts.78
The regional emphasis on strengthening judicial institutions and the already
substantial literature on judicial reform support the expectation for either uniformity or
convergence in comparable measures of judicial spending in the region, e.g., spending
per capita. This expectation is strongest within individual countries, like Brazil and
Mexico, that have pursued ambitious judicial reform projects at the national level, 79 and
where institutional similarities and policy diffusion put additional harmonizing pressures
on court budgets.
Despite these expectations, state-level judicial spending varies widely within
Brazil, and also varies substantially between the two countries. Illustrating this variation,
Figure 1 plots subnational judicial spending in Brazil and Mexico for 2003, including
Brazil’s 26 states and Mexico’s 31 states (excluding the federal districts).80 For ease of
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Interviewees cited numerous examples of annual budgets being exhausted before the end of the fiscal
year, the inability to acquire needed equipment or have surplus equipment to replace the inevitable failure
of existing equipment, the inability to carry out improvements in both infrastructure and services, as well as
the pressure placed on the political independence of the court due to insufficient budgets.
79

Mexico passed extensive reforms beginning in 1994. Brazil did not pass a judicial reform until 2004.
However, the Brazilian reform project began in 1992 and received widespread coverage and attention
during the following 12 years. For discussions of the Brazilian reform process, see Sadek (2001) and Gross
Cunha (2007); for discussions of the Mexican reform process, see Domingo (2000), Inclán (2004), and
Finkel (2005).
80

These amounts reflect the amounts budgeted by the state for the operation of state courts at the first and
second instance. In Brazil, first-instance courts are referred to as foros (fórum or foro, in the singular), and
the second instance courts are the Tribunais da Justiça, or TJs. In Mexico, first instance courts are
tribunales de primera instancia and there are state supreme courts, Tribunales Superiores de Justicia, or
TSJs. Spending allocated for federal courts and other special courts, e.g., labor or military courts, is not
included. Unlike other areas of public spending (e.g., education or health), federal transfers do not cover
judicial expenses at the state level. There are, however, occasional special transfers from the executive
branch, but these special projects occur randomly throughout the country and over time. All figures are
converted into U.S. dollars using the exchange rate in the second quarter of the year, adjusted for inflation,
and per capitized. Exchange rates and deflators are from the International Financial Statistics Database of
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comparison across the two countries, the budgets were transformed to per capita U.S.
dollars for 2000. Dependent variables in the statistical analysis are in local currencies.

the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2007), and population figures are from the IBGE and INEGI in
Brazil and Mexico, respectively. It should be noted that scholars disagree regarding the quality of the
Brazilian data, citing both the lack of common measurement standards across states and political factors
that influence court statistics. However, existing data from the Ministério da Justiça, the Conselho
Nacional da Justiça, IBGE, and IPEA, is the best available data. See Gross Cunha (2007) for an extended
discussion of court statistics in Brazil.
All 26 Brazilian states and 31 Mexican states appear along the Y-axis, and judicial spending per capita
appears along the X-axis. The amount for each state represents the deflated and per capitized spending for
2003, in constant 2000 dollars, and the states are listed in descending order according to judicial budget per
capita. It should be noted that throughout the last few decades, judicial spending has, on average, always
been higher in Brazil than in Mexico. This complements a central finding reported elsewhere regarding
Brazilian court budgets, namely, that they are higher than the budgets of regional neighbors (World Bank
2000; 2004). Importantly, at least with regards to Mexico, the graph shows this difference exists even at the
state level. That is not to say, however, that all states in Brazil spend more than every state in Mexico all of
the time. Figure 1 graphs spending figures by state in both countries for 2003. In that year, almost every
Brazilian state spent more than any one of the Mexican states. However, there are a few Mexican states –
Campeche, Chihuahua, Jalisco, and Querétaro – that spend more than the bottom three or four Brazilian
states. Also, 2003 is one of the years in which spending is closest between the two countries. Thus, the
variation reported in Figure 1 shows less difference in spending levels between Brazilian and Mexican
states than if the graph were of an earlier year, e.g., 1997.
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Figure II.1. Variation in judicial spending per capita across Brazilian and Mexican
states in the year 2003 (in constant 2000 U.S. Dollars).
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At least two puzzles arise from Figure 1. First, the cross-state variation is stark.
This variation underscores the fact that Brazil is actually “many Brazils” (and Mexico
“many Mexicos”), and that court resources vary greatly from one part of the country to
another. Also, Brazil’s supposedly national judiciary exhibits far more variation.81
Second, many of the states that spend the most on their courts are among the poorest and
more rural states in Brazil (e.g., Amapá, Acre, and Rondônia). One possible explanation
for this anomaly is that these states incurred start-up costs for new courts, new hires, or
other new or singular events in 2003. However, data even from previous years show
81

Thanks to Bill Stanley for drawing my attention to this.
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these states among the spending leaders. In per capita terms, these states have been
outspending many of their richer counterparts since at least the early 1990s. A more
likely explanation is that there is a minimum “floor” of judicial spending that every state
must meet in order to have a minimally functioning court system, and judicial spending
per capita is magnified in states where this floor is met but is divided by a low number of
inhabitants. That is, analyses of judicial strength involve economy of scale problems.
Growth rates show a different ordering of states, so per capita spending may be higher in
small, rural states, but courts may be stronger overall in large, densely-populated states.
Thus, it appears that any analysis of spending in Brazil needs to control for the influence
of population size on spending in order to control for the fact that even small states incur
this minimum “floor” of spending.
Why do some state courts have more resources than others? Why is judicial
spending higher in some states than in others? In short, what accounts for the variation in
Figure 1? Chapters 4 and 5 seek to answer these questions in the large-N analyses.
Chapters 6 and 7 offer the small-N analyses, examining judicial spending as well as other
dimensions of the administrative strength of state courts. Judicial spending per capita is
the dependent variable in the large-N analysis and is also the first dependent variable
analyzed in the small-N chapters. Thus, judicial budgets form a bridge between the types
of empirical examinations.
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4. Large-N Analysis: Mexico
4.1. Introduction
Complementing existing scholarship on judicial behavior, as well as broader
scholarship on institutional change and performance, this chapter offers the first timeseries cross-section analysis of state courts in Mexico. The analysis examines judicial
spending – as a proxy for court strength – across the 31 Mexican states from 1993 to
2007, excluding the Federal District (Mexico City). The results reveal three principal
findings. First, competition – measured four different ways – has a positive and
statistically significant relationship with spending in both countries. Second, when
controlling for ideology, divided government has a negative relationship with spending,
cutting against the opportunity logic and supporting veto player theory. Third, ideology
has a statistically significant and curvilinear, “U-shaped” relationship with spending,
with the left prong of the “U” higher than the right. That is, leftist and rightist
administrations spend more on courts than their centrist counterparts, but the left spends
more than the right. Overall, leftist governors in competitive electoral environments
appear to be the best combination for courts. The findings extend existing theories to
new empirical areas and offer insights into the political logic of judicial change in new
democracies.

4.2 Judicial Spending in the Mexican States
The regional emphasis on strengthening judicial institutions and the already
substantial literature on judicial reform support the expectation for either uniformity or
convergence in comparable measures of judicial spending in the region, e.g., spending
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per capita. This expectation is strongest within individual countries, like Mexico, that
have pursued ambitious judicial reform projects at the national level, 82 and where
institutional similarities and policy diffusion put additional harmonizing pressures on
court budgets.
Despite these expectations, state-level judicial spending varies widely within
Mexico. Illustrating this variation, Figure 4.1 plots subnational judicial spending across
Mexico’s 31 states for 2003 (excluding the Federal District; the vertical line identifies
the overall mean at 50.09).83 The cross-state variation in Figure 4.1 is stark. This
variation underscores the fact that Mexico is “many Mexicos” and that court resources
vary greatly from one part of the country to another. Second, at first glance, the general
wealth of the state does not appear to determine court budgets. For instance, Oaxaca and
Guerrero are states in the poor southern belt of the country, and it may therefore be less
surprising that they are at the bottom of the figure. However, Hidalgo, the State of
Mexico (listed as “Estado de México”), and Puebla are large, prominent states that
border Mexico City in one of the country’s industrial corridors.84

82

Mexico passed extensive reforms beginning in 1994. For discussions of the Mexican reform process, see
Domingo (2000), Fix-Fierro (2003), Inclán (2004), Finkel (2005), Ríos-Figueroa (2006), and Magaloni
(2008).
83
These amounts reflect the amounts budgeted by the state for the operation of state courts at the first and
second instance. In Mexico, first instance courts are tribunales de primera instancia and state supreme
courts are Tribunales Superiores de Justicia, or TSJs. Spending allocated for federal courts and other
special courts, e.g., labor or military courts, is not included. Unlike other areas of public spending (e.g.,
education or health), federal transfers do not cover judicial expenses at the state level. There are, however,
occasional special transfers from the executive branch, but these special projects occur randomly
throughout the country and over time. Exchange rates and deflators are from the International Financial
Statistics Database of the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2007), and population figures are from
INEGI. All 31 Mexican states appear along the Y-axis, and judicial spending per capita appears along the
X-axis. The amount for each state represents the deflated and per capitized spending for 2003, in constant
2000 dollars, and the states are listed in descending order according to judicial budget per capita.
84
The multiple entities named “Mexico” may be confusing to those unfamiliar with Mexico. The country is
named “Mexico” and the national capital is “Mexico City”, but there is also a large state, which partly
surrounds Mexico City, which is also named “Mexico”. Thus, the national unit and prominent subnational
units carry the same name.
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Why do some state courts have more resources than others? Why is judicial
spending higher in some states than in others? In short, what accounts for the variation in
Figure 4.1?

Figure 4.1. Average judicial spending per capita across the 31 Mexican states.
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4.3. Measuring Competition and Ideology in Mexico
In both the political-institutional and the judicial politics literatures, electoral
competitiveness is most often measured as either margin of victory (Beer 2006), majority
distance (Schedler 2005), divided government (Chavez 2004; Staton 2006) or, following
Laakso and Taagepera (1979), as the effective number of candidates or parties (ENC or
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ENP).85
There is broader variation in electoral competition across the Mexican states.
Margin of victory ranges from 0.02 in Guerrero (2000-2002), Jalisco (2001-2002), and
Tlaxcala (1999-2002) to 0.93 in Quintana Roo (1994-1999). In Quintana Roo, this means
the ruling party, PRI, won the governor’s race in 1992 by a margin of 93% of the votes.
Majority distance ranges from −0.11 in Michoacán (1996-2001) to 0.45 in Quintana Roo
(1994-1999) and San Luis Potosí (1995-1997). ENC ranges from 1.10 in Quintana Roo
(1994-1999) and 1.11 in San Luis Potosí (1995-1997) to 3.29 in Durango (1999-2002)
(see descriptive statistics in Table 4.1 for more information).86 With regards to ENC, we
are looking for any movement away from 1, especially above 2, since the PRI’s regime
was marked by single-party dominance. Thus, low ENC below 2, as in Quintana Roo and
San Luis Potosí, signal decreased competitiveness and diversity of political actors, i.e.,
85

Margins of victory are high in where a single party or coalition is dominant, and correspondingly low
under conditions of competitive elections. Majority distance – margin of victory minus 50 (i.e., margin –
50) captures the distance between the victor’s share of the vote and half the electorate. Again, this number
will be high where elections are non-competitive and high where competition is also high, but the variable
will be positive where the winning party dominates by more than 50 percentage points. ENC requires a
clarification with regard to measuring the competitiveness of a political system. This formula is often used
to measure party system fragmentation, but adequately captures competitiveness in new democracies like
Mexico and Brazil. Interparty competition is present when there are at least two political parties of
comparable strength competing effectively for governor or for legislative seats in the state, and is low when
a single party has a stranglehold on electoral competition (see also Beer 2003; Chavez 2004). In Mexico
and Brazil, where provincial party systems are often dominated by a single party or coalition, ENC captures
movement away from this authoritarian baseline. Thus, measures below two indicate the continuity of or
movement toward single-party dominance, and measures above two indicate movement towards
multipartyism. Divided government identifies all those instances in which the party that occupies the
executive branch does not have either an absolute majority or a plurality in the legislature (Beer 2003;
Ríos-Figueroa 2006; Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tommasi 2002; 2007). Other measures of competitiveness
include Molinar’s (1992) adjusted measure of ENP, which weights the variable according to the dominance
of a single party (see also Schedler 2005), party turnover (Spiller and Tommasi 2007). Studies that capture
competitiveness as party turnover and then model judicial performance based on how actors anticipate that
turnover rely on a very strong assumption about the “perfect foresight” that these actors have regarding
future party turnover, and how this foresight shapes strategic behavior (see Iaryczower, Spiller and
Tommasi 2002, 705). The other measures of competitiveness capture the political insecurity generate by
electoral competition without making this kind of assumption.
86
N = 1/∑si2, where si equals the proportion of either votes or seats of the i-th party (Laakso and Taagepera
1979). For example, N = 2.00 where two parties each hold half of the seats in the legislature (1/((.50)2 +
(.50)2)). N = 1.00 if one party were to completely dominate the legislature. Electoral data in Mexico is from
the CIDAC database, the national electoral institute (IFE), and local, state electoral institutes.
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the continuity of single-party dominance. Upward movement away from 2 signals
increased competitiveness and diversity, i.e., a shift towards mutlipartyism.
Following the party classification outlined in Chapter 2, ideology is coded four
different ways. First, a simple dummy variable captures the presence of ideology, coding
observations as “0” if the governor is from the PRI and “1” if the governor is from either
the PRD or PAN. Second, dummy variables identify each of the three main parties –
PRD, PRI, and PAN – distinguishing the effect of each party without forcing each onto a
left-to-right continuum. The third measure forces the three parties into an evenly spaced
ordinal variable (-1 to 1). Thus, the three main parties – PRD, PRI, and PAN – are coded
left (-1), center (0), and right (1), respectively. Finally, drawing on survey data from the
University of Salamanca (Alcántara 2008), the fourth measure locates the three parties
along a 10-point scale (1 equals “far left” and 10 equals “far right”), where the location of
each party changes every three years depending on the survey data. The PRD varies from
2.56 to 2.78; the PRI varies from 6.09 to 6.94; and the PAN varies from 8.94 to 9.27.87
While the first measure (presence of ideology) captures only whether movement
away from the PRI influences judicial spending, the remaining measures are able to
identify directional effects along a left-to-right ideological space, distinguishing between
left and right. The left-right ideological continuum is able to capture a linear relationship
between ideology and spending, i.e., whether leftist politicians increase judicial spending
more than rightist ones, or vice-versa. However, the empirical implication from the
theory outlined above is that the presence of ideological commitments – both left and
right – matters more than their direction. That is, ideology should have a curvilinear, “Ushaped” relationship with spending, captured mathematically by including both the linear
87

This measure is comparable to that of Power and Zucco (2009) used in the analysis in Brazil (Chapter 5).
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and squared terms of the ordinal and interval ideology measures.
Recalling the theoretical arguments in Chapter 2 regarding the anticipated effects
of competition and the positive effects of leftist and rightist parties, the expectations and
measures above yield the following hypotheses.
H1a:
H1b:
H1c:
H1d:

Judicial spending will vary negatively with margin of victory.
Judicial spending will vary negatively with majority distance.
Judicial spending will vary positively with ENC.
Judicial spending will vary positively with divided government and
negatively with unified government IF re-election, signaling,
insurance, or opportunity logics are stronger than the veto player
logic.
H1e: Judicial spending will vary negatively with divided government and
positively with unified government if the veto player logic is stronger
than the re-election, signaling, insurance, or opportunity logics.
H2a: Judicial spending will vary positively with the presence of programmaticideological commitments.
H2b: Judicial spending will vary positively with both Left and Right governors.
H2c: Ideology has a curvilinear relationship with spending.

4.4. Data and Methods
Data
Previous sections explain the data for judicial spending and the principal
explanatory variables of competition and ideology. The dependent variable is annual
state-level judicial spending per capita. Mexican budget data, which is from state official
reporters (Diario Oficial, Periódico Oficial, or Gazeta Oficial)88 captures the annual

88

The court budget develops in the contested process of executive proposals and legislative negotiations in
the fall of each year, and the final amount allocated to the judiciary is then published in the official state
reporter, usually in the final week of December, as the “Presupuesto de Egresos”. Gaps in the data were
supplemented with data from the national statistics office (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía, e
Información, or INEGI), the Financial Coordinating Council (Consejo Coordinador Financiero, or CCF
2004), Bello Paredes (2006, 101 n.12), and individual state websites, e.g., Poder Judicial del Estado de Baja
California, Informe relativo a la administración de justicia (2005), available at http://www.poder-judicialbc.gob.mx/transparencia/documentos/pdfs/infadmin/5.pdf (last accessed Nov. 1, 2006). The CCF report
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judicial budget per capita in real terms, adjusting for inflation and using 2000 as the base
year in Mexico (2000 = 100).89 The 14-year time span (1993-2007) includes years before
and after the historic national transition in 2000 that marked the end of the PRI’s 71-year
reign. Thus, the sample captures wide variation in key independent variables of
competition and ideology.
Three control variables are included: gross domestic product (GDP) per capita,
population density, and election year. GDP figures control for broad differences in the
level of development across states and are from INEGI. Population density controls for
the concentration of people and the general degree of urbanization. All states are
expected to incur a minimum “floor” of court maintenance costs as part of economy of
scale problems associated with state judiciaries. Similarly, small changes in already small
budgets might appear large due to the per capita transformation. Population density
controls for these factors. Population and territory figures for this variable and the per
capita transformation are also from INEGI in Mexico. Election year is a dummy variable
(0, 1), where 1 identifies a year in which governor elections were held. This variable
captures any budgetary increases associated with the electoral calendar. Table 1 reports
descriptive statistics for all data.

contains budget data for all states from 1998 to 2003. Preliminary comparisons between data collected from
primary sources during field research and CCF data revealed some inconsistencies. Theses inconsistencies
were corrected where they were identified. For instance, budget data for the state of Hidalgo were corrected
by consulting the official state reporter in Hidalgo’s Congressional Archive.
89

Deflation indices are drawn from the International Financial Statistics Database of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF 2006). Transformations are the author’s own using second quarter data from IMF.
The second quarter is utilized because this likely corresponds with the information legislators and other
politicians would have had available to them prior to preparing and negotiating the annual budget in the fall
months of each year.
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Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics for Large-N Analysis in Mexico.

Variable
Spending (Pesos)
Margin of victory
Majority distance
Competition (ENC)
Unified-super
Unified-simple
Unified-plurality
Divided government
Ideology-presence
Left (PRD)
Center (PRI)
Right (PAN)
Ideology-ordinal
Ideology-ordinal (squared)
Ideology-Salamanca
Ideology-Salamanca (squared)
GDP per cap (log)
Population density
Election year

MEXICO
Time span: 1993-2007
N
Mean
Std. Dev.
271
52.01
25.69
271
0.27
0.25
271
0.08
0.14
271
2.24
0.47
259
0.17
0.37
259
0.75
0.43
259
0.89
0.32
259
0.08
0.28
271
0.27
0.44
271
0.09
0.29
271
0.73
0.44
271
0.17
0.38
271
0.08
0.51
271
0.27
0.44
271
6.70
1.63
271
47.61
20.08
271
3.74
0.42
271
93.87
123.45
271
0.15
0.36

Min.
11.18
0.02
−0.11
1.10
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
−1
0
2.56
6.55
2.97
4.71
0

Max.
109
0.93
0.45
3.29
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
9.27
85.93
4.53
620.73
1

* Denotes mode rather than mean.
Note: Overall standard deviation and minimum/maximum values. Stata also returns between and within
values with xtsum command, but these are omitted for economy of presentation.
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Methods
The unit of analysis is the “state-year”. The panel dataset has 271 observations (N
= 271). These observations come from all 31 Mexican states, excluding the Federal
District. The time span ranges from 1993 to 2007, but data are available for varying
numbers of years in each state, making the panels unbalanced. A minimum of five and a
maximum of 14 time points are available per state. There were some missing data points
due to incomplete reports from individual states, but this small number of gaps (five)
occurred in single time points within longer series of data, so the gaps were filled with
interpolated values. Thus, there are no remaining gaps in the dataset. The unbalanced
panel structure of the data generates several methodological challenges, as outlined in
Chapter 3 (Section 3.3.1). Following the conclusions from that chapter, the large-N
analysis applies a population-averaged panel-data model, or generalized estimating
equation (GEE), with a forward-lagged dependent variable to capture temporal
dynamics.90

4.5. Results
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 and Figures 4.2 and 4.3 report all findings. Table 4.2 highlights
different measures of competition (models 1-6); Table 4.3 highlights different measures
of ideology (models 7-11). Figure 4.2 graphs predicted spending values according to

90

Independent variables are measured at time t and the dependent variable at time t+1. See Chapter 3 for
full discussion of methodological challenges with TSCS data and the tradeoffs involved in selecting the
GEE model from among other options, e.g., OLS with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs), AR1
models, panel-specific AR1 models, lagged dependent variables, time dummies, and fixed effects models.
Checks for robustness using these alternative models generate results that are substantially similar. Indeed,
most of the additional models showed stronger effects of competition and ideology, suggesting the results
reported here are among the most conservative. All models estimated with Stata v9.0 using xtgee. Data and
do-file available from the author.
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three difierent measures of ideology; and Figure 4.3 graphs marginal effects and
conditional standard errors for ideology in the final, full model (Model 11 in Table 4.3).
Models 1-4 in Table 4.2 offer strong support for the general proposition that
electoral competition exerts an upward pressure on judicial spending. Margin of victory
and majority distance both have the anticipated negative relationship with spending, i.e.,
spending increases as the margin of victory narrows. Effective number of candidates
(ENC) and divided government have the anticipated positive relationship.
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Table 4.2. GEE analysis of effects of competition on judicial spending in Mexico.
1
2
3
4
5
margin of victory

−26.21**
(3.56)

majority distance
(margin – 50)

−25.50**
(4.38)

13.54 **
(2.05)
7.27 *
(3.06)

divided government

−5.57
(3.65)

−2.89
(2.48)
−7.48**
(2.35)
52.06**
(6.66)
0.00
(0.03)
1.50
(2.03)
−128.20**
(25.96)

4.79
(3.48)
−2.29
(2.51)
−7.82**
(2.58)
51.78**
(6.64)
0.00
(0.03)
1.42
(2.03)
−131.80**
(25.62)

259
31
194.05
0.00

259
31
192.95
0.00

unified gov (plurality)
unified gov (super)
unified gov (simple)

election year
constant

−24.93**
(4.31)

−48.02**
(6.67)

ENC

GDP per capita
(logged)
population density

6

53.83**
(6.65)
0.00
(0.03)
2.29
(1.96)
−141.76**
(25.62)

54.23**
(6.72)
0.00
(0.03)
2.37
(2.00)
−146.39**
(25.73)

57.01**
(6.92)
0.00
(0.03)
2.06
(2.05)
−190.73**
(25.27)

82.58**
(7.99)
0.03
(0.04)
−2.01
(2.06)
−257.95**
(30.35)

N
271
271
271
259
States
31
31
31
31
Wald χ2
181.53
175.47
161.61
120.63
Prob > χ2
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. ** p < .01 * p < .05
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Each of these relationships is also statistically and substantively significant. For
instance, for each percentage point decrease in the margin of victory, spending rises by
0.26 pesos per capita. That is, for every four-point drop in the margin of victory,
spending increases approximately one peso per capita. This may not appear to be much,
but if a state has one million people, then the judicial budget expands by one million
pesos. Similarly, a one unit increase in ENC translates to an increase in judicial spending
of 13.54 pesos per capita. If a state was dominated by the PRI and had an ENC of 1.10
and a population of more than two million (e.g., San Luis Potosí in the mid-1990s), a
change to competitive politics and an ENC of 2.10 would translate into an increase in the
budget for state courts of approximately 27 million pesos, or almost three million U.S.
dollars.91
Models 5 and 6 in Table 4.2, however, show that divided government loses its
statistical significance if margin of victory is included in the same model.92 Conversely,
margin of victory maintains its statistical and substantive significance.93 Models 5 and 6
also add different measures of unified government (super majority, simple majority, and
plurality). Of all measures, only unified-simple is statistically significant, and has a
negative relationship with spending, suggesting that non-competitive contexts reduce
spending, which is the corollary expectation of competitive contexts and increased
spending.

91

Mexican pesos have been trading at approximately 10 to the dollar (10:1) for years as of early 2009. This
is changing rapidly with the global economic crisis, and the peso had lost nearly half of its value against the
dollar as of March 1, 2009, trading at approximately 15:1.
92
Divided government and unified-plurality are correlated, so they are not included simultaneously.
93
Auxiliary models with ENC instead of margin of victory show that ENC also maintains its significance
when included with measures of unified and divided government.
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Table 4.3 builds on the last model in Table 4.2 by adding four measures of
ideology to the analysis: (i) presence of ideology, (ii) ideology dummies (left and right;
center is modal category and therefore omitted), (iii) an ordinal variable (-1 to 1), and (iv)
a 10-point scale using the Salamanca data (Alcántara 2008).
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Table 4.3. GEE analysis of effects of ideology on judicial spending in Mexico.
7
8
9
10
11
margin of victory

−22.64**
(4.24)

Divided government
Unified gov (plurality)
Unified gov (simple)
Unified gov (super)
Ideology (presence)
(non-PRI governor)

7.77*
(3.49)
−5.65*
(2.59)
−1.63
(2.44)
9.25**
(2.78)

−23.57**
(4.26)
−9.84*
(3.73)

−23.83**
(4.27)
−11.34**
(3.80)

−23.83**
(4.27)
−11.34**
(3.80)

−23.14**
(4.21)
−12.51**
(3.77)

−5.09*
(2.37)
−2.59
(2.40)
10.04**
(2.83)

−3.67
(2.46)
−1.97
(2.43)

−3.67
(2.46)
−1.97
(2.43)

−2.80
(2.44)
−1.67
(2.40)

16.17**
(3.99)
6.13
(3.37)

Left (dummy)
Right (dummy)
Ideology-ordinal
(-1 to 1)
Ideology-ordinal
(squared term)
Ideology-Salamanca
(1-10)
Ideology-Salamanca
(squared term)
GDP per capita
(logged)
population density

−5.02*
(2.32)
11.15**
(2.88)

−15.77**
(3.37)
1.17**
(0.28)
45.91**
45.67**
47.00**
47.00**
46.06**
(6.52)
(6.55)
(6.51)
(6.51)
(6.34)
−0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
election year
2.01
2.20
2.44
2.44
2.64
(1.98)
(1.97)
(1.98)
(1.98)
(1.96)
constant
−117.26** −108.97** −115.28** −115.28**
−59.97*
(24.70)
(25.17)
(25.11)
(25.11)
(27.67)
N
259
259
259
259
259
States
31
31
31
31
31
Wald χ2
216.64
220.64
224.73
224.73
237.81
Prob > χ2
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
** p < .01 * p < .05
Notes: inclusion of PRI (center) instead of PAN or PRD in model 3 shows negative sign on PRI. If PRD is
omitted, PAN and PRI are both negative and significant, with the PRI more statistically and substantively
significant in negative direction than PAN. This is just a different way of saying that the left (PRD) exerts a
strong positive pressure on judicial spending that is both statistically and substantively significant. Findings
also show the effect of ideology is non-linear as we move from left to right.
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The first two models differ only in that Model 7 includes unified-plurality while
Model 8 includes divided government. In both of these models, margin of victory
maintains its negative and significant effect. However, there is mixed evidence regarding
veto player expectations: unified-plurality has the expected positive effect on spending,
but an even more aligned government (unified-simple) has a negative effect, and the most
aligned type of government (unified-super) is not statistically significant. In both models,
the presence of ideology has a positive and significant relationship with spending. In
substantive terms, having either a PAN or PRD governor instead of a PRI governor
increases judicial spending by between nine and ten pesos per capita (9.25 and 10.04 in
Models 7 and 8, respectively).
Models 9-11 offer a finer examination of ideology, unpacking “presence” into its
directional components – left, center, and right. This measurement improvement for
ideology also yields more stable results regarding divided government, as shown below.
First, Model 9 shows that leftist governors exert a positive and significant effect on
spending in comparison to the base category (PRI or “center”), and this effect is
substantively very sorong, translating into an increase of 16.17 pesos per capita for PRIto-PRD transitions. Rightist governors also exert a positive effect, but this effect is not
statistically significant (at the 0.50 level; however, the relationship is significant at the
0.10 level; z = 1.82). Moreover, the results from this model offer suggestive evidence
regarding the non-linear relationship between ideology and spending. That is, both ends
of the ideological spectrum – left and right – exert an upward pressure on spending while
a “spending valley” appears in the center, reflecting a “U” or “V”-shaped relationship
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between ideology and spending. The first graph in Figure 4.2 clarifies further by plotting
predicted values for each ideology position.
Figure 4.2. Effect of three ideology measures on spending in Mexico.
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Continuing with Table 4.3, Model 10 unpacks ideology further into an ordinal
variable and its squared term, capturing the non-linear relationship between ideology and
spending. The negative sign on the linear term indicates the left spends more than the
center or the right, and the positive sign on the squared term supports the conclusion that
there is a non-linear, U-shaped relationship. The middle graph in Figure 4.2 below
clarifies further by plotting predicted values against ideology. Note the similarity with the
first graph despite the different operationalization of ideology.
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Finally, Model 11 unpacks ideology into a 10-point scale. Again, the results
support the conclusion of a curvilinear relationship between ideology and spending. As
was the case in Model 10, there is a negative sign on the linear term and a positive sign
on the square term, suggesting a U-shaped curve with the left side of the “U” extending
higher than the right. The third graph in Figure 4.2 plots predicted values against this last
measure of ideology, offering the clearest picture yet of the parabolic shape of the
relationship between ideology and spending. To clarify, there are three parties, each with
three time points, generating a total of nine points graphed in the figure. Again, note the
similarity of the relationship’s shape across all three graphs despite different measures of
ideology.
Following Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006), the significance of interactions
cannot be fully determined by simply inspecting the coefficients, standard errors, and zvalues of constitutive terms. Rather, a meaningful interpretation requires the computation
of marginal effects and conditional standard errors. To this end, Figure 3 plots predicted
values (top graph, as in Figure 2), and marginal effects of ideology (bottom graph) for
Model 11 in order to capture the substantive and statistical significance of the squared
term. The relationship is significant where the upper and lower bounds of the 95%
confidence interval are either both above zero or both below zero (Brambor et al., 73-76).
Thus, ideology has a negative and statistically significant effect when the value of
ideology is less than approximately six (6), the relationship is not statistically significant
for ideology values between six (6) and eight (8), and the relationship reverses and is
positive when ideology is greater than eight (8).
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Finally, in all three models where ideology is unpacked into its left-to-right
directional components, divided government is negative and statistically significant,
showing an increase in veto players inhibits spending. This is the most stable finding
regarding divided government.
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Figure 4.3. Marginal Effect of Ideology in Full Model (Model 11)
Predicted Spending (2000 pesos)
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Finally, the control variables offer some insights, as well. GDP per capita,
operating as a control for the general level of development of the state, is statistically
significant in all models. The positive relationship was anticipated and justifies the
inclusion of the control for different levels of development across states. The controls for
election years and population density are not significant. Thus, the timing of elections
does not seem to influence state court budgets, and the degree of urbanization or
concentration of population also does not shape spending.
4.6. Discussion
The findings regarding competition offer strong support for the expected positive
relationship between electoral competition and spending. This result aligns with a
growing literature on the positive effects of increasing electoral competition in new
democracies (Rodriguez 1998; Beer 2001; 2003; Hecock 2006). Moreover, this result
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resonates with findings regarding the positive effect of competition that are specific to the
strength of the judiciary (Chavez 2004; Beer 2006; Ríos-Figueroa 2007). Thus, the rising
level of interparty competition in Mexico bodes well for courts. This does not mean
simply that “democracy is good for courts”. Rather, narrower margins of victory are
good, and two parties are better than one, three are better than two, and four are better
than three.
However, the findings go further by seeking to discriminate or adjudicate between
causal logics underlying competition. The results provide support for both the positive
influence of competitive elections (a “re-election” logic) and the negative influence of
increased veto points (veto player logic). Initially, Table 4.2 provides support only for the
positive relationship between competition and spending. Margin of victory exerts a
downward pressure on spending, and ENC exerts an upwards pressure. Moreover, the
negative and significant relationship between unified-simple and spending cuts against
veto-player expectations. Once the models control for ideology in Table 4.3, however,
there is support for both the positive expectations associated with electoral
competitiveness and the negative expectations arising from veto player theory. The
support for veto player theory is consistent beginning in Model 8 on Table 4.3, and
becomes stronger starting with Model 9, where ideology is disaggregated into left and
right components for the first time. In this and subsequent models, margin of victory is
negative and significant and divided government is negative and significant. Although
none of the measures of unified government are significant, the negative sign on divided
government is stable in Models 9-11, supporting the logic that increasing veto points
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inhibit spending. Notably, this results suggests political openings created by more veto
players do not enhance court strength, cutting against the opportunity logic.
Between electoral pressures and veto points, which has greater substantive effect?
And between competition and ideology, which exerts the strongest influence? Regarding
the first question, the negative pressure of divided government may well overwhelm the
positive effects of competitive elections. Considering that it would take a change in
margin of victory of approximately 40 percentage points to match the magnitude of the
effect of divided government, a reasonable conclusion is that a change of that kind is
unlikely. Further, even if a margin of victory were to narrow by 40 points, a likely side
effect would be divided government. Ultimately, these two dynamics are in tension with
each other, as one result suggests narrow margins of victory push spending up, but states
with low margins of victory are likely to generate divided governments, which press
spending down.
Regarding the second question, the results suggest ideology can overcome the
dampening effect of divided government. Specifically, the magnitude of the positive
effect of a leftist governor is greater than the magnitude of the negative effect of divided
government. In Model 9, both divided government and leftist governor are
operationalized as dummy variables (0,1), and both exert a statistically significant effect
on spending. However, the magnitude of the effect of a leftist governor (16.17) is greater
than that of divided government (−11.34, or an absolute value of 11.34). That is, where a
leftist governor combines with divided government, the leftist governor will overcome,
on average, the negative effect of divided government.
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The significance of the left in local government in these models emphasizes the
overall findings regarding ideology. Key among these findings is the non-linear, U-shape
of the relationship between ideology and spending. The predicted values in all three
graphs of Figure 4.2 emphasize this shape, as well as the marginal effects graph in Figure
4.3. Importantly, the left point of this “U” is always higher than the right point,
reinforcing the finding that – even though both the PRD and the PAN benefit spending
more than the PRI – the PRD exerts a stronger upward pressure than the PAN. It should
also be emphasized that the models exclude PRD-governed Mexico City precisely to
avoid biasing results in favor of the left. Even without Mexico City, the PRD’s effect is
positive and significant, supporting the conclusion that the left matters a great deal for the
financial strength of Mexico’s local courts.
The results make sense in light of the fact that the PRI is the party that ruled
Mexico for 71 years (1929-2000), characterizing the dominant-party style of
authoritarianism in this country. In states where the PRI remains dominant, the party
faces few incentives to share power or delegate power to another institution, much less
build a relevant judiciary where it has historically been irrelevant. For example, the PRI
remains dominant in the central state of Hidalgo, governing local politics virtually
unchallenged for almost 80 years. In Hidalgo, the judicial budget is one of the lowest in
the country, judicial selection is highly politicized, institutional design is weak, and
political and judicial careers overlap in ways that blur the line between the political
branches and the judiciary (see Chapter 6).94

94

A much-publicized judicial reform in Hidalgo in 2006 offered only shallow and superficial changes.
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In contrast to PRI-dominated states like Hidalgo, historically recent electoral
successes by the PRD and PAN at the state level offer signs of positive change. The PAN
was the first opposition party to win a governorship, beginning with the state of Baja
California in 1989. Since then, the PAN has generated success stories in the
administration of justice, notably the shift to oral proceedings and other improvements in
the northern state of Nuevo León. Meanwhile, the PRD won the executive office in the
federal district of Mexico City in 1997, and has since gone on to win governorships in
five states. One of the most dramatic effects of the PRD on court strength was in the
western state of Michoacán, where the new PRD governor doubled the judicial budget in
2003, and also led a judicial reform project that created one of the strongest institutional
designs in the country. Meanwhile, a PAN-aligned adminstration in Aguascalientes
presided over inaction and even counter-reforms that weakened the judiciary,
undermining arguments that the PAN strengthens courts (see Chapter 6). In short, these
brief qualitative observations are consistent with the left-prominent, U-shaped
relationship depicted in Figures 4.2-4.3 above.

4.7. Conclusion
Electoral competition exerts an upward pressure on spending, suggesting a reelection logic, but divided government exerts a downward pressure, suggesting a veto
player logic. The finding regarding divided government also cuts against the opportunity
logic. Ideology has a U-shaped relationship with spending, with the left exerting a
stronger positive pressure than the right. That is, both the PRD and the PAN spend more
on courts than the PRI, but the PRD spends more than the PAN.
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The ideology results suggest that the ideological location of the base of
authoritarianism is important. Stated otherwise, the ideological location of the main
opposition parties may exert the strongest positive effect on court strength. The base of
authoritarianism was in the center in Mexico, and the main opposition to the PRI came
from both the PRD and PAN. This is not to say that opposition trumps ideology. Ideology
matters beyond the oppositional dynamic.95 Future research using the historical
institutional approach to court building can help shed light on this phenomenon and
perhaps identify path-dependent explanations of the ideological location of programmatic
commitments to state building. For instance, if the base of authoritarianism were on the
ideological right in another country, perhaps both the left and center would strengthen
courts and other institutions.
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In related work, I analyze opposition and the interaction between competition and ideology in greater
detail (Ingram 2009). In that paper, the results show the positive influence of the PRD and the PAN is not
simply a historical artifact related to their roles as opposition parties. Indeed, the PRD and PAN continue to
exert a positive pressure even as governing parties, and the PRI continues to have a drain on spending even
when it takes on the role of opposition party. Thus, the ideological base of authoritarianism and opposition
movements may have lasting legacies that shape the trajectory of legal institutions in emerging
democracies. In short, beyond electoral incentives, there is something about being PRI, PAN, or PRD that
influences reform in different ways.
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5. Large-N Analysis in Brazil
5.1. Introduction
Complementing the analysis of Mexican states in Chapter 4, this chapter offers
the first time-series cross-section analysis of court strength in the Brazilian states.
Indeed, while there is a previous econometric analysis of the variation across state courts
in Mexico for a single year (Beer 2006), this is the first econometric study of Brazilian
state courts. Examining judicial spending per capita – as a proxy for court strength –
across the 26 Brazilian states from 1985 to 2006, excluding the Federal District
(Brasilia), reveals three principal findings. First, competition has a positive and
statistically significant relationship with spending, though the robustness of this
relationship is weaker than in Mexico since two of the four measures for competition
(margin of victory and ENC) offer inconsistent results. Second, when controlling for
ideology, divided government maintains a positive, statistically significant relationship
with spending, unlike Mexico, cutting against veto player theory and in favor of the
positive effects of competition. The precise causal logic undergirding this result is
unclear and is addressed further in the small-N, process-based analysis in Chapter 7.
Third, ideology has an inconsistent relationship with spending until the models control
for two factors: (i) the institutionalization of provincial party systems, measured as
electoral volatility, and (ii) time periods before and after 1994, a division that captures
both the stabilizing effect of the Real Plan96 and the ideological shift of one of Brazil’s
major parties – the PSDB – from center-left to center-right (Power and Zucco 2009).
Once these two factors are considered, models that split the sample accordingly find the
96

Real Plan (Plano Real) established a new currency in 1994 in order to break inflationary cycles in Brazil.
This was the fifth such effort since the mid-1980s, but was successful (unlike previous attempts).
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same “U-shaped” relationship with spending as was found in Mexico, including the
higher left prong of the “U”. However, this results appears only in more institutionalized,
low volatility party systems prior to 1995, i.e., in the earlier time period of 1985-1994.
After this point, a slightly left-skewed, bell-shaped relationship appears, suggesting both
the far left and the far right push spending down, while centrist and center-left parties
exert an upward pressure on spending. Models that examine the effects of party dummies
support these findings, in which the center-left PDT appears consistently as the party that
spends the most on courts. The findings extend existing theories to new empirical areas
and offer insights into the political logic of judicial change in new democracies.

5.2. Judicial Spending in the Brazilian States
As was the case in Mexico, the regional emphasis on strengthening judicial
institutions and the already substantial literature on judicial reform support the
expectation for either uniformity or convergence in comparable measures of judicial
spending in the region, e.g., spending per capita. This expectation is strongest within
individual countries, like Brazil, that have pursued ambitious judicial reform projects at
the national level, 97 and where institutional similarities and policy diffusion put
additional harmonizing pressures on court budgets.
Despite these expectations, state-level judicial spending varies widely within
Brazil. Illustrating this variation, Figure 5.1 plots average judicial spending per capita
across Brazil’s 26 states for the 22 years between 1985 and 2006 (excluding the Federal
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Brazil initiated a national judicial reform project in 1992. This project was not initially successful, but the
debate regarding reform maintained a high profile for 12 years. Finally, in 2004, the reform was approved.
For discussions of the Brazilian reform process, see Sadek (1998), Arantes (2001), and Gross Cunha
(2007).
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District of Brasilia; the vertical line identifies the overall mean of 44.09).98. The crossstate variation in Figure 5.1 is stark. This variation underscores the fact that Brazil is
“many Brazils” (“26 Brazils”, following Linz and de Miguel 1966), and that court
resources vary greatly from one part of the country to another. Notably, the states that
spend the most are a mix of small, sparsely populated states (Amapá, Acre, and Roraima)
and large, densely populated states that include two of the country’s (and the world’s)
largest cities (São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro), while many of the states that spend the least
are in north or northeastern part of the country (Ceará, Maranhão, Pernambuco and
Bahia), despite having sizeable populations.
Why do some state courts have more resources than others? Why is judicial
spending higher in some states than in others? In short, what accounts for the variation in
Figure 5.1?
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These amounts reflect the amounts budgeted by the state for the operation of state courts at the first and
second instance. In Brazil, a first instance courthouse is a foro or forum, usually composed of several
varas, i.e., “branches” or courtrooms that deal with different areas of the law, e.g., vara criminal. The state
supreme court is a Tribunal de Justiça, or TJ. Spending allocated for federal courts and other special
courts, e.g., labor or military courts, is not included. Unlike other areas of public spending (e.g., education
or health), federal transfers do not cover judicial expenses at the state level. There are, however, occasional
special transfers from the executive branch, but these special projects occur randomly, i.e.,
unsystematically, throughout the country and over time. Exchange rates and deflators are from the
International Financial Statistics Database of the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2007; 2009), and
population figures are from IBGE. All 26 Brazilian states appear along the Y-axis, and judicial spending
per capita appears along the X-axis. The amount for each state represents the deflated and per capitized
spending amount in constant 2000 reais, and the states are listed in descending order according to judicial
budget per capita.

161

Figure 5.1. Variation in judicial spending per capita across the 26 Brazilian states.
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5.3. Measuring Competition and Ideology in Brazil
In both the political-institutional and the judicial politics literatures, electoral
competitiveness is most often measured as either margin of victory (Beer 2006), majority
distance (Schedler 2005), divided government (Chavez 2004; Staton 2006) or, following
Laakso and Taagepera (1979), as the effective number of candidates or parties (ENC or
ENP).99
In Brazil, there is broad variation in competitiveness across the states. Margin of
victory ranges from essentially zero (0.002) in Acre (1991-1994), Rondônia (1991-1994),
and Sergipe (1995-1998), to above 0.65 (Alagoas (1995-1998), Maranhão (1987-1990),
and Paraíba (1999-2002)). Majority distance is lowest and highest in the same states just
identified. ENC ranges from 1.46 in Maranhão (1987-1990) and 1.48 in Paraíba (19992002) to 5.07 in Rondônia (2003-2004) (see descriptive statistics in Table 5.1 for more
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Margins of victory are high in where a single party or coalition is dominant, and correspondingly low
under conditions of competitive elections. Majority distance – margin of victory minus 50 (i.e., margin –
50) captures the distance between the victor’s share of the vote and half the electorate. Again, this number
will be high where elections are non-competitive and high where competition is also high, but the variable
will be positive where the winning party dominates by more than 50 percentage points. ENC requires a
clarification with regard to measuring the competitiveness of a political system. This formula is often used
to measure party system fragmentation, but adequately captures competitiveness in new democracies like
Mexico and Brazil. Interparty competition is present when there are at least two political parties of
comparable strength competing effectively for governor or for legislative seats in the state, and is low when
a single party has a stranglehold on electoral competition (see also Beer 2003; Chavez 2004). In Mexico
and Brazil, where provincial party systems are often dominated by a single party or coalition, ENC captures
movement away from this authoritarian baseline. Thus, measures below two indicate the continuity of or
movement toward single-party dominance, and measures above two indicate movement towards
multipartyism. Divided government identifies all those instances in which the party that occupies the
executive branch does not have either an absolute majority or a plurality in the legislature (Beer 2003;
Ríos-Figueroa 2006; Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tommasi 2002; 2007). Other measures of competitiveness
include Molinar’s (1992) adjusted measure of ENP, which weights the variable according to the dominance
of a single party (see also Schedler 2005), party turnover (Spiller and Tommasi 2007), and margin of
victory (Beer 2006; Cleary 2007). Studies that capture competitiveness as party turnover and then model
judicial performance based on how actors anticipate that turnover rely on a very strong assumption about
the “perfect foresight” that these actors have regarding future party turnover, and how this foresight shapes
strategic behavior (see Iaryczower, Spiller and Tommasi 2002, 705). The other measures of
competitiveness capture the political insecurity generate by electoral competition without making this kind
of assumption.
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information).100 With regards to ENC, we are looking for any movement away from 2,
since the two-party model was sanctioned by the military. Thus, reductions in ENC, as in
Maranhão and Paraíba, signal decreased competitiveness and diversity of political actors.
Upward movement away from 2 signals increased competitiveness and diversity.
Four measures capture the ideological orientation of the political system, or
executive (governor) ideology. First, ideology-presence is a dummy variable (0,1), where
“1” indicates the presence of either a leftist or a rightist party, and “0” indicates a centrist
party. Second, dummy variables for “left” and “right” capture the presence of either type
of party. Third, an ordinal measure (-1 to 1) captures ideology, where -1 = left, -0.5 =
center-left, 0 = centrist/clientelist/unknown, 0.5 = center-right, and 1 = right. In Brazil,
governors can be classified along all five points of this scale. Finally, a fourth measure
offers an improvement on the ordinal variable, which forces all parties onto a 5-point
scale of equidistant intervals. The improvement is based on survey data from Power and
Zucco (2009), that codes Brazilian parties along a 10-point scale, where 1 = left and 10 =
right. Each measure classifies parties according to the left-to-right organization described
in Chapter 2, paying special attention to the rightward drift of the PSDB between 1993
and 1996. The Power and Zucco measure closely approximates the Salamanca data
(Alcántara 2005) used in Mexico; both are 10-point scales based on surveys of federal
legislators.
While the first measure (presence of ideology) captures only whether movement
away from the ideological center influences judicial spending, the remaining measures
100

N = 1/∑si2, where si equals the proportion of either votes or seats of the i-th party (Laakso and
Taagepera 1979). For example, N = 2.00 where two parties each hold half of the seats in the legislature
(1/((.50)2 + (.50)2)). N = 1.00 if one party were to completely dominate the legislature. Electoral data in
Brazil is from the database of Jairo Nicolau (http://jaironicolau.iuperj.br) and the Tribunal Superior
Electoral (www.tse.gov.br).

164

are able to identify directional effects along a left-to-right ideological space,
distinguishing between left and right. The left-right ideological continuum is able to
capture a linear relationship between ideology and spending, i.e., whether leftist
politicians increase judicial spending more than rightist ones, or vice-versa. However, the
empirical implication from the theory outlined above is that the presence of ideological
commitments – both left and right – matters more than their direction. That is, ideology
should have a curvilinear, “U-shaped” relationship with spending, captured
mathematically by including both the linear and squared terms of the ordinal and interval
ideology measures.
Recalling the theoretical arguments in Chapter 2 regarding the anticipated effects
of competition and the positive effects of leftist and rightist parties, the expectations and
measures above yield the following hypotheses.
H1a:
H1b:
H1c:
H1d:

Judicial spending will vary negatively with margin of victory.
Judicial spending will vary negatively with majority distance.
Judicial spending will vary positively with ENC.
Judicial spending will vary positively with divided government and
negatively with unified government IF re-election, signaling,
insurance, or opportunity logics are stronger than the veto player
logic.
H1e: Judicial spending will vary negatively with divided government and
positively with unified government if the veto player logic is stronger
than the re-election, signaling, insurance, or opportunity logics.
H2a: Judicial spending will vary positively with the presence of programmaticideological commitments.
H2b: Judicial spending will vary positively with both Left and Right governors.
H2c: Ideology has a curvilinear relationship with spending.
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5.4. Data and Methods
Data
Sections II and III above explain the data for judicial spending and the principal
explanatory variables of electoral competitiveness and programmatic party commitments.
The dependent variable is annual state-level judicial spending per capita. Brazilian budget
data is from the Treasury Department’s (Ministerio da Fazenda, Secretaria do Tesouro
Nacional),101 collected and organized by IPEA. The raw annual judicial budgets are
deflated so that amounts are comparable across time,102 converting current amounts to
constant amounts, and the per capita transformation enhances comparability across states.
Thus, the variable captures the annual judicial budget per capita in real terms, adjusting
for inflation and using 2000 as the base year in Brazil (2000 = 100).103 In Brazil, the data
are logged to normalize the variable’s distribution. The 22-year time span (1985-2006)
includes years before and after the national transition to democracy in 1985-1989 that
marked the end of the military regime. Thus, the sample captures wide variation in key
independent variables of competition and ideology over pre-transition and post-transition
years.
Finally, the three control variables are gross domestic product (GDP) per capita,
population density, and election year. GDP figures control for broad differences in the

101

The local court budget develops in a contested process between the judiciary, executive, and legislative
branches in the fall of each year, and the final amount allocated to the judiciary is then published in the
official state reporters along with the rest of the state budget, usually in December, as the “Orçamento do
Estado”. The Treasury Department has been collecting this data from the states since at least 1985.
102
Deflation indices are drawn from the International Financial Statistics Database of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF 2007; 2009). Transformations are the author’s own using second quarter data from
IMF. The second quarter is utilized because this likely corresponds with the information legislators and
other politicians would have had available to them prior to preparing and negotiating the annual budget in
the fall months of each year.
103
Population figures for the per capita transformation are from the national statistics office, IBGE. The
variable is logged to normalize its distribution.
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level of development across states, and are from the IPEA and IBGE. Population density
controls for the concentration of people and the general degree of urbanization. All states
are expected to incur a minimum “floor” of court maintenance costs as part of economy
of scale problems associated with state judiciaries. Similarly, small changes in already
small budgets might appear large due to the per capita transformation. Population density
controls for these factors. Population and territory figures for this variable and the per
capita transformations are from IBGE. Election year is a dummy variable (0,1), where 1
identifies a year in which governor elections were held. This variable captures any
budgetary increases associated with the electoral calendar. Table 5.1 reports descriptive
statistics for all data.
Methods
The unit of analysis is the “state-year”. The panel dataset has 502 observations (N
= 502). These observations come from all 26 Brazilian states, excluding the federal
district. The time span ranges from 1985 to 2006, but data are available for varying
numbers of years in each state and in each country, making the panels unbalanced. A
minimum of 14 time points and a maximum of 22 time points are available. There are no
gaps in the dataset. The unbalanced panel structure of the data generates several
methodological challenges, as outlined in Chapter 3. Following the conclusions from that
chapter, the large-N analysis applies a population-averaged panel-data model, or
generalized estimating equation (GEE), with a forward-lagged dependent variable to
capture temporal dynamics.104

104

Independent variables are measured at time t and the dependent variable at time t+1. See Chapter 3 for
full discussion of methodological challenges with TSCS data and the tradeoffs involved in selecting the
GEE model from among other options, e.g., OLS with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs), AR1
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Table 5.1. Descriptive Statistics for Large-N Analysis in Brazil.

Variable
Spending (log)
Spending
Margin of victory
Majority distance
ENC
Divided gov
Unified-plurality
Unified-simple
Unified-super
Ideology-presence
Left
Right
Ideology-ordinal
Ideology-ordinal (sq)
Ideology-Power
Ideology-Power (sq)
PT
PPS
PSB
PDT
PSDB
PMDB
PTB
PSL
PFL
PDS
PPB
PPR
PSC
PTR
PDS-Legacy
GDP per cap (log)
Population density
Election year
Volatility

N
502
502
502
502
502
502
502
502
502
502
502
502
502
502
502
502
502
502
502
502
502
502
502
502
502
502
502
502
502
502
502
502
502
502
444

BRAZIL
Time span: 1985-2006
Mean
Std. Dev.*
3.58
0.77
45.86
31.93
0.18
0.15
0.02
0.11
2.53
0.64
0.66
0.48
0.70
0.46
0.34
0.48
0.11
0.31
0.61
0.49
0.16
0.37
0.39
0.49
0.15
0.69
0.50
0.43
5.84
1.84
37.43
21.38
0.05
0.21
0.01
0.09
0.05
0.21
0.06
0.23
0.14
0.35
0.39
0.49
0.02
0.15
0.00
0.06
0.15
0.35
0.06
0.24
0.02
0.14
0.02
0.15
0.01
0.09
0.01
0.09
0.12
0.33
8.35
0.51
46.31
64.00
.25
0.43
55.88
24.39

Min.
−1.27
0.28
0
−.26
1.46
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-1
0
1.89
3.57
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7.22
1.04
0
2.69

Max.
5.69
295.08
0.69
0.31
5.07
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
8.65
74.82
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
9.44
344.04
1
100

* Overall standard deviation and minimum/maximum values. Stata also returns between and within values
with xtsum command, but these are omitted for economy of presentation.

models, panel-specific AR1 models, lagged dependent variables, time dummies, and fixed effects models.
All models estimated with Stata v9.0 using xtgee. Data and do-file available from the author.
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5.5. Results
Tables 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 report the results of the large-N analysis in Brazil. Each
table reports the key independent variables first followed by the controls. Table 5.2
focuses on the measures of electoral competition: (i) margin of victory, (ii) majority
distance, (iii) effective number of parties (ENC), and (iv) divided and unified forms of
government (divided, as well as unified with plurality, simple, and super majorities).
Divided government and unified-simple are perfectly but negatively correlated, so they
are not included in the same model.
In Table 5.2, Models 1-3 examine margin of victory, majority distance, and ENC,
respectively. Margin of victory is not statistically significant on its own. However,
majority distance has a statistically significant and negative relationship with spending,
and ENC has a statistically significant and positive relationship with spending. Both of
these latter two relationships are in the anticipated direction. Models 4 and 5 examine the
effect of divided government and the measures of unified government.
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Table 5.2. GEE analysis of effect of competition on judicial spending in Brazil.
1
margin of victory

2

3

−0.59**
(0.28)
0.18**
(0.05)

divided
government
unified gov
(plurality)
unified gov
(simple)

0.29**
(0.07)
0.07
(0.07)

unified gov (super)

constant
N
States
Years (max)
Years (min)
Wald χ2
Prob > χ2

6
0.39**
(0.20)

ENC

election year

5

0.06
(0.18)

majority distance
(margin – 50)

GDP per capita
(logged)
population density

4

0.41**
(0.14)
0.00
(0.00)
0.06
(0.06)
0.02
(1.14)
502
26
22
14
16.21
0.0028

0.42**
(0.13)
0.00
(0.00)
0.06
(0.06)
0.01
(1.11)
502
26
22
14
21.11
0.0003

0.42**
(0.13)
0.00
(0.00)
0.07
(0.06)
−0.42
(1.09)
502
26
22
14
30.22
0.0000

−0.09
(0.10)
0.40**
(0.13)
0.00
(0.00)
0.08
(0.06)
−0.09
(1.10)
502
26
22
14
42.63
0.0000

0.07
(0.07)
−0.29**
(0.07)
−0.09
(0.10)
0.40**
(0.13)
0.00
(0.00)
0.08
(0.06)
−0.09
(1.10)
502
26
22
14
42.63
0.0000

0.29**
(0.07)
0.05
(0.07)

−0.18
(0.11)
0.40**
(0.13)
0.00
(0.00)
0.08
(0.06)
−0.14
(1.10)
502
26
22
14
46.61
0.0000

In Model 4, the coefficient for divided government is positive and statistically significant.
Model 5 drops divided government and adds unified-simple; as expected, the results are
the same as Model 4, but the coefficient for unified-simple is negative due to the perfect,
negative correlation between divided government and unified-simple. Finally, Model 6
includes both margin of victory and the measures of divided and unified government.
Margin of victory is now statistically significant. However, against expectations, the
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coefficient is positive. Divided government maintains its positive and statistically
significant relationship, and none of the measures of unified government are significant.
Of the control variables in this model, only GDP per capita is statistically significant,
exerting an upward pressure on spending.
Building on this last model from Table 5.2, Table 5.3 adds measures of ideology.
Notably, while margin of victory and divided government maintain positive and
statistically significant relationships with spending, none of the measures of ideology are
statistically significant. The most rudimentary measure of ideology – ideology-presence –
is not significant. Increasing in measurement sophistication – from the dummy variables
for leftist and rightist parties to Power and Zucco’s (2009) 10-point left-to-right scale –
ideology is not statistically significant.
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Table 5.3. GEE analysis of effect of ideology on judicial spending in Brazil.

margin of victory
divided government
unified gov (plurality)
unified gov (super)
Ideology (presence)
(non-PRI governor)
Left (dummy)
Right (dummy)

7

8

9

10

0.41**
(0.20)
0.29**
(0.07)
0.05
(0.07)
−0.17
(0.11)
0.06
(0.05)

0.41**
(0.20)
0.29**
(0.07)
0.05
(0.07)
−0.17
(0.11)

0.41*
(0.20)
0.29**
(0.07)
0.05
(0.07)
−0.17
(0.11)

0.34*
(0.20)
0.28**
(0.07)
0.05
(0.07)
−0.18
(0.11)

0.07
(0.08)
0.06
(0.06)

Ideology-ordinal
(-1 to 1)
Ideology-ordinal
(squared term)
Ideology-Power
(1-10)
Ideology-Power
(squared term)

0.01
(0.07)
0.12
(0.09)

0.39**
0.39**
(0.13)
(0.13)
population density
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
election year
0.08
0.08
(0.06)
(0.06)
constant
−0.09**
−0.07**
(1.10)
(1.10)
N
502
502
States
26
26
Years (max)
22
22
Years (min)
14
14
Wald χ2
48.38
48.41
Prob > χ2
0.0000
0.0000
Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
** p < .01 * p < .05
GDP per capita (logged)
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0.41**
(0.13)
0.00
(0.00)
0.08
(0.06)
−0.11**
(1.10)
502
26
22
14
49.59
0.0000

0.11
(0.08)
−0.01
(0.01)
0.41**
(0.13)
0.00
(0.00)
0.09
(0.06)
−0.39**
(1.15)
502
26
22
14
49.49
0.0000

Two aspects of Brazilian parties and ideology help understand and re-examine
this non-finding. First, the conventional wisdom regarding Brazilian parties and the party
system in general is that it is weak, unstructured and fragmented, marked by high levels
of clientelism and patrimonialism, as well as party switching and what Brazilian
observers term “ideological disloyalty” (Power 1988; Mainwaring, Meneguello, and
Power 2000). In a word, the Brazilian party system suffers from historically low levels of
institutionalization. The issue of institutionalization was considered early on in this
research when faced with the differences between Mexico and Brazil and was noted in
the theoretical discussion in Chapter 2. That is, there are clear differences in local party
systems between the two countries that are not easily quantifiable, but that appear to
shape the different results in each country. Mexico essentially has a three-party system.
Moreover, this three-party system is strongly centralized, i.e., the three parties that are
dominant at the national level are the same ones that are dominant in each and every
state. Despite the presence of smaller parties, competition at the national and subnational
levels is largely restricted to the PRD, PRI, and PAN. Further, a left-to-right ideological
spectrum easily maps onto this party system at both levels of the regime. With a few
minor caveats, the centralization and ideological structure of Mexico’s provincial party
systems make the kind of analysis conducted here fairly straightforward in that country,
which is reflected in the clear results in Chapter 4. As seen here, this is not the case in
Brazil. In part, this difference is due to the fact that Brazil’s provincial party systems are
highly decentralized and a left-to-right ideological spectrum does not map easily onto
many local party systems, i.e., not all provincial party systems are institutionalized. Thus,
one potential solution is to control for this level of institutionalization. Mainwaring
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(1998) suggests electoral volatility as one proxy for party system institutionalization, so a
re-examination of the results above could control for state-level electoral volatility.
Second, a key insight from Power and Zucco’s analysis of Brazilian parties is that
the ideological orientation of one of Brazil’s largest parties – PSDB – has been changing
over time. Indeed, the PSDB went from being a center-left party in the late 1980s and
early 1990s – splintering leftward in 1988 from the centrist PMDB – to a center-right
party in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. Where 1 identifies left and 10 identifies right,
the PSDB moved from 3.98 in 1990 to 6.22 in 1997 (and continues to hold in the centerright category at 6.30 and 6.26 in surveys from 2001 and 2005, respectively) (Power and
Zucco 2009).105 Moreover, the rightward shift of the PSDB coincided with its rise to
national prominence as the party occupied the presidency from 1995-2002, so its
influence over subnational affiliates would have been strongest during this period and, as
suggested by Power and Zucco, other parties also appear to have reacted to the PSDB’s
ideological movement. Thus, a second potential solution is to split the dataset into two
sub-samples, 1985-1994 and 1995-2006, to examine the effect of ideology in two discrete
time periods. Notably, splitting the dataset in this manner would also control for the
stabilizing effect of the Real Plan in 1994, which started to have full effect in 1995.106

105

The PT has also shifted rightward, moving from the left to the center-left since the late 1990s (Power
and Zucco 2009), but this pattern is less dramatic and less meaningful in the time span under examination.
It would, however, be fruitful to examine the policy effects of the PT’s changing ideology, especially since
2003 – the first year the party occupied the presidency.
106
Adjustments in the dataset for currency changes between 1985 and 1994 should control for most of this
effect. However, it is possible that the inflation-related instability may have been shaping judicial budgets
in other ways prior to 1995, so this temporal control can be seen as reasonable. On the other hand, the
Asian and Russian financial crises were felt acutely in Brazil in the late 1990s, so there is also instability
after 1995. In any case, though the Real Plan began in 1994, it did not begin until mid-year, so 1995 offers
the a good start year for a sub-sample of data. Since it is unclear when the PSDB moved to the right –
Power and Zucco only note that this shift occurred between their two surveys conducted in 1993 and 1997,
1995 is also a reasonable start year for re-coding the PSDB.
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Building on the last model in Table 5.3, Table 5.4 reports auxiliary models in
Brazil that control for Pedersen’s (1983) measure of volatility and also divide the sample
into two sub-samples: 1985-1994 and 1995-2006. The results here are not meant to be
definitive, but are intended as a heuristic device for understanding the differences in
provincial party systems between Mexico and Brazil, and the ways in which these
differences condition the effect of ideology.
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Table 5.4. GEE analysis of spending, samples truncated by volatility and time.
11

12
High vol
87-94

0.28
−1.30
(0.21)
(1.24)
0.15*
−0.31
divided government
(0.08)
(0.40)
0.13*
−0.09
unified gov (plurality)
(0.07)
(0.36)
−0.20*
0.38
unified gov (super)
(0.12)
(0.47)
0.11
0.61
Ideology-Power
(0.09)
(1.20)
(1-10)
−0.01
−0.04
Ideology-Power
(0.01)
(0.09)
(squared term)
0.01**
Volatility (Pedersen)
0.00
0.52**
0.74**
GDP per capita (logged)
(0.14)
(0.28)
population density
0.00
−0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
election year
0.14**
0.30*
(0.06)
(0.18)
constant
−1.57
−4.33
(1.22)
(4.13)
N
444
68
States
26
14
Years (max)
20
8
Years (min)
10
4
Wald χ2
55.07
27.63
Prob > χ2
0.0000
0.0011
Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
** p < .01 * p < .05
margin of victory

13
High vol
95-06

14
Low vol
87-94

15
Low vol
95-06

1.04**
(0.37)
−0.01**
(0.15)
−0.27
(0.17)
−0.04
(0.16)
−0.00
(0.11)
−0.00
(0.01)

0.38
(0.46)
−0.12
(0.18)
−0.07
(0.23)
−0.26
(0.31)
−0.64**
(0.23)
0.05**
(0.02)

1.60*
(0.86)
0.32
(0.23)
0.26
(0.19)
−0.50
(0.43)
0.74**
(0.22)
−0.08**
(0.02)

0.37**
(0.18)
0.00
(0.00)
−0.00
(0.08)
−0.86
(1.51)
152
23
10
2
19.71
0.0198

0.69**
(0.22)
−0.00
(0.00)
0.24**
(0.07)
−0.40
(1.84)
110
19
8
4
34.00
0.0001

0.54*
(0.31)
−0.00
(0.00)
0.19
(0.13)
−2.88
(2.69)
114
20
10
2
34.66
0.0001

Model 11 includes volatility as a control, showing its statistical significance.
Models 12-15 proceed to divide the samples according to the level of volatility and the
time period. Models 12 and 13 examine all observations with high volatility, i.e.,
volatility scores equal to or above the median (51.96), and Models 14 and 15 examine
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observations with low volatility, i.e., scores below the median. Models 12 and 14
examine the first time period (1985-1994), and Models 13 and 15 examine the second
time period (1995-2006). The results show that where volatility is high (Models 12 and
13) ideology continues to not be significant. That is, in environments of high instability,
i.e., low institutionalization, ideology does not have a statistically significant effect.
Conversely, in stable party environments, i.e., low volatility (Models 14 and 15),
ideology has a statistically significant effect. This single finding – that volatility
conditions the effect to ideology in the Brazilian states – is notable, and aligns with
expectations regarding party system institutionalization (e.g., Mainwaring 1995). Further,
in the early time period (1985-1994), the linear term for ideology is negative and the
squared term is positive, suggesting a U-shaped relationship similar to the one found in
Mexico. However, in the later time period (1995-2006), the relationship reverses,
suggesting a bell-shaped relationship or inverted-U (i.e., “∩”).
Graphs of predicted values and marginal effects clarify further. Following
Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006), the significance of interactions and constitutive
terms cannot be fully determined by simply inspecting the coefficients, standard errors,
and z-values, requiring the computation of marginal effects and conditional standard
errors. Figure 5.2 plots predicted values for the early time period, and Figure 5.3 reports
marginal effects (with 95% confidence intervals), revealing the statistical significance of
the effect of ideology on judicial spending across the full range of ideology between 1985
and 1994. In the marginal effects plots, relationships are statistically significant where the
upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence intervals are either both above or both
below the horizontal line at zero (Brambor et al., 73-76). Similarly, Figures 5.4 and 5.5
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graph predicted values and marginal effects, respectively, for the later time period, 19952006.
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Figure 5.2. Predicted values of spending (low volatility; 1985-1994).
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Figure 5.3. Marginal effects of ideology (low volatility: 1985-1994).
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Figure 5.4. Predicted values of spending (low volatility; 1995-2006).
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Figure 5.5. Marginal effects of ideology (low volatility; 1995-2006).
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Figure 5.2 resembles the U-shaped relationship discerned in Mexico. As was the
case in Mexico, the left prong of the “U” is higher than the right, indicating the left and
right spend more than their centrist counterparts, but that the left spends more than the
right. Also, the marginal effects plot in Figure 5.3 shows that the upper and lower bounds
of the confidence interval are both below zero to the left of an ideology score of
approximately five (5), but the bounds are never both above zero on the right. Thus,
while the U-shaped relationship suggests both the left and the right spend more than
center, Figure 5.3 shows that only the left has a statistically significant relationship with
spending. Notably, the left in these cases is composed of the PDT in Espirito Santo
(1991-1994), Rio de Janeiro (1991-1994), and Rio Grande do Sul (1991-1994). Thus, the
results from pre-1995, institutionalized provincial party systems reduce to the finding that
the PDT exerts a statistically significant upward pressure on judicial spending.107
This U-shaped relationship familiar from Mexico, however, reverses from 1995
forward, forming a bell-shaped curve. The curve is skewed slightly to the left, peaking at
an ideology score of approximately 4.5. The location of the peak and the left-skew of this
curve suggest center-left administrations spend the most on courts. Notably, this finding

107

The PSDB governed Ceará from 1991-1994, but the volatility score was 61.21, above the median, so it
is not included in the sample of “institutionalized” provincial party systems. In fact, the difference in state
executives in each of these cases helps to understand how the effect of ideology is conditioned by
institutionalization. For example, the governors elected in Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul – Leonel
Brizola and Alceu Collares, respectively – were standard-bearers of the left: Brizola and Colares were both
originally from the progressive PTB in pre-dictatorship Rio Grande do Sul, and were prominent figures of
the pre-dictatorship left. When Jânio Quadros left the presidency in 1961 and vice-president João Goulart
(“Jango”) was supposed to succeed, the military and conservative factions were opposed to Goulart’s
progressive credentials, threatening to block the succession. Brizola led a “campaign for legality” from Rio
Grande do Sul, helping Goulart to the presidency and keeping the existing regime rules in place, though
this was short-lived given the coup happened in April 1964. Brizola also lived in exile for most of the
military regime. In Ceará, in contrast, the PSDB brought Ciro Gomes to the governor’s office, a politician
who between the 1970s and the present had migrated from the pro-military ARENA and PDS, through the
PMDB and PSDB, to the PPS and PSB, all the while maintaining ties to the right-wing PFL. In contrast to
the fairly consistent ideological position of Brizola and Collares, Gomes looks more like a political
opportunist (BBC 2002; Folha de São Paulo 2002).
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is still consistent with the positive effect of parties like the PDT. However, the plot of
marginal effects shows the relationship between ideology and spending is statistically
significant only to the left of approximately 3.5 and to the right of approximately 5.5, as
predicted values taper downwards. That is, leftist and rightist administrations dampen
spending from 1995 forward, and centrist, perhaps center-left adminstrations, appear to
spend the most, though the statistical significance of the relationship between center-left
and centrist administrations is less clear.
These results are supported by a final approach to examining ideology. Rather
than force parties into an ordered, left-to-right spectrum, Table 5.5 reports models using
party dummies. This model is the equivalent of Model 9 in Mexico (see Table 4.3).108 All
parties that reached the governor’s office are represented. From left to right, these are PT,
PPS, PSB, PDT, PSDB, PMDB, PTB, PSL, PFL, PDS, PPB, PPR, PSC, and PTR. Given
the related origins of the last five parties, these are all grouped under one variable, PDSLegacy. 109 Model 16 drops the PMDB as the modal category. To check for robustness,
Model 17 drops the PDS-Legacy variable, treating it as the base category. As was the
case in the previous table, the full sample is analyzed and then split into two time periods.
Models 16a and 17a examine the early time period (1985-1994) and Models 16b and 17b

108

Model 9 in Mexico and Model 16 here were used to generate the typicality scores in Chapter 3.
The PFL is not grouped with these parties even though it also arose from the PDS. Most scholars
analyze the PFL separately and group the PDS-PPR-PPB together (e.g., Mainwaring, Meneguello, and
Power 2000; Power and Zucco 2009). The PDS grew out of the pro-military ARENA in 1982, and became
the PPR in 1993 (after fusing with the PDC). In the same year, the conservative PST and PTR fused to
form the PP, which fused with the PPR (formerly PDS) in 1995 to form the PPB, which in 2008 went back
to calling itself simply the PP (Mainwaring, Meneguello, and Power 2000, 183-192; Ames 2003; Power
and Zucco 2009). The center-right PSC had one administration – that of Gerardo Bulhões in Alagoas
(1991-1994). However, Bulhões was originally from ARENA and the PDS (Teofilo 2006). Similarly, the
PTR had one administration – that of Osvaldo Piana Filho in Rondônia (1991-1994). Ames and Keck
(1995) describe Piana as belonging to traditional elites in the state. In any case, the PTR merged in 1993
with the PST to form the PP as mentioned above. See Appendix D for models that separately analyze the
parties grouped under PDS-Legacy.
109
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examine the later time period (1995-2006). There is no control for volatility because the
analysis focuses on party effect, not on the effect of a left-to-right spectrum.
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Table 5.5. GEE analysis of effect of party dummies on spending, truncated by time.

16
margin of victory
divided government
unified gov
(plurality)
unified gov (super)
PT
PPS
PSB
PDT
PSDB

0.53**
(0.20)
0.21**
(0.07)
0.03
(0.07)
−0.23**
(0.11)
−0.04
(0.13)
0.04
(0.28)
0.05
(0.14)
0.23*
(0.12)
0.27**
(0.09)

16a
85-94
0.16
(0.31)
0.18
(0.11)
−0.08
(0.12)
−0.08
(0.16)
dropped
dropped
dropped
0.33**
(0.17)
0.02
(0.30)

PMDB
PTB

16b
95-06
0.79**
(0.30)
0.14
(0.12)
0.05
(0.10)
−0.27*
(0.16)
−0.17
(0.15)
−0.09
(0.31)
−0.11
(0.16)
0.21
(0.19)
0.05
(0.13)

17
0.54**
(0.20)
0.22**
(0.07)
0.02
(0.07)
−0.23**
(0.11)
0.18
(0.14)
0.26
(0.29)
0.27*
(0.15)
0.45**
(0.14)
0.49**
(0.11)
0.22**
(0.08)
−0.03
(0.22)
0.21
(0.43)
0.32**
(0.10)

17a
85-94
0.25
(0.30)
0.21*
(0.11)
−0.08
(0.12)
−0.11
(0.16)
dropped
dropped
dropped
0.44**
(0.19)
0.13
(0.11)
0.11
(0.09)
0.19
(0.29)

−0.26
0.11
−0.45
(0.22)
(0.28)
(0.38)
PSL
−0.03
−0.15
dropped
dropped
(0.42)
(0.46)
PFL
0.09
0.13
−0.18
0.25*
(0.09)
(0.12)
(0.17)
(0.14)
PDS – Legacy
−0.26** −0.19*
−0.29
(0.08)
(0.10)
(0.18)
GDP per capita
0.30**
0.54**
0.26
0.31**
0.56**
(logged)
(0.14)
(0.17)
(0.18)
(0.14)
(0.17)
population density
0.00
−0.00
−0.00
0.00
−0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
election year
0.11**
0.16**
0.09
0.11**
0.14**
(0.05)
(0.06)
(0.08)
(0.05)
(0.06)
constant
0.75
−1.13
1.36
0.45
−1.43
(1.17)
(1.37)
(1.51)
(1.16)
(1.36)
N
502
236
266
502
236
States
26
26
26
26
26
Wald χ2
74.39
48.66
27.57
72.13
46.23
Prob > χ2
0.0000
0.0000
0.0035
0.0000
0.0000
Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. ** p < .01 * p < .05
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17b
95-06
0.79**
(0.30)
0.14
(0.12)
0.05
(0.10)
−0.27*
(0.16)
0.11
(0.20)
0.19
(0.32)
0.18
0.23
0.50**
(0.24)
0.34*
(0.20)
0.29**
(0.18)
−0.16
(0.36)
0.14
(0.44)
0.11
(0.20)

0.26
(0.18)
−0.00
(0.00)
0.09
(0.08)
1.07
(1.51)
266
26
27.57
0.0355

Model 16 shows that the center-left PDT and the PSDB exert a positive and
statistically significant effect on spending. Meanwhile, the PDS-Legacy parties exert a
negative and statistically significant effect on spending. The positive effect of the PDT
and the negative effect of the PDS-Legacy parties remain in the sub-sample of the early
time period (1985-1994), but the PSDB is no longer statistically significant. None of the
parties exert a statistically significant effect in the later time period (1995-2006). Notably,
these results should be read in relation to the omitted base category, the PMDB.
Model 17, omitting PDS-Legacy parties, complements these results. The PDT and
PSDB exert a positive and statistically significant effect, and these two parties are joined
now by the PMDB and PFL. However, in the sample of the early time period, only the
PDT and PFL exert their positive and statistically significant relationship. In the later
time period, only the PDT, PSDB, and PMDB maintain this relationship.
It should be noted that in these models, margin of victory and divided government
consistently maintain their previous positive and statistically significant relationship with
spending. Moreover, unified-super is consistently significant and exerts a negative
pressure on spending.
Regarding the control variables, GDP per capita continues to exert a positive and
statistically significant effect on spending. The control for election years is also
consistently positive and significant. Population density is never statistically significant.

5.6. Discussion
The findings regarding competition in Brazil offer mixed support for the expected
positive relationship between electoral competition and spending. The consistently
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positive coefficient for margin of victory suggests that noncompetitive elections
strengthen spending, cutting against expectations and contrasting sharply with the
consistently negative sign on margin of victory in Mexico. This is a puzzling result and
requires further attention in the future. Additional research may examine the relationship
between margin of victory and the nature of the Brazilian party system. For instance,
given the volatility or low institutionalization of many provincial party systems, changes
in the margin of victory may be a much more regular occurrence than in Mexico. Another
reason may be related to magnitude of support for certain leaders in the post-authoritarian
context. Perhaps those governors elected with a large share of the vote – a mandate – may
feel more at ease in spending greater amounts on the courts.
A third reason may relate to the historical development of the Brazilian party
system. In contrast to Mexico, where a single party ruled for 71 years, the military regime
forced the existence of an official two-party system that may have hardened sympathies
in one direction or another at the local level. That is, rather than having a hegemonic
party and opposition parties that have slowly tried to erode the dominant party’s
hegemony, Brazil had an official party of the regime and an official, sanctioned
opposition party. As the transition to democracy began in 1985, the main, pro-military
party (PDS) suffered from numerous defections and “shrank to less than a third of its size
in 1983” (Mainwaring, Meneguello, and Power, 177). Thus, perhaps the dissolution of a
two-party regime generates different reasons for greater margins of victory than the
dissolution of a single-dominant-party regime.
Balancing the unexpected finding regarding margin of victory, ENC was
statistically significant and in the anticipated positive direction. That is not simply to say
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that democracy is good for courts. Rather, two parties are better than one, three are better
than two, and so forth. Further, majority distance – which is based on the margin of
victory data – is statistically significant and has the expected negative relationship with
spending. Finally, divided government is consistently positive and statistically
significant. Moreover, in the last set of models (Table 5.5), unified-simple was
consistently negative and statistically significant. Both of these results support the
conclusion that competition strengthens spending.
The results regarding ENC, majority distance, and divided government align with
a growing literature on the positive effects of increasing electoral competition in new
democracies (Rodriguez 1998; Beer 2001; 2003; Hecock 2006). Moreover, this result
resonates with findings regarding the positive effect of competition that are specific to the
strength of the judiciary (Chavez 2004; Beer 2006; Ríos-Figueroa 2007), including the
results from Mexico in Chapter 4. Thus, the rising level of interparty competition in
Brazil appears to bode well for courts.
However, the findings do not clarify the causal logics underlying competition. As
stated earlier, the general expectation regarding electoral competition relies on different
causal accounts, including re-election, signaling, insurance logic, and opportunity logics.
The statistical analysis presented here offers results that support direction of the outcome
anticipated by these causal logics, but does not adjudicate among these logics.
The findings do, however, clarify whether one causal logic is at work – the veto
player logic. Veto player theory anticipates that increased competition generates more
obstacles to policy change, not less. Thus, where divided government is present, i.e., at
least two veto players, spending increases should be more difficult. Conversely, spending
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increases should be easiest where government is unified. This is not the case in Brazil.
Divided government has a positive and statistically significant relationship with
spending, and, where unified-simple or unified-super are significant (indicating singleveto-player environments), the coefficient on these variables is negative. In short, the
findings cut against the expectations of veto player theory, but they do not resolve the
issue of which of the other causal mechanisms are driving judicial spending.
Regarding ideology, the findings in Brazil initially suggested there might not be a
statistically significant effect exerted by ideology (Table 5.3). However, once the models
controlled for volatility and time period by dividing the full data sample into low
volatility and high volatility sub-samples, as well as pre-1995 and post-1994 subsamples, statistically significant relationships began to emerge. In these analyses (Table
5.4), the conclusion emerges that party system institutionalization conditions the effect of
ideology. In both samples of institutionalized party systems (low volatility), ideology
exerted a statistically significant effect. Moreover, institutionalization matters more than
the time period, as ideology is never statistically significant in the high volatility subsamples, regardless of the time period. Focusing on the low volatility sub-samples – and
on the plots of predicted values and margin effects in Figures 5.2-5.5 – the center-left
exerted a strong, positive, and statistically significant effect on spending between 1985
and 1994. These center-left administrations – the left, statistically-significant prong of the
“U” in Figure 5.2 – are all PDT administrations: Espirito Santo (1991-1994), Rio de
Janeiro (1991-1994), and Rio Grande do Sul (1991-1994).
Overall, the PDT exerts the most consistent upward pressure on spending,
evidenced by the “U” shape in Figure 5.2, the significance of the center-left in Figures
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5.4 and 5.5, and by the results in the analysis of party dummies. The PDT was the most
consistently positive and statistically significant party in that analysis. In the center of the
ideological spectrum, Figures 5.4 and 5.5 support the conclusion that the PSDB and
PMDB exert an upward pressure on spending from 1995 forward. There is also support
for their positive effect in the analysis of party dummies, though the substantive
significance of the PDT and PSDB is greater than that of the PMDB.
Finally, on the right side of the ideological spectrum, the PDS-Legacy parties
exert a negative influence relative to their centrist counterparts (namely, the PMDB), and
the PFL exerts a positive influence when compared with other parties on the right (the
PDS-Legacy parties). This last set of findings is important for two reasons. First, the
positive influence of the PFL and the negative influence of the PDS-Legacy parties helps
explain why it is difficult to get consistent results regarding ideology when using a leftto-right category to capture all parties. The PFL and the PDS-Legacy parties are virtually
indistinguishable from each other on Power and Zucco’s (2009) scale, all of them
clustered on the right end above a score of seven (7). However, the results suggest strong
differences among them, differences that would be obscured by the ideology scale, and
that would therefore appear as confounding results in a statistical analysis. For instance,
in the U-shape in Figure 5.2, the right prong of the U is not statistically significant
according to the marginal effects in Figure 5.3. This may be due to the fact that the PFL
is pushing spending up while the PDS-Legacy parties are pulling spending down,
generating a curve that does not appear to be statistically significant. Indeed, this result
illuminates the overall findings in Brazil and helps to understand the contrast with
Mexico. Specifically, whereas Mexico has three main parties that map cleanly onto left,
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center, and right positions, Brazil has multiple parties at each position, and the parties at
each position exert effects that vary in direction and statistical significance. Second, that
fact that the PFL exerts a positive, statistically significant effect coincides with the
anticipated curvilinear relationship between ideology and spending, i.e., that both leftist
and rightist parties should promote court strength. However, the finding demonstrates
that, in Brazil, only part of the right exerts a positive pressure, while another of the right
(PDS legacy parties) exert a negative one.
The most striking result of the analysis presented here is the fact that the PT is not
statistically significant in a positive direction. In the U-shaped curve in Figure 5.2, where
the center-left exerts a strong upward pressure on spending, the PT is not included. The
time period is 1987-1994, and the PT did not win its first governor’s race until 1994
(inaugurated in January of 1995 in Espirito Santo). Similarly, in the analysis of party
dummies, the PT is never significant. The only instance where the PT is significant is in
Figures 5.4 and 5.5, where the left exerts a downward pressure on spending between
1995 and 2006.

5.7. Conclusion
Electoral competition exerts an upwards pressure on spending, but the results do
not adjudicate among rival or potentially competing causal logics. The only causal logic
that the results cut against is the veto player logic, since divided government has a
positive relationship with spending, unlike the findings in Mexico.
While the results regarding ideology are initially complicated, the more robust
pattern that emerges once the analysis controls for institutionalization and time period, as
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well as party dummies, is the positive effect exerted by the PDT, PMDB, PSDB, and
PFL, and the negative effect exerted by PDS legacy parties. Of these findings, the one
regarding the PDT is the most consistent. However, a conservative interpretation of the
large-N results suggests that centrist and center-left parties exert an upward pressure on
spending, and this includes the PDT, PMDB, and PSDB.
As discussed above, the positive effect of the right-wing PFL and the negative
effect of PDS legacy parties highlights the need in Brazil to distinguish between parties
that are similarly situated along a left-right spectrum, and also helps us understand how
the disparate effects of similarly situated parties might be obscuring correlation-based
results in the statistical analysis.
Furthermore, the negative drain of the PDS legacy parties highlights a connection
with the results regarding the PRI in Mexico. Specifically, the results suggest that the
ideological location of the base of authoritarianism in Brazil may be driving some of the
results. Stated otherwise, the ideological location of the main opposition parties may
exert the strongest positive effect on court strength. For instance, the base of
authoritarianism was in the center in Mexico, and the main opposition to the PRI came
from both the PRD and PAN, but earlier and most dramatically from the PRD, which
represented a democratizing current that split from the PRI in the 1980s to form its own
party after the 1988 elections. In contrast, the base of authoritarianism in Brazil was on
the right, represented by the pro-military ARENA and later the PDS and PDS legacy
parties. The official opposition movement – the MDB – transformed into the centrist
PMDB, which exerts a positive pressure on judicial spending in the analysis. The PDT
and PSDB – also early and prominent opponents of the PDS legacy parties, exert a
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similarly positive effect. Thus, the authoritarian baseline appears to have a lasting
negative legacy, here and in Mexico, while the opposition parties exert a positive effect.
The lack of a significant relationship between the leftist PT and spending
confounds this result. Theoretically, the PT should be one of the strongest ideological
counterweights to the PDS legacy parties, and therefore lead a charge of institutional
building, which should translate into judicial change. The qualitative phase of research in
Brazil shows that there has sometimes been a tense relationship between the strongest
party on the left, the PT, and local judicial leaders. Historically, leftist politicians express
an anti-elitist sentiment against judges, and this can translate into tensions or rivalries
between judicial leaders and leftist politicians where the judiciary is already relatively
strong. That is, in states where the judiciary has achieved a certain level of institutional
strength, anti-elitist attacks by the left can be seen as eroding judicial strength, not
building it. This also became a source of tension in the 1990s and early 2000s as the PT
led the national judicial reform effort. The PT’s support for external mechanisms of
control and accountability caused some judges in states with strong courts to perceive the
PT as a threat to their own autonomy. That is, external control over institutions that are
already strong suggests existing strength will be attenuated. However, in states where the
judiciary is still weak and underdeveloped, leftist politicians can exert a positive,
institutional-building effect by drawing attention to this weakness and the weakening
effect of traditional elites. The nature of this conditional relationship between the left and
judicial strength is explored in greater detail in the small-N analysis in Chapter 7.
Despite the tension between the PT and some strong courts, there are groups of
judges with center-left or left-leaning policy preferences. For example, in the southern
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state of Rio Grande do Sul, there is a strong affinity between many judges and the centerleft PDT dating back to the administration of PDT governor Alceu Collares (1991-1994).
In fact, this evidence coincides with the statistically significant effect of the center-left in
Brazil, and the greater upward pressure that the center-left exerts on spending than the
left. This relationship is also explored in greater detail in Chapter 7, seeking confirmatory
evidence of the kind Lieberman (2005, 448) suggests might lead to a reasonable endpoint in the analysis, i.e., his “endpoint I”, providing causal links that support the large-N
analysis and the “well-predicted” character of the case.
In this regard, Chapters 6 and 7, which follow, both seek this kind of confirmatory
evidence in the model-testing cases. The small-N analysis also seeks to understand the
process-based evidence in light of the model for the other cases, identifying ways in
which the cases support the theoretical model, undermine it, or suggest new explanations.
The next chapter turns to this phase of analysis in Mexico.
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6. Small-N Analysis in Mexico:
Aguascalientes, Michoacán, and Hidalgo
Tanto por la concepción ideológica, como por la amistad [y la] lealtad,
[permanecimos] al lado de [los Cárdenas]. [Con la educación y las experiencias
profesionales] se refuerza … la semilla ideológica heredada familiarmente,
con la concepción de un estado moderno, democrático y de derecho.
Anonymous interview, Michoacán110
Mi formación professional como abogado más la sensibilidad respecto que [el sistema de
justicia] era un factor crítico para la competitividad [económica] del Estado, me hizo
llegar a la conclusión de que quizá era un buen momento para … hacer una reforma.
Fmr. Gov. Otto Granados Roldán, Aguascalientes111
El funcionamiento pleno de la judicatura tiene un alma eminentemente económica.
Anonymous interview, Aguascalientes112
La reforma del consejo judicial fue un proyecto político.
Anonymous interview, Hidalgo113
6.1. Introduction
Building on the findings from the quantitative analysis, the qualitative
examination here traces the political logic of judicial change in three Mexican states:
Aguascalientes, Michoacán, and Hidalgo. While the large-N portion of the analysis in
Chapter 4 finds average effects supporting the positive relationship between competition
and spending, multiple causal logics might underlie this relationship. In order to address
this problem of behavioral equivalence, the qualitative analysis presented here

110

Translation: “Because of ideological conception as much as friendship [and] loyalty [we remained] on
the side of [the Cárdenas family]. [Education and professional experience] reinforced … the ideological
seed inherited through family, with the conception of a modern and democratic rule of law” (Interview 38).
111
Author interview. Translation: “My professional training as a lawyer, plus the sensibility I had regarding
the critical role of the justice system for the state’s economic competitiveness, led me to conclude that
perhaps it was a good time for reform.” Granados Roldán was speaking of his motivations in 1994 for the
state’s judicial reform.
112
Translation: “The full [or complete] operation [or performance] of the judiciary has an eminently
economic motivation” (Interview 47).
113
Translation: “The judicial council reform was a political project” (Interview 3; emphasis added). In
characterizing the reform as a political project, the interviewee was noting that it was not a serious reform.
Rather, the 2006 reform in Hidalgo, discussed in detail below, was a superficial reform motivated
essentially by narrow political interests, i.e., political ambition.
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adjudicates among alternate causal logics underpinning electoral competition. Moreover,
building on the strong findings of a relationship between ideology and judicial strength in
the large-N analysis, the small-N analysis in this chapter seeks to understand the
mechanisms and motivations underlying the pronounced U-shaped relationship between
party identity and spending that was so striking in Mexico – compelling evidence that the
leftist PRD and rightist PAN both strengthen courts more than the previously dominant
PRI, and that the PRD strengthens courts more than even the PAN. Thus, in addition to
adjudicating among rival and potentially contradictory causal logics underlying the
relationship between electoral competition and court strength, the analysis in this chapter
also seeks to identify the causal logics or mechanics of the relationship between political
ideology and court strength. In sum, this chapter offers a finer examination of the
political origins of local judicial strength in Mexico.
Recalling the rationale for case selection discussed in Chapter 3, Aguascalientes is
a well-predicted, model-testing case, and is therefore a promising case in which to flesh
out the theory that electoral competition and ideology exert positive pressures on court
strength. Aguascalientes is also a case of rising competition in which the rightist PAN has
ascended to power. Thus, in order to capture the variation of Mexico’s subnational
electoral-ideological landscape, the research design includes two other states –
Michoacán and Hidalgo – to complete the cases selected for small-N, controlled
comparisons in this chapter. Where Aguascalientes represents movement away from the
authoritarian baseline in a rightward direction, Michoacán represents movement away
from the authoritarian baseline in the form of rising competition and a leftward shift in
administrations. The PRD won the governor’s office in 2001, and has since been re-
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elected in 2007. Finally, Hidalgo represents the continuity of the authoritarian baseline –
non-competitive elections dominated by the PRI. Indeed, as of 2009, the PRI has held the
governors office and a legislative majority in Hidalgo for 80 years. In this regard,
Hidalgo is the Mexican equivalent of Brazil’s Maranhão.
Additionally, it should be noted that while Aguascalientes is a model-testing case
because it is well-predicted and exhibits variation on the key independent variables of
competition and ideology, the change in ideology reflects a rightward PRI-to-PAN
transition. That is, the state is not emblematic of the most significant ideology finding in
the large-N analysis, namely, that the leftist PRD builds judicial institutions more than
either the PAN or the PRI. Stated otherwise, Aguascalientes is a good model-testing case,
but needs to be judged against the other cases, especially against Michoacán, to assess the
effect of ideology. Notably, Michoacán is also a good model-testing case. Both
Michoacán and Hidalgo are well-predicted (see Table 3.1 and Figure 3.2). Indeed,
Michoacán in 2006 contributes the most well-predicted observation in the large-N
analysis, and both states have average typicality scores below the mean (Hidalgo has the
lowest average scores in Figure 3.2). However, Michoacán also has variation over time
on key independent variables. Thus, given its typicality scores and leftward, PRI-to-PRD
transition, Michoacán also constitutes a good model-testing case.
In sum, the three selected cases represent the trilogy of political contexts in the
Mexican states: Hidalgo represents PRI continuity, Aguascalientes rightward PRI-toPAN transitions, and Michoacán leftward PRI-to-PRD transitions. All three cases qualify
as “well-predicted” in the statistical analysis in Chapter 4, and Aguascalientes and
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Michoacán are both good model-testing cases. How have courts fared in these different
political-electoral contexts within Mexico?
The chapter is organized as follows. The first part of this chapter defines “court
strength” along three dimensions: (i) judicial spending; (ii) institutional design; and (iii)
career structure. This first part also classifies the three states examined here –
Aguascalientes, Michoacán, and Hidalgo – along these dimensions, identifying the
strongest and weakest judiciaries and ranking them “low” through “high”. Change across
these three dimensions reveals the strengthening (progressive, positive reform) or
weakening (corrosive, negative counter-reform) of courts. Thus, change and reform are
often used interchangeably here but reforms are also distinguished from counter-reforms.
The second part of the chapter focuses on tracing the causal process of change in each
state, emphasizing critical turning points or markers of change, and identifying
mechanisms and motivations that give a more textured, process-based account of
causation than the correlation-based, average effects of the statistical analysis. The final
section synthesizes the main lessons from the process-based analysis.
Forecasting the main findings ahead, this chapter makes three principal
arguments. The arguments address (1) causal logics underpinning electoral competition;
(2) the important role of ideas and ideology, as well as the extent to which their effects
are conditioned by the baseline condition of the judiciary and the timing and sequence of
reform efforts; and (3) the manner in which policy change moves across different levels
of the regime.
First, three of the main causal logics that frequently underlie electoral
competition – re-election, signaling, and insurance – do not receive empirical support. In
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contrast, the logics of opportunity and veto players do receive support. Further, a
“patronage-preserving” logic emerges that, though closely related to the policypreserving logic of Hirschl (2004) and Gillman (2002; 2006), is distinct in that (a) the
patronage preservation is non-ideological and (b) it yields no real gains in court strength.
Notably, the opportunity logic, which treats judges as key actors in the political logic of
institutional change, anticipating how political openings generate incentives for judgeled reform initiatives, is understudied in judicial politics.114 Moreover, the latter two
logics cut against conventional accounts of electoral competition in that they expect
negative consequences from increasing competition. The veto player logic anticipates
that increasing competition hinders policy change, and the patronage-preservation logic
identified here describes how traditional elites engage in corrosive, non-ideological
protection of patronage, which differs from both Hirschl’s positive logic of the
entrenchment or preservation of liberal values and policies and Gillman’s entrenchment
under ideological “partisan coalitions”. Thus, the analysis explores the negative
consequences of the entrenchment of traditional, illiberal elites in new democracies, and
the possible negative consequences of electoral competition in new democracies more
generally. However, the analysis also emphasizes that expectations regarding the content
or direction of policy change are incomplete and imprecise without information
regarding preferences and ideology. For instance, single-veto-player environments
facilitate policy change, but only if dominant political actors actually want to change
policy.
Second, courts are strongest in Michoacán, resulting from a sustained reform
effort by the left-of-center PRD and ideologically sympathetic judges that overcame
114

See Hilbink (2007b) for a discussion of this logic in Spain’s transition to democracy.
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resistance from the traditional PRI and conservative judicial elders. Court strength is
moderate in Aguascalientes, with gains led by a reformist, market-oriented PRI governor.
In this regard, despite bearing the party label of the PRI, this politician was closer
ideologically to the secular, neoliberal wing of the PAN. However, these reforms were
largely eroded by subsequent counter-reforms promoted by a PAN administration and
conservative judicial elders. The PAN in Aguascalientes (and in this region of Mexico,
more generally) has a traditional, Catholic base, so the reform and counter-reform process
in this state is consistent with theoretical expectations and also highlights the importance
of understanding intra-party ideological variation. Both cases offer support for the
important role of ideas, as well as the role of extrajudicial activity by judges to shape the
reform agenda and change the preferences of politicians. In both states, ideas and
ideology matter. Also in both states, these cultural-ideational influences travel not only
across levels of the regime, but also find some of their origins and development outside
Mexico. For instance, Spanish-trained judges were critical to the successful reform effort
under the PRD in Michoacán. Finally, Hidalgo has the weakest courts, resulting from the
non-competitive and non-ideological PRI-controlled context, where neither politicians
nor judges appear to be seriously committed to strong courts, providing the clearest
Mexican case of the patronage-preservation logic at work.

6.2. Measuring Judicial Strength in Three Mexican States
Judicial strength is defined across three dimensions. First, judicial spending
captures resource strength in both the size of and control over court budgets. Second,
institutional design captures organizational arrangements that yield both independence
and administrative capacity. Finally, career structure measures the extent to which the
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hiring and permanence of judges reflects merit-based criteria rather than discretionary or
arbitrary decisions. Change across these three dimensions can reveal the strengthening
(progressive reform) or weakening (corrosive counter-reform) of courts. Thus, change
and reform are often used interchangeably here, but reforms are also distinguished from
counter-reforms.
Benchmarks facilitate the measurement of court strength and the identification of
positive and negative change. As introduced above, these benchmarks or metrics are: (1)
judicial spending; (2) institutional design; and (3) career structure. Importantly, these
metrics capture palpable, real-world differences in the structure and operation of state
courts, differences that are meaningful to ordinary citizens. It also bears emphasizing that
the baseline condition in the Mexican states is PRI hegemony, a condition in which
judicial institutions are weakened by patronage and corruption. Judicial strengthening
entails movement away from this baseline.
First, judicial spending is a key source of court strength. In the U.S., “assaults on
judicial independence” include punitive cuts in judicial budgets (Douglas and Hartley
2003, 448-452; see also COSCA 2003, 8). In newly democratic countries like Mexico,
local court budgets are even more vulnerable. Historically weak and subordinate to the
political branches, state judiciaries have struggled to gain both larger shares of the state
coffers and greater autonomy over how the judicial budget is spent. Larger budgets
translate into higher wages for judges and court staff, attracting competent professionals
(Domingo, 723-25). However, even stable judicial budgets – neither growing nor
shrinking – do not account for the corrosive effect of inflation, which reduces the real
value of similar allocations over time (Domingo, 715). Beyond the size of court budgets,
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financial autonomy also provides the judiciary with the discretion to prioritize capital
improvements, provide performance incentives, and generally plan for the growth and
management of the institution. Multiple interviewees identify the inability to plan
appropriately as a critical weakness in the courts. In this regard, a recent report identified
budgetary strength as a key issue facing Mexican courts (Caballero Juárez, López Ayllón,
and Oñate Laborde 2006), and the Mexican Supreme Court identified court budgets as
the Achilles heel of judicial independence (SCJN 2006). Thus, in the Mexican states,
strong courts have large budgets, participate in the budgetary process, and transparent
budgetary exercise yields a balance of autonomy and accountability.
Second, institutional design across the Mexican states is fairly uniform with one
major exception – the presence and configuration of judicial councils. Judicial councils
are administrative structures within the judiciary that, in their strongest form, take charge
of all oversight, supervision, and disciplinary responsibilities (Fix-Zamudio and FixFierro 1996). Independent administrative organs yield hiring, promotion, oversight, and
disciplinary decisions that are more merit-based and credible. Traditionally, senior judges
(magistrados) on the state supreme court (Tribunal) meet in private to discuss these
issues, resulting in highly subjective and discretionary decisions. The tension and
favoritism surrounding the professional futures of judges led one interviewee to refer to
these meetings as “corridas de toros”, or bull fights (Interview 76). This practice
generates incentives to maintain politically-charged loyalties with the magistrados in
order to enter, remain, and ascend within the judiciary. Given that magistrados often owe
their own positions to the governor, loyalty networks extend from entry-level positions
all the way to the governor’s office. Judicial councils dismantle this loyalty-based
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scaffolding, generating greater confidence and credibility both inside and outside the
judiciary, and enhancing competence and administrative capacity.
A second benefit of judicial councils is that judges can focus on the task of
judging. This offers clear improvements for the courts. Several magistrados in states
without judicial councils report that administrative decisions take up the majority of time
in the sessions of state supreme courts, and that administrative responsibilities impose
significant burdens on judging. Thus, transferring these administrative duties to a judicial
council yields substantial gains in the quality and efficiency of decisions.
Three critical issues arise in evaluating judicial councils across the Mexican
states: structure, power, and composition. First, strong councils have permanent
structures, with their own facilities, support staff, and full-time appointments. Second,
strong councils have broad powers to review and decide administrative issues, including
preparing and executing the court’s budget, planning and development, as well as all
hiring, promotion, termination, and disciplinary decisions. The strongest councils wield
these administrative powers even over magistrados. Finally, strong councils have a
mixed composition of representatives from the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches, but maintain a judicial majority. There is considerable variation internationally
and across the Mexican states in this regard (Fix-Zamudio and Fix-Fierro, n.p.), but
generally the strongest designs are those that maximize accountability without
compromising judicial independence. Council representatives from the political branches
provide accountability, but if these representatives outnumber or overshadow those from
the judiciary then separation-of-powers concerns can arise. Also, councils composed of
democratic, peer-based elections are generally better than random selection processes that

202

might sacrifice competence for the sake of impartiality (Fix-Zamudio and Fix-Fierro,
Epilogue).
Finally, career structure provides a third metric by which to evaluate court
strength. While the judicial councils described above may control personnel decisions,
the judicial career refers to the basic standards for becoming a judge and advancing
through the profession. Strong judicial career structures in the Mexican states provide for
competitive, exam-based hirings and promotions, establish reasonable term limits, and
also constrain the discretionary influence of the governor in appointing magistrados, as
well as the historical discretion of magistrados in appointing lower-level judges and court
staff. On former councilor from Aguascalientes recalled that historically, magistrados
had “total discretion” (discrecionalidad absoluta) to hire judges and other employees,
and that this frequently meant judgeships went to “relatives, friends, and people who had
done favors” for magistrados (parientes, amigos, y bienhechores) (Interview 53). As with
the concerns regarding loyalty incentives, a strong career structure establishes
mechanisms that remove these subjective incentives and replace them with reasonably
objective and merit-based criteria.
Following the three dimensions of judicial strength outlined above, Table 3
reports court strength in Aguascalientes, Hidalgo, and Michoacán. Spending, design, and
career considerations are noted separately. Taken together, these dimensions of court
strength reveal courts are strongest in Michoacán, moderate in Aguascalientes, and
weakest in Hidalgo. This ordering yields an ordinal measure (1-3) in the last row, where
Michoacán = 3 (high), Aguascalientes = 2 (medium), and Hidalgo = 1 (low). A more
detailed discussion of this ordering follows below.
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Table 6.1. Summary of Judicial Strength in Three Mexican States

Judicial Spending
spending 2008
spending (mean 1995-2008)
Institutional Design
council reform
counter-reforms
council structure
council composition
council powers
Career Structure
judicial career
Overall

Aguascalientes

Michoacán

Hidalgo

High
High

High
Med

Low
Low

High
Yes
Low
Med
Low

High
No
High
High
High

Low
No
High
Low
Low

High
Med

High
High

Low
Low
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Judicial Spending
Figure 1 displays judicial spending across the three states from 1984 to 2008, both
in real per capita terms and as a percentage of the total state budget.
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Figure 6.1. Judicial Spending in Three Mexican States.115
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Court budgets are highest in Aguascalientes, followed by Michoacán and Hidalgo.
In Aguascalientes, judicial spending increases dramatically since the mid-1990s, and the
judicial percentage of the state budget has dropped below 1% only twice in the last 25
years, and since 1995 has oscillated between 1.93% in 1997 and 1.42% in 2005. Notably,
115

Figure 1 tracks spending per capita in real terms (solid line), referencing the Y-axis on the left, as well as
spending as a per cent of the total state budget (dashed line), referencing the Y-axis on the right. Both
metrics capture spending in a way that is comparable over time and across states. Sources include INEGI,
state reporters (Diario Oficial), and annual reports. Deflators are from the International Financial Statistics
Database of the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2007) using 2000 as the base year, and population figures
are from INEGI.
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while real per capita spending has been rising overall, the measure of judicial spending as
a proportion of the total state budget has been dropping since 1997, rising again for the
first time in 2008.
Court budgets in Michoacán are historically low, but a key change occurred in
2002-2003, when the court’s budget more than doubled, increasing from $104,949,274
pesos in 2002 to $251,757,218 pesos in 2003. In 2003 judicial spending exceeded one per
cent of the state budget for the first time. After 2003, the budget continued expanding,
rising in 2008 to $520,186,955 pesos and constituting more than 1.5% of the state budget.
In both real and proportional terms, spending is quickly approaching the levels in
Aguascalientes.
Hidalgo’s court budget remains one of the lowest in all of Mexico, despite
substantial increases in 2007 and 2008, and changing little over the previous 20 years. As
a percentage of the total state budget, it should also be noted that judicial spending
remained below 1% in Hidalgo for at least the last ten years. In sum, as of 2008,
Aguascalientes had one of the highest judicial budgets in the country at $153,824 pesos
per capita, slightly higher than Michoacán’s $132,130, and twice the amount budgeted in
Hidalgo of $77,273.
The autonomy and accountability of judicial spending also varies across the three
states. Aguascalientes has budgetary autonomy in that it can prepare and exercise its own
budget, but conflict remains since the court president controls these functions with little
transparency. This vertical arrangement generates ongoing accountability concerns
(Interview 54), especially when monthly salaries stand at $105,000 and $141,000 pesos
for magistrados and the president, respectively (considering the “aguinaldo”, or thirteenth
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month of salary each winter, these amounts convert to annual salaries of roughly
$136,000 and $183,000 U.S. dollars, respectively, not counting annual bonuses for each
of $20,000 USD) (Presupuesto-Ags 2008). While high salaries are desired outcomes,
these salaries begin to seem excessively high, suggesting a lack of accountability in the
distribution of judicial resources (Interview 54).
In Michoacán, the judicial council has expansive powers to elaborate and
supervise the execution of the court budget. This transparent control yields both
autonomy and accountability. Salaries for magistrados are lower but still good,
oscillating around $90,000 pesos per month in 2008, or $117,000 U.S. dollars annually
(Duarte 2007; Rodriguez 2008).
Finally, Hidalgo’s spending shows little autonomy or accountability. While the
judicial council technically has the power to elaborate the court’s budget, the court
president manages this function and also supervises the budget’s execution. This vertical
arrangement generates autonomy, but dampens accountability, yielding similar concerns
as in Aguascalientes. Symptomatically, detailed salary figures are not available in
Hidalgo.
Institutional Design
In Aguascalientes, a key design improvement occurred in 1995 with a judicial
reform that created a judicial council (CP-Ags, art. 53). However, the Aguascalientes
reform generated a council that was weaker than the national council in both structure
and composition. Despite giving the council strong powers, the reform created a nonpermanent and part-time organ (members keep their separate, full-time jobs). The council
meets only once or twice per month, and does not have its own offices. Moreover, the
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council is composed of seven people, only three of whom represent the judiciary (the
court president and two judges elected by their peers). The other four members represent
the political branches – two from the executive and two from the legislature (CP-Ags, art.
54). Thus, the council is structurally weak and majority-political, unlike the majorityjudicial councils in Hidalgo and Michoacán.116 Finally, a 2001 counter-reform removed
most council powers, leaving the council in charge of only the judicial career (CP-Ags,
art. 51).
In Michoacán, a 2006 reform created a judicial council (Decreto 44). The
Michoacán council is very strong in its structure, powers, and composition, consisting of
a permanent body operating full time and with its own installations. The council is
composed of five members: (1) the president of the Tribunal; (2) a magistrado elected by
her peers; (3) a first-instance judge elected by a peer-supervised election that requires the
participation of judges; (4) a representative of the executive chosen by the governor; and
(5) a representative of the legislature elected by vote in the pleno of the congress (CPMich, art. 67; LOPJ-Mich, art. 73). In addition to its permanent, full-time, majorityjudicial, and democratic character,117 the Michoacán council has full administrative,
supervisory, and disciplinary powers, including powers to approve and manage the
judicial budget. The council holds administrative, supervisory, and disciplinary power
116

These structural factors impede the effectiveness of the council. While some interviewees note there is
too little work in Aguascalientes for a full-time council (e.g., Interview 55), evidence suggests otherwise.
For instance, the Aguascalientes judiciary manages a budget that, in raw terms, is equivalent to the budget
in Hidalgo, at approximately 140 million pesos in 2007 and 180 million pesos for 2008 in both states. Also,
both states have similar volumes of litigation, with totals of approximately 34,000 initiated cases in
Aguascalientes and approximately 40,000 in Hidalgo for 2007 (PJ-Ags 2008; PJ-Hid 2008). A part-time
and non-permanent council is severely handicapped to administer this workload.
117
The names of all judges are placed in a bag, and three names are drawn. These three form an election
committee, which then supervises the council election. The committee generates a list of candidates – none
of whom can be on the committee – and a statewide electronic vote decides who will represent the judges
on the council. Furthermore, the election is only valid if at least two thirds of al judges participate (LOPJMich, art. 75). Contrast this process with Hidalgo, where the magistrados pick the judge that will represent
the first instance courts.
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even over magistrados (LOPJ-Mich, arts. 10, 11, 13, and 77).
In Hidalgo, a 2006 reform created the judicial council (Diario de Debates 2006a).
At first glance, Hidalgo’s reform appears strong. The council is a permanent, full-time
organ with its own offices, enjoys administrative, supervisory, and disciplinary powers
over first-instance courts, and reflects a majority-judicial composition of five members:
(1) the court president; (2) a magistrado; (3) a first-instance judge; (4) a representative of
the executive; and (5) a representative of the legislature (CP-Hid, art. 100). Upon closer
examination, however, the reform reveals several weaknesses. The council does not have
any powers over magistrados or their staff (CP-Hid, art. 100; Interview 88). That is,
magistrados, their clerks and other support staff are exempt from council supervision.
Also, while the council has a judicial majority, the first-instance judge is selected at the
discretion of the pleno, not by her first-instance peers as in both Aguascalientes and
Michoacán. Thus, the majority reflects the interests of the high court, mainly its
president.118
Career Structure
In Aguascalientes, the 1995 reform required that all sitting judges and
magistrados take an exam in order to keep their jobs, and created a more objective,
exam-based career. Also, many high positions in the offices of the executive, attorney
general, local or federal legislature, and party leaders cannot become magistrados within
a year of occupying those positions (CP-Ags, art. 53). The governor still influences the
118

Additionally, the constitutional and regulations of the judiciary leave ambiguities and lacunae that only
favor the discretionary exercise of power. For instance, regarding the composition of the council, article
100 of the constitution only says the Tribunal “designates” the magistrado and first-instance judge on the
council. Contrast this single word with the very detailed, transparent, and democratic electoral mechanism
outlined in Michoacán, or the less detailed mechanism in Aguascalientes. Also, art. 100 Ter, sec. VI,
provides language that suggests the Tribunal has the power to revise and revoke any decisions by the
council.
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selection of magistrados by reviewing candidates proposed by the council and
recommending three to the legislature (CP-Ags, art. 54).
In Michoacán, the 2006 reform that created the council also dramatically altered
the judicial career.119 In terms of the judicial career, magistrados and judges are not
required to take an exam to keep their positions, as in Aguascalientes, but all future
candidates for these positions have to take an exam and compete with a pool of
candidates. The exams and evaluations are conducted by the judicial council, at the end
of which the council presents a list of the three best candidates to the legislature for its
vote (LOPJ-Mich, art. 9). Approval requires two-thirds of the legislative votes (CP-Mich,
art. 79). Thus, the reform removed the governor entirely from judicial selection.
Additionally, the reform restricted the entry of politicians to the state supreme court,
noting that in the year prior to appointment magistrados could not occupy the post of
Attorney General, state legislator, or Secretary in any of the departments of state
government. Furthermore, the reform established term limits of 15 years subject to
performance evaluations by the council every five years (CP-Mich, arts. 76, 77). Finally,
unlike the other two states, magistrados and judges are forbidden from earning income in
other capacities, including teaching and other academic positions (CP-Mich, art. 77).
Similar competitive examinations and review periods apply to first-instance judges, law
clerks (secretarios), and other court staff, including the support staff for magistrados
(LOPJ-Mich, art. 108, 109). Judges are also subject to evaluation after three years. If
successful, judges acquire life tenure (CP-Mich, arts. 87, and 90).
In Hidalgo, magistrados remain exclusively political appointments (CP-Hid, arts.
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An earlier reform in 1999-2000 sought civil service exams, but was ineffective (Interview 70).
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95, 96; Interviews 26 and 68). Far from requiring sitting judges and magistrados to take
an exam in order to keep their positions, Hidalgo does not even require new magistrados
to submit to an exam or an evaluation by the council before reaching the state’s highest
court, as in both Aguascalientes and Michoacán. The governor still controls the judicial
selection process, sending the names of preferred candidates to the legislature for
approval. Given the elite-controlled context, the PRI’s dominance and discipline, and the
powerful role of the governor, the ratification is a mere formality (Interview 66). Thus,
the Tribunal remains a highly politicized body, often occupied not by judicial specialists
but by political favorites, indicating continuity not only in the PRI’s electoral dominance
but also in institutional arrangements of a bygone era. Other glaring signs of this
continuity are the presence of clear conflicts of interest and nepotism on the state’s
highest court; with regards to the complaints of nepotism, two senior judges justified the
presence of relatives on the court as “normal” and unproblematic (Interviews 78 and
79).120 Moreover, where the state constitution appears to break this continuity by
precluding anyone from becoming magistrado if they occupied an elected political office
in the previous six years, a later subsection specifically exempts magistrados of the
state’s highest court from this prohibition (CP-Hid, art. 95, secs. VII, VIII, IX). Thus,
there is no barrier to the entry of recent politicians to the state supreme court, as in both
Aguascalientes and Michoacán.

120

In a particularly glaring impropriety, there is at least one set of Pfeiffer cousins on the court as of April
2008. Interview evidence also indicates Alejandro Austria Escamilla, a new member of the court as of
January 2008, is President Viggiano Austria’s cousin (Interviews 56, 59, 66, 69, and 78). Though there are
qualitative differences between (i) the authoritarianism of traditional elites described here and (ii) the
authoritarianism of military regimes, the characterization by local elites of clear conflicts of interest and
even nepotism as “normal” resonates with the elite acceptance of the military’s prominent role in politics as
“normal” in Turkey (Shambayati 2008, 289).
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6.3. Causal Analysis
Table 4 summarizes causation in the three states. The top row lists the states and
the first column lists causal logics, followed by a summary of causation in each state.
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Table 6.2. Summary of Causal Analysis in Mexico

re-election logic
signaling logic
insurance logics
1 – profit maximizing
2 – self-protection
3 – policy-preserving
opportunity logic
veto-player logic
ideology

Summary

Aguascalientes
No
No

Michoacán
No
No

Hidalgo
No
No

No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Neoliberal, “marketoriented” governor
(belonging to PRI)
motivates reform;
conservative judicial
elites and traditional,
PAN-aligned
administration
combine to produce
counter-reforms
between 2000-2001

No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Progressive,
“democracy
oriented” PRD
motivates reform,
assisted by
ideologically
sympathetic judges;
traditionalist PRI
and conservative
judicial elites
combine to block
reform’s progress
for 3 years
Initial strong reform
driven by PRD, but
blocked by PRI for 3
years; pro-reform
judicial lobbying
and weakening of
PRI allow reform,
but PRI-PRD
negotiation still
dilutes original PRD
project

No
No
No
No
No
No

Early strong and fast
change driven by
reformist PRI
governor, later
weakened by
counter-reforms
driven by PAN and
traditional judges

Late, fast, and
shallow reform
shaped by noncompetitive, nonideological politics
and elite
entrenchment

The re-election logic receives no support. None of the states provide evidence that
reform, even moderate reform, responded to incentives to generate the “best policy” for
the sake of electoral success. Rather, the Aguascalientes changes in 1995 were motivated
by an economically liberal, reformist PRI governor who began governing during the run-
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up and approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), twice attended
the World Economic Forum, was especially sensitive to the “economic competitiveness”
gains from strong courts, and sought to strengthen local courts as part of a broader,
market-oriented development project (Interview 13). Moreover, the counter-reforms in
Aguascalientes cut against the re-election logic. If all politicians have this incentive, why
did the PAN-aligned government approve the counter-reforms? Also, in the strongest
case of reform – Michoacán – the project began quietly at the start of the PRD’s first
administration, not as a means to attract votes, and was motivated primarily by the PRD’s
programmatic effort to restructure the judiciary. Given the lack of competition in
Hidalgo, we would not expect to see this logic, but a weak reform occurs anyway.
The insurance logic is also unsupported. The Aguascalientes reform was carried
out by a PRI administration that anticipated staying in power, and the Michoacán reform
was initiated at the optimistic start of the PRD’s six-year administration. While some
observers might note that the PRI eventually lost in Aguascalientes in 1998, two points
are worth highlighting. First, Governor Otto Granados Roldán began the reform in 1994,
preparing and then establishing a Reform Commission on October 6 of that year, four
years before the next elections. Second, local observers agree that nobody anticipated the
PRI’s loss in 1998. In fact, the loss of a legislative majority in late 1995 came as a
surprise (Baca Morales; Interview 35). Thus, a self-protection insurance logic would
receive support if the reform occurred after the legislative elections of 1995 alerted the
PRI that their electoral strength was eroding, but this logic is not supported before 1995,
which is when Granados Roldán begins the reform. Even in Hidalgo – where the PRI
leadership would have every reason to seek “insurance” after witnessing the national
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decline of the PRI for over a decade – the 2006 reform came 12 years after the national
reform and was so weak and superficial that it could not possibly protect the PRI if it
were forced from office. Indeed, the ongoing politicization of the judiciary in Hidalgo
effectively leaves courts more vulnerable to manipulation if an opposition party were to
win.
Similarly, there is no evidence for the signaling logic. Where this logic anticipates
a “credible commitment” from majorities that face competition but expect to stay in
power, the Aguascalientes reform did not have a minority audience since the PRI
dominated both political branches in 1994. In Michoacán, the incoming PRD
administration initiated a strong reform process in 2002 that was blocked by the PRI
opposition, and the PRI political minority maintained its resistance for three years.
Neither state is a signaling story, and in non-competitive Hidalgo we would not expect to
see this logic. Thus, the conventional re-election, signaling, and insurance logics do not
satisfactorily explain reform in these three Mexican states.
The opportunity logic is supported by the increased mobilization of progressive
judges in the reform process in Michoacán. Notably, these judges had an ideological
affinity with the PRD. Thus, as the PRI’s electoral strength waned and the PRD’s
strength grew, i.e., as the competitiveness of local elections increased and led to the rise
of the PRD, reformist judges saw political openings for their initiatives that they had not
seen before.
Indeed, external and internal ideological commitments, combined with the
opportunity and veto player logics, explain most of the observed variation. Additionally,
a “patronage-preserving” logic also explains the continuity and persistence of weak
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courts in Hidalgo. This logic is a close relative of the entrenchment logic articulated by
Hirschl and Gillman, but is distinct in that it is (a) non-ideological and (b) does not result
in any real strengthening of the courts.
6.3.1. Courts in Rightward, PRI-to-PAN Transitions
Starting with Aguascalientes, the principal judicial changes were the 1995 reform
and the subsequent counter-reforms in 2000 and 2001. In 1994-1995, the PRI occupied
the state executive office and dominated the legislature, and PRI governor Granados
Roldán (1992-1998) was the main engine of reform. Granados, a technocratic priísta
allied closely with the Salinas administration, did not have ties to local elites and made
early enemies in Aguascalientes (Interviews 13 and 35). As the 1992 state elections
approached, Salinas designated Granados as the official PRI candidate for governor over
Hector Hugo Olivares Ventura, son of Enrique Olivares, leader of a prominent political
family in the state. Thus, Granados began his term as an outsider to Aguascalientes
politics, a candidate for governor imposed by the central government over the preferences
of local political families. He was strongly disliked by these local political elites, and the
situation only worsened as the unpopular Salinas administration came to a close in the
midst of a turbulent 1994 (Baca Morales 2006).
Despite this politically difficult situation, Granados initiated a reform project by
installing a Judicial Reform Commission on October 6, 1994.121 Interview evidence
shows Granados did not initially contemplate judicial reforms as part of his program of
government. However, after attending two meetings of the World Economic Forum he
121

Romo Saucedo (1997) locates the first meetings of the Reform Commission in September of 1994 (9,
113), but the official court history (Márquez Algara 1999) identifies the start date of October 6, 1994. I use
the later, more specific date, in part because it shorten the distance between the official start of the
Aguascalientes reform and the official start of the federal reform, thus reducing the bias of finding no
relationship between the federal and state reforms. In any case, the time difference is not great.
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increasingly sought a well-functioning judiciary as part of a broader, market-oriented
economic development plan. Indeed, by the summer of 1994, he was explicitly framing
the judicial reform in terms of the benefits stronger courts could provide for “economic
competitiveness” (Granados Roldán interview; see epigraph). Stated otherwise, despite
being formally identified with the PRI, Granados Roldán’s ideological views aligned
more closely with the neoliberal wing of the rightist PAN. In fact, as a technocratic
outsider to Aguascalientes politics, indicated for the governorship by the technocratic
Salinas administration, Granados Roldán was likely more disposed to adopting these
neoliberal views than a traditional, local PRI politician. Consequently, at least two of the
eleven Commissioners on the governor’s Reform Commission represented business
associations and chambers of commerce – including the local representative of a national
industrial organization, the National Chamber of Manufacturing Industry (Cámara
Nacional de la Industria de Transformación, or CANACINTRA) – and Business
Coordination Center (Centro Coordinador Empresarial) (Romo Saucedo 1997, 10;
Márquez Algara 1999; Interview 13). This Reform Commission began meeting in
October of 1994, two months before Zedillo’s national reform project was unveiled in
December. On March 27, 1995, the legislature approved the reform, creating the judicial
council and the other changes mentioned above (Interview 13; Márquez Algara).
The spending increase in Aguascalientes is also due to the creation of the judicial
council.122 The reform delegated to the council the power to elaborate the budget with a
greater degree of autonomy from the executive (Reglamento-Ags 1995, art. 19), thereby
driving spending upwards. However, the court president still retained total control over
the execution of spending. Thus, while the 1995 reform exerted an upward pressure on
122

Salary increases account for the rise in spending in 1990-1991 (Interview 5).
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spending, the real spending power remained vertically concentrated in the judicial
leadership, decreasing transparency and accountability (Interview 55).
Two months after Granados created the Reform Commission, at the very
beginning of Zedillo’s presidency in the first week of December 1994, Zedillo announced
a national reform project, including the creation of a judicial council. The national reform
proceeded quickly and was approved by December 31, 1994 (Fix-Fierro 2003). Due to
the proximity of Zedillo’s reform, the Aguascalientes reform is conventionally
understood as an example of centrifugal policy diffusion in which Granados merely
copied Zedillo’s national reform (e.g., Interview 35; Beer 2006). Evidence supporting
this argument includes the political vulnerability of Granados in 1994 vis-à-vis local
political families. By mimicking the national reform, Granados could ingratiate himself
with Zedillo, strengthening his position locally.
However, Granados was already considering a reform project and had a working
Commission two months before Zedillo’s reform. Granados merely adopted the figure of
the judicial council from Zedillo’s project (Interview 13). Although the Aguascalientes
council is structurally weak, the reform nonetheless transferred administrative powers to
the council. More importantly at the time, the reform required all sitting judges and
magistrados to submit to an exam to stay on the job, a requirement that was not part of
the federal reform. Zedillo terminated all sitting justices on the national supreme court,
replacing them with his own selections (Fix-Fierro 2003; Finkel 2008).
In Aguascalientes, judicial elders resisted the transfer of power and examination
requirement promoted by the governor (Interview 5).123 Importantly, by insisting on the
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One interviewee recalls the governor gathered all judges and magistrados in the early weeks of 1995 to
explain the reform. Attendees were outraged, particularly by the exam requirement. A senior judge recalled
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exam requirement not just for lower judges but also for magistrados, as well as an exam
for future candidates for magistrado, Granados Roldán was submitting his own judicial
appointments to the exam, as well as reducing his own discretionary power, and that of
future executives, to select judges to the state’s highest court. This self-restriction, along
with his willingness to confront judicial elders, is further evidence that Granados did not
simply follow Zedillo’s lead, but that he was motivated by a programmatic commitment
to reform.124 Notably, Granados enjoyed an overwhelming supermajority (80%) in the
local legislature, generating a strong, aligned, single-veto player environment in which to
pass the reform. This electoral landscape made the passage of the reform very easy
(Interview 13).
The second analytic moment in Aguascalientes began in 2000. Following the
PAN’s first statewide victory in 1998, a PAN-aligned government emerged in 1999,
occupying the executive and 62% of legislative seats. Though the PRI-to-PAN alternation
could be interpreted as an indicator of increasing competition, the PAN-aligned
government actually punctuates a transition from PRI dominance to PAN dominance. In
this single-veto-player context, it would have been relatively easy for the PAN to
promote further judicial change. However, contrary to theoretical expectations, the PAN
did not promote positive change or deepen the Granados project. Rather, the PAN sought
to subordinate the judiciary, and even facilitated the reversal of some of the gains made
since 1994.
that Granados noted that by taking and passing the exam, judges had a chance to legitimate their position,
enhancing their image in society (Interview 5).
124
Indeed, these motives also find support in the results of the exam. One magistrado and a first-instance
judge refused to take the exam and retired, and another magistrado and two judges did not pass and were
forced to leave, including a judge who was the brother of the sitting court president and a magistrado that
Granados himself had nominated two years earlier (Interviews 5, 13, and 55; Márquez Algara 1999). Thus,
the exam effectively restricted the sitting governor’s own influence over the judiciary and also “cleansed”
the judiciary of perceived favoritism and nepotism.
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In fact, the PRI-to-PAN alternation in 1999 generated two corrosive influences –
anti-reform elements within the PAN and an emboldened, conservative judicial
leadership. The new PAN administration of governor Felipe Gonzales proposed a
budgetary law, approved on September 25, 2000 as the “Ley Patrimonial del Estado de
Aguascalientes,” seeking to give the legislature expansive powers over, among other
things, the execution of judicial spending and purchases, essentially controlling the
court’s budget, reducing the financial and administrative autonomy of the judiciary. 125
Second, resistance to the 1995 reform continued among judicial elders, reflecting a
struggle over resources and status. Emboldened by the departure of Granados and led by
court president Cleto Humberto Neri, magistrados promoted the reversal of the 1995
reform, lobbying for and obtaining a counter-reform from the PAN-aligned government
on October 26, 2001 (Interviews 5 and 14). This counter-reform removed most of the
council’s powers, including budgetary powers, returning them to the Tribunal, which was
presided over by Neri himself.126 Even today, most magistrados prefer a limited council
without any administrative and disciplinary powers, especially not over magistrados
(Interviews 5, 15, and 57).
The PAN’s maneuvering, along with Neri’s lobbying and the 2001 counterreform, support the theoretical framework integrating the veto player logic and ideology,
in that judicial change can occur in noncompetitive, single-veto-player environments, and
in the emphasis on ideology (external and internal) over competition. Traditional
125

Cleto Humberto Neri, then court president, challenged the law’s constitutionality in the Mexican
Supreme Court, winning a 9-0 decision in 2004 (C.C. 35/2000; T.J. 82/2004).
126
Since 2001, the council is only in charge of supervising the judicial career (CP-Ags, art. 51). Judicial
elders maintain complete control over financial resources. Indeed, the court president and magistrados
personally lobby legislative committees and individual legislators for budgetary increases during the fall
budget season, even leading tours of court facilities (Interviews 57 and 61). Magistrados credit this
lobbying for the budget increases in 2007 and 2008.
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politicians and judicial elders played a key role reversing the 1995 changes. Importantly,
Neri and his colleagues could not have succeeded without the help of the political
branches, which had to approve any counter-reforms. In this regard, the success of the
2001 counter-reform in the PAN-aligned environment supports the claim that the PAN in
Aguascalientes has no programmatic commitment to strengthen the judiciary. In fact, the
counter-reform and the earlier attempt to control the court’s spending noted above
constitute evidence of just the opposite – a negative relationship between the local PAN
and court strength. Also, the court’s weakening under the first PAN administration led by
Gonzales resonates with interview evidence regarding the hostility of Gonzales to strong
institutions (Interview 35). In short, if ever there was an easy opportunity for the PAN to
strengthen courts, it was during the unified, PAN-aligned government of 1999-2001.
However, the PAN did not strengthen the court. Rather, the PAN weakened the court,
providing compelling evidence that the right in Aguascalientes is not committed to strong
courts. Moreover, the PAN victory, with Gonzalez at the helm, created opportunities for
old-guard judicial activism, rallying “beyond the bench” to recapture their institution.
Finally, beginning in 2005, the PRI started sponsoring legislative initiatives for a
re-reform, seeking to return all administrative, supervisory, and disciplinary powers to
the council, as originally approved in 1995. As of April 2008, these initiatives remained
in committee (Iniciativa 2005; Iniciativa 2007). Notably, while the PAN retained control
of the executive branch during this period, legislative composition shifted from a PRI
plurality (2003-2005), a PAN supermajority (2006-2008), and a PRI majority as of 2008
(CIDAC). In the two recent instances of multi-veto-player environments (2003-2005 and
2008-present), current and former legislators note the PAN blocked the PRI’s new

221

reforms, and judicial elders continue to resist a strong council (e.g., Interview 13; 24).
The PAN and traditional judicial elders again “vetoed” positive judicial change. Thus,
competition did not yield reform, and the ideology of politicians and judges continues to
be the determining factor.
6.3.2. Courts in Leftward, PRI-to-PRD Transitions
In Michoacán, the integrated framework also explains the reform. The first PRD
administration (2002-2008) under Lázaro Cárdenas Batel promoted judicial reforms
alongside the dramatic budgetary increases in 2002-2003. These reforms include a
judicial council and changes to the judicial career. During a period of divided government
(PRD governor and PRI-dominated legislature), the PRI opposition blocked the reform,
so the process stalled for the full three years in which the PRI-majority remained in the
legislature. The reform reappeared in May 2005 after mid-term elections weakened the
PRI, making the PRD the largest party in the congress. Notably, no single party
controlled a legislative majority, so the PRD needed the support of the PRI in order to
approve the reform. Ultimately, the reform succeeded after a lobbying battle between
pro- and anti-reform judicial elders, though the approved reform had been diluted by the
negotiations between the PRD and PRI (Interview 70). Thus, programmatic commitments
motivated the initial reform effort, the PRI and conservative, traditionalist judges
“vetoed” the reform in the newly competitive context, and the reform succeeded only
when the elections broke up the power the of PRI. Critically, the PRD’s lack of a
legislative majority meant the PRI could have maintained its veto, but in the broader
policy space generated by pluralism and competition, judges played a key role in shaping
a debate that defused the PRI’s potential veto and enabled negotiations to proceed.
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Ultimately, four years after the first project was drafted in 2002, the reform passed by a
unanimous vote (Decreto 44).
The reform was driven primarily by the PRD and sympathetic magistrados and
judges. Interview evidence credits the incoming PRD governor, Cárdenas Batel, with a
reform initiative. This initiative eventually charged Alejandro González Gomez, current
magistrado, and Jaime Del Rio, current electoral judge, with drafting the first council
project. A first draft of the reform written by Del Rio in late 2002 suggests budgetary
increases for 2003 and details the judicial council project (Reform Draft 2002). Both
González Gomez and Del Rio formed part of a close group of legal advisors to the
incoming governor, working on the council project even before Cárdenas Batel took
office (Interview 70). One interview called González Gomez the “tip of the spear” of
judicial reform in Michoacán (Interview 43; “la punta de la lanza”), and another referred
to him as the main motivator of reform (Interview 76). However, it is Jaime Del Rio who
drafted the first council reform (Interview 38).127
Notably, both González Gómez and Del Rio had deep roots in the progressive
wing of the PRI in the state dating back to the administration of General and later
President Lázaro Cárdenas Del Rio after the Revolution, a progressive wing that
eventually formed the PRD. Indeed, the father of González Gómez had been court
president under Cuahtemoc Cárdenas. Also, both men had pursued doctoral studies in law
in Spain, where they were profoundly influenced by the progressive legal currents of the
anti-Franco, democratizing judges’ movement under the banner of “Democratic Justice”
(Justicia Democrática), now Judges for Democracy (Jueces para la Democracia)
127

Both González Gomez and Del Rio studied law at the doctoral level in Spain. González Gomez earned
his doctorate and worked for the judicial council in the federal district, while Del Rio focused his doctoral
studies on the history and operation of judicial councils.
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(Interview 38; see Hilbink 2007b; 2009). While in Spain, the progressive principles and
commitments of the two men developed in tandem with their existing friendship and
familial connections. Thus, judicial reform was integral to Cárdenas Batel’s project for
2002-2008, and he gathered a group of loyal, progressive legal minds to help carry out
the reform.
In this regard, interviews note Cardenas Batel’s personal commitment to a strong
judiciary as part of his vision of democracy (Interviews 38, 70, 76, and 82). Specifically,
interviews emphasize that Cárdenas Batel’s commitment to strengthen the judiciary was
qualitatively different from his predecessors and that he followed through with campaign
promises to strengthen courts. Cárdenas Batel promoted the financial strengthening of the
judiciary, along with a vision of “democratizing” the judicial branch (Interview 38),
renovating or “oxygenating” a portion of the state supreme court with new, progressive
judges, and creating the judicial council (Interviews 12 and 70). In fact, his support for
the judicial strengthening project, in both budgetary matters and in the council reform,
continued despite the fact that the reform would remove his influence in the judicial
selection process (Interview 70). Specifically, the reform Cárdenas Batel was pursuing
would limit his ability to influence the selection of judges, even to the states highest
court. As was the case with Granados Roldán in Aguascalientes, Cárdenas Batel was
willing to constrain his own power in ways that were historically highly unusual among
Mexican governors. Indeed, this first PRD administration in Michoacán began a historic
phase of judicial strengthening. In terms of judicial spending alone, one six-year, PRD
administration achieved what it took PRI and PAN administrations 10-12 years to
achieve in Aguascalientes, and what had still not been achieved in PRI-dominated
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Hidalgo through 2008. Also, the PRD engaged in a sustained reform effort for three years
against PRI-based opposition.
From the start, Cárdenas Batel’s council project faced opposition from traditional,
conservative judges and from the PRI in the state’s 69th legislature (2002-2005). First,
opposition from within the judiciary came mainly from judges sympathetic to the PRI,
but it also came from some judges who, while sympathetic to the PRD, nevertheless
sought to protect their own interests. Both types of judges prioritized the security of their
jobs under the old order above the objective strengthening of the judiciary. That is, the
reform would required a new openness, transparency, and objective standards for hiring,
promotion, and discipline – even termination – and traditionalist judges preferred the job
security and even power that came with the opacity of the old order rather than the risk
that would accompany disrupting the status quo. These tensions were real and powerful,
and ultimately caused the original reform project to be diluted by competing interests.
Outside the judiciary, the main opposition to the reform came from the PRI
legislators. The PRD held only 23% of legislative seats, while the PRI held 57%. Thus,
the PRI acted as a classic veto player, blocking the reform. However, in the 70th
legislature (2005-2008), the PRD’s share of seats rose to 43% and the PRI’s dropped to
38%. According to interview evidence, the PRI in 2005 realized it could not block the
reform any longer, but it could play a role in shaping it by negotiating and bargaining
votes with the PRD. Thus, the PRI proposed its own reform as a negotiation tactic,
including an “Administrative Commission” that was essentially a very weak version of a
judicial council, remaining subordinated to the Tribunal (Decreto 44, 8). The original
project drafted by Del Rio called for a council composed only of members of the
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judiciary, i.e., no politicians, explicitly citing the perceived impropriety, at present, of
submitting the judiciary to political control or influence (Reform Draft, 26). It should be
noted that the PRD was behind this original proposal despite the fact it had just won the
governor’s office and was electorally ascendant. However, the PRI’s opposition
subjected the council reform to negotiation, and the final reform resulted in a mixed
council with a representative of the legislature who was ideological affiliated with the
PRI.
A principal source of resistance to the PRD’s council project came from the
highest levels within the judiciary itself – from seven of fifteen magistrados (Interview
12). These seven magistrados were closely identified with traditional power relations
within the judiciary, and with the local PRI (Interview 38), so the anti-reform judges were
working in tandem with PRI legislators to propose the weak “Administrative
Commission” cited above and to block the PRD’s project. Some of this resistance was
linked to organizational culture and differences over the proper separation of powers, but
the reform would also require accountability for the quantity and quality of judges’ work
for the first time in Michoacán’s history. Until November 2007, not a single court of the
Tribunal had ever been reviewed for work quality (Interview 12).
Furthermore, an outside organ like the council threatened to disrupt longstanding
clientelist networks within the judiciary. With the arrival of the council, transparency and
competence would become guiding concepts in everything from hiring to firing. Thus,
where magistrados could previously wield substantial power and influence over lowercourt judges and employees, holding as they did the power to make or break judicial
careers, this power would now transfer to a more neutral and transparent organ. It is not
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surprising, then, that three of the magistrados resigned shortly after the judicial council
began operating in May 2007. The 2008 Annual Report notes the voluntary retirements of
Ricardo Color Romero, Ramón Nuñez Álvarez, and Isidro Romero Silva. Interview
evidence suggests that these judges were strongly opposed to the judicial council and that
the retirements were motivated in part by reluctance to have their work “checked” by an
outside organ. Indeed, one of these judicial elders left only days before his chambers
were audited (Interview 38). This interview evidence finds support in a document drafted
in opposition to the judicial council and submitted to the legislature. The document is
signed by several judges, including these three (Oficio 2006).
Given the deep divisions among magistrados and the evolving struggle for reform
between the PRD and PRI, judicial lobbying emerged as a critical mechanism of change.
In Michoacán’s newly competitive environment, increased electoral competition raised
the number of veto players but also opened a policy space, i.e., a political opportunity, for
judges to mobilize, providing anti-reform judges with a PRI audience and pro-reform
judges with a PRD audience. Pro-reform judges allied with the PRD governor and
legislative minority were ideologically motivated to refashion the judiciary, and
traditional, anti-reform judges allied with the PRI legislative majority had an incentive to
lobby in order to protect their organizational fiefdoms. The state Supreme Court was split
down the middle, and this intra-judicial tension remained high even after the PRI’s
legislative presence weakened in 2005. In a fairly evenly split legislature, with the PRD
holding a plurality (43%), judicial lobbying shaped the final reform project. Led by court
president Mauro Hernandez Pacheco, a well-respected local figure, the pro-reform judges
successfully lobbied PRI legislators, convincing them that the reform would pass sooner
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or later. Hernández Pacheco had been a judicial employee for over 30 years, entering the
judiciary in the late 1960s at the lowest level (escribiente) while still studying law at the
university, and rising to the post of magistrado in 1980 and later court president
(magistrado presidente).128 His professional trajectory endowed his formal position as
president with the kind of legitimacy and credibility that enhanced his leadership
capacity. The PRD’s reform with the strong judicial council was eventually approved, but
having passed through the filter of the PRI it did not emerge unscathed. The PRD
accepted some compromises, but obtained a strong council nonetheless (Interview 28;
Decreto 44, 199-200).
As suggested by Tsebelis (2002), competition hindered the reform process by
increasing the number of veto players, and ideology was the determining factor. Notably,
progressive, pro-reform judges lobbied anti-reform politicians, altering the preferences of
the latter. PRD politicians and PRD-sympathetic judges combined to overcome the
resistance of PRI politicians and traditional judicial elders, producing a strong reform.
However, as also indicated above, competition generated political openings for
judicial mobilization. Specifically, while conservative, anti-reform judges mobilized
alongside the PRI against the reform, progressive, reformist, PRD-sympathetic judges
mobilized alongside the PRD. The latter group was the more influential, leveraging the
support of the Cárdenas Batel administration over the course of several years (2002128

The career of Hernández Pacheco, along with that of Fernando Arreola – court president in 2008 – was
interrupted in 1996 when then incoming governor Victor Manuel Tinoco Rubí (PRI) removed Hernández
Pacheco and Arreola from the court. Under the law, judges on the state’s highest court (magistrados)
acquired life tenure, but there was a gap in the law (“laguna de ley”; Interview 82) that left it unclear
whether life tenure triggered after seven (7) or ten (10) years on the court. In what was the first legal
challenge to the removal of a magistrado by a governor – a case that became known as the “amparo
Arreola” – both judges challenged their removal and won their reinstatement at the national Supreme
Court. Notably, Pacheco had already been a magistrado for 16 years (1980-1996). He returns as magistrado
in 1998, and becomes court president in 2002. He was subsequently re-elected for three more terms,
through 2006.
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2006) to bring about the reform.
This group of progressive judges – with the previously mentioned González
Gómez and Del Rio at its core – organized and drafted a reform agenda in ways that drew
on academic roots and influences dating back to their common legal training in Spain.
Notably, both González Gómez and Del Rio carried out doctoral studies in law in Spain,
at Madrid’s Universidad Complutense. These two future judicial leaders were also joined
in legal studies in Spain by Juan Antonio Magaña de la Mora and Emanuel Roa. Magaña
de la Mora would become magistrado during the PRD’s administration, and Roa became
director of the Judicial Institute (Instituto de la Judicatura), which was in charge of all
training and continuing professional education of judges and court staff. Both Magaña de
la Mora and Roa contributed to the early definition of the reform agenda (Interview 33;
38; 43; 70; 75; 86).
Jaime Del Rio, as stated earlier, wrote the first drafts of the reform (Reform Draft
2002). It should be noted that Del Rio’s doctoral studies in Spain focused on the design
and function of the national judicial council in Spain, an institution with a controversial
history (see Hilbink 2007b). Drawing on lessons from the Spanish experience, Del Rio
was seeking a constellation of “best practices”, and was uniquely equipped to draft such a
reform in Michoacán.
Moreover, the progressive credentials of the reform were compelling. Aside from
deep ideological sympathies and affinities with the local currents of the PRD, coursing
through the Cárdenas Del Rio, Cárdenas Solórzano, and Cárdenas Batel families, the
intellectual lineage of the Spanish-trained judges drew on strong democratizing
tendencies in legal and constitutional studies, including the “democratic justice” currents
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from the post-Franco era in Spain and other scholars of democratic practice and the rule
of law. Most notably, Enrique Gimbernat (a prominent Spanish scholar of criminal law)
and Alvaro Bunster Briceño (an equally prominent Chilean scholar of criminal law who
had been ambassador to the UK under Salvador Allende and later taught in Spain) shaped
the intellectual formation of the Michoacán group pursuing graduate studies in Spain.
González Gómez notes these influences explicitly, along with those of the constellation
of judicial figures in Spain’s transition to democracy that might be reasonably grouped
under “judges for democracy” – including one of their leading figures, Andrés Ibáñez129
(see also Hilbink 2007b). Indeed, the writings of González Gómez reflect these
influences, especially in the area of criminal law, where he emphasizes the Spanish
conceptualization of the “social and democratic rule of law” (estado social y democrático
de derecho) and the need to reinterpret the Mexican Constitution of 1917 in light of these
social and democratic perspectives on the role of the law and courts (González Gómez
2007, 50-56).
These academic and intellectual networks highlight the important role of ideas
and ideology, but also identify mechanisms or “technologies” by which these ideas travel
across national boundaries. Indeed, the ideational features of the group of judges that
studied in Spain and the manner in which their intellectual trajectory was formed by legal
communities residing and moving across international boundaries resonates with work on
epistemic communities in international relations and legal studies (e.g., Couso and
Hilbink 2009).
In sum, judicial change in Michoacán was shaped by electoral competition and
ideology. Electoral competition exerted its influence in the form of the opportunity logic
129

Personal communication with the author.
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and the veto player logic, generating positive and negative forces, i.e., competing
pressure, on the judiciary. Importantly, ideology and ideational factors appear to have
mattered the most. First, the progressive coalition of PRD politicians and sympathetic
judges maintained a reformist initiative for several years, despite electoral obstacles.
Moreover, judges and politicians were able to sway politicians in a reformist direction
even when, ex ante, the PRD did not have the legislative supermajority to carry out the
constitutional reform. Finally, these ideas and ideational frames that shaped the reform
project traveled across international boundaries, via teacher-student relationships and
academic colleagues, until they took shape, in practice, in Michoacán.
6.3.3. Courts in PRI-Dominated, Authoritarian Enclaves
In Hidalgo, judicial change has come late and in diminished form. Indeed, even
the much-publicized 2006 reform that interviews identify as the key judicial moment in
the last 20-25 years reveals shallow changes and continuity in some of the most striking
areas, including politically-controlled selection to the state’s highest court. Despite the
lack of substantive change in Hidalgo, the process deserves attention in order to better
understand the obstacles to change in non-competitive, non-ideological environments.
The timing and sequence of events in the reform process exposes some of these obstacles.
After announcing a judicial reform project on March 21, 2006, PRI governor
Miguel Angel Osorio Chong presented a legislative initiative two weeks later, proposing
the formation of a judicial council (Peralta 2006a). Prior to March 21, there was no
indication the governor planned to form a council. The council project did not appear
among other planned reforms in the chapter on courts and justice in the State
Development Plan for 2005-2011 (Gobierno de Hidalgo 2005), and interview evidence
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indicates the project was not part of Osorio’s campaign or first year in office (Interviews
16 and 66). Scarcely five months later, however, the law was approved and the council
formally established on August 15, 2006 (Poder Judicial de Hidalgo 2006a).
The trajectory of the current court president, Alma Carolina Viggiano Austria,
helps understand the surprising arrival of the council in Hidalgo. Recognized by many as
a good administrator (Interviews 26 and 68; Veledíaz 2007), Viggiano was a consummate
politician, and interview and journalistic accounts place her squarely within the dominant
local elites (Interview 90; Veledíaz 2007). Viggiano was a state and federal legislator for
the PRI, a cabinet member for both the current and previous state governments, and
campaign coordinator for the current governor, Osorio, as well as local campaign
coordinator in 2005-2006 for the PRI’s presidential candidate, Roberto Madrazo
(Interviews 66, 78, and 90; Viggiano 2008). After Madrazo’s failed run at the presidency,
Viggiano was “on leave” in mid-2006 (Interview 78).
Several interviews note that Osorio agreed to create the council for Viggiano as a
stepping stone to the state supreme court (Interviews 3, 66, and 69). Viggiano could
restart her public life, but Osorio also had his own incentives. He needed to reward
Viggiano for managing his successful campaign for governor, and he wanted to replace
the court president at the time, Francisco Díaz Arriaga, who was involved in a very
public corruption scandal that was generating criticism for Osorio’s administration
(Interviews 3, 66, and 69; Veledíaz 2007). The events of 2006 unfolded in a manner that
supports the above account. First, with no previous statement on judicial councils, and
with strong historical opposition to councils among judicial elites in the state (Interview
78), Osorio promoted a constitutional reform in March to create the council. Second, as
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noted above, the reform was approved quickly, unanimously, and without much
discussion by June 8 (Diario de Debates 2006a). Three weeks later, the state legislature
voted unanimously to select Viggiano as its representative to the council (Interview 79),
and the council was operational by August 15. Only one month later, the scandal-ridden
Díaz Arriaga resigned, and Osorio nominated Viggiano to the court on October 5. Again
by unanimous vote, the legislature ratified Viggiano on October 10, and only one week
later Viggiano’s peers elected her court president (Diario de Debates 2006b; Interview
79; Peralta 2006b; Veledíaz 2007). Thus, in less than seven months between March 21
and October 10, 2006, the council project appeared for the first time, was drafted into a
bill, the required constitutional reform was approved, the council was staffed and
operational, and Viggiano made the triple transition from council member, to magistrada,
and ultimately to court president.130
In Hidalgo’s single-veto-player environment, judicial change was easy, as
evidenced by the numerous unanimous votes in favor of the reform and the new court
president. The content of the reform, however, reveals the lack of any serious
commitment to strengthen Hidalgo’s judiciary. Rather, local elites strengthened their hold
on power by, in part, maintaining a subordinate and highly politicized judiciary. Indeed,
the president of the administrative court is also a former PRI legislator (Interview 73),
and senior judges frequently make transitions to and from political careers (Interview 78;
Angeles 2008). Thus, the boundaries between branches, as well as between party and
state, are obscured in much the same way as they were nationally from 1929 to 2000.
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As court president, Viggiano’s changes are strongly associated with her personal image, leading many
observers to cynical conclusions that reforms are merely cosmetic and that her high-profile leadership of
the court is part of a political project to reach the governor’s office in 2012 (Milenio 2007; Interviews 3, 66,
and 90).
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Thus, in the absence of electoral competition and programmatic commitments, the PRI
continues to operate as it did decades ago, hindering meaningful judicial change. Stated
otherwise, the PRI’s unchallenged permanence in power is bad for courts.

6.4. Conclusion
This chapter tests existing theories of judicial reform at the subnational level in
Mexico, integrating electoral competition and ideology, as well as external (politicianled) and internal (judge-led) influences on the judiciary. The analysis adjudicates among
competing causal logics undergirding electoral theories of institutional choice, and
highlights the importance of the ideology of both politicians and judges. The results do
not support most of the commonly cited logics of reform. Only the opportunity logic and
the veto player logic receive support, though the two logics produce competing effects.
The opportunity logic generates positive political openings, but the veto player logic
generates obstructive veto points. Overall, ideology explains meaningful parts of the
reform. External and internal ideology – adding ideological preferences and a judgecentered account to the conventional preference-less and politician-centered accounts –
explains most of the observed variation in court strength. Stated otherwise, we cannot
know where reform will occur if we only look at electoral conditions. We must look
fairly closely at politicians and scrutinize their ideological orientation. However, we must
also look beyond exogenous conditions and identify other relevant policy actors and
examine their ideological orientation, as well.
In the Mexican states, we see positive judicial change in non-competitive, singleveto-player environments with pro-reform governors, or in competitive, multi-veto-player
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environments with pro-reform politicians and judges, with the latter playing a critical
lobbying role to shape preferences of politicians. The outsider and reformist PRI
governor in Aguascalientes shows this pattern, along with the progressive PRD governor
and highly active pro-reform judges in Michoacán. In contrast, we see no change, or even
negative counter-reforms, in low-veto-player environments with traditional, PAN
politicians and conservative judges. In this regard, Hidalgo offers a historically typical
example of unprogrammatic, PRI-dominated states. However, Aguascalientes in 20002001 shows that PAN-aligned government can also have negative policy consequences
for courts, showing that unified government under historical opposition parties is not
necessarily better than PRI dominance.
Ideology and judges play a meaningful role in each case of substantial change –
reform and counter-reform in Aguascalientes, and reform in Michoacán. Notably, judicial
lobbying has both positive and negative effects. The anti-reform judicial leadership
generates counter-reforms in Aguascalientes, while two blocs of judicial elders struggle
against each other in Michoacán, with the progressive, reformist bloc eventually gaining
a slight (8-7) majority. These judge-led stories do not fit neatly into politician-centered
accounts of conventional reform logics. Ideology, however, helps us understand how
multi-veto-player contexts generate incentives for judicial lobbying, resonating with other
judge-centered accounts of judicial change (Staton 2006; 2007), and how this lobbying
shapes the preferences of politicians.
The results highlight the effects of programmatic commitments, underscoring the
partisan nature of institutional change. Contrary to expectations, positive change in
Aguascalientes comes not from the PAN, but from the reformist, neoliberal PRI
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governor, Granados Roldán, who promoted reform as part of a market-oriented
development strategy. This teaches us that economic development can motivate reform.
Meanwhile, the left-of-center commitments of the PRD and sympathetic judges in
Michoacán teach us that concerns about the quality of democracy can also motivate
reform. The programmatic differences between the Granados PRI and the cardenista
PRD highlight a tension, however, between market-oriented and democracy-oriented
development strategies. Courts are vital to both markets and democracy, but the different
development strategies emphasize different goals for judicial institutions. These
differences can have serious consequences for civil rights and democratic citizenship
(UNDP 2004) that are not yet fully explored empirically.
Overall, the integrated theoretical framework explains most variation, but the
results offer two important qualifications to the framework. First, where a noncompetitive
PRI environment was anticipated to have negative consequences for the courts, governor
Granados in Aguascalientes shows that an “outsider” or “reformist” politician of
neoliberal stripes can disrupt the status quo. Second, where the framework anticipated
that a noncompetitive PAN-aligned government would have a positive effect on courts,
Aguascalientes also shows that traditional and conservative judges and politicians with
narrower, parochial interests can have negative consequences, combining to roll back
earlier reforms. The narrow interests of judges in particular resonate with Staton’s (2007)
admonition that the interests of judges do not necessarily coincide with the broader,
public interest. A fuller explanation, therefore, should incorporate these interests under
the preferences of both politicians and judges.
The differences between a reformist PRI governor in Aguascalientes and an anti-
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reform PRI in both Hidalgo and Michoacán highlight intra-party variation across the
Mexican states. The finding regarding Hidalgo’s PRI is consistent with most literature on
the party, but the differences in the PRI across the three states remind us of the
importance of understanding local context. On the other hand, there is no evidence
regarding a programmatic effect of the PAN in Aguascalientes, which is unexpected. The
result may be a product of a non-ideological streak in the local PAN, or of the
conservative Catholic base of the PAN in the state, but the finding is compelling in light
of the broader, rightward shift in Mexico’s national politics in the 1990s and early 21st
century (Ai Camp 2007). If the PAN is similarly non-programmatic elsewhere, or erodes
democratic institutions in similar ways, the general rightward shift of the country does
not bode well for the judiciary.
Notably, PRI legislators in Aguascalientes have recently revived the original
council project with initiatives in 2005 and 2007. As of February 2008, the PRI regained
a majority presence in the Aguascalientes legislature for the first time since 1995. The
surging PRI is now headed in one of two directions: (1) leverage its majority to approve
the re-reform; or (2) back away from the reform, hoping to ride the winning trend to the
governor’s office in 2011 and exert its own influence over the judiciary. The path it
chooses will help observers understand whether the PRI in Aguascalientes is committed
to reform or simply a rebottled version of vintage PRI.
With the strong reform that was carried out under the PRD in 2006, Michoacán
offers compelling, model-confirming evidence (Lieberman 2005, 484) that the left in
Mexico bodes well for courts. Moreover, the motivations and mechanisms identified in
this state highlight the role of ideas and ideology, and identify how social, political and
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academic networks can overlap to strengthen reformist initiatives.
Future research that explores judicial or other forms of institutional choice in the
Mexican states can help understand the nature and effects of cross-state variation within
single parties in Mexico. Also, future research in Mexico, or other federal countries, for
that matter, could select states with different patterns of divided and aligned government,
exploring other aspects of competitiveness and policy formation. Moreover, the influence
of Spanish-trained academics in Michoacán’s reform suggests the unexamined role of
epistemic communities in judicial change. Finally, initial evidence regarding executive
interference with the operation of judicial councils suggests as yet unexplored separation
of powers problems with mixed-membership councils in non-competitive contexts.
Alongside this study, answers to these questions will contribute a deeper understanding
of the political origins of court strength in new democracies. Chapter 7 turns to a small-N
examination of Brazilian states, exploring these themes in second large federal system.
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7. Small-N Analysis in Brazil:
Acre, Rio Grande do Sul, and Maranhão
Primeiro fuimos amigos … depois fuimos instituições.131
Sen. Tião Viana (PT), Acre
O respeito às instituições deriva de concepções ideológicas e programáticas do
trabalhismo brasileiro.132
Fmr. Gov. Alceu Collares (PDT), Rio Grande do Sul
Boa sorte com aquele Tribunal.133
Anonymous interview, Maranhão
7.1. Introduction
Building on the findings from the quantitative analysis, the qualitative
examination here traces the political logic of judicial change in three Brazilian states:
Acre, Rio Grande do Sul, and Maranhão. While the large-N portion of the analysis in
Chapter 4 finds average effects supporting the positive relationship between competition
and spending, multiple causal logics might underlie this relationship. In order to address
this problem of behavioral equivalence, the qualitative analysis presented here
adjudicates among alternate causal logics underpinning electoral competition. Moreover,
despite the complex landscape of political parties in Brazil, there was still support in the
large-N analysis for a positive relationship between particular political parties (PDT,
PMDB, and PTB) and spending. Further, controlling for regional differences and
volatility, there was support for the U-shaped relationship between ideology and spending
that was so striking in Mexico. Thus, the analysis in this chapter also seeks to identify the
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Translation: “First we were friends, then we were institutions” (see footnote 124, this Chapter).
Translation: “Respect for institutions draws from the ideological and programmatic conceptions of
Brazilian labor traditions”. “Trabalhismo” refers to a long lineage of ideas derived from Getulio Vargas,
João Goulart, Leonel Brizola, and Darcy Ribeiro, dating back to the pre-dictatorship PTB and carried on in
post-authoritarian Brazil by the PDT (see pp. 253-255).
133
Translation: “Good luck with that Court” (referring to the state supreme court, Tribunal de Justiça). See
Appendix A for a list of acronyms and a glossary of legal terms.
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causal logics or mechanics of the relationship between political ideology and court
strength. In sum, this chapter offers a finer examination of the local politics of judicial
strength in Brazil.
Recalling the rationale for case selection discussed in Chapter 3, Acre is a state
that generates typical, well-predicted observations in the large-N analysis (i.e., Acre’s
“state-years” are typical). Thus, Acre is explicitly nested within the large-N analysis as a
“model-testing” case, and is therefore a promising case in which to flesh out the theory
that electoral competition and ideology exert positive pressures on court strength.
Further, Acre is also a case of rising competition in which the left (PT) ascended to the
governor’s office in 1998 and has since been twice re-elected (in 2002 and again in
2006), generating a historical novelty in Brazil – a leftist stronghold. Thus, in order to
capture the variation of Brazil’s subnational electoral-ideological landscape, the research
design includes two other states – Rio Grande do Sul and Maranhão – to complete the
cases selected for small-N, controlled comparisons in this chapter. Where Acre represents
movement away from the authoritarian baseline in the form of rising electoral
competition and substantial leftward movement, Rio Grande do Sul represents movement
away from the authoritarian baseline in the form of rising electoral competition and
perfect party turnover every four years since 1982 – including three non-consecutive
PMDB administrations – granting the state a competitive alternation that has been
predominantly centrist. Finally, Maranhão represents the continuity of the authoritarian
baseline – non-competitive elections dominated by the rightist PFL (now DEM) and the
Sarney family – a party and set of traditional elites, respectively, sympathetic to the
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“revolution of ‘64” and the military regime that ensued.134
Reflecting the structure of Chapter 5’s examination of three Mexican states, the
first part of this chapter defines “court strength” along three dimensions: (i) judicial
spending (budgetary size and autonomy); (ii) judicial personnel; and (iii) physical
infrastructure. This first part also classifies the three states examined here – Acre, Rio
Grande do Sul, and Maranhão – along these dimensions, ranking them “low” through
“high”. Change across these three dimensions reveals the strengthening (progressive,
positive reform) or weakening (corrosive, negative counter-reform) of courts. Thus,
change and reform are often used interchangeably here but, as was the case in Mexico,
reforms are also distinguished from counter-reforms. The second part of the chapter
focuses on tracing the causal process of change in each state, emphasizing critical turning
points or markers of change, and identifying mechanisms and motivations that give a
more textured, process-based account of causation than the correlation-based, average
effects of the statistical analysis.
It should be noted that there are similarities and differences in the dimensions of
court strength between the Mexican and Brazilian states. With regard to similarities, the
first dimension of court strength in Brazil maps directly onto the first dimension of court
strength in Mexico, emphasizing financial resources. This was also the dependent
variable in the large-N analysis, so the dimension offers a bridge between the two
methods of analysis. However, the second and third dimensions of court strength are
different. Where the analysis in Mexico focused on stark cross-state variation in
institutional design (judicial councils) and career structure, these judicial features are
134

Actors on the right side of the political spectrum refer to the events precipitating regime change in 1964
not as a “coup”, but rather as a “revolution” (see Correia de Andrade 1989, e.g., “golpe, revolução, ou
contra-revolução?”).
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much more centralized and uniform in Brazil. This is true since the 1988 federal
constitution and the wave of reforms to state constitutions that ensued, and it is especially
true since the judicial reform of 2004, which created a national judicial council – the
National Justice Council (Conselho Nacional da Justiça, or CNJ) – that supervises the
administration of the entire judicial apparatus, including first-instance courts in all 26
states and the federal district (CNJ Regimento Interno). It also bears emphasizing that the
nature of change in one of the variables in Mexico – institutional design, which related to
the presence and characteristics of local judicial councils – was explicitly constitutional
in nature. That is, the creation of a judicial council and the definition of its structure,
powers, and composition required a reform of the state constitution, which in turn
required supermajority support in the local legislature. This is not the case in Brazil. The
changes along all three dimensions of court strength in Brazil are either (i) administrative
in nature, requiring the judicial leadership to act, or (ii) legislative in nature, requiring
only simply majorities in the local congress. Despite these operational differences,
measures of personnel and infrastructure capture the administrative capacity of courts,
which is what the measures in Mexico also aimed to capture. Therefore, despite
differences in measurement, the underlying concept is the same, and the qualitative
analysis here seeks to explain variation in meaningful changes in administrative capacity.
Stated otherwise, there is a great deal of formal, constitutional uniformity across the
Brazilian states, but the states vary in the real effectiveness of these constitutional
provisions and in the real strength of their judicial institutions. The qualitative analysis is
well-suited to explain this variation. This type of analysis is also well-suited to address
mechanisms and motivations that are consistent or inconsistent with mechanisms and
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motivations in Mexico, in spite of the constitutional nature of some changes in Mexico
and the non-constitutional nature of local changes in Brazil.
To anticipate the main findings ahead, this chapter makes three principal
arguments regarding (1) causal logics underpinning electoral competition; (2) the
important role of ideas and ideology, (3) the extent to which the effect of ideology is
conditioned by the baseline condition of the judiciary and the timing and sequence of
reform efforts; and (4) the manner in which policy change moves across different levels
of the regime.
First, recalling the theoretical discussion in Chapter 2, the main causal logics that
frequently underlie electoral competition – re-election, signaling, insurance, and
opportunity – do not receive empirical support. In contrast, the neglected logics of veto
players and elite, patronage-preserving entrenchment do receive support. Notably, these
two logics cut against conventional accounts of electoral competition in that they expect
negative consequences from increasing competition. The veto player logic anticipates
that increasing competition raises the number of relevant actors, i.e., veto points, and
therefore hinders policy change. The entrenchment logic identified here describes how
traditional elites engage in corrosive, non-ideological protection of patronage, which is
unlike Hirschl’s (2004) positive logic of the entrenchment or preservation of liberal
values and policies, and unlike the entrenchment carried out by Gillman’s (2002; 2006;
2008) ideological “partisan coalitions”. Thus, the analysis explores the understudied
negative consequences of electoral competition, which help us understand why margin of
victory had the unexpected positive effect in the large-N analysis (see Chapter 5).
However, the analysis also emphasizes that expectations regarding the content or
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direction of policy change are incomplete and imprecise without information regarding
preferences and ideology. For instance, single-veto-player environments facilitate policy
change, but only if dominant political actors actually want to change policy.
In this regard, the analysis highlights the role of ideas and ideology. This chapter
argues that left-of-center politicians – from the PT, PDT, and PCdoB – tend to support
judicial change more than their centrist or rightist counterparts. However, actors internal
to the judiciary – judges – play key roles in shaping or triggering these preferences. A
central part of the argument is that internal and external actors interact in crucial ways to
shape judicial change, and that the effect of ideology is conditioned by the baseline
condition of the judiciary and the timing and sequence of interactions. For instance, the
PT has played a prominent role in the national judicial reform debate, presenting the first
proposal for reform in 1992 and distinguishing itself for its promotion of an institution or
agency to supervise the administration of the judiciary. Where the court’s baseline
condition is weak, parties on the left are seen as allies due to their support for progressive
reform and institutional accountability, but also for their broader role in democratizing
institutional practice. Conversely, where the court made early gains and the baseline
condition marked by strength and autonomy, parties on the left – but especially the PT –
are seen as encroaching on judicial independence and are viewed with hostility. Thus,
internal actors in Acre and Maranhão have relied heavily on leftist politicians and other
progressive actors, but internal actors in Rio Grande do Sul – where the judiciary enjoyed
early autonomy and is widely viewed as a strong institution – recoiled at what they
perceived as the PT’s local and national efforts take away some of the power the
judiciary had gained. This subnational variation in the effect of ideology is crucial to
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understanding judicial change across Brazil’s states, and resonates with the large-N
findings regarding the conditional effect of ideology.
Finally, advocates for judicial change in the traditional, northern state of
Maranhão have found an ally at the federal level in the PT-sponsored and newly formed
National Justice Council (Conselho Nacional da Justiça, or CNJ). Critically, this is an
administrative organ internal to the judiciary. Drawing on Keck and Sikkink (1998), the
analysis considers how local actors activate and leverage the CNJ to generate policy
change, resembling a policy “boomerang”. Additionally, following Snyder (2001a;
2001b), the analysis seeks to identify the federal footholds and other mechanisms that
explain how this boomerang works to effect local change, exploring how policies of
judicial change move across different levels of the regime. Where parties of the left have
reached the executive office, the process of change has remained largely local as the
judicial actors have been assisted by leftist administrations that exert meaningful
influence in the strengthening of courts (Acre and Rio Grande do Sul). Where these kinds
of parties have little programmatic expression or do not reach the governor’s office
(Maranhão), individual leftist legislators have helped, but the process of change has
needed to move to a different level of the regime – the CNJ at the federal level. This
process of institutional change that depends on actors at different levels of the regime
enhances our understanding of subnational policy change in large federal systems.
Overall, a central feature of the argument advanced here is that judicial change in
the Brazilian states has been judge-led but has relied on critical support from external
actors. Existing accounts of change in judicial politics and public law often speak of a
dichotomous process – “congress-centered” versus “court-centered” (e.g., Cameron
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2005). A broader dichotomy that allows for the inclusion of other actors, e.g., societal
organizations or interest groups, is the internal/endogenous versus external/exogenous
dichotomy also advanced in Chapter 5. Internal or endogenous accounts of change
emphasize the role of judges and other institutional insiders, while external or exogenous
accounts emphasize the role of politicians or other institutional outsiders. This study
contends that these different perspectives are not necessarily mutually exclusive. That is,
they are both taking place. However, in Brazil, judges have shown the most initiative for
change. Once judges have made their move, though, they have been most successful
where they were met by sympathetic outsiders. In Brazil, these outsiders have
consistently been leftist administrations or individual politicians. Importantly, judges
often worked to shape or reframe the preferences of even sympathetic politicians and
other actors. In sum, external conditions (electoral conditions and the preferences of
politicians) and internal conditions (institutional and judicial preferences) both matter,
but judges move first, activating projects for change and triggering or shaping the
preferences of external actors.

7.2. Measuring Judicial Strength in Three Brazilian States
Benchmarks facilitate the measurement of court strength and the identification of
positive and negative change. As introduced above, these benchmarks or metrics are: (1)
judicial spending; (2) judicial personnel; and (3) physical infrastructure. Notably, the
first metric – spending – is the same in both Mexico and Brazil. However, as noted in
Chapter 1, Brazil’s judiciary is nationally more centralized and uniform institutionally
than the judiciary in Mexico. Thus, institutional design and career structure – the second
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and third metrics in Mexico – are not used here. Rather, the adequacy of staffing in terms
of the number of judicial personnel, and the adequacy of physical working condition in
terms of physical infrastructure capture the relevant variation in administrative capacity
across the Brazilian states (see Chapter 1). As in Mexico, these differences capture
palpable differences in the real-world structure and operation of local courts, differences
that are meaningful to ordinary citizens. That is, differences in spending, personnel, and
infrastructure capture whether local courts function well or not in any given state. It is
also worth emphasizing that, in the aftermath of the military regime, the baseline
condition in these states – the authoritarian baseline – was the hegemony of traditional,
conservative elites, a condition in which judicial institutions were weakened by patronage
and corruption. It is difficult to overstate the extent to which positive movement in each
of these categories reflects movement away from this baseline. 135
First, judicial spending is measured as both (i) budgetary size and (ii) budgetary
autonomy. Budgetary size captures the amount of judicial spending in per capita terms
and is essentially the same dependent variable analyzed econometrically, creating a direct
link to the large-N analysis. Budgetary autonomy captures the extent to which the
judiciary has acquired effective independence to develop and propose its own budget as
established in local constitutions, and to have this amount respected by the executive
branch. Second, judicial personnel is measured as judges per 100,000 people, offering a
metric of the professional capacity of the courts to attend claims and litigation relative to
the size of the population. Finally, infrastructure is measured as square meters of space
per 100,000 people, capturing the size of the judiciary’s physical installations and capital
135

The singular possible exception to this statement is Rio Grande do Sul. The possibility of the state’s
“judicial exceptionalism” is addressed in greater detail below, as well as the implications related to positive
movement across these four measures of court strength.
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investments relative to the population. Collectively, these three measures provide a
picture of the administrative capacity of courts.
Following the three dimensions of judicial strength outlined above, Table 6.1
reports court strength in Acre, Rio Grande do Sul, and Maranhão. Judicial spending,
judicial personnel, and infrastructure considerations are noted separately, ranking each
state in each category. Taken together, these dimensions of court strength reveal courts
are strongest in Rio Grande do Sul (“high”), moderate in Acre (“medium/high”), and
weakest in Maranhão (“low”). A more detailed discussion of this ordering follows below.
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Table 7.1. Summary of Judicial Strength in Three Brazilian States.

1

2

3

a
b
c
d
e

Judicial Spending
Budgetary size
Per capita spending
1985-2007 average
(constant 2000 R$)a
% of total spending
(average 1995-2007)a
Per capita spending
(current 2003 R$)b
Per capita spending
(current 2007 R$)b
Budgetary autonomyc
Personnel
Judges per 100,000
2003
Judges per 100,000
2007
Infrastructure
Area (m2) per 100,000
2003d
Area (m2) per 100,000
2007d
SUMMARY

AC
High

RS
Med/High

MA
Low

79.44

50.85

15.89

5.74

5.23

5.53

100.52
(2/26)
137.11
(2/26)
Med
Med/High
8.49
(5/25)
7.5
(10/25)
Med/High
4244.93
(5/24)
3401.43
(9/26)
Med/High

68.57
(10/26)
112.12
(8/26)
High
Med
6.94
(10/25)
7.6
(9/25)
Med/High
3310.73
(11/24)
3852.84
(5/26)
High

33.04
(22/26)
44.58
(26/26)e
Low
Low
3.93
(25/25)e
4.30
(24/25)
Low
1125.11
(23/24)
915.79
(26/26)e
Low

Source: IPEA.
Source: CNJ.
Evaluation is from qualitative analysis discussed below.
Data for 2003 do not distinguish between total area and “usable” area. Data for 2007 reported here
is for “usable” space, but rankings are similar with either figure, and Maranhão is last in both.
Maranhão is in last place in these three categories.

Judicial Spending
Figure 7.1 graphs judicial spending across the three states from 1985-2007 in (a)
nominal per capita terms (current amounts), (b) real per capita terms (constant amounts
2000=100), and (c) as a percentage of total state spending. Overall, court budgets are
highest in Acre, followed by Rio Grande do Sul and Maranhão.136 Table 7.1 supports this

136

In all three states, nominal judicial spending increases after 2001, but the real value of this spending is
eroded by inflation (which reached 10.55% and 13.73% in 2002 and 2003, respectively), so the nominal
increases effectively amount to modest institutional gains or simple maintenance of real spending.
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ordering, showing Acre spends the most per person on its courts out of these three states,
followed closely by Rio Grande do Sul. In both Figure 7.1 and Table 7.1, these two states
appear to be converging over time, in both nominal and real terms. However, Maranhão
remains far behind, consistently spending less than half of what the other two states
spend on courts. Though some caution is in order in interpreting pre-1995 values due to
the economic instability, hyperinflation, and multiple currency changes between 1985
and 1994,137 the ordering remains of Acre (high), Rio Grande do Sul (medium/high), and
Maranhão (low). Notably, spending levels in Maranhão are generally less than half that
of either of the other states, and are staggeringly low early in the time period. Even in the
rough and resource-poor decade of the 1980s, Acre and Rio Grande do Sul were far
outspending Maranhão. By 2007, the relative distance between the states had closed, but
the first two states still spent more than twice the amount in Maranhão.

137

The currency in 1985 was the cruzeiro, which later changed to the cruzado (1986), cruzado novo (1989),
back to the cruzeiro (1990), and then the cruzeiro real (1993) before becoming the real in 1994 (Banco
Central do Brasil 2007).
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Figure 7.1. Judicial Spending in Three Brazilian States.

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
year
% of total state spending

Considering that spending levels are generally regarded as healthy if courts
receive more than one per cent (1%) of the state’s total spending, the elevated
percentages in these three states are remarkable. All states average more than five per
cent (5%) for 1995-2007, and only Maranhão falls repeatedly below four per cent (4%).
However, spending in both Acre and Maranhão, as a proportion of total state spending, is
fairly erratic. Acre fluctuates widely in the 1990s, approximating nine per cent in 1996
but later stabilizing around four or five per cent since 2000. Maranhão’s judicial spending
remains erratic through recent years. After approximating nine per cent in 1998, the
judicial budget plunged to three per cent in 1999, and fluctuated between three and six
per cent through 2007. Thus, as a share of state spending, these state courts seem to be
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doing well. However, the erratic patterns of judicial spending as a proportion of state
budgets, especially in Maranhão, suggest the budgetary process itself is discretionary or
arbitrary.
Court budgets in Acre were historically low, but Figure 7.1 shows two key
moments. The first occurred in the mid-1990s with a large increase in spending. The
second change took place in 2001-2006.138 Rio Grande dos Sul also experienced two
important moments: one in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and another from 2002
forward.
Maranhão’s court budget remains one of the lowest in all of Brazil, despite
substantial increases in 2006 and 2007, and changing little over the previous years.
Indeed, as of 2007 – which are the latest figures available across all states from both the
National Justice Council and the Treasury Department – Maranhão ranked last out of all
26 Brazilian states, spending only 44.58 current reais per capita on its courts. In sum, as
of 2007, Acre had one of the highest judicial budgets in the country, slightly higher than
Rio Grande do Sul’s, and more than three times the amount budgeted in Maranhão.
Budgetary autonomy also varies across the three states. Rio Grande do Sul’s
autonomy with regard to the preparation and exercise of its budget has been strong since
1991-1992, when it acquired the practical and effective responsibilities formally granted
to it in the 1989 constitution. However, conflict has arisen repeatedly over the years
regarding executive cuts to the size of judicial budgets, and this conflict has generated a
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Data from the Acre court itself also shows a steep increase beginning in 2001. According to their
reports, the court’s budget increased by 50% from 2000 to 2001, by another 49% from 2001 to 2002, and
then by another 31% from 2002-2003. Thus, the Acrean judiciary in 2003 was enjoying a cumulative
budgetary increase of 191.01% over the last three years, almost triple the amount allocated in 2000 (TJAC
2002; 2005). Notably, these percentages reflect nominal changes, not the real changes emphasized in the
analysis.
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new and sporadic kind of political struggle in the state. That is, there is sense among
some sectors that the judiciary has grown and strengthened enough, and that it need not
continue to receive as much money has it did in the past. Indeed, there have been two
high-profile challenges by governors regarding the amount of money requested by the
judiciary, one in 2001, and another in 2007. Thus, where the state followed a pattern
similar to other states of struggling for resources and autonomy over a long period of
time, the judiciary appears to have crossed a threshold of financial strength and autonomy
in the 1990s, and there is now a reversal of dynamics, where the judiciary is seen as
having sufficient resources (perhaps even privileged), and the political branches now seek
to check the growth of the judicial budget. Thus, where political oversight of the judiciary
would have been seen as an invasion of judicial independence, political branches might
now be playing an accountability role. The changing nature of judicial-executive and
judicial-legislative relations in Rio Grande do Sul maps onto the conceptualization of
judicial independence as a continuum between autonomy and accountability.
Autonomy is lower in both Acre and Maranhão. In both states, the judiciary
formally prepares its own budgetary proposal, but the executive still frequently cuts the
judiciary’s proposal and controls budgetary increases throughout the year in the form of
“supplements” (suplementação orçamentária). Notably, the kinds of high-profile, legal
challenges that have occurred in Rio Grande do Sul do not occur in these states. Critics of
this budgetary practice emphasize that executives purposely provide the judiciary with an
inadequate budget at the start of the year as a strategic effort to maintain a subordinate
judiciary. In Acre, judicial budgets are higher than they have ever been (and higher than
in Maranhão), but there is still memory of the consistently impoverished judiciary.
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Moreover, at least as of 2007, the governor continued to reduce the budgetary proposals
of the judiciary, the governor controls the disbursement of funds on a monthly basis, and
the governor controls budgetary supplements. The chronic insufficiency of financial
resources, coupled with the possibility of receiving supplements throughout the year,
requires the judiciary to remain deferential to the executive throughout the year in order
to receive the supplements. As one interviewee in Acre noted, this practice was also
known as “troca de liminares”, or the “trade of decisions”, whereby the governor would
expand the court’s budget only after the court decided favorably in a case involving the
executive branch as one of the parties to litigation. In the words of one local judge,
budgets are “the lifeblood of the judiciary” (“o orçamento é a vida do judiciário”), so the
combination of budgetary weakness and supplements created a condition of vulnerability,
becoming “o calcanhar de Achiles”, the Achilles’ heel of the judiciary (Interview 136).
In short, the practice created a chronic dependence or subordination of the judiciary vis-àvis the executive.
Judicial Personnel
Both Acre and Rio Grande do Sul are well-staffed when it comes to judges. That
is not to say that there is no need for improvement; rather, both rank in the top half of
Brazil’s states. However, the adequacy of staffing is a recent improvement in Acre,
dating to the hiring of more than 20 new judges in 2001. By 2007, the two states were
fairly indistinguishable in the ratio of judges per 100,000 people, with a ratio of 7.5 in
Acre and 7.6 in Rio Grande do Sul. Maranhão is once again at the opposite end of the
spectrum. In fact, Maranhão ranked last in judicial personnel in 2003 with a ratio of 3.93
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judges per 100,000, and by 2007 had only climbed one place to the penultimate spot with
a ratio of 4.30.
Infrastructure
In terms of physical infrastructure, Acre and Rio Grande do Sul again rank fairly
high. Both are in the top half of states in this category, as well, with Acre ranking fifth
and ninth in 2003 and 2007, respectively, and Rio Grande do Sul ranking 11th and fifth.
By 2007, the two states were fairly close, at 3401.43 square meters per 100,000 people
(Acre) and 3852.84 square meters (Rio Grande do Sul). In contrast, Maranhão again lags
far behind. Maranhão ranked second-to-last in 2003 with only 1125.11 square meters per
100,000 people, and was in last place in 2007 with 915.79 square meters.
In sum, while no single variable above perfectly captures the administrative
strength of local courts, each variable is a reasonable approximation of a meaningful
dimension of court strength, and taken together they offer a compelling picture of court
strength across space and over time in the Brazilian states. Courts function well in Rio
Grande do Sul, reasonably well in Acre, but not so well in Maranhão. The picture that
emerges is one of high strength in Rio Grande do Sul, medium/high strength in Acre, and
persistently low strength in Maranhão.
What explains this variation? What are the political sources of court strength in
these Brazilian states?

7.3. Causal Analysis
Overall, the results do not support most of the logics underpinning electoral
competition. The only logic with positive consequences that receives support is the
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opportunity logic in which judges take advantage of political openings or the “softening”
of the status quo to mobilize reform initiatives. The veto player logic also receives
support, especially in Rio Grande do Sul, where once the judiciary reached a threshold of
institutional strength it has been able to block attempts by the executive to limit the
judicial budget. However, the results show the most consistent support for the role of
ideas and ideology. Progressive groups of judges have been instrumental in raising the
reform agenda and lobbying and striking for policy change, and left-of-center politicians
have consistently supported reformist initiatives. Table 7.2 summarizes the patterns of
causation observed in the three Brazilian states. The following sections deepen the
analysis.
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Table 7.2. Summary of Causal Analysis in Brazil

re-election logic
signaling logic
insurance logics
1 – profit maximizing
2 – self-protection
3 – policy-preserving
opportunity logic
veto-player logic
Ideology

Acre
No
No

Rio Grande do Sul
No
No

Maranhão
No
No

No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Reformist, firstinstance judges
strike on eve of TJ
presidency of
sympathetic senior
judge; senior judge
has deep roots in PT
and is close friends
with new, PT
governor

No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
PDT governor plays
key role in granting
financial and
administrative
autonomy; governor
also close friends
with TJ president

Late change, but
strong and once it
gets started, driven
by reformist judges
and PT governor

Early and strong
change; following
new federal and
state constitutions,
judicial strikes and
pressure from senior
judges highlights
need for policy
change; center-left
PDT governor
approves change,
delegating financial
and administrative
autonomy to court

No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Progressive, firstinstance judges
pushing for a more
“democratic,”
influence by
progressive currents
from Rio Grande do
Sul; two leftist
politicians, from PT
and PCdoB, are only
external support
Judiciary remains
opaque and
intransigent;
progressive, firstinstance judges
gained leadership of
state judges’
association in 2002,
and since the have
lobbied and
litigation for change,
being especially
effective by
leveraging the
National Justice
Council (CNJ)

Summary

7.3.1. Courts in Leftist Strongholds
Several causal dynamics underlie the increase in real spending in Acre in the mid1990s, and these dynamics shaped additional administrative gains and continue to shape
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judicial strength in Acre today. While there were sporadic civil service exams and hirings
in the early and mid-1990s, as well as a salary increase for judges in 1992 (the last until
2003), this analytic narrative highlights three key moments identified in interviews: (1)
1995-1996, which overlapped with the PT’s first municipal administration in the state
capital (1993-1996) and the administration of Desembargador (Des.)139 Jersey Pacheco
Nunes (1995-1997) as president of the state supreme court (Tribunal de Justiça, or TJ);
(2) 2000-2003, which overlapped with the TJ presidency of Des. Arquilau de Melo Melo
(2001-2003); and (3) the recent period since 2006.
1995-1996: Corrosive Gains from Within, Progressive Strength from Without
Interviewees note that the presidency of Des. Jersey Pacheco Nunes on the TJAC
(1995-1997) was an important period in the court’s history (Interview 127; 136; 159).
Pacheco Nunes is credited with a physical expansion of the judiciary, especially in the
area of small claims courts. However, despite these accomplishments, interviews and
archival evidence show that the changes were not his idea and also indicate that the
means by which Des. Pacheco Nunes achieved these gains compromised the court’s
integrity and weakened its legitimacy. Specifically, the creation of small claims courts
(juizados especiais) were mandated by a federal law passed in 1995 that gave states until
1996 to form the new courts (LF 9.099/95). Thus, the motivation for the small claims
courts was not Pacheco’s own. Moreover, once faced with the legal requirement to create
new courts, Pacheco decided that, rather than engage the political branches for more

139

Desembargador is the title of judges on the state supreme court, which are all second-instance or
appellate judges in the state’s judicial structure (see list of legal terms in Appendix A). The term is
somewhat awkward and unwieldy, even in Portuguese, as “embargo” translates as a “lien”, “injunction”, or
other legal obstacle or “blockade”, i.e., embargo, so a “des-embargador” is someone who removes these
embargos. Many interviewed judges expressed a humorous disdain for the title, and some openly wished to
change it.
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funding, he would unilaterally increased legal fees across the state (TJAC Resolution No.
001/96). Thus, he raised the money to build and fund new courts – money that did not
come from the state’s budget. This new revenue source accounts for at least a portion of
the large spike in judicial spending as a proportion of total state spending in the mid1990s shown in Figure 6.1.
However, this funding mechanism was unethical and likely illegal. Interviewed
judges agreed that Pacheco should not have acted on his own to raise the legal fees (e.g.,
Interview 136). In fact, his fee increase was challenged in a constitutional action in 1997
(ADI 97.00065-0). In that suit, the PFL challenged Resolution No. 001/96 of February
27, 1996, by the Council of Magistrates (Conselho da Magistratura), of which Pacheco
Nunes presided over as court president (TJAC Regimento Interno, art. 16). In that
resolution, the Council grants itself the authority to raise legal fees (custas judiciais). The
Council did so after comparing the legal fees in the nation’s federal district with the fees
in the state of Acre, noting the disparities without acknowledging that they were
comparing a large, mostly rural state with the nation’s capital, and went on to raise
Acre’s legal fees to match those in Brasilia. Symptomatic of the state supreme court at
this time, the TJ engaged in the ethically controversial act of deciding a matter in which
one of its own organs and effectively its president were a party to the litigation, and
rejected the PFL’s argument on March 1, 1998, without offering any detail. However, it
does not appear that any of the parties were notified of this outcome because more than
five years later, on August 20, 2003, the court receives a request for information
regarding the case. Deciding the case anew on October 29, 2003, more than seven years
after it was initially filed, the court now ruled the PFL’s challenge was moot, i.e., there
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was no longer a controversy, 140 because of a law passed in 2001 (Lei 1422/2001) that
replaced Resolution 001/96. Thus, the court argued, since the challenged resolution
essentially no longer had any legal force, the case against the resolution disappeared. This
decision relied on procedural formalities in order to “decide without deciding” the very
real constitutional conflict before the court.
Making matters worse, the higher legal fees collected by the court were not going
into the state’s general fund, but were being deposited directly in a special fund that had
just been created on November 11, 1995 (Lei 1.168/95), and that was managed only by
the court (Fundo Especial para a Instalação, Aparelhamento, Aperfeiçoamento, e
Desenvolvimento das Atividades dos Juizados Civeis e Criminais, or FUNAJE). Thus, the
court was arbitrarily raising legal fees and costs, and the new law left the court free to
manage and spend this money without interference or oversight from any other branch. In
2002, the state’s public prosecutor (Ministério Público Estadual, or MPE) challenged this
arrangement in a separate lawsuit, arguing that the concentration of revenue generation
and spending powers in a single branch was unconstitutional, and perhaps even a criminal
case of corruption, or improbidade administrativa (ADI 2002.000334-0).141 However, the
case was delayed without any action for more than three years as the original judge
assigned to it, Des. Eliezes Mattos Scherer, retired and the case was not re-assigned to a
new judge, Des. Francisco Praça, until February 17, 2005. On October 8, 2005, the court
decided against the MPE, finding that the law creating the FUNAJE posed no direct
violation to the text of the constitution and dismissing the case (“inexistência de violação
140

The court refers to the process as extinguished, or “extinto”, because it has lost its object of litigation –
“perdeu seu objeto” (ADI 97.000065-0).
141
“Improbidade administrativa” covers acts of “unlawful enrichment” and misuse of funds by public
officials, as well as broader issues regarding the honesty or character of public administration, and can
carry both criminal and non-criminal (civil) sanctions (LF 8429/92).
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direta com extinção de processo”).
In sum, while Pacheco Nunes did indeed expand the judiciary by increasing
spending to create the small claims courts, the motivation was not his own and the
mechanism he employed was of dubious legality. Thus, this “change from within” had a
corrosive effect on the local legitimacy and reputation of the court, a stain interviewed
judges still remembered uncomfortably.
Interviews also identify another major change in the period 1995-1996, this one
unequivocally positive – a judicial outreach program called the Citizen Project (Projeto
Cidadão). The project was originally inspired by a study of the national statistics office,
IBGE, which found that nearly 80% of Acre’s population did not have any official
government identification (Interview 159).142 Obtaining official documents, therefore,
became the necessary first step towards effectuating a fuller sense of citizenship,
including legal or “civil” citizenship (see Marshall 1965; O’Donnell 1993; UNDP 2004).
By targeting this problem, the Citizen Project was extraordinarily popular and received
many awards nationally and internationally, but, contradicting some accounts that
attribute the entire project to Pacheco, it was again not an initiative of the courts. Rather,
it was a program designed by the PT’s municipal administration in Rio Branco under
Jorge Viana, specifically its secretary of education, Arnobio “Binho” Marques, who was
later elected governor of Acre in 2006 (Interview 127). The program received support
from within the judiciary, especially from Des. Arquilau de Melo Melo. However, it
should be noted that the program originated with Marques and the PT, and the courts only
142

The lack of official documents is a major obstacle to citizenship in bureaucratic Brazil, where any
interaction with the state requires the presentation of proper documents and identification. In the judicial
arena, the lack of documents translated into an access to justice issue. Without the right documents,
individuals could not file legal claims, request government services, legally marry, register the birth of a
child, obtain work permits, and a host of other issues.
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came on later as partners in its funding and execution (Interview 127; 159). The role of
the courts was and remains meaningful, however, as the judiciary provided funding and
lent its full institutional support to the program, bringing judges and the judicial process
to neighborhoods and eventually moving beyond the state capital to carry basic legal
proceedings, including marriages, other legal certificates, and small claims resolution to
cities in the interior of the state. Interviews indicate the program also received federal
funding, which may also help explain the rise in spending during this period, especially
the high percentage of judicial spending as a portion of total state spending (Interview
116; 148; 192).
Importantly, while the IBGE study drew attention to the problem of
documentation, it was the PT and not another party or entity that designed this program
specifically to address and resolve the problem. In doing so, the PT was motivated by the
incorporation of large, marginalized sectors into Acrean society, but the inclusionary
mission of the project is also consistent with the PT’s programmatic preferences and its
strong foundations in social movements and activist networks in the state. Also, Melo
was a founder and lawyer for the PT before becoming a judge, so his support for Projeto
Cidadão from within the judiciary resonates with the ideological motivations motivating
such a program. Thus, the Citizen Project is an instance of “change from without” that
draws on principled-ideological motivations outside and inside the judiciary – originating
in forces external to the judiciary, triggered by a federal agency but motivated also by
political ideology, and finding an ideologically sympathetic advocate within the courts.
2000-2003: Progressive Pressures from Within Meet External Support
Alongside Projeto Cidadão, interviews also identified the period between 2000
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and 2003 as a second important moment of positive judicial change in the recent, postauthoritarian history of Acre’s judiciary. In late 2000, first-instance judges and local court
staff (servidores) went on strike in Acre, asking primarily for a larger budget for the
judiciary, an increased number of judges and support staff throughout the state, and
improvement to the physical infrastructure of the courts. In mid-2003, the judges again
went on strike, and again demanded a larger budget, the hiring of more judges, and a
salary increase. Despite being internal movements that were similar in strategy, the first
strike was short and successful, while the second strike was long, it embittered even
judges who were originally sympathetic, and it ended without any gains. 143
Why were the two outcomes different?
On December 4, 2000, first-instance judges initiated a general strike. During the
previous week, work stoppages and slowdowns (paralizações, or operações tartarugas –
literally “operation turtle”), as well as intentionally minimal staffing (atendimento
plantonista) prefaced the strike. In other words, a week of labor-related disruptions led up
to the strike as judges and court staff lobbied the judicial leadership and made their
demands known (Página 20 2000, 1, 4). As these actions did not have any effect, the full
strike ensued and first-instance courts shut down. Adair Longuini, then president of the
state judges’ association (Associacão dos Magistrados do Acre, or ASMAC),144 noted
that the governor was offering the judiciary a budget of R$29 million for 2001, but that
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The legality or constitutionality of civil service strikes, especially in the judicial sector, constitutes an
ongoing and lively debate in Brazil and elsewhere. Judges and other public officials at the highest levels
have differing opinions. In practice, strikes by judges and other branches of the public sector are very
common in Brazil. For a discussion of the debate over the right of judges to organize and strike in the
Spanish transition to democracy, see Hilbink (2007b). For recent coverage of the first ever strike by judges
in Spain, and for comments about the frequency of strikes by judges in other countries, e.g., Portugal, see
Público (2009). Notably, there has never been a strike by judges in Mexico (see Chapter 6 and comments in
Chapter 8).
144
As of 2007, judge Adair Longuini became desembargador, promoted to the state supreme court (TJAC).
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the courts required a budget of R$72 million, more than twice the amount proposed by
the executive (Página 20). Longuini’s leadership of the 2000 strike was important
because he had been the judge who presided over the trial of the murder of Chico
Mendes, and he was a highly regarded public figure in the state with near folk-hero
status, especially among his judicial colleagues (Interview 140; Interview 178). In
making ASMAC’s case, Longuini stressed that Acre was in dire need of more judges to
staff courtrooms, that the physical structures of the judiciary were in need of repair and
deteriorating rapidly, and that the judiciary required a greater number of support
personnel to attend to the daily business of the courts. To address these needs, ASMAC
proposed two new civil service exams (concursos) – one for judges and one for court
staff – and the upgrading of numerous court buildings and facilities. Quoting Longuini,
“We only want them to do something to stop the impending failure of the judiciary. The
situation has become unbearable, to the point that we cannot do our work. We can no
longer merely depend on budgetary supplements” (Página 20).145 Longuini was calling
for a budget that would be sufficient to put an end to this practice. Thus, ASMAC’s
argument for a new, more adequate judicial budget aimed to strengthen the staffing,
supplies, and physical infrastructure of the judiciary, but these administrative
improvements would also yield inter-institutional, political gains, strengthening the
separation of powers and constitutional practice.
On December 5, after a week of stoppages and slowdowns and only one full day
of striking, the judges obtained a partial success and returned to work. The entire process
lasted one week, and the gains included the following: (1) a new judicial budget of R$37
145

Author’s translation; original Portuguese: “Queremos apenas que façam alguma coisa para deter o
estado de pré-falência do Judiciário. A situação chegou a um limite insuportável, a ponto de não dar mais
para trabalhar. Não podemos mais depender apenas da suplementação orçamentária.”
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million, which, although it was not the full budget the judges were requesting did amount
to an increase of over 27% from the governor’s initial offer, and an increase over the
2000 budget of 50% (the 2002 budget increased further, adding another 49% from 2001
to 2002 (TJAC Informe 2002 and 2005); (2) a new exam process (concurso) to hire
judges starting in May 2001; and (3) a commitment to hire 20 new judges by November
of 2001 (Batista 2000). By most accounts, the 2000 strike was a successful labor
action. 146 Though all demands were not met, a reasonable compromise was achieved and
the courthouse doors were closed for only one day.
The second strike began on May 5, 2003 (Interviews 127, 136, 140; A Gazeta
2003, 1). This time, however, the process and the outcome would be different. On June
11, after 36 days away from work and bitter confrontations with the judicial leadership,
the judges ended the strike and returned to work without having obtained, in full or in
part, a single one of their demands. Two of the demands in 2003 were substantially
similar to the ones in 2000 – more personnel and improvements in supplies and
infrastructure. However, a critical new demand was a salary increase for judges, who had
not received such an increase in 10 years (Machado 2003).
With regards to salaries, governor Viana had been negotiating an increase of 22%
since 2002. Notably, this increase would not amount to a full improvement of 22% in real
terms due to the reductive effects of inflation, but it would have amounted to an
improvement of four or five per cent. However, the increase had not yet been established,
and the judges were now asking for a 45% increase. Viana kept offering 22%, but the
ASMAC rejected the offer on May 28, saying that it was the same offer that had been in
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Court staff remained on strike for an extra day and were not fully satisfied with the outcome (Batista
2000).
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negotiation since 2002 (Consultor Jurídico 2003).
The salary issue was related to another issue – the chronic departure of recently
hired judges for jobs in other states. According to judge Jordani Dourado, vice-president
of ASMAC in 2003, there had been an “exodus of judges” from Acre after the 2001
hirings. Three of the new hires had decided to transfer to neighboring states of Rondônia
and Mato Grosso,147 and at least two more judges were preparing to retire (Paulo 2003).
Thus, having made personnel and staffing gains in 2001 by hiring 20 new judges, these
gains were slowly being eroded rather than, as promised, used as a platform for the
judiciary to continue growing to meet the state’s needs and demands.
Moreover, aside from losing a raw number of judges, Dourado was expressing a
concern about the pattern of new judges leaving Acre for jobs in other states. That is,
beyond reducing the number of judges in the state, this pattern created a chronic need to
re-hire for the same position, meaning that the state was also losing valuable expertise
acquired from experience on the job – experience that could not be replaced even with
new hires. Judges had been calling attention to this issue, but there were no plans by the
judicial leadership to hire replacement judges, much less build on the 2001 hirings. By
the end of April 2003, a week before the strike, the judges announced their intended labor
action if negotiations did not advance. By May 5, the courts were closed for the second
147

Notably, this is a common complaint in many of Brazil’s western and northern states – that new judges
often do not have any local roots or connections, so they have little incentive to remain in the state beyond
the two-year probationary term of “substitute judge”. Given the national structure of civil service exams
and the judicial career, a law school graduate from a southeastern state like São Paulo, where there are
numerous law schools and a congested judicial job market, can take an exam in a state like Acre and then
slowly migrate closer to family in São Paulo as jobs open in Rondônia, Mato Grosso, or another state.
Thus, as is the case in other peripheral states (non-southeastern), local acreanos resent the hiring of judges
who are unlikely to remain in the state, a practice that creates a chronic deficit in personnel and expertise as
these judges leave and a chronic expense to conduct new exams to re-hire for the same position. In short, an
organizational characteristic of the national judicial career generates strengths in terms of uniformity and
centralization at the national level of the regime, but simultaneously creates weaknesses for some state
judiciaries that must be confronted at the local level.
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time in less than three years, and they would remain closed for five bitter weeks of
striking. To this day, judges in Acre remember the 2000 strike fondly and the 2003 strike
with discomfort (e.g., Interview 140).
The different outcomes of the two labor actions can be better understood by
noting the different conditions inside and outside the institution in 2000 and in 2003. The
president of the TJ was different, the president of the ASMAC was different, and the
local and national political context was different.
In late 2000, Francisco das Chagas Praça had just a couple of months left in his
two-year term as TJ president, which was scheduled to end in February of 2001. Praça
was unpopular and the source of much dissatisfaction in the judiciary. Some judges
referred to his administration as a “valley” (vale) in the recent history of the judiciary,
also describing him as “inviável”, translated literally as “not viable” (Interview 136;
Interview 140). Indeed, Praça likely contributed to the strike not only because he was
perceived as a poor leader of the judiciary, but also because of an inability to negotiate
with the judges. Indeed, the new court president, Arquilau de Melo Melo, had to step in
earlier than anticipated. Melo,148 the same judge that had supported the PT’s Citizen
Project in 1995, was a desembargador that had just been selected to become the next
president for the 2001-2003 term. Despite the fact he was not scheduled to take the
leadership position for nearly two more months (on February 1, 2001), Melo negotiated
the resolution of the strike with judges and court staff in the first week of December 2000
(Batista 2000). Several judges identify Melo as not only being pivotal in the strike’s
148

Naming conventions in Brazil require some clarification. Unlike many other Latin American countries,
Brazilians regularly refer to even prominent public officials by their first names or even nicknames, e.g.,
“Fernando Henrique” rather than Cardoso, or “Lula” rather than President da Silva. Further, if using only
the last name, it is often unclear whether to use the first, second, or subsequent last name. Here, I adopt the
naming convention of using the final last name.
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resolution, but also credit his two-year administration of the judiciary as a positive
“marco” or reference point in the trajectory of the state judiciary (Interview 140;
Interview 148; Interview 192; Página 20 2000b).
Melo was effective for several reasons. First, with a background in journalism and
rights advocacy in the state, Melo had then gone to law school and was both a founder of
the PT in Acre and later a lawyer for the PT and CONTAG, the National Association of
Agricultural Workers (Interviews 127; 140). Thus, Melo had very strong roots in local
social movements and enjoyed an aura of legitimacy and moral authority, which also
helps explain his support of the Citizen Project in 1995-1996 discussed above (Interview
140). A judge since 1986, Melo had worked in precarious and even perilous conditions
through some of the state’s most difficult years, including the waves of land-based
conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s that saw the murders of activist leaders Wilson Pinheiros
and Chico Mendes (see Keck 1995), the rise of organized crime related to trafficking
across the Bolivian border with Acre, and the suspicious murder of a sitting governor.149
Given Melo’s background, and especially his roots in the PT, it is not surprising that he
supported the judges’ right to strike. That is, even as the leader of the judiciary, he
thought that the judges he was going to supervise should strike if they thought they had a
grievance against his office (Interview 127). This perspective endeared him to many
judges and court staff, facilitating the resolution of the strike (Interview 148; Interview
149

As late as 2003, the murder of Pinto still remained controversial. One state legislator, Moisés Diniz
(PCdoB), went so far as to demand a public debate regarding events. Diniz noted that the official
investigation in 1994, a Parliamentary Investigatory Commission (CPI) on political violence (“CPI da
pistolagem”), did not yield satisfactory conclusions. For instance, Pinto’s murder was officially declared a
“latrocinio” – a robbery resulting in death – but when Pinto’s body was found, he was still wearing his
Rolex watch and $10,000 U.S. in cash were still in his possessions. Moreover, Pinto was killed in São
Paulo, where he had travelled specifically to testify in a massive fraud case involving business interests in
Acre. Finally, three men were arrested in connection with Pinto’s death, but all three committed suicide
while incarcerated. Before killing himself, one of these men testified that he had been given money to kill
Pinto (Rio Branco 2003b). Understandably, many observers find the official conclusions unsatisfactory.
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192). After only one day of striking, and two months before he was supposed to take
office as court president, Melo resolved the strike on December 5, 2000.
The outcome of the 2003 strike was different, in part because Melo was no longer
president. The presidency of the TJAC rotates every two years and the sequence of the
rotation is determined by seniority. Thus, following Melo’s administration (2001-2003),
Ciro Facundo took the reins of the TJ in February of 2003.150 Facundo’s administration
(2003-2005) was marked by inter-branch conflict and an inability or unwillingness to
negotiate with ASMAC during the second strike of 2003. From the start of the strike,
Facundo declared himself against the strike and stated an unwillingness to negotiate with
the judges so long as they remained on strike (Albuquerque 2003a; Rio Branco 2003).
This position contrasted starkly with that of Melo. Moreover, Facundo publicly attacked
the judges’ demands as selfish and threatened to fire temporary and discretionary
employees, including judges who were still within the two-year probationary term (juízes
substitutos). He also threatened to withhold salaries for each day a judge or other
employee was away from work. Further, Facundo appealed to public fears and insecurity
by saying the judges’ strike would cause innocent people to remain in jail without a
hearing, or that dangerous criminals might be released early. Coupled with his
unwillingness to talk with judges until they returned to work, these harsh and polemic
tactics polarized and personalized the strike, generating much more animosity than in
2000 and creating a politically volatile situation (Rosas 2003; Zilio 2003) that even
150

That is, Facundo was not elected for this leadership position. It was simply his turn. This raises the issue
of the undemocratic access to the TJ and the democratic deficit at the cupula of the judiciary. However,
more relevant to the current discussion, the TJ did not have a choice as to who it could choose to lead the
court at this stage. This could be interpreted as a design flaw in the institution, since it would benefit the
institution to be able to select it leaders to be better able to deal politically with problems or issues on the
horizon. For instance, perhaps the TJ saw the 2003 strike on the horizon – or at least the very real
possibility of a strike – and could have decided to put a different person in charge, or even re-elect Melo.
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reached the national press (Scolese 2003).
The differences in judicial leadership from 2000 to 2003 explain a large portion of
the different outcomes of the strikes. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the
external political leadership did not change between the two time periods. Jorge Viana
was governor in 2000, and he was also governor in 2003.
The most salient feature of the 2000-2003 period was the fact that Melo and
Viana shared roots in the PT and were close, personal friends. This feature of executivejudicial relations disappeared in 2003 when Facundo became president. Despite clashing
on several issues, including the best resolution of the strike, Melo and Viana had the
capacity to communicate effectively with each other, negotiate and compromise. Multiple
interviews noted this capacity – and their friendship – as playing a central role in the
strike’s resolution (Interviews 127, 136, 140). Indeed, at the inauguration of Adair
Longuini as a new state supreme court judge in 2007, Senator Tião Viana, ex-Governor
Viana’s brother and also of the PT, mused that “first we were friends, then we were
institutions”. 151 This statement nicely captures the mapping of the close, private, personal
ties between Arquilau and Jorge onto their public, professional interactions as court
president and governor. In short, friendship and ideological principles formed a
productive bond between the two men.
This was not the case in 2003. As noted above, Facundo (the new court president)
openly antagonized the striking judges and court employees. He and Viana appear to
have been members of rival political groups. In 2002, Viana’s rivals initiated a legal case
to try to prevent Viana from running for re-election in the October elections of that year,
151

Original Portuguese: “Primeiro fuimos amigos, depois fuimos instituições.” Sebastião “Tião” Viana, PT
Senator from Acre, Dec. 7, 2007. Public remark at ceremony in Rio Branco, Acre, at which author was
present (author’s own translation).
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and these rivals, led by a local businessman and politician, Narciso Mendes (PPB),
engineered the process in the Regional Electoral Tribunal (TRE-AC) to win their case
and bar him from that election. While these local, conservative political elites were
successful in the TRE and sought to delay the ability of the national electoral tribunal
(TSE) to review the case, the TSE heard the appeal and reversed their decision, noting
several improprieties and allowing Viana to run for (and win) re-election.152 After this
high-profile episode was over and Viana had been re-elected, Facundo began his
152

In 2002, when Viana was running for re-election, his main opposition was Flaviano Mello (PMDB).
Mello was an ally of Nabor Junior, also of the PMDB, and Narciso Mendes, of the conservative, rightleaning PPB, who together formed the Movimento Democrático Acreano (MDA). Narciso Mendes was also
owner of a local newspaper, O Rio Branco, and he used his newspaper as a platform from which to support
Mello’s candidacy and launch scathing editorials (which he often wrote himself) against Viana and
tendentious articles leading up to the October 2002 election. Furthermore, there were also clear signs that
conflicts between conservative and progressive elites had penetrated the judiciary. Led by Mello and
Mendes, the MDA had initiated litigation to bar Viana from running against him in the gubernatorial
election. Mello argued that Viana had used the resources of the state to promote his campaign – an
argument that was based on the new logo Viana’s administration designed for public works (a small,
stylized tree bearing the title “Governo da Floresta”, “Government of the Forest”). The case rose to the
regional electoral court, Tribunal Regional Eleitoral do Acre (TRE-AC), where the court decided against
Viana on August 23, preventing him from running in the upcoming October 2002 election, and barring him
from political office for three years. The process against Viana, however, was extraordinarily politicized
from the beginning, initiated and promoted by the PT’s political rivals, and with strong indications of
organizational and procedural irregularities. For instance, then-president of the TRE-AC Miracele de Souza
Lopes Borges altered the selection of judges to the TRE by doing away with a seniority rule that was
intended to favor the selection of judges with longer careers marked by independence and integrity. Having
done so, Lopes Borges assigned this volatile case to one of the newest judges she had just selected under
the new rules (Global Justice, Oficio JG/RJ 188/02). The high-profile case attacking Viana received even
more attention when one of the three appellate judges on the court publicly revealed his misgivings about
the lack of political neutrality on the TRE, noting the recent changes to the composition of the TRE and
adding his own observations that the judges were politically aligned against Viana (Amaral e Bittar 2002;
Ribeiro 2002; Vitale Jayme 2002; Global Justice, Oficio JG/RJ 188/02). Ultimately, according to the high
electoral court (TSE), the TRE’s decision suffered from four main problems: (1) the legal claim in the
litigation was not appropriate; (2) even if the claim were allowed, the alleged wrongdoing should have been
charged in a different court (forum) – in regular courts and not in an electoral court (i.e., this was not an
electoral matter, but a civil or perhaps criminal matter); (3) evidence against Viana was admitted without
ever giving Viana an opportunity to respond to it; and (4) Lopes Borges changed the rules for selecting
judges to the TRE in the 12 months leading up to the 2002 elections, guiding the selection of at least two
electoral judges of questionable integrity, one of whom had a substantial conflict of interest in the case.
After Viana and the regional electoral prosecutor appealed, the nation’s Supreme Electoral Tribunal
(Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, or TSE) reversed the TRE’s decision, recognizing that Viana’s actions as
governor were not illegal and that the procedural flaws in the case should have prevented the case from
ever being filed in the first place (TSE Acordão RO-593/AC). Moreover, the TSE overturned two other
TRE decisions regarding candidacies. Ironically, one of these candidacies was that of one of Viana’s rivals
mentioned above, Narciso Mendes, who was approved by the TRE but later barred by the TSE. Due in part
to these irregularities, by September 29, 2002, one week before the elections, the TSE launched a three-day
inquiry into the TRE-AC.
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leadership at the TJ. In his newspaper, Narciso Mendes – who had just recently been
attacking Viana – greeted Facundo’s inauguration with enthusiasm, congratulating
Facundo in an editorial that suggested a proximity between the two and praising Facundo
as a “man of character”. The editorial was accompanied by a foto of Facundo under a title
that read “Respeito às instituições” (“respect for institutions”). Directly below this
complimentary text, there was a photograph of Miracele Lopes, the TRE president who
had also been attacking Viana, accompanied by a defense of her position and strong
language critical of Viana (Rio Branco 2002a). Notably, in the very same week, Melo
honored Viana with the highest award given by the judiciary, the Colar do Mérito
Judiciário, recognizing Viana as the only person outside the judiciary to receive it in at
least two years (Rio Branco 2002b). Thus, part of the difficult relationship between
Facundo and Viana was likely due to tensions springing from their different political
sympathies. In contrast to Melo’s deep roots in the PT and his personal proximity with
Viana, Facundo appears to have been closer to traditional local elites with roots in the
conservative, pro-military PDS.
In addition to this underlying political rivalry, Viana was in difficult position in
2003 because he did not want to bring the executive branch into labor relations internal to
the judicial branch. Meanwhile, Facundo did not want to negotiate with judges until they
returned to work, and suggested that Viana exercise his influence to get the judges to end
the strike. Thus, the judicial leadership (Facundo) and state executive (Viana) found
themselves arguing about who should negotiate with the ASMAC (Paulo 2003). It should
be noted that Facundo’s position was anathema to the normative constitutional provisions
regarding judicial autonomy. That is, he should have been defending his authority to
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decide administrative matters of the court, and perhaps even praising Viana for not
wanting to interfere in a labor dispute within another branch.
Regardless of the specific nature of the tension between Facundo and Viana, a
tension existed that did not exist during Melo’s presidency of the TJAC. In this regard,
the change from 2001-2003 to 2003-2005 marked a fundamental switch in the state’s
executive-judicial relations. Three central features of the 2001-2003 period were: (a) a
close, personal friendship between the court president and the governor, (b) ideological
alignment between the court president and governor, and (c) a leftist, PT-based content to
this ideological alignment. Importantly, this affective and ideological proximity
disappeared in early 2003, when Facundo took over as court president.
A second factor that influenced the different outcome in 2003 was the
composition of the ASMAC leadership during the strike. 153 Adair Longuini, the judge
who supervised the Chico Mendes trial, was no longer president of the ASMAC. Though
still active in the ASMAC and supportive of the strike, he had been replaced in the
ASMAC presidency by Maria Cezarinete Angelim (Rio Branco 2003). A judge with a
much lower public profile than Longuini, Cezarinete was now the ASMAC’s point
person in negotiations with the Tribunal and the political branches. Thus, the legitimacy
and leverage of the association’s leadership was weaker in 2003 than in 2001.
Third, the national political context had shifted by 2003, altering local and
national conditions. In Acre, the PT’s Viana was elected for his second term in 2002.
However, the PT had also just won a historic presidential election in 2002. Luiz Inacio
“Lula” da Silva had won – on his fourth attempt – placing the center-left workers’ party
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Court staff also strike in 2003, mobilizing as of May 8 (Albuquerque 2003b) and engaging in a partial
work stoppage on May 13 (Albuquerque 2003c).
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in the presidency for the first time in the party’s 23-year history. Therefore, in January
2003, Viana began his second term under very different national conditions, paralleling
the start of the first PT national administration under Lula. Viana was no longer an
“opposition governor”, but rather a PT governor with a PT president. As such, Viana was
subject to different attention, pressures, and strategies at the national level.
One of the policy areas in which these pressures became manifest was precisely
that of judicial reform. Indeed, in December 2002, even before he took office in January
of 2003, Lula was already highlighting the need for judicial reform, noting how it had
been blocked for several years and that the 1988 Constitution was still not fully effective
(Gazeta Mercantil 2002; Mattos and Juliano Bacile 2002). His new Minister of Justice,
Marcio Thomaz Bastos, cited judicial reform and police reform as his two top priorities
on December 18, 2002, the day he was first nominated for the cabinet position (Folha de
São Paulo 2002). The seriousness of the Lula administration with regards to following
through with judicial reform became evident early on, beginning with the January 7
announcement by Bastos of his intention to create a Secretariat of Judicial Reform for the
purposes of analyzing, promoting, and coordinating the reform, followed quickly by the
creation of the new secretariat within the Ministry of Justice on April 30, 2003 – the
Secretaría de Reforma do Judiciário. Lula also had an early opportunity in the first week
of May to appoint three new justices (ministros) to the 11-member STF, one of which had
a 12-year history with the PT and favored “external control” of the judiciary – a
centerpiece of the reform project (Vitale Jayme 2003a; 2003b).
A series of high-profile confrontations followed between the Lula administration
and the judiciary with regard to the reform. On May 13, Lula’s referred to the judiciary as
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a “black box” (caixa preta) in a statement about the need for reform (Folha de São Paulo
2003). After a group of seven state judges from the southeastern state of Paraná said they
were “personally injured by the insults” and suggested they might sue under a law similar
to defamation (“crime contra a honra”), Min. Gilmar Medes, the chief justice of the
nation’s supreme court, gave Lula 48 hours to explain the “caixa preta” comment (Folha
de São Paulo 2003). Less than a week later, the new Secretary of Judicial Reform, Sergio
Renault, commented that the reform would aim to free judges from administrative duties
so that judges could focus on judging (“Juíz tem de julgar, não de administrar”),
generating a backlash from judges, including the president of the federal labor court
(Tribunal Superior de Trabalho, or TST), Francisco Fausto, and the president of the
infra-constitutional supreme court (Superior Tribunal de Justiça, or STJ), Nilson Naves.
Fausto exclaimed “the mask has fallen” (“a máscara caiu”), noting that Renault’s
comments revealed what the judiciary feared all along, that Lula’s true intention with the
reform was to control the careers of judges and the way judges did their work. Similarly,
Naves argued that the very creation of the Secretariat for Judicial Reform threatened the
separation of powers, asking provocatively whether Lula would like it if the judiciary
created a secretariat to reform the executive (Gallucci 2003).154
In the midst of these May events and with the topic of judicial reform on the list
of national priorities, Lula visited Acre on May 8, a visit that had been announced on
April 22 (Aquino 2003). This was going to be Lula’s first visit to the state as president,
and it was a high-profile meeting with all the governors of the northern region of the

154

Naves was echoing sentiments voiced earlier in the reform process. See, e.g., Sadek (2001, 128),
quoting an April 28, 1999, statement by Wagner Antônio Pimenta, then president of the TST: “Invertendo a
hipótese que alguns defendem, seria desejável, por exemplo, que o Legislativo fosse controlado por um
conselho de membros do Executivo e do Judiciário?”
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country, attended also by 11 cabinet members (Página 20 2003; Xangai 2003). The strike
by local judges began on May 5, just three days before Lula arrived, so there were many
observers who were upset by the strike for reasons unrelated to the condition of the
judiciary. That is, some were simply upset because of the appearance that the strike was
timed for Lula’s visit, or timed to leverage Lula’s visit in favor of the ASMAC’s
negotiating position, but which in the end made the judiciary – and perhaps the state –
look bad in front of the president.
Moreover, a controversial pension reform was also part of the national debate, and
judges were mobilizing around the country in opposition to some of the provisions of the
reform. The national judges Association of Brazilian Judges (Associação dos
Magistrados Brasileiros, or AMB), an umbrella organization with a membership of over
10,000 judges that networks closely with state associations like the ASMAC, was a
central player in the pension reform debate, along with the association of federal judges
(AJUFE), who also supported the Acre strike. As early as May 13, the AMB expressed its
support for ASMAC’s strike in Acre (Albuquerque 2003d). Interviews highlight the fact
that AMB insiders convinced the ASMAC to extend the strike beyond points where it
might have been resolved in order to build support for the nationwide mobilization
against the pension reform (Interview 136; 140). This evidence helps explain why the
ASMAC turned down Viana’s offer of a 22% salary increase, which on the surface
appeared to be a reasonable offer. Finally, a contemporaneous journalistic account notes
that two AMB vice-presidents were also in the state on June 10 when the strike ended,
observing that the Acre strike needed to end in order to maintain national unity among
judges with regard to pension reform (Rosas and Arruda Dias 2003). In short, the strike
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became nationally strategic, not locally strategic. Perhaps unexpectedly, the sacrifice of
local goals for the sake of a national strategy disappointed a portion of the ASMAC
membership, leading many to withdraw their support for the strike, and some even
returned to work. In 2007, judges still expressed a bitterness over the 2003 strike, noting
that it went on too long and that the goals were not clear.
The timing of the strike around Lula’s visit to Acre may have been strategic or
coincidental. More importantly, the overlap of local judicial needs, a national judicial
reform, and a national pension reform generated deep misgivings within the judiciary
itself about the 2003 strike. These misgivings weakened the ASMAC’s position vis-à-vis
both the hostile judicial leadership (Facundo) and the governor, contributing to the end of
the strike without achieving any gains.155
2006-2007: Deepening Administrative Reforms
The third and last episode of judicial strengthening examined here began in 2006
with the decision to participate in the early stages of a program run by one of Brazil’s
best law schools, the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) in Rio de Janeiro (Direito-Rio).
The new program is framed as a business administration degree for the judiciary, or MBA
do Judiciário. Notably, the program is coordinated in part by the director of the DireitoRio who is also a former counselor on the CNJ, Joaquim Falcão. As of November 2007,
Acre’s judiciary was one of only four states in the country participating in the program,
which required significant financial investment (800,000 reais for the full program in
2006 and 2007, or approximately $400,000 U.S.)
Notably, governor Viana agreed to pay for part of the program, and as of 2007 all
155

Ultimately, on December 4, 2003 – six months after the end of the strike – Viana and the TJ agreed on a
salary increase for judges of 22.4%, which is the same figure that was being negotiated since 2002 and that
was offered by Viana on May 28 ().
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of Acre’s judges were participating in monthly trainings in how to improve the
administration or gestão of justice. Indeed, interviews emphasized the fact that this word,
gestão, signaled a recent but central shift in the internal culture of the judiciary. One
interview noted that even six months earlier (in April or May of 2007), there was little
awareness of the administrative hurdles to improving the delivery of judicial services
(Interview 136). However, since the beginning of the MBA do Judiciário program, judges
were collectively experiencing a proverbial opening of the eyes, and that the institutional
leadership in this regard was key. That is, judges were learning how to keep better track
of their caseloads, how to manage their workload, and how to prioritize different types of
cases. The same judge that noted a cultural change in the last six months highlighted the
fact that judges used to wear bloated caseloads as a badge of honor; if a judge had
thousands of cases backed up, it was considered a good sign within the judicial culture, a
kind of bragging right. This changed after the FGV courses. Judges who brag in this oldfashioned way are now criticized. Internally, among judges, more value has been placed
on reducing the total volume of cases via good administrative and management practices
(Interview 136).

7.3.2. Courts under Competitive Alternation
As was the case in Acre, several causal dynamics underlie the process of judicial
strengthening in Rio Grande do Sul, and these dynamics shaped additional administrative
gains and continue to shape judicial strength in Rio Grande do Sul today. This analytic
narrative highlights two key moments: (1) 1989-1992, which overlapped with both the
approval of the state constitution (1989) and the first PDT administration in the state
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(1991-1994); and (2) 1999-2002, which was the first PT administration in the state.
1989-1992: Positive change from within supported by the left
After the 1988 federal constitution and the 1989 state constitution, which
established the normative framework for judicial autonomy, the most important moment
in the recent history of Rio Grande do Sul’s judiciary occurred between 1989 and
1992.156 In 1989, following the passage of the state constitution, judicial leadership
challenged the persistence of unconstitutional encroachment by the executive. Further, in
1989 and 1991, first-instance judges in Rio Grande do Sul took to the streets, striking
against the governor’s intrusion in the judicial budget and the daily administration of the
courts. Judges demanded higher salaries, but they were also directly challenging the
intrusion of the political branches into the affairs of the third branch of government.
Thus, a core part of the dispute involved the judiciary’s real independence in defining and
managing its own resources as an equal branch of government. In short, judges were
contesting the gap between constitutional theory and constitutional practice. By 1992, the
governor had granted the judiciary its functional autonomy, closing the theory-practice
gap. Indeed, despite lobbying and occasional inter-branch litigation that has continued to
the present, the years between 1989 and 1992 were crucial – gaining financial and
administrative autonomy in practice was a critical achievement in the post-authoritarian
trajectory of the state’s courts.
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Interviews note that the single most important moment is the passage of the Federal Constitution in
1988, and the passage of local constitutions in Brazil’s 26 states to adjust to the federal standard. However,
at the local level, the real struggle involved making the terms of the local and federal constitutions
effective. With regards to the judiciary, this meant turning constitutional provisions about “budgetary
autonomy” and “administrative autonomy” into reality, which was ultimately a struggle to remove powers
from the executive (see, e.g., Interview 194). The extraordinary rise in litigation is also mentioned
alongside the Federal Constitution, linking the two together. That is, the 1998 “citizen constitution”
identified so many individual right and created new mechanisms of vindicating those rights that it
effectively caused the explosion in litigation.
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Following the Federal Constitution of 1988, Rio Grande do Sul’s 1989 state
constitution called for the financial and administrative autonomy of the judiciary (CE Rio
Grande do Sul, arts. 93, 95). In substantive terms, the governor (and politicians in
general) needed to relinquish control over the planning and exercise of the judicial
budget, and also needed to relinquish control of managing the judiciary, including
decisions regarding the organization of judicial districts (comarcas), the creation of new
posts in the judiciary (clerks, secretaries, judgeships, etc.), and all purchasing, building,
and institutional planning. In short, constitutional norms regarding the proper separation
of powers needed to be put into practice. This change posed a twofold challenge – (i) the
executive needed to give up power over a large and geographically extensive institution,
and (ii) the judiciary needed to rise to the occasion, assuming new powers and
responsibilities.
The first signs of change appeared in 1989. On November 6 of that year, Oscar
Gomes Nunes, President of the judiciary (TJRS), filed a document with the state
legislature (ALERS). In his complaint, Gomes Nunes noted that Governor Pedro Simon
(PMDB), through the state’s revenue department (Secretaria de Fazenda), had cut the
judiciary’s proposed budget for 1990 (Processo 08615/89-6). Specifically, the court had
made an original budgetary proposal earlier in July, and the governor had reduced this
amount. This kind of reduction was standard historically among the practices of
executive domination, but it was now in violation of the 1989 state constitution, and the
court’s leadership was taking the unexpected step of formally contesting this violation
before the other political branch. On November 30, the legislature forwarded a final
budget to the governor with an increase in the court’s budget (Processo 07293-1.00), and
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on December 4, Dep. Titio Livio Jaeger, president of the legislature’s Finance and
Planning Committee, wrote to Gomes Nunes, letting him know that the legislature had
voted to correct the governor’s action and increase the court’s budget (Processo
08615/89-6, p.6). Thus, the judiciary successfully challenged the executive’s
encroachment on its budget, resolving the issue through the legislature.
The following year, in October 1990, Alceu Collares was elected governor,
inaugurating his administration in January of 1991. Collares, trained as a lawyer, had
been a core member of Leonel Brizola’s left-of-center Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro
(PTB) prior to the 1964 coup, had witnessed the controversial transfer of the PTB’s
insignias to a rightist, pro-military group in 1980, and had since joined Brizola in
reorganizing core members of the original PTB into the PDT.157 In 1991, he became the
first PDT governor of Rio Grande do Sul, and one of only four PDT governors158 in
Brazil’s conservative transition to democracy.159 Collares was elected with 60% of the
vote in second round, and took office in January 1991.
Paralleling the rise of Collares to the state executive, Nelson Luiz Púperi (19901992) and José Barison (1992-1994) rose successively to the presidency of the TJRS.
Púperi initiated a project to grant the TJ a fuller and more effective administrative
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This event inspired Carlos Drummond de Andrade’s famous poem, “Eu vi [um homem chorar]” (“I saw
[a man weep]”), describing Brizola’s tearful reaction before the TSE, during which he tore a piece of paper
on which he had written the letters, “PTB” (Drummond de Andrade 1980).
158
First was Leonel Brizola himself in 1982, winning the governorship of Rio de Janeiro after returning
from exile during most of the previous 20 years. Brizola won in Rio again in 1990 (alongside Colares’s
victory in Rio Grande do Sul and the victory of Albuíno Azeredo in Espirito Santo in the same year)
(IUPERJ-Nicolau Dataset).
159
Despite holding the first popular elections for president in 1985, the victorious ticket was composed of a
pacted combination of the progressive Tancredo Neves (president) and the conservative José Sarney (vicepresident). One day before inauguration, Neves fell ill and died. In an irony that seems tragicomically
fitting, the conservative and pro-military Sarney became president, thus giving a kind of continuity to the
military regime until 1989 (Mainwaring, Meneguello, and Power 2000, 176-177). For a more detailed
discussion of the persisting strength of conservative parties in Brazil, see Mainwaring, Meneguello, and
Power (2000).
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autonomy (Axt and Biancamano 2004), and by 1992, the judicial budget was established
at 6% of all state spending, an extraordinary achievement (Processo
0632/01.00/ALRS/91-2, p.4). However, the project of administrative autonomy was
consolidated under Barison, as Collares transferred the accounting and other technical
responsibilities of developing a judicial budget, along with all financial planning
responsibilities, to the judiciary. Interviews highlight that the transfer was carried via
intense negotiations between Des. Tedesco, the judge in charge of administering the TJ’s
finances, and Orion Cabral, the Treasury Secretary under Gov. Collares. Further, the
transfer of these administrative responsibilities was initiated by Barison, and the transfer
was successful for two reasons: the two men shared a close friendship, and Collares was
ideologically inclined to respect the judiciary’s institutional autonomy (Interview 183;
190; 194). Indeed, Collares himself acknowledged that Barison initiated the proposal, and
he described his displeasure with the historical subordination of the judiciary to the
executive (personal interview).160 Collares noted that he and the PDT respected the
functions and powers of the three branches because of “ideological and programmatic
conceptions” drawing from the “trabalhismo brasileiro”, the center-left tradition that
dates back to the pre-1964 PTB. Contemporaneous legislative records also reflect that
Collares’s treasury secretary, Orion Cabral, expressed surprise at the way the judiciary
had been treated by the executive “as an adolescent” prior to 1991, and that Rio Grande
do Sul was the first state to grant effective administrative autonomy to its judiciary
160

Barison was deceased at the time of this research. However, I interviewed Governor Collares, who
acknowledged that Barison was the one who approached him with the initiative to grant effective autonomy
to the judiciary, and that Collares simply wanted to support the project once Barison proposed it. It would
be in Collares’s own interest to claim this action as his own idea (indeed, he spoke of it as one of the
greatest achievements of his administration), so the fact that Collares did not try to take credit for the
original initiative enhances the validity of the conclusion that it was Barison who provided the initial
motivation for change. The other two interviews cited here are from judges who overlapped with Barison’s
tenure as court president.
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(ALERS-CFP 1993).
Overlapping with the challenge by Gomes Nunes and with the fuller projects of
administrative autonomy pursued by Púperi and Barison, first-instance judges twice went
on strike between 1989 and 1992 (Interview 183). These have been the only strikes by
judges in the state’s post-authoritarian history, and their early timing in contrast to the
later strikes by judges in Acre in 2001 and 2003 is another indicator of the early internal
pressures for judicial change in the state.
Thus, as was the case in Acre, a pair of ideologically sympathetic friends rose to
the leadership of both the judiciary and executive, the judicial leaders initiated a project
to grant fuller autonomy to the courts, and the executive supported the project,
responding to the pressures of two recent strikes by judges, the friendship with Barison,
and his own ideological preferences. As noted above, the friendship helped make the
process successful, and the governor’s ideological stance also complemented Barison’s
initiative, drawing on the PDT’s deep roots in the state (with Brizola’s PTB in the predictatorship era) of legality, democratic institutions, and democratic practice. As
summarized by one interview, “there was friendship and ideological will; the friendship
was determinative”161 (Interview 194).
1999-2002: The left clashes with the court
After the change in 1991-1992, interviews note that several years of institutional
growth and credibility followed until 1999 (Interview 194). However, in that year,
Antônio Carlos Magalhães (ACM), a traditional strongman or coronel from the PFL in
the northeastern state of Bahia, initiated a high-profile, politicized attack on the national
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Author’s own translation. Original statement: “Houve amizade e vontade partidária … a amizade foi
determinante.”
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judiciary that eventually took the form of a congressional investigation (CPI do
Judiciário), focused primarily on the apparent misuse of funds by a labor court in the
state of São Paulo (Sadek and Arantes 2001, 12).162 Fearing that ACM’s political
maneuvering might result in forced changes that would be less palatable than changes
generated from within, the judiciary nationwide re-started the stalled national debate on
judicial reform (Sadek and Arantes, 12). For many judges at both the local and national
levels, therefore, 1999 saw a confluence of criticisms against the judiciary. On one hand,
ACM was mounting a politicized attack on the courts. On the other hand, other
politicians, judges, and lawyers were renewing constructive but nonetheless pointed
critiques of the judiciary’s faults and noting areas in need of improvement. One judge
noted that 1999 marked the beginning of “the disparaging of the court, which also
reached Rio Grande do Sul” (Interview 194).163
Many of the criticisms against the judiciary, however, were legitimate. In this
regard, one of the foremost proponents of judicial reform was the PT. In fact, a PT
legislator – Hélio Bicudo – proposed the first reform project in March of 1992 (Sadek
and Arantes, 7). Moreover, the reform contemplated an external mechanism of
administrative accountability (controle externo) in order to enhance the institution’s
transparency and efficiency, and the PT was the foremost proponent of this kind of
oversight, seeking, as noted in the discussion of Acre, to open the “black box” of the
judiciary. Indeed, a PT legislator was put in charge of this part of the reform when the
debate re-ignited in 1999, and a 1999 poll showed the PT had more federal legislators
162

ACM was apparently motivated to maintain a high public profile over the next few years in order to run
for president in 2002, but was reacting to a legal action brought against him by the AMB for disparaging
remarks he made against the judiciary (Sadek and Arantes 2001, 13, note 7).
163
Original Portuguese: “começou o desprestigio do judiciário, que também chegou no Rio Grande do
Sul”.

284

who favored this accountability portion of the reform (98%) than any other party (Sadek
2001, 157-158). Notably, many senior judges saw “external control” of the judiciary as
an affront to their institutional independence and a violation of the separation of powers
(see discussion of Acre). This was especially the case in states where the judiciary had
already grown substantially and acquired administrative autonomy, as was the case in Rio
Grande do Sul. Thus, judges in Rio Grande do Sul perceived their institution was under
attack from both traditional elites in the form of ACM, and from new, leftist forces, most
prominently in the form of the PT. Indeed, interviewed judges fondly recalled Collares
and the left-of-center PDT, but expressed bitter memories of a “disrespectful” Dutra and
the PT (Interview 183; 194). In short, the climate of policy change was very different
beginning in 1999, and the strong baseline condition of the TJRS following several years
of growth since 1991-1992 made the reformist PT a natural enemy.
In this climate of hostility between the PT and the courts, Olívio Dutra began his
first year as the state’s first PT governor. Exacerbating the situation, Dutra’s
administration also overlapped with an economic crisis that spread from Asian economies
and Russia to Brazil, causing revenues to shrink and creating enormous pressure for the
reduction of public spending.
In this context, the PT had a highly contested relationship with the courts from
1999-2002. In efforts to reduce spending, the PT challenged the high levels of spending
of the TJRS, leading the judiciary to formally challenge the executive’s reduction of the
judicial budget as Gomes Nunes did in 1989. 164 The national debate regarding judicial
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This kind of challenge occurred again in 2007, for the 2008 budget, when governor Yeda Crussius
(PSDB) reduced the judiciary’s budget. In Rio Grande do Sul, the PSDB has a distinctively neoliberal feel,
heightened under the administration of Yeda Crussius, so their particular rationale could be categorized
under the rubric of fiscal discipline or austerity. While the PSDB’s reduction in 2007 was fairly drastic, the
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reform and pressures of the economic crisis made a difficult combination for the
relationship between the PT administration and the courts. From the judiciary’s
perspective, the PT appeared unexpectedly as a negative influence, seeking to “check”
the judiciary’s power both financially and administratively. From the PT’s perspective,
local judicial budgets had become bloated and too strong, leading to perceptions that
judges had become privileged, bourgeois elites. Indeed, interviews identified this
perception among the political left of “o juiz burguês” (e.g., Interview 144).
The phenomenon of PT-TJRS contestation is important because it signals the
extent to which the effect of ideology on court strength may be conditioned by existing
institutional strength, i.e., the level of the judiciary’s institutionalization, and by the
timing and sequence of reform efforts. That is, in states where the courts are very weak,
the left may exert a positive influence in order to build effective institutions, balance the
separation of powers, and strengthen democratic practice. However, in states where the
courts are already strong – as was arguably the case in Rio Grande do Sul by 1998 – the
left may exert more of an accountability function. Viewed solely from the perspective of
judges, the left may be positive if judges are trying to rise from irrelevance and create
more open institutions, but the left may be negative if judges are already strong and the
left seeks to check judicial budgets and salaries, or oversee the institution in any way.
This latter phenomenon of supervision for the sake of accountability may actually trigger
recent memories of executive encroachment on the judiciary, i.e., of the subordination

motivations for reducing the judiciary’s budget were similar to the PT’s – the sense that judicial spending
was high in Rio Grande do Sul, indeed too high. Thus, the leftist PT and the center-right PSDB were both
trying to do the same thing with regards to judicial spending. Importantly, Dutra was trying to control
judicial budgets in a time of crisis, while Crussius was doing so in a time of economic growth, though the
state did have a budget crisis and has had budgetary problems for a long time. Also, these two conflicts
were qualitatively different from the executive control of the judicial budget that existed historically and
that Gomes Nunes was challenging in 1989.
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and vulnerability of the courts vis-à-vis the political branches. Indeed, in RS the court
was already strong locally and reacted negatively to the PT’s demands for accountability.
The PT was also supporting the national judicial reform project, especially the portion of
the project about external controls and accountability mechanisms. This was a positive
innovation for judges who worked in courts in the poorer and less institutionalized parts
of the country, especially the north and northeast, but it was negative for judges who
worked in highly functional and professional institutions in some of the wealthier and
more institutionalized states, especially in the south.165 Specifically, the PT had long
advocated the “external control” (controle externo) of the judiciary. This position mapped
onto the preferences of progressive judges inside weak or captured institutions, e.g.,
Maranhão, but clashed with the preferences of judges, even progressive ones, inside
strong, autonomous institutions, e.g., Rio Grande do Sul. 166
In sum, the left was an ally of judicial reform early in the strengthening process in
Rio Grande do Sul, as evidenced by the relationship between the PDT and the judiciary in
the early 1990s. However, once the judiciary grew stronger on its own – becoming one of
the models of institutional strength for the rest of the country – the prospect of being

165

An additional factor in Rio Grande do Sul in particular is regional pride, or gauchismo. The idea of a
national, centralized power that could oversee local affairs – which were generally (and correctly) regarded
as functioning better than many of the national institutions – was offensive to gauchos on a culturalideational level.
166
This friction between the PT and judges in strong institutions mirrored tensions over the national judicial
reform project. The PT initiated the reform project and was leading the way in the promotion of an
external mechanisms of accountability, the proposed National Justice Council. However, judicial memories
of the previous council – an organ created by the military regime to control the judiciary, which was
eradicated by the 1988 constitution – generated animosity against the new proposal for a council. Of
course, the new proposal had nothing to do with the authoritarian model employed during the military
regime, but the judiciary had grown in strength and independence since 1988 (see, e.g., Garouda and
Ginsburg 2009, 111). Plainly stated, judges – especially federal judges and local judges working within
strong institutions – resisted giving up their newfound strength. The resistance is understandable in
historical context, but the point highlighted by the comparison between Rio Grande do Sul and other states
is that not all local judiciaries were strong. Where courts were weak, e.g., Maranhão, judges relished the
idea of a national institution they could call upon to hold their local institutions accountable.
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constrained by budgetary reductions or a national reform that imposed external
mechanisms of accountability generated tensions between the courts and the proponents
of said restrictions – the PT. The experience of the courts and the political left in Rio
Grande do Sul is critical because it signals differences in the left’s attitude toward the
judiciary and, conversely, in judicial attitudes toward the left, depending on the condition
of the courts, the timing of the PT’s arrival in office, and the sequence of reform efforts.
Indeed, these three factors may operate as a sort of critical juncture at the local level. If
the left arrives at a time when the court is weak, the judiciary may develop a positive
relationship with the left. However, if the timing of the left’s arrival in office coincides
with a more “advanced” stage of judicial strength, the tone of the left’s relationship with
the judiciary may be acrimonious. Similarly, if politicians initiate a reform effort where
courts are weak, judges may be receptive, but if politicians initiate a reform where courts
are strong or becoming strong on their own, there may be tension. Importantly, even in
Rio Grande do Sul, the left favors strong judicial institutions – transparent, accessible,
and effective courts that provide a quality service to the population. The adversarial
relationship between the left and the courts emerged primarily with regard to judicial
spending and an independent agency of accountability.

7.3.3. Courts in Authoritarian Enclaves
Despite the bleak judicial landscape in Maranhão, there are four promising sources of
change that gained expression after 2002: (1) the local judges’ association (AMMA); (2) the
local chapter of the national lawyers’ association (OAB-MA); (3) the union of employees
from both the courts and the public prosecutor’s office (SINDJUMP); and (4) two leftist
legislators – the single PT deputy in the local congress, Dep. Helena Barros Heluy, and a
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PCdoB deputy in the federal congress, Dep. Flavio Dino. These four forces help us to
understand the condition of the courts in Maranhão prior to 2002, even if only for the fact
that these forces have begun to exert meaningful influence very recently. Each of these actors
has brought at least one legal action before the national judicial council (CNJ), and the details
of the litigation also help us understand the status quo of the courts. Further, their efforts are
remarkable because there appears to be nothing else pushing the judiciary in a positive
direction, either from other politicians or from the judicial leadership itself. Also, the results
of their efforts were only just beginning to show in 2008 and early 2009. Moreover, from an
analytic standpoint, these influences are compelling because they overlap with the causal
mechanisms identified in Acre and Rio Grande do Sul – lobbying from within the judiciary
by judges’ association (AMMA), and sympathetic support from external actors on the left of
the ideological spectrum in the form of the PT and PCdoB. The OAB activities do not map
well onto the forces in other states, but are a compelling new complement to consider in
additional states, and resonate with the democratizing influence the national lawyers’
association had at the national level in the 1980s.
Finally, a crucial component of the causal mechanisms of change in Maranhão is the
extent to which these four forces – AMMA, OAB-MA, SINDJUMP, and the PT and PCdoB
legislators – leverage the influence of national institutions, specifically the CNJ, to draw
attention to the condition of the judiciary in Maranhão. That is, these actors exit the state and
move to another level of the regime – the national level – in order to promote judicial change
back at the local level. This use of national agencies and institutions by local actors signals
the poverty and passivity of local resources for change, but also coincides with the link
between local actors and the national AMB in Acre in 2003, highlighting the way in which
the particular design of Brazil’s judicial federalism shapes the logic of change. Theoretically,
this process resonates with Snyder’s (2001a; 2001b) attention to the way actors at different
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levels of a regime interact to shape policy outcomes, and with a domestic version of Keck
and Sikkink’s (1998) policy boomerang.
Among these influences, the AMMA took a critical leadership role in effecting
change, a role that has sometimes been risky and even dangerous, highlighting the resilience
of patterns of authoritarianism and traditional politics within Brazil.167 The AMMA was
originally a politically benign group that focused most of its energy on social activities
among judicial colleagues. Notably, the group never challenged the poverty of conditions in
the courts, the poor functioning of courts, or the drain on financial resources at the top of the
judicial hierarchy. However, beginning in 2001-2002, a small group of progressive judges –
led principally by lower-court, first-instance judges Rolando Maciel and Gervasio dos Santos
– began organizing a candidacy for the leadership of AMMA. They canvassed neighborhoods
and lobbied their colleagues, arguing for an administration of justice that was more
democratic. Ultimately, they were successful in the internal elections of 2002, and Maciel
became AMMA president. Under Maciel’s leadership, the judges’ organization began
challenging the administration of the judiciary by the judges on the state’s supreme court
(Interview 160; 191).
This challenge coalesced in 2006, when the AMMA filed an administrative action
with the CNJ – Proceso de Controle Administrativo, or PCA168 – challenging the legality of
payments made to personnel within the judiciary and requesting a review of the judiciary’s
finances and payroll between 2005 and 2008 (PCA 255). This legal action taken by the
AMMA became the central mechanism of accountability between 2006 and 2008, as other
167

AMMA leadership received threats at the height of some of the actions described herein, including
threats to the safety of their family members (Interview 160; Interview 191).
168
PCAs are one of several oversight procedures available at the CNJ. The CNJ’s regulations allow for
other mechanisms, including PAD (Processo Administrativo Disciplinar), PP (Pedido de Providências),
and Inspection (Inspeção). The disciplinary measures available under each of these vary, but in both PCAs
and PADs, the CNJ has the power to remove judges from office and forward proceedings to the local and
federal public prosecutors for criminal actions (Regimento Interno do CNJ, art. 75, para. 2; art. 95, sec. III;
and art. 105; see, e.g., PCA 255).
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actions initiated by the OAB and SINDJUMP were joined to the process of deciding PCA
255, and both the PT and PCdoB legislators lobbied in favor of these actions and expressed
public support for the AMMA and the CNJ’s activities (Dino 2007; Jornal Pequeno 2007;
Barros Heluy 2009). Ultimately, PCA 255 also led to the CNJ’s own actions, including PCA
439 (initiated 2007) and an inspection in Maranhão in October and November of 2008
discussed below (CNJ Portaria 83/2008).
Decided on June 25, 2008, nearly two years after it was originally filed (Sept. 13,
2006) PCA 255 included a financial review (auditoria) by a team of four accountants from
the TCU that spent 40 days in Maranhão (PCA 255 Acordão, 5-6).169 In its decision, the CNJ
determined that between January 2005 and April 2008 the TJMA had misused funds totaling

90,550,059.80 reais, which at the time translated to approximately $43 million USD.170
Among the more egregious financial actions noted by the CNJ, were payments to the
wife of the TJMA president,171 and payments for 224 employees who were no longer
active or never actually worked at the court. This last group of employees included more
than 200 who were ordered dismissed by the CNJ in 2005 due to nepotism, including the
wife of the President of the TJMA in 2006, Raimundo Liciano de Carvalho, who
continued working at the court as of the date of the decision (June 25, 2008) (PCA 255
Acordão, 7, 47; CNJ Resolução 07/2005). Also among the highlights of this decision
were (i) the criticism of the large number of discretionary employees (CCs), of which
only a small portion (19.9%) were filled with personnel from civil service streams, in

169

The CNJ has an agreement with the TCU that allows the two institutions to work together. In cases like
this one (PCA 255), the CNJ is able to rely on the technical expertise of TCU staff to conduct audits and
reviews of court finances (CNJ Convênio 1/2007).
170
The average exchange rate between January 1, 2005 and April 30, 2008, was of 2.12 reais to the dollar
(2.12:1). The real lost as much as 40% of its value against the dollar after the global economic crisis began
to manifest itself in the latter part of 2008 (Oanda 2009).
171
Iná Nascimento Silva de Carvalho, wife of Raymundo Liciano de Carvalho.
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direct violation of local and national constitutions (Acordão, 8), and (ii) the TJ’s upward
adjustments of salaries, especially salary ceilings, by way of internal regulatory changes,
rather than by legislation in the local congress, again in violation of national and local
laws (Acordão, 14). The CNJ counselor, Felipe Locke Cavalcanti, ended his decision by
congratulating the AMMA for its courage and persistence in drawing attention to these
matters, and summarized the present obligations of the TJMA to stop hiring illegally,
stop illegal payments, return money paid illegally, and remove the wife of the former
President from her position (as previously directed in 2005) (PCA 255 Acordão, 50-51).
Further, Cavalcanti forwarded his decision to Maranhão’s public prosecutor’s office
(Ministério Público), attorney general (Procurador Geral do Estado), legislature (ALMA,
for consideration of action at TCE), and to the federal attorney general (Procurador Geral
da República).
Complementing the AMMA’s efforts, two legislators have supported judicial
strengthening in Maranhão: local deputy Helena Barros Heluy (PT), and federal deputy
Flávio Dino (PCdoB). Both Barros Heluy and Dino contribute deep understandings of the
needs of the judiciary. Barros Heluy was an attorney herself, a public prosecutor, law
professor, and as of 2007 three of her children were judges in Maranhão (Interview 152;
Interview 160; Interview 191; ALMA [n.d.]. One judge described Barros Heluy as the only
local legislator with a serious commitment to reform the judiciary (Interview 160). Similarly,
Dino was an attorney, a federal judge, president of the national association of federal judges
(AJUFE), also a law professor, and was secretary-general of the CNJ before running for
political office (Dino n.d.). Thus, both Barros and Dino are first “internal players” and later
“external players” drawing from their professional pride and ideological commitments in
seeking to improve the conditions of the judiciary.
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Barros Heluy has also initiated litigation that, though not aimed directly at the courts
in the way that AMMA’s PCA 255 was, have helped check the excesses of the political
branches and generated a larger opening for actions like those pursued by the AMMA, as
well as the OAB and SINDJUMP discussed below. Both suits filed by Barros Heluy were
against governors. The first suit challenged Governor Roseana Sarney’s act of putting her
name on the state’s accounting court (Tribunal de Contas do Estado, or TCE) (Ação Popular
in Vara de Fazenda Pública, initiated Dec. 16, 2002).172 The second suit challenged
Governor José Reinaldo Tavares act in his last year in office of granting ex-governors a
lifetime pension; that is, he was establishing a benefit from which he would gain immediately
in the following year (this was still in litigation in late 2007, see, e.g., Recursos Especiais
17.536/2007 and 17.538/2007, initiated by Jose Reinaldo Carneiro Tavares) ((1) Ação
Popular (Processo 5975/2003) (initiated April 7, 2003).

Both episodes are revealing of traditional politics in Maranhão, and Brazil more
generally. However, the first episode is particularly relevant to the judiciary because the
actions before the CNJ were forwarded to, among other institutions, the TCE in
Maranhão. For example, the TCE is supposed to review the CNJ’s decision in PCA 255
and determine whether and how the judiciary should be disciplined or prosecuted. Thus,
the fact that the former governor and sitting federal senator, Roseana Sarney Murad –
who as of April 17, 2009, returned as governor of Maranhão after the impeachment of the
sitting governor – placed her name on the principal auditing authority of the state,
officially naming the court, “Palacio Governadora Roseana Sarney Murad”. When Barros
Heluy initiated the litigation to challenge this act, the state legislature – dominated by
Sarney’s allies, passed a constitutional reform (with the requisite supermajority of votes)
172

This case was still being litigated as of December 2008 (see Gonçalves 2008).
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to alter the relevant article so that the court’s new name would not be patently
unconstitutional (Emenda Constitucional, or EC 36/2003). In spite of the relatively clear
legal issue at stake, the case remained in litigation as of December 2008, six years later,
and Roseana Sarney’s name remains on the court. In short, there is ample reason to be
cynical and expect that the TCE will not do much to hold the TJ or the political branches
accountable since these institutions are populated by the same traditional, powerful
families. This cynicism is especially justified now that, as of April 17, 2009, Roseana
Sarney was returning to govern Maranhão.
Further complementing the AMMA’s actions since 2002, the local chapter of the
national lawyers’ association, the OAB-MA, filed another legal complaint with the CNJ on
July 5, 2006, approximately two months before the AMMA filed PCA 255. The OAB’s
action, PCA 175, alleged improprieties in the contract between the TJMA and one of Brazil’s
largest banks, Banco do Brasil (BdoB). According to the contract, BdoB was going to handle
the judiciary’s payroll, as well as all deposits from litigation (e.g., fines, fees, and liens
collected by the courts). Initially, the TJMA justified the relationship, saying that BdoB was
also helping the judiciary finance the acquisition of materials and supplies, including
computers and information technology. However, after the CNJ began reviewing the OAB’s
action, the TJMA’s own in-house counsel (assesoria jurídica) recommended cancelling the
contract due to the legal issues involved, and the TJ did just that on November 20, 2006. On
April 18, 2007, the CNJ joined this action to AMMA’s action, PCA 255, as well as another
action (PP 1349, discussed below). Ultimately, the TCU’s review of the TJMA’s finances
under PCA 255 helped establish the facts for this action, though the point was moot since the
contract had already been cancelled.
Finally, the union of court employees and personnel from the public prosecutor’s
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office (Sindicato dos Servidores da Justiça e do Ministério Público, or SINDJUMP) also
filed a legal action against the TJMA. This action (Pedido de Providências 1349, or PP 1349)
noted irregular payments to a court employee in the amount of approximately 30,000 USD.
This case was also joined to PCA 255 so that the TCU’s review of TJMA’s finances could
also establish the facts for this case. As noted in PCA 255, the claims of SINDJUMP in PP
1349 were supported.

Despite the challenges of pursuing PCA 255, the AMMA pressed for judicial
improvements on other fronts, as well. The judges’ association never organized a strike
or other labor action, as was the case in both Acre and Rio Grande do Sul, but it did
mobilize 100 first-instance judges in 2007 to appear at the TJ in a show of support for more
transparency and changes to the institution (Interview 191). The AMMA also publicized its
activities, drawing attention to shortcomings in the administration of the courts and other
judicial matters.173 As late as April 2, 2009, AMMA was playing a key role in amplifying the
resources of courts and in constraining the power of the TJ. Regarding resources, AMMA
President Gervasio Santos, Maciel’s successor, and other AMMA staff directly lobbied the
state legislature in order to help pass legislation on March 25, 2009, that added 16 new
substitute judges in the state capital. This measure helped reduce the workload of several
judges, including at least two judges who were responsible for multiple courtrooms (two and
three, respectively) (AMMA Noticias 2009c; 2009d). Regarding new efforts to constrain the
TJ, AMMA was very publicly opposed to irregularities in the civil service exam for open
judgeships (AMMA Noticias 2009e). Thus, the AMMA has been a central force for positive
judicial change.
Importantly, the AMMA judges have only recently become this active in the local
173

The AMMA’s electronic newsletter (AMMA Noticias) and website (www.amma.com.br) were active
with regular announcements and media releases as early as 2006.
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politics of judicial reform. As noted in interviews, two distinct camps of judges developed
within the AMMA since the early 1990s: (i) a conservative group aligned with the traditional,
TJ elites, and (ii) a younger group with a more progressive vision (“visão progressista”),
seeking improvements in the administration and transparency of the courts based, in part, on
an idealistic vision inspired by democratization, the 1988 constitution (Interview 160), and
progressive movements in other parts of the country. With regards to these movements in
other regions, the “alternative law” (direito alternativo) movement, which was strongest in
Rio Grande do Sul and was very influential in shaping the minds of young judges in that
state, as well as in states like Maranhão (Interview 152; Barros Heluy 2006; see also
Engelmann 2007).174 The former, conservative group had dominated until very recently, but
the group led by Rolando Maciel and Gervásio Santos began pushing for greater openness in
the late 1990s and in the early 2000s. Only in 2003, after the election of Maciel as president
of the association, did the progressive group become an expressive majority, pushing PCA
255 to the CNJ struggling in the ways mentioned above against the heretofore unchallenged
opacity of the TJMA (AMMA Noticias 2007). Among judges, Maciel has the kind of folkhero status that Adair Longuini or Arquilau de Melo Melo have in Acre, maintaining pressure
on the judiciary to open despite threats to his person and family (Interview 160; 191).
Gervásio Santos succeeded Maciel beginning January of 2007, giving continuity to this
progressive cadre, and the same group, again led by Santos, won another two-year
administration on December 12, 2008 (AMMA Noticias 2008b). Thus, a progressive group
within the judiciary has gained prominence and leadership since 2003, and has actively been
challenging the traditional, hierarchical, opaque, and weak judicial structure of the state.
174

Gaining prominence in the 1980s, direito alternativo was a judicial philosophy that prioritized
substantive concerns about justice and equity in deciding litigation rather that procedurally correct and
formally legal decisions that led to unjust results. Given that the movement is broadly concerned with
contextual economic factors and social justice, some observers draw connections between “alternative law”
and Marxism. The analog of “alternative law” in the U.S. is the “critical legal studies” (CLS) movement.
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CNJ Boomerang
The various actions of the AMMA, OAB-MA, SINDJUMP, and Dep. Helena Barros
Heluy were effective in so far as the CNJ eventually initiated its own action – PCA 439 – and
an inspection of Maranhão’s courts on October 22-25 and November 21-22, 2008 (CNJ
Portaria 83/2008). First, PCA 439 (initiated February 2, 2007) was activated by the CNJ itself
(de oficio) following CNJ Resolutions 13 and 14 (March 21, 2006), which set salary ceilings
for the judiciary at all levels and directed state TJs to inform the CNJ of the salary structure
in each state. Noting irregularities in the salary structure of Maranhão’s judiciary, PCA 439
was born (see “Voto Vencido” of Feb 7, 2007 for clearest statement of rationale). Despite the
CNJ’s stated motivation for PCA 439, it is reasonable to infer that the previous actions also
motivated the administrative body. The complaints discussed above had already reached the
CNJ. Specifically, two complaints reached the CNJ in 2006 – PCA 175 and PCA 255 – both
of which cited financial irregularities, and PCA 255 identified multiple irregularities related
to salaries and extralegal payments. Thus, a reasonable conclusion is that Maranhão’s
judiciary already had the CNJ’s attention prior to February 2007 when the Council decided to
take a closer look at salary ceilings in Maranhão. Indeed, the final decision of PCA 255
congratulates AMMA for its courage in raising the case of abuses within the TJMA in the
first place (PCA 255 Acordão, 50). That is, the counselors at the CNJ noticed that it was
judges themselves who were complaining about courts in Maranhão, which is another signal
that this case quickly raised Maranhão’s profile at the CNJ.
A second example of a “boomerang” with stronger effects was the CNJ’s inspection
of Maranhão’s courts in 2008. Citing several worrisome signs from Maranhão – including the
large number of unattended cases, the growing backlog of cases, and the total absence of any
disciplinary or corrective measures by the local judiciary – the inspection took place between
October 22 and 25 and November 21 and 22 (CNJ Portaria 83/2008; CNJ Inspeção –
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Relatório 2009). Despite the fact that none of the previous complaints were cited formally as
motivations for the inspection, it is again reasonable to conclude that the prior actions played
a meaningful part. The sequence of events and the timing of the inspection strongly suggest
that all the previous complaints, especially those from the local associations of judges
(AMMA) and lawyers (OAB-MA) played a prominent role in motivating the CNJ to examine
the inner workings of Maranhão’s judiciary.
The CNJ’s inspection (inspeção preventiva) was harshly critical of Maranhão’s
courts. Among its findings were the following highlights: (i) the excessive number of
discretionary employees (cargos em comissão, or CCs) criticized in earlier decisions (see
PCA 255) were still employed, generating expenses in just the offices of the 24
desembargadores of R$2.5 million per month ($1.25 million US, or about $50,000 per judge
per month); (ii) a large number of payments to inactive employees or “ghost employees”
(servidores fantasma)175, which were also criticized in PCA 255; (iii) a large number of
judicial orders remained unexecuted, among which at least 4,000 were found in storage in no
apparent order (i.e., not sorted by date or priority), and the storage area had been organized
only one week earlier, i.e., after the CNJ announced it would be conducting its inspection;
(iv) extraordinarily excessive and unsupervised per diems (initially R$2000 reais ($1000

USD), but lowered to $1000 reais ($500 USD)); and (v) the use of 144 officers of the
military police used to guard the private homes of desembargadores (CNJ Inspeção –
Relatório). While it remains to be seen whether the CNJ will be able to enforce its
decisions in Maranhão, the political logic that once facilitated or even promoted a weak,
patrimonial judiciary has changed. The CNJ has been an effective “federal foothold” for

175

This phenomenon of servidores fantasma in Brazil is similar to the phenomenon of voladores, or
“fliers” in Mexico – individuals who are listed as employees and who collect a salary, but who never
actually perform any work.
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local reformists – internal and external – to leverage the attention and political influence
of national institutions.
In this regard, many local judges feel vindicated for their support of the national
reform of 2004 that created the CNJ. For instance, Ronaldo Maciel, AMMA president
from 2003-2006, was one of only three presidents of local judges’ associations who
lobbied his judicial colleagues in 2003-2004 in favor of an organ of external
accountability like the CNJ (controle externo). In general, the judicial community was
against external supervision of their institution (Sadek 2001). As AMMA president,
Maciel attended meetings of the national judges’ association (AMB) alongside his
colleagues from all 27 states (including the federal district). However, Maciel was one of
only three association presidents (along with his equals from Ceará and Pernambuco)
who supported the creation of the CNJ. Indeed, in an interview, Maciel recalled a
confrontation with the president of the judges’ association from Rio Grande do Sul
(AJURIS), who had been criticizing the CNJ as an affront to judicial independence and
an invasion of the judicial branch by the political branches. Maciel responded that the
opposition to the CNJ in Rio Grande do Sul was understandable, since that state already
had a strong and functional judiciary. However, even if the CNJ did restrict a portion of
the state’s administrative autonomy, the judiciary would remain a strong institution. As
phrased by Maciel at the time, Rio Grande do Sul was upset because they were being
asked to switch “from a Ferrari to a Mercedes”. He asked his colleagues to consider that,
in Maranhão, they were still “inventing the wheel”.176

176

Author’s translation. Original Portuguese: “vocês estão mudando de Ferrari para Mercedes; no
Maranhão estamos inventando a roda.” After giving this speech at the AMB, Maciel recalled that the
president of the judges’ association of Ceará, Michel Pinheiro, approached him and welcomed Maciel to
the “losing side”, referring to the generalized opposition to the CNJ within the AMB leadership (“bem-
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6.4. Causal Logics
Having traced the process of key moments of judicial change in three Brazilian
states, I now turn to a more focused assessment of the underlying causal logics.
Specifically, I seek to adjudicate among the competing and contradictory causal logics
that undergird expectations associated with electoral competition, and to identify the
causal logic underlying the association between party identity and change. Overall, this
portion of the analysis seeks to refine the causal account of judicial change, finding the
right causal place for external and internal influences.
First, the re-election logic is not supported. In both Acre and Rio Grande do Sul,
the policies toward the judiciary were not packaged as any kind of “best practice” or
“best policy” for the sake of re-election. Rather, it was the association of first-instance
judges in Acre (ASMAC) and both first-instance judges and the judicial leadership in Rio
Grande do Sul that raised the issues of judicial spending and autonomy. Additionally, the
timing and sequence of the two crucial moments of judicial change in Acre do not
support the re-election logic since both moments occurred after elections. The first
budgetary increase in 2000 came after the PT had won office and almost two years before
the next gubernatorial elections. This timing undermines any strong claim that the new
PT governor (Viana) conceded to ASMAC’s demands in late 2000 in order to be reelected in late 2002. However, many of the demands required fulfillment throughout
2001 and even 2002, so while there is no clear evidence of re-election motives, the
possibility that Viana was maximizing his electoral chances cannot be dismissed entirely.
Similarly, the strike in 2003 came after Viana was re-elected in 2002, in the first year of
vindo ao grupo do voto vencido”).
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his second and final term. Moreover, Viana had not moved on his budgetary proposals for
the judiciary during 2002, which was the relevant electoral year for the re-election logic.
If this logic were correct, Viana should have been very flexible during 2002, which he
was not. It is reasonable to infer that he had a larger stake in resolving the first strike –
given that he would soon be campaigning for re-election – and that he did not face similar
electoral pressures in mid-2003. Nonetheless, he would have still wanted his party to win
the 2006 elections, so he would have faced similar electoral incentives in order to
maximize his party’s success. In any case, there is no clear evidence that Viana was
pursuing judicial change as a kind of “best policy” for the sake of appealing to the
electorate.
In Rio Grande do Sul, Alceu Collares had already won his election in 1990 and
was in the first half of his administration when he began supporting Púperi’s and
Barison’s projects of judicial autonomy and a more substantial budget. Thus, as was the
case in Acre, Collares did not make judicial reform a campaign priority, but promotes the
strengthening of the court after being elected. Finally, in Maranhão, the historically low
levels of electoral competitiveness and the persistence of traditional politics would not
lead us to anticipate a re-election logic to motivate politicians to propose policies of
judicial change. Indeed, the only local politician to voice consistent and public support
for improving the administration of justice was the PT legislator, Barros Heluy.
The evidence also disfavors the insurance logic of Ginsburg and Finkel. This
logic highlights the electoral uncertainty of sitting administrations, requiring that present
majorities (i) anticipate an imminent electoral loss, and (ii) strengthen the courts in an
effort to protect themselves as future minorities. That is, expecting to soon be out of
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office, current majorities strengthen the third branch of government in order to “selfprotect” against incoming majorities, accepting the short-term costs of reduced power in
exchange for the long-term benefits of political safety (Finkel 2001; 2008; Ginsburg
2003).
This is not the case in Acre, Rio Grande do Sul, or Maranhão, where the timing
and sequence of change cut against the insurance logic. In Acre, the PT was in the middle
of a historic first administration in the state (1999-2002), judicial strengthening began in
2000-2001, the restrictions on running for re-election had been lifted in 1997, and there
were strong indications that the PT would win a second term in the October 2002
elections.177 In Rio Grande do Sul, Collares had just entered office in 1991. Though he
would not be able to run for re-election in 1994, making it more likely that he would be a
future minority again (as he was from 1982-1990), he should be strengthening the courts
on his way out of office, not at the beginning, which would actually restrain his own
power. That is, an executive should give away power to another institution when she will
no longer be needing or using that power, and in order to keep it from her adversaries
who are about to enter office, not when the administration is just starting and will have to
co-habit with a strong judicial branch for at least a full term.
Further undercutting the insurance logic, the events in Acre and Rio Grande do
Sul ask us to consider why the previous administrations in each state did not strengthen
courts. That is, prior to the PT victory in Acre, why did the previous PMDB
177

Viana did win a second term, but this kind of ex-post evidence should not be used to support or undercut
theoretical expectations. For similar reasons, skepticism could be expressed regarding ex-post arguments in
other contexts, e.g., Mexico’s national judicial reform in 1994, where there is a risky temptation to point to
the PRI-to-PAN transition in 2000 as proof of the PRI’s motivations in 1994, a full six years before the
transition. For arguments in support of an insurance explanation in this context, see Ginsburg (2003) and
Finkel (2005; 2008). For more skeptical positions, see Inclán (2006), Magaloni (2008), and Ríos-Figueroa
(2007).
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administration not strengthen courts? Further back, why did the previous PDS
administration not strengthen courts before the PMDB’s victory? Similarly, prior to
Collares’s PDT administration in Rio Grande do Sul, why did the PMDB or PDS
administrations not strengthen the courts? The judiciary was a prominent part of the
constitutional debates of 1988 and 1989, and a national debate regarding judicial reform
maintained a high profile since 1992, following a reform project initially proposed by the
PT (Sadek 2001). The actions by leftist parties in government and the lack of action by
other governing parties suggest ideology trumps insurance.178
Maranhão offers a kind of crucial case for the insurance logic, much like the case
of Hidalgo in Mexico. Maranhão’s political elites had the single-veto-player environment
in which to at least start improving the judiciary, but they did not do so. Indeed,
following the insurance logic, these elites (current majorities) had been in power for a
long time, so the risks to them if they were to lose power (future minorities) were high.
Moreover, the PDT’s recent win in the governor’s race of 2006 could be read as
suggesting there was electoral uncertainty in the preceding years. However, interviews
indicate there is little distance between the PFL/DEM majorities and the PDT,
highlighting that the PDT governor, Jackson Lago, was part of previous PFL
administrations and that Lago and other dominant politicians “all belong to the same
group”, namely the coalitions built around the Sarneys (Interview 152).179 In addition, the
actions brought before the CNJ, and the decisions of the CNJ itself, had provided ample
178

Thanks to Bill Stanley for suggesting this phrasing.
A compelling example of the kind of “choreographed opposition” in Maranhão occurred in 2006, when
Roseana Sarney Murad’s brother-in-law, Ricardo Murad, wanted to run for governor. He was legally barred
from doing so because of his close family ties with Roseana, so he set out to distance himself from his
brother’s wife in awkward, contrived, public statements about how opposed he had always been to her
(Correio Braziliense 2002). In any case, the recent events in Maranhão – the PDT victory in October of
2006 and Roseana Sarney’s success in impeaching Lago and having the TSE place her, as the runner-up,
back in the governor’s office – suggest that the configurations of power may be shifting.
179
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evidence of specific problems in the judiciary, and had even ordered specific changes.
Despite all these factors, nothing changed. Indeed, even as Roseana Sarney returned as
governor of Maranhão on April 17, 2009, bringing the PFL back to the executive, the
CNJ’s orders remain disobeyed and unenforced.
Rather than supporting an insurance logic, the evidence in Maranhão supports a
logic of entrenchment that is reminiscent of Hirschl’s (2004) “hegemonic preservation”
thesis. However, the entrenchment in Maranhão, much like that in the Mexican state of
Hidalgo, differs from Hirschl’s thesis in two important ways: (1) it is not ideological, and
(2) it does not result in any actual strengthening of the courts. Unlike the individualistic
and neoliberal ideology that motivated Hirschl’s elites, the elites in Maranhão are simply
trying to remain in power and in control of the sources of patronage. This is most
apparent in the incidents of corruption mentioned in the disciplinary processes before the
CNJ, including nepotism, “ghost employees”, extraordinary per diems, and using the
military police to guard the residences of judicial elders. Additionally, unlike Hirschl’s
elites who actually strengthen courts in order to insulate their neoliberal policies within
these non-majoritarian institutions, the elites in Maranhão are not strengthening the
judiciary in any way. Rather, they are preserving their own, narrower networks of
privilege and patronage. Given these differences, the entrenchment in Maranhão is of a
much balder variety than the strategic policy insulation argued by Hirschl, motivated
more by a desire to maintain control of patron-client networks in order to perpetuate the
non-ideological clientelist and patrimonial relations that have characterized relations of
power in the state for so long. Thus, unlike the insurance logic or even Hirschl’s
neoliberal entrenchment or insulation, the evidence indicates Maranhão’s elites have
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tightened their grip on local institutions rather than resort to the subtle, longer-term,
sophisticated and anticipatory strategy of strengthening courts to provide any kind of
protection, insulation, or institutional “lock-in” for their policies. Notably, Hirschl’s
thesis is based on the analysis of four advanced democracies – his “near-ideal” case is
Israel’s reform of 1992 (Hirschl, 50) – so the evidence in Maranhão (and Hidalgo)
suggests that a different kind of entrenchment may work in newer democracies.
The signaling logic also receives no clear support. According to this logic, current
majorities that anticipate remaining in power, but need the support of minorities to
govern effectively, strengthen courts as a signal of their respect for the rights of the
minorities in order to gain their support. This is not the case in either Acre or Rio Grande
do Sul – the two cases of actual strengthening – and there is no sign of this even
beginning to happen in Maranhão.
The veto-player logic, however, does receive support. The clearest evidence is
from Rio Grande do Sul. As early as 1989, when Gomes Nunes challenged budgetary
reductions by the executive, the judiciary effectively leveraged the legislature to act as a
veto point on the executive. Moreover, during the PT’s first state-level administration
(1999-2002), the executive tried to check the judiciary’s spending, but the judiciary was
again able to challenge the reduction. Also, in 2007 the new PSDB governor, Yeda
Crussius, engaged the judiciary in a very public and bitter battle over the court budget for
2008. The TJRS went as far as the nation’s high constitutional court (STF) in order to
challenge the governor.
Importantly, the motives of the three attacks on judicial budgets in Rio Grande do
Sul – by the PMDB in 1989, the PT in 2001, and the PSDB in 2007 – were not the same,
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generating different possibilities for resolution and a different range of outcomes. Thus,
while there is support for the veto-player logic, the logic provides information about
when we might expect policy change, but gives no information about preferences or
motives, i.e., the content of policies or the direction of change. Even the logic’s capacity
to predict the timing of change is undermined by the example from 1991-1992, when
Collares strengthens the court under effectively the same number of veto players as when
the executive attacked the judicial budget in 1989. Further complicating the logic, in
Maranhão, the non-competitive, single-veto environment should have made it easy for
the political branches to effect change, but reform does not happen. Thus, even where we
expect the logic to anticipate the timing of change, it fails because of the absence of
information regarding preferences and motives. In short, beyond the number of relevant
actors, the information regarding the motives, preferences, or the ideological identity of
relevant actors is crucial for anticipating both the timing and the content or direction of
reform.
In contrast to the weak or mixed evidence regarding most of the causal logics
underpinning electoral competition, there is strong support for the causal role of ideology.
In this regard, three types of evidence are particularly useful: (1) the nature and extent of
change when change is easiest to accomplish; (2) the degree of effort to bring about
change when it is very difficult to carry out, i.e., persistence when confronted with
significant obstacles; and (3) instances in which actors pursue positive change that is
against their own narrow, material self-interest.
The fact that the PFL/DEM in Maranhão did not promote change when it was
easiest for them to do so speaks to the first type of evidence. That is, the PFL/DEM failed
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to improve the judiciary during its long, single-veto-player tenure in government. This
was strategically the easiest environment in which to effect change, but the status quo
remained. Indeed, the judiciary continued to deteriorate. This evidence cuts against any
conclusion that the PFL/DEM in Maranhão systematically or programmatically supported
strong courts. Rather, the evidence supports the conclusion that the PFL/DEM is a
clientelist party marked by persistent patronage-based politics and patrimonialism, a
dynamic that has penetrated and corroded the judiciary.
The actors that have pushed for change in Maranhão – the AMMA, Barros Heluy,
the OAB-MA, and the union of court employees – have done so under very difficult
circumstances and, in some cases, at considerable risk. This persistence in the face of
substantial obstacles speaks to the second type of evidence. Moreover, progressive judges
and other “operators of the law” (operadores do direito) have found sympathetic support
in local PT and federal PCdoB legislators. This is not to say that lofty idealism has been a
root cause of efforts to change the status quo. Rather, an analytically conservative
conclusion is that progressive, democratizing currents within the judiciary (internal
influences) have risked substantial costs in order to improve local courts, and their efforts
have resonated with left-of-center politicians (external influences) who have been
pushing for a closer approximation between democratic theory and democratic practice.
At the very least, this signals the important role of ideas in shaping reform efforts. That
is, from at least the judges’ perspective, attitudes, values and other cultural-ideational
factors override narrow considerations of material self-interest.
In Acre, a similar pattern emerges, though there is a much stronger political
presence of the left and greater interaction between internal and external pressures. The
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strongest improvements have been initiated, facilitated, or approved by actors within the
PT or actors sympathetic to the PT, including Des. Arquilau de Melo Melo, who was a
founding member of the PT before becoming a judge.
Finally, in Rio Grande do Sul, governor Collares gave up a portion of executive
power during his own administration, transferring this power to the judiciary. Along with
Viana’s actions to strengthen the courts in Acre, this speaks to the third kind of evidence
– actions that are not easily explained by referring to material self-interest. Rather, the
evidence supports the role of ideology and ideas about the proper institutional
configuration in a democracy. Why did Collares grant autonomy to the TJ? If a central
insight of existing research in public law and judicial politics is that politicians seek to
constrain courts, bending them to their political will, then why would a sitting governor
do the opposite early in his term, effectively limiting or constraining his own power and
influence? In this regard, the phrase of an interview cited earlier is illustrative, “there was
friendship, but there was also ideological will”. Indeed, this phrase resonates with a
statement from Acre, “first we were friends, then we were institutions.” Notably, while
these phrases highlight friendship over partisanship, the evidence suggest the
complementary causal prominence of friendship and a reformist ideology.180

6.5. Conclusion
In sum, the entrenchment and veto player logics are the only causal logics

180

Judges in Rio Grande do Sul seemed to acknowledge similar phrases in their understanding of the
success of judicial autonomy in Minas Gerais due to friendship between the executive and judicial
leadership and its failure in Paraná due to the absence of this friendship. The evidence suggests the success
of reform projects depends on more than just friendship. For instance, judges and political elites in
Maranhão are, in all likelihood, close acquaintances if not good friends, yet there is no meaningful reform
project forthcoming.
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underlying electoral competition that receive empirical support. Notably, as competition
increases both of these logics can have negative consequences. Also, the veto player logic
is often neglected in existing analyses of electoral competition, and the entrenchment
logic presented here is non-ideological and corrosive, unlike Hirschl’s neoliberal,
positive, “hegemonic preservation” thesis. The results here suggest both of these logics
deserve greater attention in studies of the consequences of electoral competition,
especially in new democracies transitioning from non-competitive authoritarian
baselines.
With regard to ideology, the findings suggest the left supports judicial
strengthening more than its centrist or rightist counterparts. However, the effect of the
left is mediated by the baseline condition of courts, as well as the timing and sequence of
reform efforts. Overall, we should expect stronger, more developed institutions earlier in
the south and southeast of Brazil, and weaker, less developed, or late-developing
institutions in the center, north, and northeast. Thus, the left should exert a positive effect
throughout the country, even in the south and southeast, early on in the post-authoritarian
phase (i.e., in the 1980s and early 1990s). This relationship should persist in the center,
north, and northeast of the country. However, this effect should reverse after the 1990s –
specifically after 1999 – in the south and southeast, becoming clearly negative in 2000s.
This should be true specifically regarding judicial spending. More broadly, ideology
should exert a strong effect in the south and southeast but a weak effect in other regions,
given that politics in general is less institutionalized in these regions and more
patrimonial and traditional.
The conditional nature of the relationship between the left and court strength
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outlined above resonates nicely with the latter portion of the quantitative findings. That
is, the essence of the discussion above is that the effect of ideology may be contingent on
institutional factors. This is precisely the finding in Chapter 4. Initially, ideology did not
seem to have a consistent relationship with spending, unlike the clear U-shaped
relationship in the Mexican states. However, controlling for the institutionalization of
local party systems (operationalized as electoral volatility), the same U-shaped
relationship emerged in the Brazilian states. That finding was not as robust as it was in
Mexico, but the result is consistent with the qualitative finding reported here – that the
effect of ideology varies across the Brazilian states. Specifically, the effect of the left is
conditioned by the strength of local judicial and party institutions.
The influence of ideology highlights the broader importance of the role of ideas in
understanding judicial change. In this chapter, ideology is the clearest example of the
manner in which ideas or cultural-ideational factors shape and motivate judicial change.
However, there are other examples, as well. First, the very notion that judges can engage
in labor actions – slowdowns, stoppages, and strikes – in order to pressure the judicial
leadership or the political branches, has a cultural-ideational foundation. Although
judicial strikes are often met with claims that they are illegal or unconstitutional (see
footnote 114 in this chapter), the fact that they are widespread in Brazil contrasts starkly
with Mexico, where judges have never gone on strike at any level of government. The
fact that judicial strikes are not unusual in Portugal but that Spanish judges only struck
for the first time in the post-Franco era in February of 2009 (Público 2009) suggests an
avenue of research that explores the extent to which legal or constitutional culture
influence the incidence of judicial strikes in Brazil relative to Mexico that is based in the
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different colonial or constitutional legacies in each country. That is not to say that culture
or colonial legacies determine the outcomes, but rather that the presence or absence of
patterns of extrajudicial activity is suggestive of a different attitude towards this kind of
conduct across the two constitutional cultures. A second example of the role of ideas is
the progressive culture that developed among some judges in Rio Grande do Sul during
the 1980s around “alternative law,” or the rights-consciousness the developed after the
1988 federal constitution. Indeed, both of these movements were explicitly cited as
influential in the way reformist judges in Maranhão perceived their own role and the role
of courts in a democracy. Finally, the new “culture of administration” promoted by the
FGV’s MBA do Judiciário is another example of the role of ideas. Judges in Acre, for
example, highlight the shift in professional attitudes and internal culture that have been
wrought by participation in this program, forming a generation of judges attuned to the
administrative needs of the courts and increasingly equipped with techniques to make
their work faster and better. Importantly, the FGV’s program bears a close ideational
proximity to the mission of the CNJ and the 2004 national reform. This should perhaps
not be surprising, since the director of the FGV law school in Rio de Janeiro and the lead
figure behind the MBA, Joaquim Falcão, was also one of the first counselors on the CNJ.
In sum, the importance of ideology, judicial labor actions, “alternative law”, and the
judicial MBA program highlight the role of ideas, which are generally underemphasized
in the study of institutional change.
Lastly, the CNJ is itself a new and effective mechanism of policy change. Indeed,
the evidence from Maranhão strongly supports the conclusion that the CNJ is fulfilling its
promise of forging a “strong but politically accountable judiciary” (Garoupa and
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Ginsburg 2009, 111-112). From the perspective of understanding causal mechanisms, the
way local actors use the Council as a federal foothold from which to leverage national
institutions to effect local change resonates as a domestic variant of Keck and Sikkink’s
policy boomerang. Moreover, the local-federal-local pattern of change answers Snyder’s
call for greater attention to the ways in which policies move across and are shaped by
different levels of a regime. In this regard, the small-N analysis enhances our
understanding of judicial change in the Brazilian states, and the evidence also yields
insights into the process of policy change in large federal systems.
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Part III. Conclusion

8. Conclusion
Crafting Courts in New Democracies
8.1. Origins of Strong State Courts in Mexico and Brazil
Drawing on the first time-series cross-section analyses of state courts in either
Mexico and Brazil, as well as small-N, process-based research designs in each country,
the results show electoral competition and ideology shape the strength of local courts.
The large-N analyses are limited in their ability to distinguish between multiple causal
logics undergirding electoral competition, but the small-N analyses are more suited to
this task and adjudicate among complementary and competing logics. Moreover, the
cases are explicitly “nested” within the large-N analysis, providing model-testing and
model-building opportunities.
8.1.1. Opportunity Structures, Patronage Preservation, and Ideology in Mexico
In Mexico, the large-N analysis provides clear evidence that competition and
leftist politicians benefit judicial strength, with weaker support for the proposition that
rightist politicians improve courts, and a strong statement that the historically dominant
PRI weakens courts. The positive relationship between competition measures does not
identify specific causal logics, but the negative relationship between divided government
and spending supports the veto player logic. The case studies provide what Lieberman
(2005, 484) considers confirmatory evidence of the causal process underlying the model
tested in the large-N analysis. Specifically, state courts in Mexico are strongest in
Michoacán where electoral competition generated veto players, but leftist politicians and
ideologically sympathetic, progressive judges sustained a reform effort for more than
three years and eventually overcame the legislative veto point. Notably, the divided
government generated by electoral competition was composed of a PRD governor with a
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PRI legislature, and it was the PRI that blocked the PRD’s reformist agenda from 2003 to
2005. The legislative elections in 2005, however, resulted in PRD gains and PRI losses,
weakening the PRI’s ability to veto. Combined with the active extrajudicial conduct in
the form of lobbying in favor of the reform and drafting of a compelling reform agenda,
the PRD and sympathetic judges succeeded in passing the reform, though in diluted form
after negotiations with the PRI. Thus, Michoacán offers the kind of process-based
evidence that confirms the findings of the large-N model and analysis.
In Aguascalientes, courts initially strengthen due to the initiatives of an outsider,
reformist, PRI politician with a market-oriented ideology closer to the neoliberal wing of
the PAN, but judicial elders from traditional elites later reverse these reforms during the
PAN-aligned administration, negating many of the previous reforms. This result supports
the expectation that right-wing ideologies favor reform, but suggests strong differences
between (a) the neoliberal orientation of outsider PRI politicians and (b) the particular
PANista brand of rightist ideology in Aguascalientes. Specifically, the dominant trend
within the PAN in this state is not neoliberal; rather, the party in the state is dominated by
Catholic conservative current of the PAN, which has long been strong in this centralwestern region of Mexico. The extent to which party ideology varies from one state to
another, i.e., the PRI behaving like the economically liberal branch of the PAN, or the
PAN expressing only its socially conservative current, may have important consequences
for institutional change.
In PRI-dominated Hidalgo, reform has come late and in weak form, essentially
amounting to superficial, cosmetic changes and the continuity of top-down, traditional
PRI politics. This evidence is also consistent with the model, but highlights the
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“patronage-preserving” logic that is also present in the Brazilian state of Maranhão. The
extent to which this logic differs from the entrenchment logic of Hirschl (2004) and
Gillman (2002; 2008) is addressed further below.
8.1.2. Opportunity Structures, Patronage Preservation, and Ideology in Brazil
In Brazil, the large-N analysis indicates divided government benefits courts,
cutting against the veto player logic in Brazil and suggesting competition exerts a
positive pressure. However, margin of victory has an unanticipated positive relationship
with judicial spending, i.e., noncompetitive elections correlate with higher court budgets,
contradicting the expected positive relationship between competition and court strength.
Generally, center-left and centrist parties exert an upward pressure on courts. Among
Brazilian parties, the PDT, PMDB, and early PSDB exert this pressure most consistently,
and there is some evidence that the PFL also benefits courts, though only relative to PDSlegacy parties. Importantly, the model also finds right-wing, PDS-legacy parties weaken
courts. Overall, among the reduced group of leftist and centrist Brazilian parties, the
center-left PDT emerges as the most consistent promoter of court strength.
Again, the small-N research offers confirmatory evidence, as judicial strength is
the strongest in the model-testing case of Rio Grande do Sul, which provides compelling
evidence that the PDT administration of Alceu Collares granted critical financial and
administrative autonomy to the judiciary largely for ideological reasons. However, while
ideology was a key influence, Collares and the TJ president, José Barison, were also good
friends, and it was the judicial leaders – first Puperi and then Barison – that pushed for
reforms. Thus, judicial initiatives, coupled with friendship and ideological affinity
between the court president and governor, shaped early gains in court strength. Despite
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the apparent support of the judiciary by this center-left administration – support that led
to a series of years in which the local courts grew in both instiutitonal strength and
legitimacy – a PT governor two administration later (1999-2002) sought to reduce the
judicial budget. This action was seen locally by judges as an invasion of the judiciary’s
autonomy, generating animosity between the judicial leadership and the PT.
In Acre, by contrast, the PT exerts a positive effect. Judges again pressured for
policy change, primarily lower-level judges. The state judges’ association organized a
strike on the eve of a new administration by a senior judge, Alceu de Castro Melo, who
had deep roots in the PT and would be sympathetic to the judges’ demands. Moreover,
Melo shared a close friendship and ideological affinity with the PT governor, Jorge
Viana. Thus, once again, judicial mobilization coupled with friendship and ideological
sympathies across the judicial and executive leadership shaped judicial change.
In Maranhão, as in Hidalgo in Mexico, the judiciary remains institutionally weak
and opaque. Moreover, the leadership of the state courts – the “cupula” of state supreme
court – continues to behave in unethical and illegal ways, evoking memories of
corruption and mismanagement that many observers hoped were part of the distant past.
Much of the problem appears to be in the “patronage-preserving” posture of traditional,
conservative elites. In this state, however, as in other states, reformist initiatives have
come from progressive first-instance judges who gained leadership positions within the
state judges’ association. These judges have leveraged national institutions, namely, the
National Justice Council, to carry out change at the local level. It still remains to be seen
whether this change will occur, but as in other states, the main sources of extrainstitutional support have come from leftist politicians – a single, local legislator from the
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PT and a single federal deputy from the PCdoB. The cases do not provide confirmatory
evidence regarding the PMDB or PSDB, but they do support the negative relationship
between PDS legacy parties and court strength.
Moreover, the case studies show the PT has different effects on court strength
depending on the baseline condition of local party and judicial institutions, helping us
understand why this party – commonly understood as the most programmatic in Brazil –
does not have a statistically significant effect in the large-N analysis. Models that take
into account the baseline strength of the judiciary at the time of reformist initiatives can
help us understand the effect of ideology. The conditioning effect of party system
institutionalization on the influence of ideology can also help in this regard, and helps
explain the different results between Mexico and Brazil. Since the 1990s, Mexico has had
a stable three-party system at the national level. Moreover, this party system is also stable
subnationally. Thus, Mexico’s party system is highly structured, stable, and centralized,
and ideological preferences map well onto this system, facilitating the expression of
consistent ideological commitments. Conversely, Brazil’s national party system is highly
unstable. Despite recent increases in stability, the number of parties and changing
coalitions at the national level stand in stark contrast to the Mexican system.
Furthermore, the Brazilian party system is highly decentralized – state parties often
reflect local, candidate-centered machines, oligarchic or family-based coalitions, and
patronage-based or clientelist patterns. Parties that receive large shares of votes locally
are often not represented nationally. Ultimately, ideological orientation does not map
well onto this party structure, helping to explain some of the inconsistencies regarding the
effect of ideology in the aggregate results in Brazil. Greater attention to the
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operationalization of party system institutionalization will improve expectations
regarding the effect of ideology.
Overall, the results in both Mexico and Brazil highlight the role of ideas. Within
this realm of cultural-ideational factors, the left matters more than the center or the right,
with progressive ideas regarding the role of courts in democratic societies motivating and
exerting a meaningful and consistent influence on reform. Stated otherwise, institutional
change has not been an unintended side effect of democracy, as suggested by some of the
more mechanical logics underpinning electoral competition. Rather, actors intend to
change institutions and work towards this end, often over long periods of time and
despite obstacles and constraints.
However, agents of reform cannot express their intentions automatically, just as
electoral competition does not have automatic effects. The expression of ideas is
contingent upon the strategic terrain, including electoral conditions. Opportunity
structures, alliances, and overlapping historical processes condition the effect of ideas.
Among the historical processes identified in the preceding chapters, three are prominent:
(i) the ideological legacies of authoritarianism, i.e., the extent to which the ideological
location of the base of authoritarianism exerts persistent effects over time, specifically,
the negative effect of the center in Mexico due to the PRI and the right in Brazil due to
ARENA/PDS); (ii) the baseline condition of courts when the left arrives in power, i.e.,
weak courts welcome the reformist program of the left while strong courts reject this
program (e.g., animosity between relatively autonomous judiciary and PT in Rio Grande
do Sul contrasts sharply with the positive role of the PT in Acre and Maranhão); and (iii)
ongoing processes at other levels of the regime, e.g., reform projects at the national level
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in both Mexico and Brazil, or the cross-cutting national pension reform in Brazil in 2003.
To these, we could also add the international movement of ideas regarding the role of
courts in democracies, as evidenced by the movement of leftist or progressive ideas
among Spanish-trained judges in Michoacán, or the movement of similar ideas among the
“alternative law” community in Brazil. Ultimately, the results emphasize the role of ideas
as well as the conditional expression of these ideas, that is, the contingency of
intentionality.

8.2 Contributions
This study yields empirical, methodological, and theoretical contributions.
Empirically, the data generated at the state level in Brazil and Mexico – including
spending data as well as interview, archival, and observational evidence – contribute
greater empirical depth to an underexamined area of judicial politics, subnational court
strength in federal systems. Methodologically, the study contributes a demonstration of
the case selection opportunities available in nesting cases within time-series cross-section
data, and sheds light on how small-N, process-based analysis can at least partially
neutralize concerns about the interdependence of observation in subnational research.
Theoretically, the analysis contributes finer specifications of causal logics
undergirding electoral competition, and articulates theory-guided causal patterns that
enhance the theory-testing capability of process tracing methods. Notably, many of the
conventional causal logics underpinning competition-induced change do not receive
support in either Mexico or Brazil. For instance, in Mexico, the evidence supports the
veto player logic in Michoacán, though ideological commitments prove strong enough to
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overcome the obstacles of increased veto points, and judges emerge as critical actors in
shaping the reform agenda and lobbying legislators to alter the preferences of these
politicians. The evidence also supports a cynical brand of the entrenchment logic – what I
term “patronage-preservation” – activated by traditional judges and reinforced by
conservative, PAN politicians in Aguascalientes, and activated by politicians and judicial
elders and essentially accepted by affiliated or sympathetic judges in both Hidalgo and
Maranhão. Additional theoretical contributions are discussed below, beginning with
clarification or adjustments to existing causal logics, including this last adjustment to
what some might consider equivalent to the “hegemonic preservation”, policy-preserving
logic of Hirschl and Gillman.
Adjustments to Causal Logics
The results suggest two corrections to the causal logics underpinning electoral
competition. First, the “profit-maximizing” aspect of the first insurance sub-logic that
builds on insights from Landes and Posner (1975) may not operate in newer and poorer
democracies, where political time horizons tend to be shorter. Second, the “policypreservation” aspect of the third insurance sub-logic may also not operate in new
democracies, where current elites are frequently affiliated with the authoritarian regime,
and therefore the kind of entrenchment that takes place has more “patronage preserving”
aspects. In advanced or established democracies, where current elites, i.e., current
majorities, are not the same majorities that were dominant during an authoritarian period,
the incentive to entrench policies makes sense. However, in newer democracies, where
traditional elites have still not been entirely displaced and where clientelist networks tied
to these elites remain the dominant conduit for politics, electoral uncertainty generates
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incentives to preserve sources of patronage rather than preferred policies. For instance,
rather than seeing Hirschl’s neoliberal elites seeking to insulate their preferred economic
policies, or Gillman’s Republican or Democratic coalitions of elites seeking to insulate
their agendas of economic nationalism or the good society, respectively, traditional elites
in new democracies engage in balder forms of entrenchment following the “patronagepreservation” logic. In short, in contrast with “policy preservation” and other logics of
ideological entrenchment, the “patronage-preserving” logic assumes two things: (a)
current majorities are traditional, non-ideological elites tied to the authoritarian regime,
and (b) there is no real strengthening of courts taking place, despite actions suggesting
otherwise (even in Maranhão, where federal institutions have been mobilized, limited
change has taken place). Future research might examine whether this pattern is unique to
new Latin American democracies or whether it is more widespread; whether this is a
legacy of Latin American forms of authoritarianism; or whether the style of democratic
transition matters.
Authoritarian Baselines and Legacies
The findings also indicate ways in which authoritarian baselines – the ideological
location of the authoritarian regime – can exert lasting influence on the strength of courts.
In Mexico, the dominant-party regime under the PRI occupied a centrist or relatively
non-ideological position, and two main opposition parties, the leftist PRD and rightist
PAN, pushed for movement away from this baseline. In the results, the PRI continues to
act as a drag or drain on court strength, generating much weaker courts than either the
PRD or PAN. In Brazil, the military regime placed the authoritarian baseline on the right
end of the ideological spectrum. The official, government-sactioned opposition took the
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form of the centrist MDB, which translated into the PMDB after the softening of the
military regime in 1979. The main pressure for movement away from the rightist
authoritarian baseline came from this centrist grouping, as well as center-left (PDT) and
leftist (PT) parties. As was the case in Mexico, the results show that rightist parties
continue to act as a drain on court strength, particularly parties that grew out of the promilitary PDS. However, while the large-N results suggest centrist and center-left parties
have exerted the strongest upward pressure on court strength, the small-N results suggest
center-left and leftist parties have exerted the strongest positive influence. Moreover, the
large-N results identify a positive effect exerted by the rightwing PFL, an influence that
is distinctly absent and contradicted by the case study in Maranhão. Overall, however, the
ideological location of the authoritarian baseline is important, and this baseline exerts a
meaningful and lasting influence. In order to understand the origins of court strength,
therefore, these authoritarian baselines and legacies indicate we must also understand the
previous sources of judicial weakness and the continuity or persistence of these sources.
Indeed, the motivations and the mechanisms of reformist forces are shaped by the nature
of the forces they are reacting against. Put simply, the nature of the new order is
conditioned to a certain extent by the nature of the ancién regime.
This is not to say simply that history matters, or that the process-based methods
employed in the small-N phase of research constitute simple narratives or “doing history”
(Hall 2003). Indeed, the large-N results also suggest the importance of authoritarian
baselines and legacies. However, even the qualitative research is not “doing history.” As
Hall notes, historical research often seeks to gather as much information as possible about
a phenomenon from as many different perspectives as possible. In contrast, the theory-
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guided process tracing employed here specified expected causal patterns derived from
existing theories of institutional change, and then sought to test these theories by judging
observed causal processes against the expected causal patterns. As detailed above and in
Chapters 6 and 7, the results support a “patronage-preserving” logic of traditional elites
affiliated with the authoritarian regime. This result, coupled with the positive influence of
progressive judges and left-of-center politicians, supports the conclusions regarding
authoritarian baselines and legacies.
This conclusion has important implications for future research. If the ideological
base of authoritarianism has a lasting legacy that shapes the trajectory of legal institutions
in emerging democracies, future research needs to be more attentive to the continuity of
authoritarian politics and styles of governance. These legacies also shape the nature of
reformist initiatives, so attention to authoritarian baselines and legacies offers meaningful
lessons for the study of persistent forms of authoritarianism as well as reformist
movements.
Ideas and Epistemic Communities
The results highlight the role of ideas and the way in which these ideas, in
addition to policies (see above), travel across levels and units of a regime, as well as
across national boundaries. In Mexico, a core group of Spanish-trained judges played a
critical role in designing and lobbying in support of the reform. Notably, these judges
were influenced by prominent, progressive judges in Spain, judges who contributed to
and grew out of the “democratic justice” movement that shaped the Spanish transition to
democracy. The vision of the social and democratic functions of law and courts maps
onto the more progressive visions of democratic institutions in the leftist PRD, and
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constrasts sharply with the baseline conditions of judicial institutions in Mexico. Thus,
judges whose ideas about law and the legal complex were shaped in Spain have
combined with leftist politicians to put these ideas into practice at the local level in
Michoacán.
These progressive currents in Spain and Mexico find their equivalent in Brazil in
the form of the “alternative law” (direito alternativo) movement (Engelmann 2004; 2008;
see Chapter 7). This movement crested in Rio Grande do Sul, shaping progressive
attitudes among many judges. Importantly, the influence of this movement extended well
beyond the state. Key judicial leaders in the northern state of Maranhão, for instance, cite
the influence of direito alternativo in shaping their own views about the role of judges,
law, and courts in democratic societies, resonating with statements by progressive judges
in Michoacán. Thus, in both Mexico and Brazil, we see examples of the important role of
ideas in shaping policy preferences, and the ways in which these ideas travel across levels
and units of a regime, and even across national boundaries, via teacher-student
relationships, conferences, and other forms of conduct “beyond the bench”.
Notably, ideas can map onto preferences of the left or right. In Mexico, the case
of Aguascalientes reveals a PRI governor, Granados Roldán, who was an outsider to local
politics (he had been named for the governorship by President Salinas de Gortari over the
preferred candidate of local elites), and whose policy preferences coincided more with
neoliberal currents within the PAN, or perhaps the more technocratic, economistic
currents within the PRI. A key influence in his own ideational trajectory was attendance
at a meeting of the World Economic Forum, after which he pursued a reformist agenda in
the courts. Unlike the social or democratic lens through which progressive judges and
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politicians viewed law and courts, Granados Roldán viewed legal institutions through an
economic lens, as means to enhance investment, commercial transactions, and business
activity, a lens that maps onto perspectives regarding the rule of law at the World Bank
(e.g., Kaufman et al. 1999), or even critical perspectives on the need to re-emphasize the
role of institutions within the neoliberal agenda (see Naím 2000; Williamson 2000).
Recent efforts in both countries seem to strike a more ideologically neutral
position while strengthening the administration of justice. These efforts include (1) the
FGV’s Judicial MBA program (“MBA do Judiciário”), which was carrying out pilot
projects in teaching managerial and administrative skills to judges in four states as of
2007, including Acre and Rio Grande do Sul; (2) the conferences and workshops
sponsored by Mexico’s Supreme Court over the course of two years, which produced a
“White Book of Judicial Reform” in 2006; and (3) consulting by researchers and
academics at UNAM-IIJ and CIDE, who have also carried master’s programs in judicial
administration to certain states, e.g., Aguascalientes, similar to the FGV’s MBA program,
though less extensive and systematic than the FGV’s program, whose pilot projects and
strategic plan are structured to reach first- and second-instance judges in all states.181
Similar, though much less systematic efforts by the IIJ and CIDE.

181

Hector Fix-Fierro and Jose Antonio Caballero Juárez are key figures in Mexico. Both were part of IIJUNAM until 2006. As of 2007, Fix-Fierro was the director of IIJ-UNAM and Caballero Juárez was the
director of CIDE’s law school (División de Estudios Jurídicos). In Brazil, the FGV’s law school in Rio de
Janeiro, Direito-Rio, is the key academic institution, which as of 2007 was directed by Joaquim Falcão.
Falcão was a former counselor on the National Justice Council (CNJ), granting prestige and credibility to
the MBA program. Notably, where a reduced number of academics from IIJ-UNAM or CIDE appear to do
most of the consulting or teaching in Mexico, a combination of academics and working judges from around
the country do the teaching in the FGV’s program in Brazil. For instance, in a weekend session I attended
in Acre, the instructor was a senior judge from Rio Grande do Sul.
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Judge-led Reforms and Conduct “Beyond the Bench”
Throughout this study, I have sought to address the extent to which politicians and
judges shape institutional change. That is, the analysis considered the influence of actors
external and internal to judicial institutions, resonating with studies that distinguish
between “congress-centered” and “court-centered” approaches to judicial politics
(Cameron 2005). However, the case studies have also highlighted the extent to which
judges not only act alongside politicians, but also often initiate reformist movements,
shaping the reform agenda and activating politicians.
This judge-led emphasis highlights “extrajudicial” activity (Whittington 1995;
Dubeck 2007), or what I re-label as conduct “beyond the bench”, including lobbying,
litigation, labor actions, teaching, conference participation, and public speaking. Notably,
these types of conduct identify causal mechanisms by which ideas regarding the role or
proper function of judges and courts are transmitted. Thus, while the previous section
identifies the importance of ideas, and also identifies some of the key actors and events,
the emphasis on conduct beyond the bench helps to complete our understanding of causal
mechanisms shaping judicial change.
Policy Movement Across Levels and Units of a Regime
Complementing the discussions above of ideas, key actors and events, and
judicial conduct beyond the bench, certain institutions also help understand the
mechanisms of change. Specifically, while Mexico does not have a national judicial
council that supervises state courts, and only half of the 31 states have local judicial
councils (and these vary in structure, powers, and composition; see Chapter 6), Brazil has
a national council that oversees the administration of all courts, including state courts.
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The National Justice Council (CNJ) in Brazil therefore acts as a “federal foothold” for
local actors to use in implementing judicial change. For instance, in Maranhão, judges,
lawyers, and other court staff have separately filed complaints with the CNJ, leveraging
this national institution to effect change at the local level.
In a separate case, the second judicial strike in Acre in 2003 reveales how local
logics of change can be affected, in that case in a negative manner, by the national logic
of policy change. During the second strike in Acre, the judges’ association (ASMAC)
kept a strike going much longer than necessary, despite the fact that the governor was
offering a 22% salary increase. While the decision to continue the strike was not locally
rational – and interviewed judges expressed bitterness regarding the length of the strike –
the extension was nationally strategic because of ongoing national debates regarding the
the public pension system. Specifically, the national judges’ association (AMMA)
encouraged the local association (ASMAC) to maintain the strike in order to leverage
bottom-up pressure on the national debate, which was unrelated to the motives of the
local strike. Ultimately, the strike ended without achieving any of the stated aims.
Although judges obtained a salary increase several months later, the strike was widely
regarded as a failure. Thus, even debates about different and unrelated reforms can shape
policy change across levels of a regime.
These instances of policy change, or the lack thereof, speak directly to Snyder’s
(2001b) plea for greater understanding of the ways in which policies travel across levels
and territorial units of a regime, especially in large federal systems. The attention to ideas
and motivations, as well as key actors, events, and causal mechanisms, help construct
finer theories about this kind of policy change. Further, the “federal foothold” for judicial
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change offered by the CNJ identifies a pattern of local-federal-local change that suggests
a domestic variant of Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) policy “boomerangs”.

Implications and Suggestions for Future Research
Stark differences exist between Mexico and Brazil. The differences include styles
of authoritarianism, the temporal duration of authoritarianism, the ideological location of
authoritarian baselines, transitions to democracy, party systems, and styles of judicial
federalism. Further, data for each country was collected separately, and the construction
of the datasets for the large-N analysis presented different coding challenges. Each of
these differences between the two countries was expected to dilute the results, especially
in the extent to which they might travel across both countries.
Despite these differences, there is remarkable consistency in the explanation of
judicial change across the Mexican and Brazilian states. First, electoral competition
matters, but is not a key determinant of change. Rather, in both cases, ideology and ideas
exert the most statistically significant, consistent, and meaningful influence on judicial
change. Indeed, the combined results of the large-N and small-N analyses suggest
competition is not a necessary condition for change, while ideology appears to be a
sufficient one.
The causal similarities across Mexico and Brazil are especially apparent with
regard to ideology and the role of ideas. Politicians on the left side of the ideological
spectrum matter the most for judicial strength, and ideologically sympathetic, progressive
judges also matter in both countries. Notably, center-right politicians of neoliberal stripes
exert a positive effect on courts, but this effect appears to be lower and less consistent
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that the effect of left-of-center politicians. Perhaps most importantly, judges are key
actors in the process of judicial change, designing reforms, shaping the reform agenda
and the policy space or options of reform, and triggering or activating the preferences of
politicians. Frequently, judges and politicians draw on common bonds of both ideological
affinity and friendship. Thus, a key finding in both countries is that, rather than rational,
electoral incentives, judicial change is shaped principally by cultural-ideational forces.
The conclusions regarding ideology suggest that the ideological identity of local
administrations has broad implications for the nature of development, democratic
practice, and citizenship. Theoretical expectations and qualitative evidence teach us that
leftist and rightist parties both seek to strengthen courts, but for different reasons. The left
prioritizes democracy-oriented projects regarding the judiciary, while the right prioritizes
market-oriented projects. These different policy priorities can lead to very different
policies regarding courts at the local level, emphasizing either democratic practice and
citizenship or market relations and commerce. The findings suggest that courts are being
strengthened by both social-democratic currents on the political left and neoliberal
currents on the political right, but that they may be pulled in different policy directions
depending on the ideological nature of the administration. This kind of tension in
institution building has the potential to generate greater unevenness in a judiciary that is
already uneven across Mexican and Brazilian states. Future research that examines
patterns of litigation across different types of cases can offer greater insight into whether
democracy and market promotion generate positive or negative synergies, or whether
they are independent of each other.
Another implication of the ideology finding is that broad shifts along a left-right
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ideological spectrum may strengthen or weaken judicial institutions and the rule of law.
In Mexico, if scholars are correct in estimating the country is shifting to the right (e.g., Ai
Camp 2007), the lower effect of the right on courts, relative to the left, may not bode well
for the judiciary. If other scholars are correct and Mexico is shifting to the left (e.g.,
Alcántara 2009), this trend bodes well for courts. In Brazil, the rise of the PT to national
prominence bodes well for courts, although there are clear signs the PT is moderating its
ideological stance since 2002 (Cleary 2006; Power and Zucco 2009). Regionally, the
results indicate that the “left turn” of 10 Latin American countries (including El Salvador
as of March 15, 2009) (Cleary 2006) bodes well for courts. Future research that offers
finer examinations of ideological patterns can help clarify this debate, as well as
understand the effect of ideology on the strengthening of courts and other aspects of state
building. Importantly, the results highlight the need to distinguish between different
variants of the left and right (across countries and within countries). Moreover, the results
highlight the need to distinguish between different currents within a single party, e.g.,
socially conservative and neoliberal currents within the PAN in Mexico.
In sum, the present findings extend existing political-institutional, strategic, and
social movement literature on institutional change and judicial reform to new empirical
areas, and contribute new insights into the political explanation of judicial change. The
attention to specifying and adjudicating among disparate causal logics contributes a finer
theoretical understanding of judicial change. Further, the methodological choices
demonstrate the strengths of multi-method research at the subnational level, highlighting
understudied opportunities for “nesting” cases within time-series cross-section data, and
addressing how process-based qualitative research can neutralize what is conventionally
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understood as a weakness of case studies at the subnational level. These findings and
insights enhance our understanding of the sources of court strength and the partisan
nature of judicial change in newer and poorer democracies, and identify new avenues for
empirical research and theoretical development.
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Appendices

Appendix A. List of Acronyms and Glossary of Legal Terms
BRAZIL
Acronyms
ABONG
ADI
AJUFE
AJURIS
AMB
AMMA
ARENA
ASMAC
CEBEPEJ
CNJ
CONTAG
CUT
EC
FGV
IBGE
IBRAJUS
IPEA
LC
LE
LF
MDA
MDB
MS
OAB
PCA

PP
PUC
SINDJUMP
STF
STJ
TJ

Associação Brasileira de Organizações não Governamentais
Acão Direta de Inconstitucionalidade (sometimes ADIN or Adin)
Associação dos Juízes Federais
Associação dos Juizes do Rio Grande do Sul (Rio Grande do Sul Judges
Association)
Associação dos Magistrados Brasileiros (Brazilian Judges Association;
national association)
Associação dos Magistrados Maranhenses (Maranhão Judges Association)
A. Renovação Nacional
Associação dos Magistrados do Acre (Acre Judges Association)
Centreo Brasileiro de Estudos e Pesquisas Judiciais
Conselho Nacional da Justiça
Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura
Central Unica dos Trabalhadores
Emenda Constitucional (“Constitutional Amendment”)
Fundação Getulio Vargas (Rio de Janeiro (FGV-RJ) and São Paulo (FGVSP))
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística
Instituto Brasileiro de Administração do Judiciário
Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada
Lei Complementar (“complementary law”; state law that modifies existing
law)
Lei Estadual (“State Law”)
Lei Federal (“Federal Law”)
Movimento Democrático Acreano (2002 coalition of Flaviano Melo
(PMDB) and Narciso Mendes (PPB) in the state of Acre)
Movimento Democrático Brasileiro
Mandado de Segurança
Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil
Procedimento de Controle Administrativo; administrative action by CNJ
(see above) that reviews procedures and conditions in state courts. [These
statement by the CNJ are not binding but are highly authoritative].
Pedido de Providências (type of action before the CNJ).
Pontificia Universidade Católica (e.g., PUC-RS in Porto Alegre, PUC-RJ
in Rio de Janeiro, or PUC-SP in São Paulo)
Sindicato do Servidores da Justiça e do Ministério Público (union of
employees from judiciary and public prosecutor’s office, in Maranhão)
Supremo Tribunal Federal
Superior Tribunal de Justiça
Tribunal de Justiça
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TJAC
TJRS
TJMA
TRE
TSE
TST

Tribunal de Justiça – Acre
Tribunal de Justiça – Rio Grande do Sul
Tribunal de Justiça – Maranhão
Tribunal Regional Eleitoral (e.g., TRE-AC, which is the Regional
Electoral Tribunal in the state of Acre)
Tribunal Superior Eleitoral
Tribunal Superior do Trabalho

Political Parties
PC do B
PDS
PDT
PFL/DEM
PL
PMDB
PPB/PP

PPS
PSB
PSD
PSDB
PT
PTB
PV

Partido Comunista do Brasil
Partido Democrático Social
Partido Democrático Trabalhista
Partido da Frente Liberal (renamed Demócratas (DEM) in 2007)
Partido Liberal
Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro
Partido Progressista Brasileiro, now Partido Progressista, or PP (Partido
Progressista Brasileiro incorporated PP in 1995 and then dropped the “B”
in 2003). Not to be confused with Partido Popular of early 1980s.
Partido Popular Socialista
Partido Socialista Brasileiro
Partido Social Democrático
Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira
Partido dos Trabalhadores
Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro
Partido Verde

Terminology
Agravo de
Instrumento

Apelação
Câmara

Comarca
Deferido

An appeal of a procedural decision or ruling conducted as part of
litigation, prior to the final sentence on the main substance of
litigation. In this regard, this legal recourse is closest to an
“interlocutory appeal”. Along with “apelação” below, “agravo” is
one of several appeal mechanisms (“recursos”) recognized in
Brazilian law (see Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure (Código de
Processo Civil, or CPC, Title X).
An appeal of a final sentence in litigation.
Section of Tribunal identified by the area of law for which it is
responsible, e.g., Câmara Cível; literally “chamber”. “Câmara
Recursal” can be a general term for any appeals chamber, but is
often used with specific reference to appeals from small claims
courts (“Juizados Especiais”).
Geographic jurisdictional unit within a state, i.e., a “judicial
district”. See “distrito judicial” in Mexico.
A type of judicial decision regarding a claim made by a litigant,
meaning “allowed”, i.e., “favored” (in a judgement or sentence,
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Desembargador/a

Doutor/a
Entrância

Foro/Fórum

Improbidade
administrativa
Indeferido

Instância

Juíz
Juíz Auxiliar
Juíz Substituto

this means the court finds in favor of, or “defers to”, a requested
action, i.e., a finding for the plaintiff); contrast with “indeferido”
(not allowed).
Second-instance judge at the state level in Brazil; a judge on the
state’s highest court, namely, the Tribunal de Justiça (TJ);
appellate or second-instance judge. The title is usually abbreviated
as “Des.” While somewhat awkward or unwieldy, the term’s
etymology is interesting. The root is “embargo”, which, aside from
having a cognate in English, is also a term for an appellate
mechanism in Brazilian litigation (along with “agravo” and
“apelação” identified above). Thus, when faced with an
unfavorable decision at a lower court, the losing party could appeal
by “embargoing” the decision; it was then the appellate judge’s
role to decide whether to “un-embargo” the case. Thus,
Desembargador literally translates to “un-embargoer”.
Title of lawyer or judge; form of addressing judges, lawyers, and
legal professionals, e.g., Doutor Silva.
Hierarchical designation for different geographic regions of a
state’s judicial structure, usually ranked as “first”, “second”, and
“special”; “first” refers to rural locations with low population and
low demand for judicial services; “second” refers to intermediate
localities; “special” refers to the state capital and other major cities
in the state. Throughout their career, judges usually start at a lower
“entrância” and work their way up the hierarchy, aiming to reach
the state capital and then promote to “desembargador”.
First-instance court at state level; also, general term for local
courthouse, which can house several different courtrooms, e.g.,
civil, criminal, family, juvenile, traffic, small claims, etc.
Legal term for dishonest or otherwise improper actions by public
officials; this terms loosely translates as “administrative
corruption” and can carry both criminal and civil penalties.
A type of judicial decision meaning “not allowed”, i.e., a finding
against the requested actions, against the plaintiff. Contrast with
“deferido” above.
Jurisdictional limitation, i.e., “instance”, as in “first-instance” or
“second-instance” courts; also referred to as “grau”, e.g., “primeiro
grau” (first instance), or “segundo grau” (second instance).
Contrast this term with “entrância” above, which categorizes a
geographic region according to population and the demand for
judicial services.
First-instance judge
Auxiliary first-instance judge.
Entry-level judge; this is a designation for a probationary, firstinstance judge.
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Juíz de Direito

Juizado
Juizado de
Pequenas Causas
Juizado Especial
Jurisdicionados
Liminar
Magistrado

Mandado de
Segurança
Ministro
Presidente

Recurso

Tribunal
Vara

First-instance judge with permanent status; after Juíz Substituto
passes probationary term, he/she becomes a Juíz (or Juiza) de
Direito
Court; usually refers to small claims court, e.g., Juizado Especial
small claims court; see also Juizado Especial, which is more
common.
Small claims court; also, Juizado de Pequenas Causas (Juizado
Especial is more common).
Litigants or those who seek redress from the court; similar to
“justiciables” in Spanish. This term can often sound overly formal.
Order by the court, usually to stop an action or proceeding; a
preliminary order or decision; an injunction.
Judge or magistrate; can be any kind of judge (e.g., first or second
instance, or justice of supreme court). This is the broadest term for
a judge. Thus, the national association of judges, which includes
judges of both very low and very high rank from across the
country, is the Associação de Magistrados Brasileiros (AMB).
Request for injunction or court order; request for court action.
Justice of one of the supreme courts (e.g., STF or STJ)
Chief judge or justice; at the state level, term refers to president of
court, who is also the head of the state judiciary, i.e., chief judge of
the Tribunal de Justiça.
Appeal; this is the broadest term for appeal and includes several
distinct appeal mechanisms, including “agravo”, “apelação”, and
“embargo”. Thus, an appeals chamber would be a “Câmara
Recursal” (though this term is often used specifically with
reference to chambers that review appeals from small claims
courts, “Juizados Especiais”)
Second-instance court at the state level; appellate court; highest
jurisdiction at state level.
Section of first-instance court or “forum”; each section is identified
by the area of the law for which it is responsible, e.g., “vara
familiar”; literally “branch”.

MEXICO
Acronyms
AC
CIDAC
CIDE
CV
FLACSO

Asociación Civil
Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo, A.C.
Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas
Capital Variable
Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (unless otherwise stated,
the acronym refers to the Mexico City campus, “sede México”)
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IIJ
INEGI
SA
SCJN
STJ

TSJ

UNAM

Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas
Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Información
Sociedad Anónima
Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación
Supremo Tribunal de Justicia. This is a designation for some state supreme
courts, e.g., Michoacán or Aguascalientes. The title “Supreme” is usually
reserved for the national supreme court, “SCJN” (see also “TSJ” below).
Tribunal Superior de Justicia (common designation for state supreme
courts, using “Superior” instead of “Supreme”; however, see “STJ”
above).
Universidad Autónoma de México

Political Parties
PAN

PRD

PRI

PRM
PSUM
PT
PVEM

Partido de Acción Nacional, or “National Action Party”. Conservative
party on the right with bases in the business community and Catholic
conservatives. The party that defeated the PRI in the presidential elections
of 2000 to usher in Mexico’s democratic era, it can have either a marketoriented flavor supported by business leaders and commercial sectors, or it
can have a socially conservative flavor supported by the Catholic church
and groups organized against contraception, abortion, homosexuality, and
other social issues.
Partido de la Revolución Democrática (Party of the Democratic
Revolution). Main leftist party in Mexico, formed by dissidents of the PRI
in 1988-1989.
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party);
previously hegemonic and historically dominant party that ruled Mexico
from 1929 to 2000.
Partido de la Revolución Mexicana; precursor to PRI; now defunct.
Parstido Socialista Unido Mexicano
Partido del Trabajo
Partido Verde Ecologista Mexicano

Terminology
Derecho
Comunal

Distrito
Judicial
Entrancia

“Communal law” (also called “Justicia Comunal”). This is an area of the
based on indigenous practices. As of 2007, this area of the law, akin to
“Indian Law” in the U.S., was a fairly recent phenomenon but was
increasingly being legislated and systematized across Mexico’s states,
including attention to translation issues, the selection of “communal
judges”, and the appropriate fora for communal litigation and disputes.
Judicial district; geograhic demarcation that defines the territorial
jurisdication of a court; analogous to “comarca” in Brazil.
Category of judicial district based on geography, population, and judicial
workload. In each state, there is usually a hierarchy of “entrancias”,
ranked from low to high. In some states, e.g., Michoacán, these are ranked
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Instancia
Juez
Justiciables

Licenciado
Magistrado

Ministro

by letters (A, B, and C). Throughout the judicial career, judge start at the
lower entrancias and work their way towards the higher ones, which are
usually in the state capital.
Jurisdictional designation for courts, i.e., “instance”, as in “first-instance”
and “second instance”.
Judge
Litigants; see “jurisdicionados” in Brazil. Both of these terms are a rather
generic way of referring to “clients” of the judicial system, so some legal
professionals dislike the term. A preferred term is sometimes “usuario”,
which literally means “user” but roughly translate as “customer” or
“client”.
Title of lawyer or any professional with a college degree.
Appellate judge sitting on a state supreme court. Translates literally as
“magistrate”, but unlike the U.S., where this term can refer to firstinstance judges of the lowest rank or even auxiliary judges who are
outside the formal judicial career, in Mexico this term refers to judges at
the top of the state’s judicial hierarchy.
Justice of the national supreme court.
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Appendix B. Maps of Variation in Electoral Competition and Ideology in Mexico
and Brazil
Figure B-1. Average Margin of Victory across Mexican States, 1993-2007
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Figure B-2. Average Effective Number of Candidates (ENC) across Mexican States,
1993-2007
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Figure B-3. Average Ideology Score across Mexican States, 1993-2007 (Salamanca
Data, 1-10, where 1= left and 10 = right)182
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Pattern of ideological distribution is remarkably similar to most recent results of federal elections for
Chamber of Deputies on July 5, 2009. The results of those elections are attached here as Figure B-7.
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Figure B-4. Average Margin of Victory across Brazilian States, 1985-2006
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Figure B-5. Average Effective Number of Candidates (ENC) across Brazilian States,
1985-2006
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Figure B-6. Average Ideology Score across Brazilian States, 1985-2006 (Power and
Zucco Data, 1-10, where 1= left and 10 = right)
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Figure B-7. Election Results for Federal Chamber of Deputies, July 5, 2009 (IFE
2009)183

183

PRD is yellow, PRI is dark green, and PAN is blue. Note similarities with average ideological
distribution from 1993-2007 shown in Figure B-3. These results reflect IFE’s preliminary count through
July 6, 2009, including 99.87% of votes (IFE 2009).
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Appendix C. List of Governor Elections in Brazil and Mexico
The tables below list the year of elections for governor in the Brazilian and Mexican
states. In Brazil, elections for governor occur at the same time across all 26 states, so only
the year of election is listed below. In Mexico, each state is listed separately since
elections are not timed equally across states. Notably, a reform underway in 2008 sought
to align all state elections by 2015.
Table C-1. Governor Elections in Brazil
Governor Elections in Brazil
1982
1986
1990
1994
1998
2002
2006
2010 (upcoming)

Table C-2. Governor Elections in Mexico
Governor Elections in Mexico
Aguascalientes
1980
1986
1992
1998
2004
Baja California
1983
1989
1995
2001
Baja California Sur
1980
1987
1993
1999
2005 Feb. 6 (takes office April 5)
Campeche
1985
1991
1997
2003
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Coahuila
1981
1987
1993
1999
Colima
1985
1991
1997
2003
Chiapas
1982
1988
1995
2000
Chihuahua
1980
1986
1992
1998
2004
Distrito Federal
1997
2000
2003
Durango
1980
1986
1992
1998
2004
Guanajuato
1985
1991
1995
2000
Guerrero
1980
1986
1993
1999
2005
Hidalgo
1981
1987
1993
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1999
2005
Jalisco
1982
1988
1995
2000
Estado de México
1981
1987
1993
1999
2005
Michoacán
1980
1986
1992
1995
2001
Morelos
1982
1988
1994
2000
Nayarit
1981
1987
1993
1999
2005
Nuevo León
1979
1985
1991
1997
2003
Oaxaca
1980
1986
1992
1998
2004
Puebla
1980
1986
1992
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1998
2004
Querétaro
1979
1985
1991
1997
2003
Quintana Roo
1975
1981
1987
1993
1999
2005
San Luis Potosí
1985
1991
1997
2003
Sinaloa
1980
1986
1992
1998
2004
Sonora
1979
1985
1991
1997
2003
Tabasco
1982
1988
1994
2001
Tamaulipas
1986
1992
1998
2004
Tlaxcala
1980
1986
1992
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1998
2004
Veracruz
1980
1986
1992
1998
2004
Yucatán
1981
1987
1995
2001
Zacatecas
1980
1986
1992
1998
2004
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Appendix D. Auxiliary Tables and Figures of Typicality Scores
Table D-1. 30 most atypical or worst-predicted observations in Brazil.
no.

state-year

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Ceará-1995
Rondônia-1993
Santa Catarina-2003
Santa Catarina-2004
Alagoas-2001
Alagoas-2000
Alagoas-2004
Alagoas-2003
Paraná-1997
Acre-1993
Acre-1991
Roraima-1999
Acre-1994
Acre-1992
Roraima-2001
Maranhão-1987
Acre-1995
Ceará-1991
São Paulo-1992
Acre-1996
Amapá-1993
Amapá-1999
Minas Gerais-1986
Maranhão-1985
Amapá-1994
Roraima-2000
Acre-1997
RG do Norte-1990
Ceará-1992
Amapá-1997
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typicality
score
4.8352
3.8908
3.4616
2.6113
2.4355
2.4158
2.2367
1.9521
1.6886
1.5580
1.5367
1.5154
1.5107
1.4713
1.4207
1.4087
1.3563
1.3328
1.3281
1.3249
1.2800
1.2750
1.2736
1.2711
1.2658
1.2628
1.2487
1.2185
1.2077
1.2037

spending
0.28
0.51
1.15
2.74
3.10
3.18
3.98
5.20
295.08
112.53
109.20
89.70
124.11
103.16
86.58
5.34
104.72
11.35
201.72
100.16
144.41
125.24
9.59
4.64
163.19
74.62
93.84
9.93
12.78
129.68

Table D-2. 30 most atypical or worst-predicted observations in Mexico.
no.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

state-year
Nuevo Leon-1998
Nuevo Leon-1999
Nuevo Leon-2000
San Luis Potosi-2001
Tabasco-2002
Nuevo Leon-1997
San Luis Potosi-2002
Tabasco-2001
Nuevo Leon-1996
Nuevo Leon-1995
Nuevo Leon-2001
Nuevo Leon-2003
Coahuila-1995
Baja California-1995
Coahuila-1994
Tamaulipas-1998
Jalisco-2002
Tamaulipas-2001
San Luis Potosi-1997
Chiapas-1994
Estado de Mexico-2000
Tlaxcala-1993
Nuevo Leon-2002
Baja California-1996
Tamaulipas-1997
Campeche-1997
Chihuahua-2001
Tamaulipas-2002
Jalisco-1998
Durango-1994
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typicality
score
62.32
55.25
48.50
48.27
47.44
46.11
45.65
45.42
44.57
43.87
42.50
34.88
34.15
33.62
32.93
32.65
31.39
31.22
30.60
30.55
30.52
30.43
30.00
28.81
28.36
28.10
28.00
27.73
27.55
27.47

spending
32.53
39.90
50.19
96.01
91.33
36.51
93.71
92.25
32.86
31.58
54.98
65.85
29.64
48.27
29.09
20.69
103.00
31.61
58.95
34.00
24.16
41.49
68.47
48.60
19.59
98.00
108.06
36.07
42.41
20.59

Figure D-1. Typicality Scores over Time in Three Mexican States

20

Typicality in Three Mexican States, 1993-2007

1 std. dev.

0

5

Typicality Score
10

15

mean

1990

1995

2000
Year

Aguascalientes

Michoacán

2005

2010

Hidalgo

Note: pattern in Michoacán shows higher typicality scores from 1996-2001, but then
scores drop in 2002 and continue to drop through 2006, ultimately generating the single
most typical observation in 2006.
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Figure D-2. Typicality Scores over Time in Three Brazilian States

1.5

2 std. dev.

Typicality Score
.5
1

Typicality in Three Brazilian States, 1985-2006

1 std. dev.

0

mean

1980

1990

2000

2010

Year
Rio Grande do Sul

Acre

Maranhão

Note: Typicality scores in Acre vary substantially, reaching extreme values of atypicality
(Seawright and Gerring 2007) in the early 1990s, and then dropping close to the overall
mean starting in 2000.
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Figure D-3. Average Typicality Scores across Mexican States (see also Figure 3.2).

Baja California
Sonora

Mean typicality (quintiles)

Chihuahua

2.84 - 8.36
8.37 - 14.05

Coahuila

14.06 - 17.02
Baja Califor nia Sur

17.03 - 21.31

Nuevo Leon
Sinaloa

21.32 - 45.33

Durango
Tamaulipas
Zacatecas
San Luis Potosi
Nayarit

Aguascalientes
Jalisco

Colima

Guanajuato Queretaro
Hidalgo
Michoacan Mexico Tlaxcala

Federally Administered Territory

Morelos

Yucatan
Quintana Roo
Veracruz

Campeche

Puebla
Tabasco

Guerrero
Oaxaca

Chiapas
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Figure D-4. Average Typicality Scores across Brazilian States (see also Figure 3.3).

Roraima

Amapa

Amazonas

Para
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Litigated Zone
Ceara
Rio Grande do Norte
Paraiba

Piaui
Acre

Pernam buco
Alagoas

Tocantins

Rondonia

Sergipe
Bahia

Mato Grosso

Goias Distrito Federal

Mean typicality (quintiles)
0.17 - 0.30

Minas Gerais
Espirito Santo
Mato Grosso do Sul

0.31 - 0.38

Sao Paulo

0.39 - 0.54
0.55 - 0.74

Parana

0.75 - 1.05

Santa Catarina
Rio Grande do Sul
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Rio de Janeiro

Appendix E. Auxiliary GEE Analysis in Brazil Showing PDS-Legacy Parties.
Auxiliary Model
0.42**
(0.20)
0.20**
(0.08)
−0.00
(0.07)
−0.16
(0.11)
−0.02
(0.13)
0.10
(0.28)
0.08
0.13
0.23*
(0.12)
0.26**
(0.08)
−0.32
(0.23)
−0.11
(0.43)
0.08
(0.09)
−0.31**
(0.11)
−0.41*
().21)
0.10
(0.18)
0.47
(0.29)
−1.20**
(0.29)
0.29**
(0.14)
0.00
(0.00)
0.11**
(0.05)
0.93
(1.18)
502
26
99.21
0.0000

margin of victory
divided government
unified gov (plurality)
unified gov (super)
PT
PPS
PSB
PDT
PSDB
PTB
PSL
PFL
PDS
PPB
PPR
PSC
PTR
GDP per capita (logged)
population density
election year
Constant
N
States
Wald χ2
Prob > χ2

Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. ** p < .01 * p < .05
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